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THE SUBLIME IN ROTHKO, NEWMAN, AND STILL 
McMahon, Cliff Getty, Ph.D. University of St. Andrews, 1998. 318 pp. 
An important body of literature has accumulated (both primary and secondary 
sources) which necessitates that Rothko, Newman, and Still be placed in the tradition of 
the sublime. In attempting this task, a background is established by a detailed summary 
of classical theory of the sublime in Longinus, Burke, Kant, and Nietzsche, followed 
by detailed summaries of major recent sublimicist theory by Weiskel, Crowther, 
Lyotard, and Ferguson. Also, key ideas of Sartre and Jung are treated in order to round 
out the proper ideational context for a sublimicist analysis of these three painters. From 
this foundation, a working theory of the sublime is developed. Next, the painters' 
crucial theoretic statements are analyzed for their relevance to the sublime, and their 
programs and specific works are characterized in relation to theory of the sublime, and 
in relation to their treatments in criticism. 
The last two chapters treat two crucial contexts in which Rothko, Newman, and 
Still are situated: the historically accumulated American tradition of the sublime in art 
and literature; and the general European context of modernism and postmodernism. 
Throughout the study, it is argued that various kinds of transcendence validate a set of 
various major modes of the sublime: the ideational, religious, moral, Burkean-Gothic, 
Kantian, Nietzschean, romantic, existential, Jungian-mythic, ontological, noble, and 
the sublime of light/color, along with negative modes such as the comic, the ironic, the 
counter, the mock, and the merely rhetorical. It is argued, finally, that sublimicism will 
continue to be attractive for conservative, moderate, and radical points of view, that 
theory of the sublime has on-going power and validity into the future, and that between 
positive and negative modes, the positive will probably continue to dominate. 
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Introduction 
There are good reasons to attempt a detailed study of the sublime in Rothko, 
Newman, and Still. In 1961 Robert Rosenblum, fourteen years before completing his 
Modern Painting and the Northern Romantic Tradition, published a brief essay entitled 
"The abstract sublime," in which he claimed that Rothko, Newman, Still, and Pollock 
were inheritors of the traditions of the sublime as established by Longinus, Burke, 
Reynolds, Kant, Diderot, and Delacroix, and that in the early nineteenth century, "the 
Sublime provided a flexible semantic container for the murky new Romantic 
experiences of awe, terror, boundlessness and divinity."1 Of a Rothko painting 
Rosenblum declares: "Like the mystic trinity of sky, water and earth that, in Friedrich 
and Turner, appears to emanate from an unseen source, the floating, horizontal tiers of 
veiled light in the Rothko seem to conceal a total remote presence that we can only intuit 
and never fully grasp. These infinite, glowing voids carry us beyond reason to the 
sublime."2 Rosenblum observes that painters may approach the sublime through either 
a calm and static mode or a turbulent dynamic mode; that the scale of large paintings can 
contribute to the sublime effect; that Newman sought a horizon orientation suggesting 
infinity; that Newman's Viz Hemicus Sublimis puts us before a terrifying yet 
exhilarating void; that a new myth concept is in the air because the large canvases of 
Newman, Still, Rothko, and Pollock "might well be interpreted as a post-World-Wax-II 
myth of Genesis"; and that now, the sublime subjects of the romantic era are given a 
new treatment "today, such supernatural experiences are conveyed through the abstract 
medium of paint alone."3 Rosenblum concludes, "In its heroic search for a private myth 
to embody the sublime power of the supernatural, the art of Still, Rothko, Pollock and 
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Newman should remind us once more that the disturbing heritage of the Romantics has 
not yet been exhausted."4 These directions opened by Rosenblum are indeed crucial for 
understanding the abstract expressionists, and a strong tradition has developed to group 
Rothko, Newman, and Still into a set, leaving out Pollock partly due to closer personal 
relations between the three, and due also to Pollock's having moved away from 
abstraction in his late works. 
Two years after Rosenblum's article, Lawrence Alloway published in 1963 his 
more incisive treatment, "The American Sublime," focused on Rothko, Newman, and 
Still and the abstract style they all developed in the late forties. Alloway properly 
observes that Newman's ideograph concept applied to all three painters, necessitating 
that any mythical content would now have to be some kind of "deposit of myth" on the 
minimal abstract forms (which were no longer signs) whose meanings could best be 
approached "with the aesthetics of the sublime." Alloway treats Newman's essay of 
1948 "The Sublime is Now," probably the central text demanding that Rothko, 
Newman, and Still be connected to theory of the sublime. We know that in preparing 
his statement, Newman reviewed the concept of the sublime in Longinus, Burke, and 
Kant, using their differentiation between the sublime and the beautiful to support his 
claim that the abstract expressionists had set aside beauty to seek the exaltation of 
sublime subjects, as they also set aside memory, nostalgia, and older myths to reach a 
contemporary base in which the content of a new mythical treatment was to be the 
existential self, with its contemporary feelings.5  
Alloway correctly observes that several features of Burke's theory of the 
sublime (such as the value of strong emotion, dark colors, terror, great size, voids, and 
silence) should be connected to the three painters, but beyond any specific 
correspondences to the eighteenth century was the deeper relation—the "sublime as 
powerful domination, sublime as absolute emotion, sublime as exaltation." Alloway 
adds, again shrewdly, that the new American sublime will see the artist himself as hero 
in a new moral drama seriously instrumental, will reflect humanized values, will 
produce minimal abstract works as a total unity rather than a collection of parts, all this 
in search of sublime presences that are unknown, shrouded in mystery, making each 
painting "the image of a higher, hidden reality." Alloway further recognizes that in this 
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abstract American sublime light and color will be agencies for sublime content in the 
manner of "Neo-Platonic and medieval mystics," and that Rothko may have been 
influenced by Bonnard's use of strong light, redirecting the light toward the sublime by 
using "veils" for the mystery, as recommended by the Renaissance philosopher Pico 
della Mirandola. Thus Alloway clearly understands that the past is "one half of a 
dialogue with the present," and that we should pursue the dialogue between the abstract 
expressionists and the eighteenth century theory of the sublime—that "Common to both 
images is the concept of the sublime as part of an expansive, or transcendent, move."6  
Alloway perceptively points to issues that still need to be pursued in detail. 
The directions struck in these essays by Newman, Rosenblum, and Alloway 
have been building toward a general recognition that Rothko, Newman, and Still cannot 
be properly understood until they are located in the historically accumulated literature of 
the sublime, as well as the context of their own epoch. And of course our perspectives 
on the theory of the sublime continue to expand with prominent studies in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, studies which create new contexts and raise new 
problems for the interpretation of abstract expressionism. Consequently, my study will 
treat the role of theories of the sublime in the formation of the artistic vision of Rothko, 
Newman, and Still, and, equally important, will give critical consideration to a variety 
of contemporary notions of the sublime in relation to the interpretation of the works of 
these three painters. Almost all art historians and critics who have treated Rothko, 
Newman, and Still emphasize that their art and thought were deeply influenced by 
Nietzsche, by Sartrean existentialism, and by new myth theory popularized in the 
works of Jung. As a general rule these interpreters do not give detailed attention to 
Nietzsche, Sartre, and Jung, and do not perceive how their concepts bear on the 
experience of the sublime. What we find in the criticism is mostly casual remarks in 
passing. For instance Robert Motherwell, who produced a companion article with 
Newman on the sublime, did not say more about the matter than to call the sublime "the 
exalted, the noble, the lofty," and to declare that "Perhaps . . . painting becomes 
Sublime when the artist transcends his personal anguish, when he projects in the midst 
of a shrieking world an expression of living and its end that is silent and ordered."7 In 
other casual remarks Motherwell declares that he and the other abstract expressionists 
4 
saw a mysticism in abstraction, an effort "to wed oneself to the universe" by crossing a 
void; that a course he taught at Hunter College had an existential center; that modern art 
is strongly ethical with a sense of enemies, traitors, and heroes; that the abstract 
expressionists transformed the automatic gestures of surrealism into something "plastic, 
mysterious, and sublime"; that Jung's theory was for them "a useful concept"; that they 
could not produce a clear manifesto because of "the existential doubt and the anxiety 
that we all felt"; and that the painters were influenced by Wallace Stevens, Hart Crane, 
T. S. Eliot, and James Joyce's Myna 8 These casual remarks all suggest directions 
needing a fuller treatment. The same holds for important studies such as Dore Ashton's 
The New _York School and Stephen Polcari's Abstract Expressionism and the Modern 
&vaience. Ashton observes that "for a time, Newman, Rothko, and Still formed a 
distinct trio," and she devotes whole chapters to the strong influence of existentialism 
and of Jungian and myth theory. Yet in these chapters her insights, while valid, are 
rather casual. With Sartre, for instance, she does not go much beyond generalizations 
about his emphasis on subjectivity, freedom, and moral responsibility; and with Jung, 
she does not give a detailed treatment, but points to general features such as his being 
snore comprehensive than Freud and his stress on psychic depth, primordial insights, 
and bringing the dark unconscious into the light of rational awareness. She also 
mentions in broadest terms the major influence on Rothko, Newman, and Still from 
Nietzsche's concept of Apollonian and Dionysian.9  
In his insightful study, Pblcari notes the importance of myth theory in Jung and 
others (such as Nietzsche, Fraser, Joyce, and Eliot) and observes that abstract 
expressionism was "an art of historical and mytho-religious character addressing the 
spiritual life of the West"; that these painters sought a redeeming vision; that their ideas 
attached "to the pattern of dynamic historic continuum? and to "ha is mythic pattern 
and ancient ritual"; that they avoided domination by politics; that they liked 
metamorphosis and had their own geometrism; that they found "the personal in the 
universal"; that the whole of modernism impinged on them; that they responded to 
Jung's archetype theory, spirituality, and emphasis on imagery; and that they were 
deeply influenced by Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy. 10 Pblcari does not have space to 
give the needed details about Jung's critique of Christianity or Nietzsche's theory of the 
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sublime, so that, again, one finds crucial directions to follow, couched in the broadest 
general terms, but needing a more thorough elaboration. 
In deciding which more recent theorists of the sublime to consider as shedding 
light on the issues raised by Rothko, Newman, and Still in their sublime subjects, the 
writer, in a rather wide-ranging project, must make a selection that seems reasonable. 
Two scholars who cannot be omitted are Francois Lyotard and Paul Crowther, due to 
the sustained and detailed attention they have given to the theory of the sublime. 
Lyotard and Crowther both extend the insights of Kant, but in different ways. Thomas 
Weiskel should be added in that his study of the sublime pays special attention to its 
negative manifestations, which he tries to connect to Freudian thought and to semiotics. 
And Frances Ferguson would make a helpful addition because she represents those 
who emphasize rhetoric as a subversive feature of language which undermines any 
positive transcendence in the sublime experience. These four contemporary theorists 
will help to provide a sense of the complex way in which recent aesthetic theory has 
elevated the sublime, once again, to the apex of aesthetic speculation. A fifth 
contemporary theorist of the sublime, Slavoj izek, has earned the right to be 
considered, and I will introduce his paradigm in my last chapter. 
One of the important disputes centers upon the idea of transcendence. In some 
classical theory of the sublime, there must be a genuine crossing of a threshold onto 
higher spiritual or metaphysical ground, an authentic ascent to a higher reality 
accompanied by the positive feelings of awe and exaltation. Yet--touched by modern 
philosophic scepticism and by various theories of language as a subversive self-
referential zone of arbitrary word games and touched by the peculiar semantic 
ambiguities and fadings asserted by Derrida—a considerable set of modern interpreters 
of art and literature feel compelled to deny the reality of any postulated area of 
metaphysical or spiritual transcendence. Rothko, Newman, and Still believed that their 
openness to spiritual absolutes resembled that of primitive artists. They believed that 
they were making a kind of primitive new beginning, and their challenge was to find in 
existential subjectivity a basis for treating the eternal, to find in personal passions a way 
to treat universal modes of feeling, to find in minimal abstract forms a direct route to 
eternal ideas that would carry a mythic aura and yet be separated from nature and natural 
forms. They required transcendence in a new key, touched by secularized spirituality 
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and a modern existential and tragic coloration. 
Another strongly disputed area is the presence or absence of a necessary 
bonding between aesthetics and morality, the ancient fight dramatized by Plato, and 
continuing in the twentieth century to mark the debates about the sublime. There are 
moral components in the theory of the sublime of Longinus, stronger cues in Kant, and 
interesting ones in Nietzsche. Crowther and Lyotard carry► forward the speculation on 
the ethical in relation to the sublime. In general, Crowther utilizes Kant, Merieau-Panty, 
and a reciprocity principle to create an affirmative, flexible, and comprehensive modern 
critical aesthetics in which the sublime plays an important role, while Lyotard directs his 
interest cm a less affirmative manner) toward a general defense of philosophic thinking 
as a presentation of the =presentable, thus locating serious thought in the domain of 
the sublime. Crowther's paradigm includes the essential but rare understanding that 
criticism itself has an ethical core. This is not to imply that I will develop any kind of 
moral theory or try to indicate any right way to connect the moral and the aesthetic. I 
will merely point to places where the issue has come up in the writings that I utilize. 
Americans in general have displayed a strong national interest in morality and civic 
virtue, and it is not surprising that Rothko, Newman, and Still declare strong moral 
contents in their art programs. 
Since the particular aesthetic and ideational programs of Rothko, Newman, and 
Still developed in the stream of American history, it would shed light on their art if it 
could be located in the general American tradition of snblimicism, a concept treated 
early by Poe and a term used by Melville, Emerson, Thoreau, and others. Indeed, the 
American literati and artists would have been cognizant of the emergence of theory of 
the sublime from European foundations. And even when American writers and painters 
did not manifest a strong conscious theory of the sublime (as in the case of Melville, 
Whitman, and Dickinson), the vocabulary of the sublime offers a satisfactory way to 
analyze their grand art programs and transcendental thrustings. The American sublime 
standing behind the abstract expressionists was manifested strongly both in literature 
and in painting, and both vectors need to be considered, even if in a summary manner. 
Obviously thew was a second major context for Rothko, Newman, and Still—
the general European rise of modernism and the first moves toward postmodernism. 
These three painters worked in the forties, fifties, and sixties, when high modernism 
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was powerful, and when the various negative and disruptive impulses of postmodern 
sensibility were also receiving much attention. It will not be easy to make sharp 
distinctions between a modernist and postmodernist frame of mind, and not easy to 
separate the two temperaments in the works of Rothko, Newman, and Still, and it is far 
beyond the scope of this study to make any fully satisfying effort to solve problems 
which many of our best minds are now grappling with and arguing about It would be 
very helpful for books to appear which lead to a consensus as to the core principles that 
define modern and postmodern, and perhaps such studies will come. So far the debate 
seems to suggest two schools: that the postmodern is a radical rejection of modernism, 
or that the disruptive postmodern vector is the radical moment which launches most of 
the modernist visions of the twentieth century. But even though this issue, with the vast 
literature treating it, cannot be a major subject for this limited consideration of three 
painters, it is, nonetheless, a very important item in the general European cultural fabric 
which influenced these Americans, and therefore some brief comments can be helpful in 
illuminating their works. 
All of these considerations, then, suggest a reasonable way for this 
study of Rothko, Newman, and Still to proceed: part one offering a chapter going 
beyond the typical and rather casual generalizations about the historically accumulating 
theory of the sublime to offer a detailed explanation of the crucial ideas in Longinus, 
Burke, Kant, and Nietzsche; a chapter on recent theory from Weiskel, Crowther, 
Lyotard, and Ferguson; and a chapter giving the needed detail about the strong 
background and indirectly sublimicist thought of Sartre and Jung. Then part two, 
presenting a chapter each on Rothko, Newman, and Still emphasizing their own 
specific statements relevant to their sublime subjects (keeping in mind the treatments of 
the major theorists) and then applying the accumulated perspectives on the sublime to 
several specific works of each artist; and for part three, one chapter treating briefly the 
American literary and painterly tradition for sublimicist aims and projects, and a second 
brief chapter making some tentative remarks about the general European emergence of 
modernist and postmodernist sensibilities as these bear on the interpretation of Rothko, 
Newman, and Still. 
There is a general line of argument which this study develops, mounted on the 
following premises: that the experience of the sublime is both authentic and universal as 
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an experience of deep content, of wonderment, and of transcendence; that various 
experiential and ideational orientations make for a wide variety of kinds of 
transcendence and thus a wide variety in modes of sublimity; that in the analysis of art 
the full range of the accumulated historical and relevant vocabulary should be employed; 
that moral vectors tend to accompany much of the creating and interpreting of art and all 
human choices in general; that historical and cultural origins and backgrounds constitute 
an essential aspect of adequate art analysis; and that art works, as a rule, are sensory 
forms which carry symbolic meaning and can adumbrate general world-views. 
In more specific terms, I will argue that there is permanent on-going value to 
key ideas about the sublime in the noble concepts of Longinus, the darker concepts of 
Burke, the reason-enhancing concepts of Kant, and the culturally centered concepts of 
Nietzsche, and that these classical theorists of the sublime had an important influence on 
Rothko, Newman, and Still. I will argue that Weiskel's contemporary theory of the 
sublime contains useful ingredients, but is weakened by yielding too much ground to 
Freud, to postmodern anti-idealism, and to modern scepticism and negativity. I will 
suggest a possible weakness in Ferguson's sublimicist theory on the grounds that she 
concedes too much to the idea that all cultural values and issues are arbitrary linguistic 
constructions, and concedes too much to the idea that genuine sublime transcendence is 
discredited because the concept of the autonomous rational self is discredited. Ferguson 
comes too close to postulating a merely rhetorical sublime. I will show general approval 
of Paul Crowther's flexible, many-faceted, eclectic, and philosophically optimistic 
reciprocity paradigm which builds from Kant, Merleau-Ponty, and others. However I 
will raise some questions about Crowther involving hierarchy of values and duration of 
forms. I will show approval for Lyotard's use of Kant to make the whole project of 
philosophy sublime, and approval also for his understanding of the centrality of the 
moral sublime, yet raise questions about the peculiar paralysis of his negativized point 
of view, joined to the paralysis engendered by his theory that pluralistic speech 
communities sabotage all trans-cultural and universalist claims, and also raise questions 
about his belief that the dominant ideological narratives of the West (which strongly 
shaped Rothko, Newman, and Still) are now evaporating. The balancing of the seminal 
theories of Longinus, Burke, Kant, and Nietzsche with the contemporary theorists to 
the interpretation of the three chosen painters. Also, I will argue that Sartre and Jung-- 
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as they formulate existential and mythic modes of transcendence—activate new 
possibilities for sublime transcendence, and also exert a crucial general influence on the 
ideational programs of Rothko, Newman, and Still. 
Using these broad cultural resources, I will derive a working theory of the 
sublime focused on the concept of a variety of sublimicist modes; on the need for 
shock, astonishment, and check; on the potential sublimity of raw ideas; and on the 
crossing of a genuine threshold onto higher ground—recognizing also that such positive 
modes of the sublime are accompanied by more negative and tentative modes, and the 
more negative and postmodern impulses should be given their due. 
Also in specific terms, I will carefully weigh the relevant statements of Rothko, 
Newman, and Still as they work out their sense of sublime subjects. I will locate them 
chiefly in the ideational sublime (joined to other modes), will emphasize the portal motif 
in Rothko, the verticality and deeper religiosity in Newman, and the stronger 
individualistic existential stance of Still, correlated to his zig-zag lines. Along the way I 
will pay considerable attention to the insights of numerous scholars, and judge these 
against the norms of my own theoretical alignments. 
In the last part of my study I will try to treat, in summary fashion, some of the 
obvious highlights in the American historical tradition of the sublime as it has been 
manifested in major writers and major painters. I will follow this with a brief chapter on 
the emergence of European modernism and postmodernism (though of course 
Americans have played a major role in these developments). I will emphasize the 
difficulty, at the moment, of making clear distinctions between what is modern and 
what is postmodern, and here I will introduce Zink, because he offers not just 
important theorizing about the sublime, but also a good test case for showing that 
modern and postmodern values often seem to complement each other, rather than 
making for neat and clear contradictions. These last two chapters suggest the broader 
cultural contexts whose presence is felt in the works of Rothko, Newman, and Still. 
Finally, I will offer a brief and general conclusion which ends with 
some speculations on the future of the sublime. Obviously these foundations for my 
study have implications for what would and would not be acceptable as a general 
aesthetic theory, though I have not tried to produce one, but rather to treat a limited 
group of tasks and problems. It will be obvious that at many points in my study, I am 
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working with such extremely complex issues that I must resort to oversimplification in 
order to gain some effect of direction, coherence, and point of view. Some of the 
writers treated (such as Kant, Nietzsche, Ferguson, Lyotard, and Zizek) are difficult to 
understand, and in many cases the relevant literature is impossibly large to absorb. I 
will try to remind my readers from time to time of the flaw of oversimplification. And 
obviously I have some biases that should be confessed, since they will be apparent. I 
think that it was wise of Rothko, Newman, and Still to strive for a positive, affirmative 
center, and to try for universalized meanings, and not to give up a concern for 
transcendental entities and moral and religious values. I do not think that the main 
stream of Western thought and value can or should be swept aside and made obsolete. I 
think that both Plato and Zeno, like Rothko, Newman, and Still, will remain 
permanently influential into the future, and that science will continue to dikrover 
genuine logical truth about what is. At major points I have recorded major aspects of the 
sceptical, negative, disruptive vectors which have steadily gained force in the academies 
of Europe, Asia, and America. I have hoped to show an awareness of current deep 
divisions in art and thought. But I confess to a belief perhaps impossible to justify that 
in a general way, the affirmative and universally meaningful visions and categories will 
maintain their traditional hold, even though I am not prepared to make a philosophic 
defense of such a view, and even if I were, it is not needed in order to make a search 
for what seems to be affirmative in theory of the sublime and in the works of these three 
painters. I will certainly not ignore the darker, disruptive elements, but I am confident 
that Rothko, Newman, and Still would themselves not object to one's emphasizing their 
positive values. In broadest terms, I try to defend the authenticity and value of sublime 
transcendence, the need for historical perspective, and the quest for the sublime in 
Rothko, Newman, and Still through the ideographic art symbol. Obviously these biases 
and preferences demonstrate, in the spirit of Nietzsche's perspectivism, that my 
perspective is a limited one, and that others will approach this same body of material 
from different points of view, and will reach different conclusions. 
PART ONE 
BACKGROUND THEORISTS OF THE SUBLIME 
One - Four Seminal Theorists of the Sublime 
Rothko, Newman, and Still are known to have made important use of Nietzsche's 
general philosophy and theories of the sublime advanced in the works of Longinus, 
Burke, and Nietzsche, while Kant was a lesser influence. Burke and Nietzsche may 
properly be seen as thinkers who emphasized the existential component of the sublime 
experience, the component related most strongly to the programs of these three creators 
of abstract expressionism. For background, it seems reasonable to treat Longinus, 
Burke, and Nietzsche in some detail, followed by a brief summary of Kant's theory. 
Single treatises of Longinus, Burke, and Kant provide the essential documents, while 
for Nietzsche the whole of his philosophic program must be sketched, because that 
whole is perceived as a grand sublime enterprise. 
A. 0. Prickard, in the introduction to his translation of Longinus on the Sublime, 
observes that in Greek criticism, the treatise of Longinus enjoys a lofty position shared 
only with Aristotle's &gm 1 Focusing chiefly but not entirely on the literary sublime, 
Longinus begins by declaring that the sublime is "an eminence and excellence in 
language," and the sublime soaring is seen in "a lightning flash."2 The idea of a sudden 
flash of awesome apprehension has become an almost universally accepted sublime 
trait, though the flash may come in a stately mode as well as a turbulent one, as 
Longinus later makes clear. At this point Longinus states that the sublime cannot be 
presented as wildly irrational, but must be invested with the dignity of orderly method.3  
Longinus describes the sublime in terms such as "great" and "surpassingly good" 
(thus touching on a moral aspect), and he offers this crucial passage: "The soul is raised 
by true sublimity, it gains a proud step upwards, it is filled with joy and exultation, as 
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though itself had produced what it hears."4 Not only does Longinus make clear a moral 
instrumentalism in this upward gain for the soul, he also comes intriguingly close to 
Kant, a foreshadowing of Kant, in this pointing to a subjective sense of inner creative 
power. In another prefiguring of Kant, Longinus makes the important point that the 
encounter with the sublime "gives much food for fresh reflection."5 One of the richest 
components in Kant's theory is that sublime experiences yield an enormous stimulation 
to the whole intellectual life. Rothko, Newman, and Still (unlike the younger painters 
who followed them) retain at the core of their programs not only the exalted Longinian 
sublime, but also the Longinian and Kantian emphasis on enhancement of intellect, and 
this is especially true of Newman. Longinus additionally anticipates Kant in claiming 
that the sublime "pleases always, and pleases alL"6 Kant stressed universal assent as a 
condition for aesthetic judgments. 
One of the most important of Longinus's assumptions is that of five sources for a 
sublime style for some natural genius, there stands "First and most potent the faculty of 
grasping great conceptions," and often just a bare idea "moves our wonder, because the 
thought is very great."7 Such a thesis should rank high in any full theory of the 
sublime. 
Interestingly (because he connects the sublime to intense joy), Longinus, while 
finding strong passions one source of the sublime, rules out (in a move pointing toward 
Nietzsche) pity, grief, and fear as suitable passions. And in a comment anticipating 
Kant's sublimity of the noble, Longinus asserts that there is often "sublimity without 
passion."8  
In another important insight, Longinus observes that in Homer the violent warfare 
passages and cosmic destruction passages are often sublime, yet even more sublime 
than words is the silence of Ajax in the Lower World.9 This insight of Longinus points 
toward the element of the sublime that theorists have associated with emptiness, the 
void, the abyss, and with the silent gazer in paintings by Friedrich. Longinus also 
locates sublimity in noble old testament passages, singling out (in a manner relevant to 
many painters) the creation motif in the phrase "Let there be light."10 
Longinus offers a shrewd awareness of significant form through his observation 
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that one feature of the sublime appears when the artistic genius, from some given area, 
chooses "the most vital of the included elements" and makes these "by mutual 
superposition, form as it were a single body." 11 Such a principle is highly relevant to 
the mature sense of wholeness and proportion achieved in the styles of Rothko, 
Newman, and Still. Longinus adds that this sublime effect becomes most powerful 
when the harmonized form reflects the ideational content.12 It often does in abstract 
expressionist works. 
A rather neglected passage in Longinus declares that a serial repetition can build 
sublimity, an effect analogous to a series of great waves.13 This principle may be 
applied not only to internal features of paintings and to a series of paintings, but also to 
the very strong desire of Rothko, Newman, and Still that their works be shown in a 
carefully controlled serial manner in a special room, or in the case of Still, a special 
museum. Serial impact may be considered in the Rothko room at the Tate Gallery, in 
the Rothko chapel panels at Rice University, and in Newman's room at the National 
Gallery in Washington. Repetition of themes in musical works would be relevant, and 
in literature, an example might be a sonnet cycle. 
Longinus observes again that strong sublime passions are raised by Homer's 
dramatic action-packed stories of the gods, but that Plato offers a second more calm and 
rational mode of the sublime, and there is a calm and reasoned historical sublime in the 
narratives of Thucydides.14 
 Clearly Longinus has in mind that the sweep of historical 
forces and movements can offer sublime subjects. This concept has not been invented 
by modernist thinkers. The calm and noble sublime in Plato's passages receives high 
status from Longinus, who declares that Plato competes against Homer for the 
crown.15 The noble sublime contrasts to the passional. Plato's splendid rhetoric of 
course is made powerful by the sublime ideas being conveyed. In a brilliant passage 
highly relevant to the profound moral, aesthetic, and ideational seriousness of the 
Rothko, Newman, and Still, Longinus pins down the essential attitude for an artist of 
the sublime: "If I write this, in what spirit will future ages hear me?"16 Among 
philosophers, this attitude is uniquely powerful in Nietzsche. 
Relating to the special painterly vocabulary created by the abstract expressionists, 
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Longinus emphasizes that bold creations of the imagination can be sublime.17 
Longinus notes that a sublime figure of speech may seem so natural and apt that the 
sublime elevation is unnoticed, and his analogy comes from painting, when the dark 
elements seem less conspicuous than the light, so that we get a "veiled" effect. 18 In 
abstract expressionism there is considerable veiling of the sublime in dark colors. 
Additionally, Longinus asserts that the live emotional intensity of question and 
answer exchanges can be used in art for sharpening the passions of sublime 
encounters.19 There is evidence that the abstract expressionists painters sought this 
very kind of living dialogue between painting and viewer, a dialogue in which each 
interrogates the other. Obviously such a question and answer exchange may be seen as 
one of the vivifying features of all paintings. It seems that little attention has been given 
to this insight from Longinus, and little attention also to the rich comment that sublimity 
can be generated by surprising leaps from the one to the many or the many to one, and 
also by thrusting the past into the present. These principles are useful in analyzing the 
sublime in Rothko, Newman, and Still because these painters have a strong sense of the 
one behind the many, and their version of neo-primitivism (touched by their sense of 
bonding to primitive painters, and by the past-present bonding of Jungian archetypes) 
brings the past into the present. Generally speaking, these profound and sudden 
thrustings described by Longinus would meet Kant's requirement of some dynamical or 
mathematical apprehension too rugged or complex to be held in any single clear image. 
Rothko, Newman, and Still displayed a high, ethical, and dignified seriousness 
about their programs, which may be connected to the Longinian precept that the 
strength of the sublime increases as dignity in rhetoric increases, a dignity principle 
raised extremely high by Kant, for whom our greatest sublime dignity lies in legislating 
universal moral rules, which are binding if validated by one of the several Kantian 
versions of the categorical imperative. Generally speaking, painters coming after 
Rothko, Newman, and Still (like poets coming after Frost, Crane, Stevens, Yeats, 
Hopkins, and Eliot) were much less committed to transcendence, height, dignity, 
nobility, and sublimity. 
In a comment highly relevant to the metaphorical symbols in abstract 
expressionism, Longinus claims that daring metaphors called out by strong passion can 
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reach the sublime, though Longinus observes in an earlier passage that such a single 
device will not be effective unless part of a larger purpose and suitable occasion, and in 
a later passage he adds simile and hyperbole as promising devices.20 Most scholars 
would label as hyperbole the claims of Nietzsche, Newman, and Still that their works 
can change the whole world. 
Longinus grounds his theory of the sublime in universal psychological constants, 
claiming that nature does not intend for mankind to be ignoble, and has implanted in all 
people "an invincible and eternal love of that which is great and . . more divine."21 In 
a manner similar to Plotinus, Longinus declares that in men of greatest genius, 
"sublimity raises them almost to the intellectual greatness of God." Finally, pointing 
again toward Kant, Longinus observes that the inner human world of imagination and 
mind holds greater scope for the sublime than does the physical universe.22 Most of 
these features of the sublime as given in this great seminal work of Longinus will be 
incorporated later into my own working theory of the sublime, and will be used to 
explicate the works of Rothko, Newman, and Still. 
Edmund Burke's bodily and existential theory also yields classical explanatory 
principles, which he gathered into his Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our 
Ideas of tligublime and Beautiful.23 Burke's paradigm of sublimity holds special 
interest in that he tried to ground it in the best scientific psychological theory available to 
him. Burke's treatise was published in 1756. The psychology then dominant was a 
calculus of pleasure and pain. In the introductory essay to his treatise (called "On 
Taste"), making it clear that he assumes universal psychological traits, Burke declares 
that the pleasure-pain logic of the senses is the same in all people, and so is the logic of 
the imagination, "since the imagination is only the representation of the senses."24  
Burke adds that in addition to the immediate pleasures and pains derived from natural 
objects, there is an added pleasure "perceived from the resemblance which the imitation 
has to the original"25, furthermore, "The mind of man has naturally a far greater alacrity 
and satisfaction in tracing resemblances than in searching for differences: because by 
making resemblances we produce new imam; we unite, we create, we enlarge our 
stock; but in making distinctions we offer no food at all to the imagioation.”26 For 
17 
Burke all people have an equal gift for taste, but they do not have equal knowledge, and 
elevation in taste depends upon gaining the proper superior knowledge.27 Yet "So far 
then as taste belongs to the imagination, its principle is the same in all men," though the 
degree of emotional response varies greatly, depending on giving or not giving close 
attention to the object, and depending also on greater or less "natural sensibility."28  
Pursuing his theme of psychological universals, Burke observes: "Love, grief, fear, 
anger, joy, all these passions have, in their turns, affected every mind; and they do not 
affect it in an arbitrary or casual manner, but upon certain, natural, and uniform 
principles."29 But when we move beyond elementary passions into the more complex 
realm of character, action, virtues, and vices, then judgment comes into play, and 
judgment "is improved by attention, and by the habit of reasoning." Burke adds that 
this more complex zone contains most of the objects on which taste is brought to 
bear.30 As proof for the education and improvement of taste, Burke notes that "Men of 
the best taste, by consideration, come frequently to change these early and precipitate 
judgments."31  
The most important things to understand in Burke's argument are that he has a 
strongly empirical sort of bodily orientation, that he combines pleasure/pain psychology 
with faculty psychology, that he seeks a grounding in psychological universals, and 
that he allows for the emergence of superior critical and evaluative insights, based on 
combinations of natural gifts and higher education. From this general foundation, he 
launches a careful analysis of sublimity and beauty. Burke begins by declaring that 
pleasure and pain are positive emotions, that one is not simply the negating of the other, 
and that there is a large indifferent emotional state when we feel neither pleasure not 
pa in.32 Burke offers the term "delight" as "the sensation which accompanies the 
removal of pain or danger."33 Burke divides passions into two modes: those related to 
self-preservation, and those involving social relations. The strongest of all passions, 
Burke declares, are those related to self-preservation, those of pain and danger. This 
leads him to his preliminary definition of the sublime: "Whatever is fitted in any sort to 
excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is 
conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a 
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source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind 
is capable of feeling. I say the strongest emotion, because I am satisfied the ideas of 
pain are much more powerful than those which enter on the part of pleasure."34 
Burke's point is that to be stabbed by another makes a greater impact than to be 
kissed. After adding that the idea of death is the strongest of all passions, Burke makes 
a crucial point "When danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any 
delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, 
they may be, and they are, delightful."35 It is important to note that Burke does include 
more than terror, since he names things "analogous to terror," but does not elaborate. 
Burke's conceptual scheme is complex, and its central insights have major permanent 
value. Just as paintings of the crucified Christ and plots of Greek tragedy offer death at 
a distance, so do the works of Rothko, Newman, and Still treat sublime themes of pain 
and death at a certain distance. 
Burke next moves into a detailed treatment of the sublime. He asserts that the 
passion caused by encountering the sublime in nature is an astonishment that paralyzes 
the soul, circumventing operations of reason: "astonishment, as I have said, is the effect 
of the sublime in its highest degree; the inferior effects are admiration, reverence, and 
respect."36 Kant will later make more of respect, and will not allow reason to be 
circumvented. Offering a thesis that later theorists will find too narrow, Burke declares: 
"Indeed, terror is in all cases whatsoever, either more openly or latently, the ruling 
principle of the sublime."37 Following the terror theme—and suggesting ways to 
interpret Rothko, Newman, and Still—Burke adds that terror is increased by some 
obscurity and darkness, a principle utilized by many religions, and by Milton in 
description of death as "dark, uncertain, confused, terrible, and sublime to the last 
degree."38 Burke observes that things which strike the mind as having greatness "make 
some sort of approach towards infinity," which is prevented if we see clear 
boundaries,39 
 Burke's stress on infinity might suggest Kant's mathematical sublime, 
and the obscurity principle might relate to the fuzzy edges in abstract expressionist 
work. Indeed, the hard edges of Noland, Kelly, and the early Stella may be designed in 
part to declare their moving away from the theme of outer sublime mysteries (though 
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the thesis that Noland, Kelly, and Stella are decorative and devoid of deeper subject 
matter is not correct). 
In another important move, Burke applies the obscurity principle to ideas: "A clear 
idea is therefore a name for a little idea."40 As an example of sublime obscurity in a 
grand idea, Burke cites a passage in which Job confronts in fear and trembling a night- 
time obscure supernatural being: "an image was before mine eyes, there was silence, 
and I heard a voice, —Shall mortal man be more just than God?"41 The sublimity of 
great but obscure ideas has not received its due as a principle for interpreting art, even 
though such a principle is recognized by Longinus, Burke, Kant, and Nietzsche. Later 
it will be shown that this principle establishes an important bond between abstract 
expressionism and the realms of metaphysics and science. Interestingly, Burke declares 
that paintings of hell are not successful because they make the obscure too clear.42 
Pointing toward Kant's dynamical sublime, Burke states, "Besides those things 
which 6.ectly suggest the idea of danger . . . I know of nothing sublime, which is not 
some modification of power."43 There is a mathematical sublime in the works of 
Rothko, Newman, and Still as they manipulate certain motifs of distant horizons and 
extensions beyond the picture frame, but most of their sublimity dealings involve the 
dynamical sublime of forces and powers. We should not forget that a strong idea is a 
strong force. After commenting on the potentially sublime and dangerous force of bulls, 
horses, tigers, lions, wolves, commanders, and kings, Burke notes that our instinctive 
sense of God centers on His destructive power for which we feel "a sacred and 
reverential awe."44 While Burke does not state that awe and reverence are defining 
traits of the sublime, he does imply it. 
Burke moves to important new ground, locating the sublime in states of emptiness 
and privation, states such as vacuity, darkness, solitude, and silence.45 Later in this 
study, such states will be connected to the spiritual condition of modernist life as 
reflected in Jungian thought and in the thought of Rothko, Newman, and Still (and also 
central to Heidegger's theory of modernist art, which centers on privation of Being). 
Also suggesting abstract expressionist style, Burke notes that vast size is sublime, that 
verticals are more sublime than horizontals, and jagged surfaces more sublime than 
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smooth, this being related to his general theory that beauty is calming while the sublime 
is disturbing. Burke declares that the idea of infinity yields "delightful horror, which is 
the most genuine effect and truest test of the sublime"; also, infinity can be suggested 
by serial progressions.46  
In another passage whose value has not been appreciated enough, Burke observes 
that difficulty, when great, can be sublime.47 Certainly this Burkian insight should be 
connected to the difficulty of abstract art; the difficulty of philosophic, mathematical, 
and scientific systems; and the difficulty of writers such as Eliot, Hart Crane, Hopkins, 
Joyce, Dickinson, Faulkner, and Wallace Stevens. Usually when there is a great 
difficulty, there will exist, in Kantian terms, an inability to perceive something in the 
harmony of a single image, and therefore a turning to reason for some bridging 
concept. There will be the shock of a disruption that needs to be reconciled. Burke's 
shrewd insight into the sublimity of things difficult should receive more attention. 
Burke's own phrase is telling: "When any work seems to have required immense force 
and labor to effect it."48 Burke's example is Stonehenge. 
Next, Burke names magnificence as a source of the sublime, using the synonyms 
of "grand" and "grandeur," and tying magnificence to some rich profusion as in the 
"starry heaven."49 Then Burke singles out light and darkness as sources of the 
sublime, along with the colors revealed by light. Relevant to major paintings is Burke's 
claim that mere colored objects in light would not be sufficient, and some additional 
"circumstances" are required for the elevation to sublimity. Burke also names rapid 
transitions from light to dark or dark to light as possibly sublime, "But darkness is 
more productive of sublime ideas than light," when the artist reaches "the power of a 
well-managed darkness,"50  a principle relevant to Rothko, Newman, and Still, and 
also relevant is Burke's observation that Milton properly surrounds divinity with 
darkness, as in Milton's striking line about deity which Burke quotes and underlines for 
emphasis: Talk with excessive light thy skirts appear." Here Burke reveals his own 
appreciation for the sublime impact of paradox: "And this is not the only instance 
wherein the opposite extremes operate equally in favour of the sublime, which in all 
things abhors mediocrity."51  At a later stage this study will utilize braidings of paradox 
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in the explication of sublimity in abstract expressionist artifacts. 
Burke claims that in sublime architecture, there should be strong inside dimness 
by day and perhaps strong light by night, to arouse the strongest passions. In the colors 
Burke nominates for sublime potential, he predictably favors black, brown, and deep 
purple, and yet in an interesting remark that can be connected to Newman's lir 
Heroicus Subhal 
 and other works, he states that though red is apparently an 
unsuitable and cheerful color, a "strong red" can carry sublimity.52 
Finally, in some passages not relevant to painting, Burke discusses sublime 
possibilities in the domains of sound, taste, and smell, following this with a brief 
conclusion to his treatise on the sublime by stressing that "the sublime is an idea 
belonging to self-preservation; that it is therefore one of the most affecting we have; that 
its strongest emotion is an emotion of distress."53 One reason which justifies our 
rejection of the narrowness in Burke's theory lies in the fact that frequently his own 
examples do not involve self-preservation, anxious fear, or pain, such as his examples 
of starry skies, vertical lines, seriality, and red colors. However if we confronted Burke 
with this point of view, he certainly would look for a way to find an existential bodily 
connection to fear, pain, and death. 
Moving into a discussion of the beautiful, Burke continues to shed light on the 
sublime. First he rejects various candidates as touchstones for beauty, including formal 
measure and proportion, which Burke sets aside as being too rationally studied, noting 
that women have more beauty than men even though proportions are the same, and 
noting that British taste was in process of rejecting the crisp proportion and harmony of 
formal gardens and clipped hedgea54 Concluding therefore that beauty must reside in 
certain general qualities, Burke sets up a series of contrasts: beauty has small size, the 
sublime large; beauty has slow smooth curves, the sublime jagged and sharp angles; 
beauty has bright and light colors, the sublime darker ones; beauty is delicate, the 
sublime massive and rugged.55  
Turning to a consideration of a suitable efficient cause for beauty and sublimity, 
Burke once again presents an important enlargement of his paradigm which has not 
been sufficiently appreciated. Repeating his basic claim that terror is a general basis for 
the sublime, Burke adds that "many things from which we cannot probably apprehend 
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any danger, have a similar effect, because they operate in a similar marmer."56 From 
this enlargement, it seems reasonable to extrapolate a Burkian sanction for the sublimity 
of any sudden astonishment provoking strong passion, wonder, and awe, and deriving 
from grand and rugged qualities. Burke declares specifically that the strongest sublime 
experience calls for astonishment, and a somewhat weaker sublime encounter would 
call for awe, then reverence, then respect57 Whether Burke would sanction it or not, 
such an enlargement is necessary. Burke would insist, however, on some element of 
pain, but Burke himself enlarges this principle to include spiritual and mental pain.58  
By way of summary (and after stressing that the delight in the sublime requires that we 
not stand in actual danger of death), Burke offers a neat definition of the sublime: "a 
sort of delightful horror; a sort of tranquility tinged with terror."59 While Burke does 
not mention it, his theory would justify the claim that the muted terror might well be 
supplied by our constant general sense of mortality, which, as existential philosophers 
have stressed, engenders (along with the burden of enormous responsibility) a constant 
sense of dread behind each moment of freely chosen action. The first fact for an existent 
is the terrible brevity of existence. The point is that we might either reject Burke's 
excessive stress on terror and pain,or we might (encouraged by Burke) expand these 
categories so broadly that they avoid damaging narrowness. Burke's own final 
summation is helpful: "the sublime and beautiful are built on principles very different, 
and . . . their affections are as different the great has terror for its basis; which, when it 
is modified, causes the emotion in the mind which I have called astonishment; the 
beautiful is founded more on mere positive pleasure, and excites in the soul that feeling 
which is called love."60  
The final section of Burke's treatise focuses on the manifestation of beauty and 
sublimity in words, and here Burke stresses the existential psychological universal of 
sympathy: words can reach the sublime (not by direct pointing as in painting) by a 
secondary route of revealing how people feel about sublime things, which moves us, 
due to sympathy. Burke adds that sublimity in ideas can emerge through powerful 
combinations of words, Burke's example being the two nouns in the phrase "the angel 
of the Lord."61 Burke's principle is relevant to painting in that as soon as we verbalize 
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the meaning of paintings, it is often the case that we will combine noun concepts in 
certain reciprocally strengthened patterns of rugged polarity. The two terms of the 
construction of symbol and metaphor allow the effect Burke has in mind, whether the 
metaphor is poetic or painterly.62 
In the early pages of his The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art, Paul 
Crowther observes that Kant crucially broadens the theory of the sublime, accepting 
Burke's terrifying sublime but adding modes such as the noble sublime and the 
splendid sublime, and also moving beyond Burke's physiological and external 
causation pattern into the wider and richer realm of subjective intent, which allows Kant 
to locate sublimity not just in nature, but in areas such as friendship, understanding, 
and morality.63 Most of Burke's insights into the sublime will be carried over into a 
working theory of the sublime to lay a foundation for this study of Rothko, Newman, 
and Still.64  
One distinctive aspect of Nietzsche's speculations on the sublime lies in the fact 
that his entire project is called aesthetic in essence and his entire project may be seen as 
sublime in essence. This project calls for the use of artistic fictions to produce a total 
and radical decentering and reentering of Western society, thought, art, and values. 
The basic pattern for Nietzsche's merging of thought and value into art is laid down in 
The Birth of Tragedy, but these concepts must be supplemented by proclamations 
found in The Will to Power, The Joyful Wisdom and Twilight of the Idoti One key 
statement defining Nietzsche's whole project as lying in the domain of the sublime 
comes rather early in The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche has declared that the original 
Greek chorus consisted of satyrs, half human and half goat, who represent the original 
state of Dionysian nature: powerful, cruel, destructive, wild, aggressive—a world in 
which we perceive the pointless absurdity of life. Yet these horrors and this sense of 
absurdity are not tolerable to the human spirit; therefore "art approaches as a saving and 
healing enchantress; she alone is able to transform these nauseating reflections on the 
awfulness or absurdity of existence into representations wherewith it is possible to live: 
these are the representations of the Rai= as the artistic subjugation of the awful, and 
the comjc as the artistic delivery from the nausea of the absurd.'65 Thus for Nietzsche 
the general terribleness of the state of nature must be encountered and overcome in a 
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sublime transaction achieved through art; consequently all major art is sublime when it 
offers order, meaning, and positive value through its saving fictions. Nietzsche is not 
far away from Kant in that the Nietzschean state of nature would be the kind of 
boundless and destructive power which must, in Kant's view, deliver its destabilizing 
shock and then be overcome (for Kant by the intervention of reason, for Nietzsche by 
the intervention of artistic will and imagination). It is also the case that Nietzsche's vast, 
turbulent state of nature would be, as Kant's theory calls for, a condition of force and 
power which could not be encompassed by any clear image of the imagination. From 
Kant's point of view, "state of nature" would be the concept of reason which allows us 
to subdue and handle in discourse the otherwise ungraspable entity. 
To understand Nietzsche's sense of the sublime, one must obviously trace the 
origin and shape of those "representations" of the sublime which make it possible for 
mankind to live in hope rather than despair. The Birth of Tragedy lays out this origin 
and shape. Before condensing the narrative of origins that Nietzsche creates (with the 
risk of oversimplification) a few generalizations may be helpful in setting the stage. For 
Nietzsche the deepest insights lie not in philosophy or science, but in art. Art (which 
Kant would base on aesthetic ideas) comes first in the evolution of culture, and first and 
last, supplies the visions, values, beliefs, and world-metaphors which might establish 
unity and purpose for individuals and societies. Art can do this, in Nietzsche's system, 
when it effectively blends myth and tragic vision. For the Greeks (the first people to 
triumph greatly over life) the first satyr chorus was the first major art step toward the 
union of myth and tragic vision. A tragic sense is mandatory because real life is full of 
pain, suffering, paradox, death, and nihilism. But the creative human will is a will for 
positive joy and purposivity. It will not accept any negative vision; it will through 
powerful instincts create fictions of order and make them socially effective by weaving 
them into works of art. The art fictions will be taken as genuine and true beliefs. When 
the saving and plausible fictions are lodged in myth and simultaneously lodged in art, 
the will to life and power has prevailed, the horror and meaninglessness have been 
transformed into an exalted social vision: the sublime has exerted its harmonizing 
power. Kant and Schopenhauer encouraged Nietzsche to center his vision in 
subjectivity. The reason that Nietzsche gives everything to art is simple: he assumes that 
philosophy, science, and religion are themselves artistic fictions designed to generate 
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effective cultural coherence. Such a framework of thought explains Nietzsche's famous 
remark early in The Birth of Tragedy: "the existence of the world is loam' only as an 
aesthetic phenomenon."66 For Nietzsche, a successful nation, culture, race, religion, 
scientific system, philosophic system, age, or individual should all be seen as 
constructed works of art generated in subjective freedom by the will to power as it tries 
to make a world suitable for instinctive needs and for mastery of life. The pre-Socratic 
Greek world is his model. 
The narrative that fleshes out Nietzsche's concept of the sublime is the general 
story of his aesthetic theory, given in The Birth of Tragedy. At the dawn of a race or 
culture, art sets about its task to supply that race or culture with its essential consoling 
spiritual and metaphysical vision. In Nietzsche's analysis, art has two great powers to 
draw on, two great powers that give the will its transforming zeal. These powers are 
named in Nietzsche's famous terms, Dionysian and Apollonian. 
The Dionysian force is the wild, jubilant, singing sense of a Primal One as the 
ground of all being; it is the frenzied, orgiastic, pre-rational, non-moral intoxication that 
people feel when they are united with the primal maternal heart of nature, when they 
merge with all plants and animals, all joyously bonded together in the Primal Unity. 
Their own individual will has lost itself in the universal will to life. All sense of 
individual separateness has been flooded out, all awareness is gone of discrete persons 
or objects. The veil of the illusion of individuation has been torn aside, and we feel 
joyously afloat on the dark, mysterious, ineffable ground of existence. We are one with 
the universe because we have become one with the original principle.67  
The Greek deity who is the best art symbol for this orgiastic spring-time Mardi-
Gras exuberance is Dionysus, the outlaw God of wine, drunkenness, and ecstatic 
inspiration who walked up Mt. Olympus and demanded to be worshiped. Nietzsche 
calls Olympus the "magic mountain" which teaches these lessons.68 He points to one 
legend in which Dionysus is dismembered by the Titans, concluding that this legend 
symbolizes the annihilation of the individual. The legend implies that Dionysus will be 
gloriously reborn,and this symbolizes that the Dionysiac force is eternal and eternally 
triumphant.69 
 
Since the Dionysiac trance takes us far back to primitive origins, it is not 
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constrained by later creations of religion or morality; therefore it is stained with the lust, 
cruelty, rape, and killing which were prominent Ur-features of life, before civilization 
emerged. Nietzsche believes all people remain capable of bursting all bonds of law and 
morality to indulge this ancient wild side. 
The Dionysian state is there, waiting for the artist to use it. This state, closely 
related to drunkenness, finds its most powerful symbolic expression in music. Unlike 
sculpture and painting, music is not clear to vision, is obscure and irrationally 
powerful, like the will itself, and is not essentially moral in its mode. Music appears 
very early at the dawn of a culture, and it is the first art resource of Nietzsche's savior-
artist as he begins to construct a vision of cultural values. Nietzsche makes this 
comment about the Dionysian basis of art "we have the mystery doctrine of tragedy: the 
fundamental knowledge of the oneness of all existing things, the consideration of 
individuation as the primal sense of evil, and art as the joyous hope that the spell of 
individuation may be broken, as the augury of a restored oneness."70 Then Nietzsche 
adds that when, as in the early satyr chorus, the artist utilizes music, it is music which 
supplies the crucial power to "invest myths with a new and profound significance."71  
Music is an idealization (like all art), not an imitation, and it allows the voice of 
Dionysus to be heard and idealized. Nietzsche declares his acceptance of Schopenhauer 
view that music "is not a copy of the phenomenon, but a direct copy of the will itself," 
and as idealization, music brings the metaphysical into the physical.72 From this 
perspective, Nietzsche awards to music a major role in the conquest of life by the 
coming of art's sublime transfiguration: the "capacity of music to give birth to myth," to 
"tragic myth," which "speaks of Dionysian knowledge in symbols."73  
However, the Dionysiac force alone in the early artists cannot create forms of 
order because it is inherently disorderly. The Dionysiac ecstasy must collaborate with 
its peer, an antithetical instinct for form, coherence, and universal meaning, a force 
Nietzsche calls Apollonian,74 after the Greek god Apollo, god not of artistic inspiration 
but of artistic design, god of light, reason, healing, morality; and god of all measured 
restraint and limit. 
Just as Dionysus is suggested by the physiological state of drunkenness, Apollo is 
suggested by the physiological state of dreaming. Art will supply a middle world of 
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vivid illusions that carry meaning. In the dream life of primitive man, the dreamers 
encountered a world of vivid illusions, a world in which they saw separate and radiant 
people, creatures, and forms, bathed in some mysterious light, and therefore 
encountered as spiritual and idealized forms different from the forms of nature.75 The 
Apollonian artist takes his cue from dreams. Dreams teach the artist that the will can 
create new forms, different from natural forms, new forms that are crisp and 
individuated, and that seem more than real because they are imbued with radiant 
meaning and vahie.76  
Thus the primitive Apollonian artist studies dreams and finds his sense of strategy. 
And he already has music, whose form is also different from nature. Thus, for 
Nietzsche, it is an easy step for the primitive artist like Homer to invent stories of 
imagined heroic warriors and queens, to sketch clear portraits of possible gods on Mt. 
Olympus, to envision landscapes and actions that, like dreams, are vivid and clear.77  
The early artist also quickly adds dance, which is such a primitive instinct. Though 
dance is strongly Dionysiac, its formal patterns reflect Apollo. 
The worship of Dionysus has begun, and the ceremony is an art performance 
clouded in the darkness of pre-history. The first ceremony was simple: in some public 
place, using music and dance, a group of satyr figures announce the coming of the god 
Dionysus, whose bursting vitality and immortality are offered to the believers. The 
satyrs are half human and half goat, artistic symbols created by the will to life, symbols 
designed to carry some affirmation and positive joy, and to launch, in Nietzsche's 
scheme, the conquest of life by the sublime. 
However, the early Dionysiac ceremonies could not come into their full unifying 
power until the god is enhanced by myth. Nietzsche does not really speculate on why it 
must be myth, but he might have connected myth to the human sense of the arrow of 
time, which would make human experience read like a narrative. In any case, myth 
gives the early artist just what he needs. He can combine it with music and dance, he 
can give the gods distinct individual lives as creations separate from mother nature, he 
can give them experiences in a measured world of rocks, trees, weapons, food, and 
unfolding episodes, and, above all, he can invest the mythical narratives with a 
compelling cluster of cultural values and meanings, thereby giving a whole people a 
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sense of identity. In short, the artists create myth so that a struggling culture can 
discover what it is. There are no preordained paradigms for any culture. The shaping 
artistic impulses are generated in subjective artistic freedom. The artists follow their 
instincts as they fabricate a national character through their symbolic manipulation of 
music, dance, and myth. And of course the other arts can emerge and add their values, 
such as sculpture, architecture, and painting, but these emerge later and are more 
Apollonian in their clarity and measure. To repeat Nietzsche's phrase, these 
metaphysical symbolic forms "are the representations of the siblimg as the artistic 
subjugation of the awful." 
In Nietzsche's story of the rise of Greek art, the Greek artists had some good 
luck. Any culture could produce music, dance, and religious myth. But not any culture 
could produce Greek tragedy. Fortunately the legends of Dionysus are rich in suffering 
and death, and have a tragic cast. The satyr chorus is already present with singing and 
dancing. Nietzsche calls the satyrs "sublime and godlike:18 Then other actors are 
added to the chorus, and the Greek artists now have dialogue, plus plot lines from the 
myths, and the primitive drama festivals in honor of Dionysus evolve toward the 
perfected Greek tragedy in the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles. They created 
sublime art forms in the presence of which—in spite of the horror, suffering, and death-
-the citizens did not feel despair, but rather an elevated and surging affirmation of life. 
They were led to feel that the suffering, pain, cruelty, and death were necessary and 
morally justified, and they were led to feel that all the annihilation of persons, creatures, 
and things, and all the paradoxes and puzzles of life, are justified in the illusion of a 
meaningful universe. To them, in Nietzsche's story, life was justified as an aesthetic 
phenomenon, and since the consolation depended on metaphysical meanings, Greek art 
and drama helped to call out the metaphysical passions of Greek philosophy. 
Nietzsche emphasizes that the early satyr chorus, dominant in the original 
performances, continues as the dominant element in the perfected high tragedies. The 
music, choral speaking, and dancing of the sophisticated chorus retain the true soul of 
the drama, the ancient sense of Primal Unity which points to Dionysus. The chorus is 
the chief agency through which the audience feels the Dionysiac escape from 
individuation. The audience merges with the chorus to create "one great sublime chorus 
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of dancing and singing satyrs."79  
While Nietzsche always gives priority to the Dionysian power, there is a sense in 
which the Apollonian power was, for the Greeks, their dominant passion, because in 
Nietzsche's view the Greek genius is essentially located in their search for reason, 
form, limit, order, and measure, reflected in the cult of Apollo and in the dean lines of 
Greek sculpture and Doric columns. Nietzsche's own words best explain his concept of 
the balance between the two powers. At one point late in The Birth of Tragedy 
Nietzsche seems to give the victory to Apollo: "What can the healing magic of Apollo 
not accomplish when it can even excite in us the illusion that the Dionysian is actually in 
the service of the Apollonian, the effects of which it is capable of enhancing; yes, that 
music is essentially the representative art for an Apollonian substance?" 80 However, 
Nietzsche adds that this seeming victory of Apollo is an illusion: 
The drama, which, by the aid of music, spreads out before us with such inwardly 
illumined distinctness in all its movements and figures, that we imagine we see 
the texture unfolding on the loom as the shuttle flies to and fro,—attains as a whole 
an effect which transcends all Apollonian artistic effects. In the collective effect of 
tragedy, the Dionysian gets the upper hand once more; tragedy ends with a sound 
which could never emanate from the realm of Apollonian art. And the Apollonian 
illusion is thereby found to be what it is,--the assiduous veiling during the 
performance of tragedy of the intrinsically Dionysian effect: which, however, is 
so powerful, that it finally forces the Apollonian drama itself into a sphere where 
it begins to talk with Dionysian wisdom, and even denies itself and its Apollonian 
conspicuousness. Thus then the intricate relation of the Apollonian and Dionysian 
in tragedy must really be symbolized by a fraternal union of the two deities, 
Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo; Apollo, however, finally speaks the 
language of Dionysus; and so the highest goal of tragedy and of art in general is 
attained.81  
Thus Greek tragedy is created by the will's interest in the ordering power of sublime 
and clear forms, yielding the art structures of music, dance, specific noble heroes, and 
the structured myth, of which Nietzsche declares: "Tragedy sets a sublime symbol, 
namely the myth between the universal authority of its music and the receptive 
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Dionysian hearer."82 Tragedy maximizes the resources of the sublime. 
Nietzsche's aesthetics also includes his theory about the decline of Greek culture, 
which he connects to the growing national admiration for Socrates, and for the overly 
Apollonian Socratic idea that what is good can be known by mason. In Nietzsche's 
view, this disastrously over-stated rationalism is reinforced in the late and decadent 
drama of Euripides, who tried to reduce beauty to logical formulas and stressed the low 
debased interest in character analysis, as opposed to the higher ground of metaphysical 
value and belief. Socrates and Euripides cut themselves off from the saving instinctual 
and musical wildness of Dionysus. When Socrates tried to make mysteries of value 
clear to discursive reason and conceptual knowledge, he destroyed depth and tragic 
vision, and therefore Socrates dared "to spill this magic draught in the dust" Nietzsche 
condemns the Socratic man for thinking that even "the sublimest moral acts" are 
"teachable."83 A further element in Nietzsche's aesthetics concerns the specific relation 
between German culture and tragic myth. Nietzsche declares that the Socratic growth of 
science and of the reasoned-out ideal of democratic leveled equality has destroyed 
genuine culture all through Europe. He thinks the French have gone so far that they are 
hopeless. Pointing to German music, he insists that the wild Dionysian German heart is 
not dead, and can rise up to destroy the blight of science and Socratism.84 Nietzsche's 
deconstruction of science lies in his claim that scientific concepts are themselves fictions 
of the will, and that the theoretic man will meet his Waterloo when scientific thoughts 
move out to the extreme peripheral points of theory where the scientist "stares at the 
inexplicable."85 The man of science will then realize that science can never really make 
the dark things light.86 It is important to note that, for Nietzsche, science will 
eventually become the hand-maiden for art in that the disappointed scientists will be 
driven to a sense of defeat which, "In order to be endured, requires art as a safeguard 
and remedy."87 So, when the battle between science and poetry ends, only poetry will 
be left on the field. 
Given the catastrophic tenor of Nietzsche's analysis of the sickness of modern 
nations, it would seem hopeless that any new cultural unity could emerge. However, 
Nietzsche believes that the pendulum will swing back toward artistic tragic wisdom. 
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For Germany or any other culture, religious myth is, for Nietzsche, the golden key, 
because religious myth prevents secularization and causes citizens to see current events 
as if connected to a timeless eternal zone. Of course the religiosity, for Nietzsche, is a 
socially helpful lie. The will needs this blessed assurance. In a blazing rebuke to 
modern secular humanism, Nietzsche proclaims that either a person or a society "is 
worth just as much only as its ability to impress on its experience the seal of 
eternity."88 Nietzsche declares that in his age the "stupendous secularization is 
accompanied by a homeless roving about, an eager intrusion at foreign tables, a 
frivolous deification of the present or a dull senseless estrangement.'89 Nietzsche 
declares that such secularized cultures enter a "wilderness of thought, custom, and 
action."90  
Nietzsche also states that Germany and other European nations cannot fully 
convert to any foreign imported myth, but must (as Vico thought) circle back into the 
sources of national culture and myth 9i Nietzsche did not endorse any totally German 
search for cultural coherence, though it is equally obvious that he hoped for a center in 
German myth.92  
Since music is so crucial for Nietzsche's art theory, some of his comments on 
music should be highlighted. Music is postulated as the first redeeming step of art 
toward the Apollonian ordering of a culture. Nietzsche makes music an Ur-principle by 
calling it a direct copy of the will at the stage when the will is one with the Primal 
Unity. Since music is thus an imitation of the will, it is an art symbol, an idealized and 
measured form carrying metaphysical meaning. The human joy in the flood of music 
allows us to comprehend as an intuition the "joy in the annihilation of the individual."93  
Nietzsche asserts that opera is debased music, given over to frivolous pleasures, 
allowing the verbal text to murder the musical impulse. He expresses amazement that 
the same Renaissance age that enjoyed "the ineffably sublime and sacred music of 
Palestrina" could also welcome the beginnings of opera.% Nietzsche suggests that 
anyone hearing just the powerful music of the third act of Wagner's Tristan and Isolde 
would ash, would be annihilated in the "thundering stream" of the original cosmic 
will if it were not for the Apollonian restraint imposed by Wagner's chosen myth.95 
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Naming Bach, Beethoven, and Wagner, Nietzsche envisions a modern German culture 
awaiting rebirth in "the fire-magic of music."96  
Music cannot clearly enunciate moral value because music is so close to the pre-
rational and pre-moral aesthetic zone of the dawn of art in the Dionysian context; 
consequently, Nietzsche concludes, music teaches us that authentic art should not be 
encroached upon by the morally sublime, but must "insist on the purity in her 
domain."97 
 Such a divergence would seem to work against his ideal of cultural unity, 
so that ideal should not be pushed too far. Dissonance in music is extremely important 
for Nietzsche (and would be important in painting) because dissonance proves that 
conflicting pairs can work together, as they do in the fraternal connection of Dionysian 
and Apollonian to produce the special paradoxical blending of suffering and joy (an 
important goal of Rothko, Newman, and Still). Nietzsche observes that just like Greek 
music and Greek tragedy, what is man but "an incarnation of dissonance."98 In the 
interesting phrase picked up by Thomas Mann as the title of a novel, Nietzsche claims 
that when Greek music reached out toward Greek myth, the Greeks created and 
ascended their "magic mountain."99  
Perhaps it would be prudent to confirm this interpretation of Nietzsche's narrative 
of the sublime with a few additional supporting passages. Early in The Birth of Tragedy 
 
Nietzsche makes it clear that the sublime art symbols make each person's life a work of 
art: "Man is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art."100 Nietzsche connects 
Dionysian music to the psychology of the sublime in declaring that it "excited awe and 
horror."101 He adds that this music incited man "to the highest exaltation of all his 
symbolic faculties," and that to order and express the world symbolically, "a new world 
of symbols is required."102 In comments relevant to the fire and flame motifs in 
Newman and Still, Nietzsche gives special value to the symbolic myth of Prometheus. 
The fire Prometheus steals from the gods symbolizes the creative, aspiring human 
impulse in opposition to divine creativity, a myth different from Jewish legends in that 
"the Aryan representation is the sublime view of actiyeAn as the properly Promethean 
virtue."103  In modernist and postmodern movements, there is an element of 
transgression encouraged by this "active sin" vector in Nietzsche's philosophy; 
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however, this element is often given an exaggerated importance. It is reasonable to see 
Nietzsche's ideas as having an influence on the Promethean aggressive impulse in the 
abstract expressionist group, and on their hostility to organized religion. Nietzsche 
asserts, in opposition to traditional Christianity and Judaism, that effective myths are 
always killed when these sublime representations "are systematized as a completed sum 
of historical events" by the "stern, intelligent eyes of an orthodox dogmatism."104 
Religious dogmatism was firmly rejected by Rothko, Newman, and Still. 
Nietzsche's sense of a primal unity as the reality behind Dionysian myth is 
conveyed when he speaks of "the eternally creative primordial mother," through whom 
"We are really for brief moments Primordial Being itself, and feel its indomitable desire 
for being and joy in existence."105 In a further revealing comment on myth, Nietzsche 
states: "Without myth, however, every culture loses its healthy creative natural power: it 
is only a horizon encompassed by myths which rounds off to unity of a social 
movement." 106  Later in this study it will be shown that Rothko, Newman, and Still, in 
search of usable myth, enlarge the concept of myth and encourage other constructive 
enlargements which make Nietzsche's general theory of the sublime power of myth 
more productive. Nietzsche adds that mythless modern culture, separated from any 
"fixed and sacred primitive seal" in myth, cut off from the holy, has strangled the might 
of the saving sublime representations; yet at some deeper level, "a glorious, intrinsically 
healthy, primeval power" lies sleeping, not dead, sleeping in what Nietzsche calls an 
abyss, and "It is from this abyss that the German Reformation came forth:107 This 
concept of the retreat of the sacred into an abyss of absence from which it may be 
resurrected by art constitutes a major theme for Nietzsche, and also for Rothko, 
Newman, and Jung. 
In another passage, Nietzsche pinpoints his concept of sublime transfiguration 
through art in a manner sharply relevant to the program of non-imitative abstract 
expression. The transforming power of the sublime through tragic myth is effective 
"provided that art is not merely an imitation of the reality of nature, but in truth a 
metaphysical supplement to the reality of nature, placed alongside thereof for its 
conquest. Tragic myth, in so far as it really belongs to art, also fully participates in this 
transfiguring metaphysical purpose of art in general."108 Nietzsche, in a sense, was at 
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least a spiritual father of abstract modern art, and his ties to abstract expressionism are 
close and deep.109 
It is not necessary to explain much more of Nietzsche's thought in clarifying his 
theory of the sublime. However there are some crucial passages in works other than 
The Birth of Tragedy. In The Joyful Wisdom Nietzsche treats his key doctrine of 
perspectivism, which follows logically from his insistence that any sense of the world 
is spun from fictions. Obviously a particular set of harmonized fictions would issue 
from some guiding perspective. Our general sense of the world, in Nietzsche's view, 
will have to be "appearance seen in pprspective."110 In a section entitled "What one 
should Learn from Artists," Nietzsche asserts that artists teach us the great lesson of 
life: to use "inventions and artifices" to create our own desired perspective." 
Nietzsche gives helpful insights about his own moral vision. In passages 
throughout his works he rejects the sentimental "other" centered morality of sympathy 
and compassion that Christianity offered. Here Nietzsche comments that a noble and 
wise person will do his utmost "for mg alone."112 Often Nietzsche's ideas have a 
shrewd value even if one would modify them. For instance, in his self-centered 
morality Nietzsche lays a productive moral burden on each person. If we are to do our 
utmost for ourselves, Nietzsche concludes that we must ask the following question of 
all of our little daily habits: "are they the product of numberless little acts of cowardice 
and laxness, or of . . . bravery and inventive raison?"113 There is a valid sense in 
which artists and people in general should not turn aside from their major chosen tasks, 
and should indeed do their utmost for their own chosen values. Painters often must 
walk alone with genuine "bravery and inventive reason," and Nietzsche encourages this 
kind of isolated existential idealism. 
In another passage Nietzsche shows the value of a conserving and preserving 
sense of history, observing that a superior noble person in the modern world can enjoy 
something new, the historical sense, which allows a modern aristocrat to absorb all the 
sufferings and joys of past humanity as "one who has an horizon of centuries before 
him, as the heir of all nobility, of all past intellect, and the obligatory heir . . . of all the 
old nobles, while at the same time the first of a new nobility."114 Such a condition 
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would yield "a God's happiness, full of power and love."115 Here Nietzsche shows 
that all the sublime representations from the past remain permanently constructive in 
spite of the transvaluation of values which he advocates. There is no point in ignoring 
conservative features of Nietzsche's thought. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche's attack on Christianity contains some moderating 
elements. While Nietzsche never wavers in his belief that the sublime symbolic and 
mythic forms of Christianity were in service of a wrong and harmful perspective, he 
observes that "Most people in old Europe . . . still need Christianity at present, and on 
that account it still finds belief." 16 Since Luther, in spite of his heroic will, hated all 
higher and noble men and encouraged "plebeianism of the spirit," the Protestant 
Reformation "was a coarse, honest misunderstanding."117 Nietzsche's elitist sense of 
superior sensibilities is inescapable. 
Here Nietzsche reveals his important later concept that productive sublime art must 
originate not as reaction, and not from any "reduced vitality," but rather from a sense of 
plenitude, of exuberant "overflowing vitality." He dismisses romanticism (as he 
understood it) as a kind of lament coming from reduced vitality. Nietzsche calls for a 
pivotal question: "Has hunger or superfluity become creative here?"118 He declares, 
"We love art when it is the flight of the artist from man, or the raillery of the artist at 
man."119 Nietzsche is a strong humanist, and what he objects to is a kind of lower 
humanism that does not reach high enough toward the superman. 
Some valuable ideas relating to sublime art appear in Nietzsche's Twilight of the 
idob.120 Nietzsche again makes the point that mimesis is a wrong view of art, that 
born painters "never work 'from nature,'" and that copying nature is "lying in the dust" 
before trivial fa cts.121  Nietzsche adds that all kinds of ecstasy stand behind art—the 
ecstasy of sex, strong passions, destruction, cruelty, and impassioned will, leading the 
artist to idealize, which is to ignore surface details and "bring out the main 
features."122  Nietzsche declares that the artist "transforms things until they mirror his 
power—until they are reflections of his perfection. This haying to transform into 
perfection is 	 art," and since Raphael displayed this transforming and "Yes" 
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saying passion, "Raphael was no Christian."123 Nietzsche follows with an important 
comment about architecture, a comment revealing Nietzsche's concept of a grand style. 
He claims that architects transcend the Dionysian and Apollonian states as they actualize 
a unique act of will and almost literally move mountains, performing their feats in a 
noble grandeur of style which is oblivious to opposition, does not try to please, and 
gives itself its own laws.124 
Nietzsche sheds light on his quarrel with Schopenhauer, who displays "a 
maliciously ingenious attempt" to make the positive and exuberant forces of life serve "a 
nihilistic total depreciation of life."125 Schopenhauer's negation of desire and negation 
of sexuality are misguided because, Nietzsche observes, sex is the cause of so much of 
the beauties of nature seen in colors, fragrances, tones, and graceful rhythmic 
movements.126 
Nietzsche calls art for art's sake a hopeless doctrine because art always has 
metaphysical and idealizing purposes as it projects a certain vision of a desirable kind of 
life; as it praises, glorifies, and selects; and as it sets about to make stronger or weaker 
some chosen group of values.127 Adding comments importantly connected to his 
theory of the sublime, Nietzsche thinks the tragic artist operates "without fear in the face 
of the fearful and questionable," a "triumphant state" showing "Courage and freedom of 
feeling before a powerful enemy, before a sublime calamity, before a problem that 
arouses dread."128 Theory of the sublime in general focuses upon the sublime 
challenge of something fearful and questionable, plus affirmations coming out of this 
challenge. 
Rothko, Newman, and Still refused to become greatly involved in the generally 
socialist and religious humanitarian causes of their milieu, no doubt influenced by 
Nietzsche's elitism for the sake of a sublime aesthetic project. Nietzsche points to a 
wide recent growth in the sense of victimhood, accompanied by much bewailing of the 
lot of the average man. He notes that the leveling Socialists and Christians are 
conspicuous for bewailing,129  and he highlights "Our morality of sympathy, against 
which I was the first to issue a warning," claiming that everywhere he looks everyone 
is either sick or "a nurse for the sick," and that true and wholesome power in a society 
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must cleave, must create strong hierarchy.130 
Nietzsche has his own version of a return to nature, and it corresponds to that of 
Rothko, Newman, and Still, who, like Nietzsche, were strongly influenced by 
primitive art but also realized that the modern intellect can never return to any primitive 
state. Nietzsche proclaims, "I too speak of a 'return to nature,' although it is really not a 
going back but an ascent--up into high, free, even terrible nature and naturalness where 
great tasks are something one plays with."131 Rothko, Newman, and Still, like 
Nietzsche, accept the current stage of life and try to move ahead, using primitivism as a 
stimulus, but not as any return to primitive life. 
Nietzsche's The Will to Power also sheds important light on Nietzsche's vision of 
art's sublime qualities, and sublime tasks.While Nietzsche never relents in his attacks 
upon Christianity, he now reveals an appreciation for the Christian movement, 
declaring that Christianity was highly constructive in placing a high value on man; 
creating a sense of perfection, freedom, and meaningful evil; assuming that men can 
have knowledge of absolute values; keeping man from despising himself; and holding 
nihilism in check.132 Nietzsche adds that Christianity also asserted the value of 
truthfulness, and that value will lead to the rejection of Christian beliefs.133  
Nietzsche's doctrine of perspectivism prohibits any reaching of final truth, "there 
simply is no true world"; mankind always creates some useful simplified world based 
on fictions that serve the needs of the will to power and the result is some "perspectival 
Pyrs'Astsiv., whose origin lies in us."134  Thus all thinkers create fictions of value in the 
manner of artists. Nietzsche's sense of the fading of Christian belief is certainly part of 
the world-view of the abstract expressionist painters: "The time has come when we 
have to pay for having been Christians for two thousand years we are losing the center 
of gravity by virtue of which we have lived; we are lost for a while."135 It is important 
to note that Nietzsche depicts Jesus as one of the proper artists and heroes in the bold 
proclaiming of value. In Nietzsche's view the church twisted the teachings of Jesus: 
"What did Christ deny? Everything that is today called Christian."136 Nietzsche 
declares: "it is we scholars who today best fulfill the teaching of Christ," and Christ on 
the cross "is the most sublime symbol—even today."137 Nietzsche shows a less radical 
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streak in claiming that powerful artist aristocrats must always use existing moral and 
religious forms as vehicles for proclaiming new values, and that God can be seen in a 
new way, not as a humanitarian God, but "God conceived as an emancipation from 
morality, taking into himself the whole fullness of life's antitheses, and in a divine 
torment, redeeming and justifying them"; and "God the supreme power—that 
suffices!"138 Certainly Nietzsche's more moderate tone is not any great concession to 
Christianity: "I abhor Christianity . . . because it created sublime words and gestures to 
throw over a horrible reality the cloak of justice, virtue, and divinity."139 Part of this 
"horrible reality" is what Nietzsche construes as the Christian doctrine that natural life is 
tainted and worthless. 
Many passages focus on art and aesthetic theory. Nietzsche finds self- 
narcotization in the idea of art for art's sake.140 He rejects any return to nature because 
"there has never yet been a natural humanity."141 Since reason and passion are terms 
often met in art theory, Nietzsche's view on their relation is noteworthy. He rejects their 
separation which might degrade passion: "The misunderstanding of passion and reason, 
as if the latter were an independent entity and not rather a system of relations between 
various passions and desires; and as if every passion did not possess its quantum of 
reason 
 ..,,142 This is very close to Blake's position in "The Marriage of Heaven and 
Hell." 
In an important passage Nietzsche comments that among the value-declaring 
fictions of art there is a class of necessary fictions: "we have to believe in time, space, 
and motion, without feeling compelled to grant them absolute raality."143 Nietzsche's 
concept of necessary fictions, like Wallace Stevens's derivative concept of final 
fictions, has not received the emphasis it deserves, and it brings Nietzsche closer to 
Kant. Kant's a priori categories of space and time are seen as logically necessary, while 
for Nietzsche they are necessary for human survival in a bearable constructed world: 
"Truth is that kind of error without which a certain species of living being cannot 
exist."144 Interestingly, Nietzsche does not totally reject Kant's point of view: "The 
most strongly believed a priori 'truths' are for me—provisional assumptions," including 
the "law of causality" which "not to believe in would destroy the race."145 Nietzsche 
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later adds (in a sentence Kant might have written) that "Rational thought is interpretation 
according to a scheme that we cannot throw pff."146 Nietzsche rejects any absolute 
truth because such truth would deny those qualities in the world "that constitute its 
reality: change, becoming, multiplicity, opposition, contradiction, war..147 
Nietzsche rejects the concept of a higher ideal world because it would keep artists 
from their task of declaring and shaping a more perfect real world. The artists "at least 
fix an image of that which ought to be; they are productive, to the extent that they 
actually alter and transform; unlike men of knowledge, who leave everything as it is." 
The sublimity of the whole project of art rests precisely in this power to transform 
through art symbols via the will to power. In one of his most valuable definitions of 
will to power, Nietzsche explains that it is "not self-preservation, but the will to 
appropriate, dominate, increase, grow stronger."148 
There is a sense in which Nietzsche is driven to the sublime due to weaknesses in 
the idea of the beautiful. Any concept of traits of beauty could be no more than another 
temporary perspective; thus "To experience a thing as beautiful means: to experience it 
necessarily wrongly."149 Of course artists will continue to seek valuable fictions of 
beauty in that the genesis of art is "That making perfect, seeing as perfect, which 
characterizes the cerebral system bursting with sexual energy," and lovers dream of a 
romantic transfiguration which makes life "a succession of sublime things."150 Art is 
"sublimely expedient even when it lies."151  
In an interesting rebuff to much recent thought, Nietzsche refuses to reduce our 
world to language. He places language under art: "The aesthetic state possesses a 
superabundance of means of communication, together with an extreme receptivity for 
stimuli and signs. It constitutes the high point of communication and transmission 
between living creatures--it is the source of languages."152 
Nietzsche labels as effeminate any art theory focused on the viewer, calling instead 
for a masculine theory focused on the creative artist.153  Declaring that the artist cannot 
offer pessimism (and that Schopenhauer was wrong) Nietzsche asserts: "What is 
essential in art remains its perfection of existence, its production of perfection and 
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plenitude; art is essentially affirmation. blessing. deification of existence154 One 
principle behind Nietzsche's scorn of romanticism is made clear when he observes that 
the strong feelings of nationalism constitute a decadent form of romanticism and that the 
hunger for excessive feeling, imagining, and exoticism reveals a "Weariness of 
will."155 Nietzsche, in a move relevant to abstract art, condemns Wagner, Hugo, Zola, 
Taine, and romanticism for lacking a tyrannical will to unity shown by their failures in 
"omitting, shortening, clarifying, simplifying."156 Since abstract expressionist art 
leans heavily on measure and ratio, it is noteworthy that Nietzsche stresses the passion 
for and power of restraint as a trait in the coming aristocratic new barbarians who will 
appreciate "The natural delight of aesthetic natures in measure."157 The delight in 
measure follows logically from both classical style and the Apollonian principle. One 
great Nietzschean law is that when Dionysus strengthens, Apollo must also strengthen. 
Almost writing a credo for Rothko, Newman, and Still, Nietzsche proclaims that "To 
remain objective, hard, firm, and severe in carrying through an idea—artists succeed 
best in this."158  
Predictably, Nietzsche's emphasis on measure and simplification involves a strong 
valuation of form in art. Formalism is implied in Nietzsche's remark that "Logical and 
geometrical simplification is a consequence of enhancement of strength."159 Drawing 
close to Longinus and Kant in raising high the sublime trait of nobility, Nietzsche 
connects this trait to "Pleasure in forms; taking under protection everything formal, the 
conviction that politeness is one of the greatest virtues."160 Nietzsche declares that the 
meaning of the forms in gardens and architecture is "to remove disorder and vulgarity 
from sight and to build a home for nobility of soul."161 Giving an interesting insight 
into his doctrine of eternal recurrence (which, though improbable, does justify all of life 
and does demand that we create maximum excellence that can return), Nietzsche 
speculates that the shape, the form of space "must be the cause of eternal movement, 
and ultimately of all 'imperfection.'"162 Nietzsche berates contemporary painters for 
leaning too much toward expressive meaning and not appreciating form "for the sake of 
what it is."163 
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Grand style and classical style continue as major concerns for Nietzsche. Of the 
grand style Nietzsche writes: "that it disdains to please; that it forgets to persuade; that it 
commands; that it wills—To become master of the chaos one is; to compel one's chaos 
to become form: to become logical, simple, unambiguous, mathematics, )--that is the 
grand ambition here."164 Nietzsche observes that a classical style will bring to 
perfection some particular genus of art (as did Rothko, Newman, and Still for abstract 
expressionism) and requires "a quantum of coldness, lucidity, hardness."165 
Nietzsche never diminishes his insistence that great art must be tragic. In choosing 
between the tragic symbolic value of the dismembered Dionysus and the wrongly 
manipulated crucified Christ, Nietzsche observes: "One will see that the problem is that 
of the meaning of suffering: whether a Christian meaning or a tragic meaning. In the 
former case, it is supposed to be the path to a holy existence; in the latter case, being is 
counted as holy enough to justify even a monstrous amount of suffering. The tragic 
man affirms even the harshest suffering: he is sufficiently strong, rich, and capable of 
deifying to do so."166 Nietzsche rejects both Schopenhauer's tragic pessimism and 
Aristotle's theory of tragic purgation by proclaiming that art must be "the great stimulant 
to life" and that tragic art "is a Ionic." The tragic artist understands that "a preference for 
questionable and terrifying things is a symptom of strength."167 
Rothko, Newman, and Still were deeply influenced by both Nietzsche and 
existentialism, and it is important to see how Nietzsche is considered a father of 
existentialism. In the existential movement the mortal isolated existent, lodged in a body 
under the supreme threat of death, must discover and live by his own discovered 
values. Nietzsche obviously belongs in this tradition. The physically embodied 
emphasis of Nietzsche appears in several passages: "All our categories of reason are of 
sensual origin," and "The phenomenon of the body is the richer, clearer, more tangible 
phenomenon," and "The body and physiology the starting point"; "The animal 
functions are, as a matter of principle, a million times more important than all our 
beautiful moods and heights of consciousness," and body and flesh are the great things 
in "spinning out the chain of life" so that it can be improved.' 68 Perhaps the following 
comment gives Nietzsche's most lucid statement about his existentialism: "The 
individual is something quite new which creates new things, something absolute; all his 
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acts are entirely his own," and "Ultimately, the individual derives the value of his acts 
from himself."' 69  
Enough of Nietzsche's fundamental beliefs have been covered to explain how his 
entire philosophic program (centered on the art power of symbol making to achieve a 
sublime elevation of mankind) becomes a sublime task and an exercise in aesthetic 
theory. Because the philosophic aggressive artist does everything that counts, Nietzsche 
can declare that "The 'genius' is the sublimest machine there is."170 He can declare 
"Art and nothing but art! It is the great means of making life possible."171 He can 
declare that the great man, the needed giant man of art, the noble man of the future, will 
be the sublime man, and "The sublime man has the highest value, even if he is terribly 
delicate and fragile, because an abundance of very difficult and rare things has been 
bred and preserved together through many generations."172 
This rather detailed treatment of Nietzsche's theory of the sublime and the general 
pattern of his philosophy has been attempted on the basis of three assumptions: that his 
concept of the sublime has unique value as part of the background theory of the 
sublime; that his general philosophy has been a major formative influence on the 
American thought climate from the twenties to the present; and that both his theory of 
the sublime and his general philosophy shed important light on the search for sublimity 
by Rothko, Newman, and Still. 
There are various possible objections to the picture I have drawn, one of these 
being that I have ignored the frequently raised problem that Nietzsche kept changing his 
conception of art and that later statements contradict earlier ones. This cannot be denied. 
My defense is that in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche gives his most specific definition 
of the sublime as a positive, constructive force, and does not later, in any clear way, 
repudiate this original sublimicism. Therefore, I have looked for passages in his texts 
which seem to reinforce his most essential theoretic declaration. Admittedly, this is an 
over-simplification, adopted in the interest of working out a coherent, positive 
conception which is a possible one, and supporting it with concrete quotations. I have 
felt, rightly or wrongly, that the theory of the sublime which is given a positive cultural 
role in The Birth of Tragedy would be the theory most likely to be read and appreciated 
by Rothko, Newman, and Still, who were, I will argue, more modernist and positive 
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than they were postmodern and disruptive. However, a different position would also be 
possible, one focused on the fact that perhaps no thinker has been as disruptive and 
deconstructive as Nietzsche. As Robert John Ackerman notes, "We have, in a sense, 
two Nietzsches to deal with. . . . The first Nietzsche is content to attack the prevailing 
tables of his time (and ours, since those values are still discernible), and the other 
Nietzsche is trying to produce progressive new value tables."173 It is the second 
Nietzsche that I have brought to the fore. I am not the only one to do so. Benjamin 
Bennet argues that the wild and wicked Dionysian spirit is not mg in its primitive 
origin, but becomes pure later when it is assimilated into sublime art forms and is 
connected to Apollonianism. The two mutually support each other. Bennet argues that 
Nietzsche sees Dionysian truth (horrible truth) as imagazglablz We struggle against it 
by turning to the Apollonian, in order to create our Socratic net of culture. Bennet 
declares that Nietzsche does not favor the destruction of the Apollonian-Socratic net, 
but hopes that it can be preserved, since it is our only hope.174 That  is, while Dionysus 
should be strong and active, the saving principle lies in the positive, affirmative, order-
seeking work of Apollo. And this is the face of Nietzsche that I have tried to emphasize 
in a treatment of his constructive conception of the sublime. But this might be seen as a 
too easy optimism, in that Nietzsche also has in mind a very long period of tearing 
down, before a new constructive and wholesome cultural net can be possible, so that 
his nihilistic side might deserve the greater emphasis. In any case, what I have tried to 
do is to take a very limited perspective (in keeping with my limited focus on theory of 
the sublime), and to show how, if we simply accept Nietzsche's only definition of the 
sublime, that definition can be fleshed out and understood in relation to various 
comments Nietzsche makes in other works. 
A brief sketch of the central features of Kant's theory of the sublime is necessary 
to round out the historical perspective. An elaborate treatment of Kant is not required 
because Rothko, Newman, and Still, while strongly influenced by Longinus, Burke, 
and Nietzsche, do not reveal any similar interest in Kant Also, additional features of 
Kant's thought will become clear in the treatment of Crowther's extension of Kant's 
model. Describing sublime experience in his Critique of Judgment, Kant presents seven 
steps: (1) we experience something which in either size or force is so awesome, 
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boundless, and dangerous that the imagination cannot grasp it in a single clarifying 
image, nor can understanding deal with it; (2) this defect of faculties is not acceptable 
because we exist under an a priori law of reason which demands wholeness of 
comprehension; (3) reason then comes to our rescue by providing a holistic rational 
concept which does encompass the unbounded thing; (4) this judgment through reason 
is disinterested in that we register a phenomenological impact with no attention given to 
the general usefulness of the unbounded item (if it were the ocean, we would not have 
in mind its value for shipping lanes); (5) solving the problem through reason brings 
home to us the value of our supersensible zone of subjective reason, and sharply 
reminds us of our true vocation as thinkers in the transcendent realm of reason and 
moral choice operating in freedom; (6) we see that although the awesome entity might 
destroy us, we have courageous dominion over it through the power of reason; and (7) 
the essence of our sense of sublimity lies not in the boundless entity, but in our 
profound respect for our inner power of reason as it stands superior to nature's greatest 
structures.173 For example, we could stand in front of ungraspable entities such as an 
ocean storm or a sky full of stars, finding these too vast to be comprehensible by any 
single image of imagination or single registering of understanding. Yet reason could 
come to our rescue with at least logically encompassing ideas, such as abyss or 
hurricane or cosmic vault The painful frustration of important faculties would yield to 
the pleasure of victory through reason, and we would feel a conscious and heightened 
appreciation of and respect for subjective reason and its supersensible domain. 
Kant marks out two large modes of sublimity, the mathematical and the 
dynamical, the mathematical realized through encountering a size too vast to be 
encompassed by the clear numbers and units of measure that the understanding offers. 
We are having an aesthetic experience triggered by sensory elements, but only reason 
can, in the sudden leap to an idea, give a sense of the wholeness of that which we 
confront The dynamical sublime involves not size, but power. An infinite extension is 
not before us, but rather an infinite force, whose might carries some sense of fear; yet 
when the sudden leap to an idea of reason comes, we will see that a vast and dreaded 
power "has no dominion over us," and we will feel a special sense of courage to face 
such challenges and prevail, as we gain our victory of reason over nature's most 
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destructive powers.174 
Importantly, Kant observes that war, a display of vast and dangerous power, 
could be sublime if conducted honorably. Such an insight opens the sublime to other 
powerful social movements, such as political struggles and conflicting intellectual 
currents and religions. A rather neglected aspect of Kant's theory of the dynamical 
sublime is his use of it to purge theology of some superstitions. Kant claims that in the 
sudden flash of reason which actualizes the sublime, it is proper to see our minds as 
superior to the forces of nature, and a person elevated to the sublime will refuse to read 
natural disasters as signs of the wrath of God; moreover, Kant claims later that the 
human sense of sublimity (which can overcome so much) repudiates all abject 
supplications to God which ask Him to overcome the evils of the world.175 
In other important passages, Kant states that "dread and holy awe" are proper 
emotions in sublime experience; that in a context of loss and gain, we could feel an 
intellectual sublimity for the claim of moral law; that while the zeal of strong passions 
and their rugged tensions can reach the sublime, a higher mode is the noble sublime, a 
calm and cool stage, a cerebral contemplative sublime based on "the satisfaction of pure 
reason" such as we might feel in a rational grasp of a noble building or in the 
appreciation of a literary style, these being rational states which produce not a sudden 
flash of astonishment but a calm and sustained admiration; that strong passions are not 
sublime unless they trigger a conscious resolution through and triumph for ideas of 
reason; that deep solitudes and tragically colored meditations are potentially sublime 
states; and that meditative sadness about evil can be sublime when it utilizes 
supersensible ideas of reason.176 
At one point Kant clearly reveals his agreement with Longinus that a raw idea can 
reach sublimity, and the sublimity can be enhanced if style is added to idea. This 
combination is very useful in treating the sublime subjects of Rothko, Newman, and 
Still. Kant's example is the idea of the absolute ineffable One inscribed on the Temple 
of Isis: "I am all that is and that was and that shall be, and no mortal hath lifted my 
veil," of which Kant declares, "nothing more sublime has ever been said."177 
An important problem arises in Kant's efforts to connect the sublime to the moral. 
The beautiful is not immediately moral (though a beautiful thing could also be a symbol 
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for the good). Pure beauty can become dependent beauty when a moral or utilitarian 
concept is added to it Yet with the sublime, we are taken directly into the ideational 
zone where free moral judgments are made, so that the sublime has a larger overlap 
with the moral. Among the connections Kant makes (other than the ones already named 
about the sublime claim of moral law and the sublimity of meditations on evil) are these: 
the arts would breed social discontent if not joined to moral ideas; aesthetic alertness is 
the mark of a good soul; disinterested aesthetic experience quickens and strengthens the 
cognitive faculties used in moral judgments; all aesthetic experience of purposivity 
without purpose points to our ultimate purpose, which is "our moral destination"; all 
inner subjective purposes are united through having their a priori source in will; the 
sublime prepares us for morality in that "the sublime prepares us to esteem something 
highly even if in opposition to our own (sensible) interest" (a logic form that x so 
resembles y as to strengthen y); and alertness to the sublime is not instinctive, but must 
be taught by a high culture rich in moral idealism.178 All of these connections seem to 
be relational ones that do not jeopardize the aesthetic autonomy of sublime awareness, 
yet obviously Kant raises difficult and unresolved problems about the exact reciprocity 
between the sublime and the good.179 This brief sketch of Kant's treatment of the 
sublime is sufficient to show the basic features of his model, and thus to round out the 
historical background sought in Longinus, Burke, Nietzsche, and Kant 
Rothko, Newman, and Still were consciously aware of the accumulation of 
sublimicist theory through Longinus, Burke, and Kant, although not in a detailed 
manner, and aware also of the general philosophy of Nietzsche. It would be wrong for 
art historians not to apply this historical perspective to these three painters, when that 
very perspective yielded formative consequences for their works. Therefore interpreters 
need to move toward the abstract expressionists with a clear comprehension of these 
influences: from Longinus the concepts of the ideational sublime in raw ideas and force 
of intellect, the hot and cool sublime, the pattern of elevation and transcendence, the 
relation of the sublime to the good, the sublimity of formal excellence, and specific 
ways to invoke the sublime, such as verticality and seriality; from Burke the concepts 
of the sublime of pain and terror plus analogous experiences, the presence of 
psychological universals, the enhancements through difficulty and obscurity, the 
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essential element of overwhelming astonishment, the near-abyss conditions of darkness 
and silence, the terror-tinged plunges into depth, and the sublime of light and color; 
from Kant the concepts of the mathematical and dynamical sublime, the triumph of 
reason by virtue of holistic concepts, the close ties of the sublime and the moral, the 
cooperation between faculties, and the wide and complex enrichments for personality 
and culture through the reciprocal bonding of idea and sensory form in sublime 
experience; and from Nietzsche the concepts of sublime art symbols which integrate 
culture, the Apollonian and Dionysian, the aesthetic justification of life, the ideal of the 
aggressive will of the artist, and the necessity for joy and affirmation. We should also 
note that these theorists draw upon historical accumulations, and do not hesitate to 
employ with confidence essentialist and universalist language. 
For treating twentieth century painters, the classical theorists of the sublime must 
be supplemented by ideas derived from modernist and contemporary sublimicist theory, 
the task to be undertaken next. 
Two - Four Recent Theorists of the Sublime 
The heritage of the sublimicist ideas of Longinus, Burke, Kant, and Nietzsche has 
been strongly energized in the last quarter of the twentieth century, partly because of the 
value of the sublime for treating strong forces, rugged tensions, and negations which 
have developed in critical, philosophic, and political theory. A good cross-section of 
this new upsurge of interest in the sublime (involving theories applicable to Rothko, 
Newman, and Still) may be presented by explaining the chief features of the sublimicist 
theory of Thomas Weiskel, Paul Crowther, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Frances 
Ferguson. Weiskel, Lyotard, and Ferguson have been more strongly turned toward 
postmodern points of view than Crowther (though, as a later chapter will consider, 
postmodernism is not easy to define). 
Weiskel did not finish the manuscript of his The Romantic Sublime before his 
death, which may explain the reader's impression that loose ends have not been brought 
together in a fully coherent study. However, Weiskel did break important ground in 
trying to accommodate the idea of the sublime to contemporary thought. Weiskel 
properly insists on the need for transcendence: "The essential claim of the sublime is 
that man can, in feeling and in speech, transcend the human. What, if anything, lies 
beyond the human—God or the gods, the Demon or Nature—is matter for great 
disagreement." Declaring that "a humanistic sublime is an oxymoron," Weiskel adds 
that a supra-human transcendence becomes more difficult with the retreat of God. The 
sublime is gaining strength, yet it tends to become a "secondary or problematic sublime 
. . . pervaded by the nostalgia and uncertainty of minds involuntarily secular." The 
romantics began this secular move by seeking "a massive transposition of 
transcendence into a naturalistic key," using a "stunning metaphor" (which Weiskel 
49 
does not identify, but would be something like "natural supernaturalism.") Since 
Weiskel focuses on a postmodern sense of the sublime to replace the outmoded 
romantic model, it seems surprising that he would call his work The Romantic Sublime. 
His explanation is that some basic features of the romantic sublime have carried over 
because our age is "a late variant of Romanticism"; however we cannot accept the high 
spiritual search for unity in Wordsworth and Coleridge: "To please us, the sublime 
must now be abridged, reduced, and parodied as the grotesque, somehow hedged with 
irony to assure us we are not imaginative adolescents. The infinite spaces are no longer 
astonishing; still less do they terrify." Weiskel hopes to isolate the original sublime 
moment "in which a burden . .. is lifted," an original moment with "a structure beneath 
the vast epiphenomenon of the sublime." He fails to deliver on this promise, admitting 
that "It is difficult to be wholly clear about the logical status of the metaphorical moment 
we seek." He further undercuts his logic by admitting, in a postmodern tonality, that the 
very idea of an originating moment could be a fiction, a trick of rhetoric.' 
While we may accept Weiskel's thesis that the sublime must produce a 
transcendence and an influx of power, he errs to assume that such patterns cannot exist 
in a fully human context. Longinus, Kant, and Burke all recognize some wholly secular 
sublime transactions, though they would all give a high place to the religious sublime. 
Weiskel tries to attach his theory to semiotics (shifting it towards rhetoric) and also 
to Freud (shifting it towards naturalism and psychology). He states: "a general semiotic 
of the sublime would find, I think, the same discontinuity between sensation and idea 
as between idea and word—this is, at any rate, the substance of my hypothesis of fusing 
the natural and rhetorical sublimes." Pursuing his semiotic and rhetorical direction, 
Weiskel posits one mode of the sublime when some sign or thing (some signifier) has a 
strong overload, and a second mode when some meaning (the signified) is overloaded. 
Pursuing his movement toward Freud, Weiskel assumes that our age, not receptive to 
Kantian or other idealism, would be receptive to a naturalistic, "a `realist' or 
psychological account" because "many also experience the sublime whose adhesion to 
the empirical is firm to the point of scepticism toward any particular transcendent 
schema."2 Weiskel thinks we should stop talking of Kantian idealistic height and talk of 
naturalistic depth. The postmodern mind is suited to a blank wasteland metaphor, "an 
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abridgement of the sublime moment so that we are confined to the second phase and 
await futilely the restorative action which never comes, except ironically." Weiskel 
claims that to bridge the mode of an overloaded signifier, a metaphor would be called 
for, while to bridge over the mode of an overloaded meaning, metonymy would be 
suitable. He thinks the metaphor mode is negative, the metonymy mode positive.3  
Weiskel states that if the turn to restore balance from an overload masks an ulterior 
motive to serve some ideology, then the turn should be viewed as a fiction, as in the 
case of Kant Weiskel sees a positive sublime as offering a smooth reconciliation of 
conflicts, while a negative sublime maintains a sense of conflict, tension, sabotage, and 
disillusionment, an unmasking pattern. Weiskel thinks we should shift the discourse 
field to Freudian psychology, treating the sublime in terms of ego conflict, and yet 
unlike the harmonious egotistical sublime of Wordsworth, the Freudian egotistical 
sublime allows splitting and conflict, all of which can be encompassed under the 
Freudian concepts: "The sublime moment recapitulates and thereby establishes the 
Oedipus complex, whose positive resolution is the basis of culture itself." The terror 
stressed by Burke could be elided into "an unconscious fantasy of parricide." Even 
Weiskel realizes that this Freudian model would be too narrow, and that deeper than 
any Oedipus pattern would be more fundamental structures of attraction and repulsion, 
and deeper than this is a wish "to be pleasurably stimulated" Sliding his model toward 
the negative mode, Weiskel claims that even if one tried for a harmonious 
Wordsworthian egotistical sublime, that would no longer work because the concept of 
self has collapsed into "unresolved ambivalence," so that the "structure of the egotistical 
sublime ends precisely at the point of ambivalence in which we found the beginnings of 
the negative sublime." Revealing again the obvious wandering and wavering aspect of 
his thought, Weiskel observes that his psychological and naturalistic formula is useful 
"only if it is not taken too seriously."4  
Weiskel has not made a major contribution to theory of the sublime because the 
various directions of analysis are never crystallized into a coherent pattern. However, 
he has importance as an indication of the struggle by postmodern theorists to maintain 
some kind of transcendental move required in sublime experience, yet also use the 
sublime to support highly negative, sceptical, and anti-idealist points of view. Weiskel 
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tries to show that negative, ironic, and disruptive uses of the sublime are the only ones 
now possible. While it would be conceivable to apply such a model to early abstract 
expressionism (focusing on ego problems, voids, and doubts), such a negative and 
ironic sublime would not do full justice to the positive vision of these painters, though 
they have strong negative elements. 
From 1985 through 1989, Paul Crowther published a group of articles and a 
major book focused on Kantian aesthetics and theory of the sublime. From this 
launching, he has gone forward to produce a comprehensive modern critical aesthetics 
and demonstrate its value in addressing current theoretical issues and debates involving 
aesthetics and philosophy, with more to come on modem philosophic currents. A full 
and fair description of Crowther's system is beyond the scope of this study, but some 
of its core principles may be stated. Crowther, like the rest of us, is face to face with an 
age which (unfortunately) seems to be destabilizing any and all major structuralisms 
which would allow a permanent order for society, art, thought, and culture. We 
observe a peculiar will to scepticism. Crowther's thought has the great advantage of 
absorbing some of the sceptical and pluralist tonality, yet discovering deep continuities 
and permanent conditions which make for stability, while accepting to some degree 
pluralism and change factors that have come to the fore. Along the way, Crowther 
challenges most of the recent destabilizing doctrines, and by doing so, probably 
anticipates the positive turn that philosophy and theory are likely to take as a new 
century begins. 
In the broadest sense, Crowther adapts Kantian theory of beauty and sublimity to 
Merleau-Pbnty's concept of selfhood as pre-linguistic physical embodiment, and also as 
embodiment in the historically accumulated cultural field. The self as physically 
embodied opens the domain of special needs for a self-conscious embodied person, and 
the background web of culture opens the domain of cultural historicity, so that 
Crowther, using a principle of reciprocity, is able to locate a highly productive set of 
continuities and stabilizations which are, in principle, permanent. Procedurally, 
Crowther is eclectic but looks for modifications, gaps, and unrecognized implications 
which sustain his general point of view. His latest work, Mt and Embodiment, extends 
from Merleau-Ponty and develops around and towards theorizing the basic needs of 
self-consciousness, chief of which are attention, comprehension, projection, 
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reversibility, species-identity, and individual freedom. This phenomenology of self-
consciousness allows us to discover "an emergent order in human existence one which 
is orientated towards answering the needs of self-consciousness rather than those of 
physical survival alone."5 Kant features prominently in Crowther's synthesis in that 
aesthetic experience satisfies a permanent human need and greatly enhances the 
culturally mediated emergent order. Extending Kant, Crowther argues that art supplies 
to self-consciousness unique and indispensable aesthetic values which are, inescapably, 
philosophic values as well. One indication of Crowther's acceptance of becoming as it 
modifies theory (plus his insistence on continuities) lies in the ideal of "flexible 
onsiant3" which he articulates in the preface to his Critical Aesthetics and 
Eugmudomism. 6 Crowther's complex model works against both the scepticism and 
narrow reductionism which are so prominent in recent theory-building. His model of 
critical aesthetics gains a wide range of applicability because he brings together the 
theoretic assets of autonomy criteria, cross-relations, historical content, existential 
grounding, and embodiment implications; and he is strongly aware of the complex 
ethical good which lies behind productive art and thought. 
For the purposes of this study, the approach to Crowther will concentrate on his 
contribution to the theory of the sublime, keeping in mind that this type of autonomous 
aesthetic experience is one element in his overall critical perspective. A good starting 
point is Crowther's The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art. I will not try to follow 
the full analysis, but will concentrate on selected points of emphasis, on Crowther's 
modifications and enhancements of Kant's model, and on Crowther's final general 
theorizing of the sublime. 
Since Kant's conception of the sublime is connected to his ethics, Crowther 
presents Kant's ethical theory as a necessary background, before taking up the Critique 
of Judgment. Crowther notes that, for Kant, there would be a special bodily emotion of 
respect when a person rises to the sublime zone of moral duty perceived as universal 
law, yet Kant does not explain why this would have to be the case, and there is also the 
problem that many people might obey the moral law and have no sense of sublime 
respect—so that there are difficulties as Kant tries to bond morality to sublime emotion.7  
From my point of view, one interesting feature of Kant's emphasis on respect is that it 
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is a cool, calm emotion, and the stern ascent to the categorical imperative of moral law 
is also very cool. Therefore if Kant or others can successfully find a necessary 
connection between ethical choice and sublimity, this state would have a natural affinity 
with Kant's noble sublime, and would thus attach to the cool and measured moral 
vision of Plato. Crowther observes that throughout his critique of ethics, Kant uses the 
concept of the sublime only in reference to the moral law, showing perhaps a tendency 
even to limit the sublime to moral selfhood, a tendency in part based on Kant's decision 
to use morality to establish the cnicial concepts of God, freedom, and immortality. 
Crowther points out that Kant assumes "the axiological superiority of moral 
consciousness," and that "for Kant, the supersensible grounding of moral 
consciousness renders it ontologically superior to any phenomenal object or state."8 
One important issue raised by Crowther's treatment is the general stature of the moral 
sublime, obviously quite high in Kant's model. To the extent that any productive ethical 
attitude must be based on ideas of the good, the moral sublime should be seen as falling 
under the ideational sublime, though it would have an autonomous domain. This issue 
is relevant to Rothko, Newman, and Still because they work chiefly with the ideational 
sublime as it can be rooted in sensuous art forms, and they were very serious about 
moral vectors in their art. 
After this discussion of Kant's emphasis on the moral sublime in the Critique of 
Practical Reason, Crowther treats the way in which the Critique of Judgment moves the 
idea of the sublime from the moral zone into the aesthetic domain. Kant stresses that 
reflective judgments seek final ends and should yield pleasure. Crowther underlines the 
value to Kant of aesthetic reflective judgments, because in this special area "our 
pleasure in natural finality is enjoyed explicitly," whereas in non-aesthetic cases the 
pleasure could slide by unnoticed.9  The pleasure of our search for rational and moral 
finality in nature stands uniquely manifested in aesthetic judgments, thus making a link 
from nature to aesthetics to morality. An aesthetic judgment both affirms the pleasure 
and, philosophically, implicates the supersensible inner realm where all a priori 
foundations are discerned. Crowther is explaining the Kantian basis for the autonomy 
of aesthetics, as well as the philosophic value of art. 
Kant does insist that the judgment of beauty is pure, based on formal unity, but 
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Crowther crystallizes ways in which Kant connects beauty to morality: a beautiful 
object may be a symbol for the good and claim universal assent; the pleasure makes us 
aware of the superiority of our supersensible rational being; the judgment is universal 
because reflective judgments must have a universal a priori basis and are also grounded 
on a universal common sense; aesthetic judgments are analogous to moral judgments in 
immediacy, disinterestedness, and universality; and in common usage most people 
assume an analogy between beauty and morality.10 Kant does bring in art as well as 
nature. He does not say (as I would) that any painting intending to do good for the 
world is a general symbol of the good, over and beyond any internal moral content. 
Plato would say this ought to be the case. Crowther observes that moral content would 
be one feature which heightens the consciously recognized presence of the 
supersensible domain of reason and morality. By these emphases Crowther explains 
Kant's statement in the last paragraph of the Critique of Judgment that at the highest 
level, aesthetic taste is, in Kant's words, "a critical faculty that judges of the rendering 
of moral ideas in terms of sense."11 Though not as strongly as I would prefer, 
Crowther is sensitive to moral value in various elements of his critical aesthetics, and 
this is a strength. The moral vision of Rothko, Newman, and Still should not be 
abrogated, and a Kantian foundation can help explain it. However, Crowther believes 
Kant pushes the moral element too far, because a Kantian aesthetic judgment is not the 
same thing as a moral judgment. Also, Crowther finds the whole idea of subjective 
finality not invalid, but troublesomely vague.12 
After a lucid reconstruction of Kant's core concepts of the mathematical and 
dynamic sublime (the sublime of size, and of force), Crowther reconstructs Kantian 
aesthetic theory to invest it with some extensions and enrichments: the Kantian aesthetic 
experience harmonizing nature and mind would generate a unique respect for the 
material sensory manifold and also cause us to feel strongly at home in the world; Kant 
is wrong to insist on a fully disinterested aesthetic state oblivious to truth and reality, 
and wrong to restrict aesthetic response to formal surface features; and, on 
phenomenological grounds, the aesthetic cannot properly be seen "as a single mode of 
experience, but as a domain of logically and phenomenologically cognate experiences at 
once definable and differentiable in terms of their contrasting ways of embodying the 
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felt compatibility of rational cognition with the sensible world"—an approach which 
"allows us to escape from the unwarrantably restrictive definitions of the aesthetic 
propounded by traditional formalism, yet without succumbing to scepticism as to the 
vary possibility of finding criteria for the aesthetic."13 Obviously, Kant's own 
emphasis on bodily states and human faculties, plus his passion to make a place for 
moral and rational vectors, supplies a warrant for Crowther's amplifications. 
Next Crowther offers his revision of Kant's theory of the sublime, recommending 
a tighter analogy between the mathematical and dynamical sublime, the common feature 
being the pleasure of gstaiskinlyjsalizing that our intellect can transcend some vast 
physicality or infinite power, can range over something so challenging. Since an 
obvious rational component enters, we must drop the fully disinterested concept, and 
should also drop (as some of Kant's examples would imply) the Burkean insistence that 
pain or terror is always required. Crowther points out that much of the awe and 
astonishment are generated by paradox, the sense of being both chained and 
libaated.14 
Crowther moves to the important task of extending the sublime from works of 
nature to works of art. Kant confines himself almost entirely to sublime experience 
triggered by nature, but he sometimes mentions sublime art, as when he cites St 
Peter's in Rome as being sublime because it is so huge and complex, and the literary 
inscription on the Temple of his as being a peerlessly sublime content enhanced by 
artistic style. Consequently we may extrapolate to assume that a work of art may 
provoke the sense of the sublime by sufficient hugeness, complexity, and 
monumentality. Our conscious awareness of it as a thing made for a purpose is 
overwhelmed, thrust aside in the jolt of sublime impact Furthermore, since depth of 
content can reach sublimity, Kant gives us warrant to conclude that there would be a 
further range for sublimity as we complicate the con= of the work by the 
sophisticated theoretic understanding we bring to it, so that both a phenomenal impact 
and a cerebral complication would create the sublime sense of awe and wonder, both of 
them being vast and difficult to grasp.15 These deepenings of the Kantian model are 
indispensable in understanding the sublime subjects of the abstract expressionists. 
Crowther adds that Kant's sense of artistic genius would further activate the 
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qualities making for sublimity, as in the case of King Lear, following the unique laws 
of Shakespeare's genius, creating such a vast range of universality, and adding his 
stylistic splendors. However Crowther cautions that we should not restrict what type of 
subject might lend itself to sublime impact—that, for instance, a Watteau Fete plan% 
might embody an overwhelming tragic sense of transient love. This is an important 
point, causing us to be alert for explosive concepts even in a cool painter like Vermeer, 
and like Newman. The expressive vector coming from genius would need to be paired 
(from the audience's point of view) with overwhelming personal impact, so that, in a 
relatively disinterested context, the sublimity of art encompasses overwhelming scale 
and scope of the object, overwhelming conceptual content, the expressivity of genius, 
and overwhelming personal impact, with the pleasure coming from the recognized 
compatabilities between the sensible and mental worlds, which causes us to feel at 
home in the world as sensate and rational creatures.16 Since all four areas involve 
human powers, Crowther reaches a definition: "the sublime is an item or set of items 
which, through the possession or suggestion of perceptually, imaginatively, or 
emotionally overwhelming properties, succeeds in rendering the scope of some human 
capacity vivid to the senses."17 Crowther adds that—as powerful forces—war, 
capitalism, and class warfare (as Marx theorized) become possible sublime subjects.18 
At the end of his study, Crowther points to philosophic and moral values 
implicated in the experience of the sublime—philosophic in that the sublime reveals 
ontological relations, essential faculties, metaphysical concepts, and transcendent 
structures. Some necessary moral adjuncts named by Crowther (extending the Kantian 
model) seem to be indisputable: that the sublime asserts rational selfhood and thus 
engenders respect for all persons; that the various powers and excellencies met in 
sublime encounters enhance respect for the whole human race; and that the sublime, 
though essentially aesthetic, can lead to moral values.19 While Crowther does not say 
so at this point, these horizon Teachings to all of humanity would relate to his 
conception of art as enriching our sense of belonging to a hospitable world, a world-
hold meshing with body-hold. 
Some additional features must be indicated in other studies by Crowther. Since 
Burke's emphasis on emotional states points to an existential sublime centered in strong 
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but distanced physical and mental shocks that threaten life and arouse terror, Crowther 
pursues the implications of such an existential sublime for art, noting that artworks have 
distancing built in that allows for contemplative scrutiny, and that human beings seek 
out dangerous shocks of the sublime, "enjoy the dangerous thrills of the sublime for 
their own sake." Burke understood that these experiences are salutary, and we may 
properly connect such sought-out thrills to the existential boredom of so many people in 
the work-world of capitalism and state-capitalist societies. Unfortunately this need for 
shocks to relieve monotony is generally met by "shocks provided by the media-
especially television with its sports events, violent gangster programmes, horror films 
and sensational news items." However the authentic existential shock of the sublime 
goes much deeper, yielding not only escape from boredom, but also the elevation and 
rejuvenation of vital human faculties, which accompany the tragic awareness of death 
and finitude. Since all societies desire such shock relief from boredom, "What Burke 
offers, then, is the basis of an existential variety of the sublime. In it, some actual or 
represented negation of life disrupts the normal monotonous tenor of our existence and 
makes the present moment of consciousness all the more vivid."20 Crowther— 
disagreeing with those who think that shock and violence are always harmful to society-
-argues that shock materials could be morally reprehensible if they produce a general 
desensitizing of ethical concern, but that would have to be weighed against the spiritual 
value of sublime shock in relieving boredom and enhancing existence—including the 
encouragement for existential courage against the dangers and negations of life. To 
prevent both desensitizing and the film-television tendency to enfeeble the potentially 
sublime by reducing it to mere entertainment and profit, Crowther recommends the alert 
and informed public discussion of these issues through a critical aesthetics of the kind 
he has produced.21 Democracies must be vigilant and informed. 
In a further consideration of Kant, Crowther argues that we need not accept 
Kant's claim that natural objects themselves cannot be sublime. Kant could have saved 
himself from this restriction by observing that a natural object has intrinsic features 
which call up the very zone of supersensible reason, morality, and freedom that he 
wants to invoke. To allow for the sublimity of a sensible item, including art objects, 
Crowther supplements Kant's morally focused theory with sensory grounding.22 Even 
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if some find Kant's idealism too extreme, this would not, Crowther declares, invalidate 
his acute universalist insight that, in sublime encounters, concepts of reason 
successfully bridge over some overwhelming shock of the sublime. There is no way to 
rule out rational capacities because the human hold on world and experience always 
involves the reciprocity between sensible and rational. Also it should be accepted that 
universalizing judgments are appropriate, since other people (with the same body-hold 
and needs) will have to experience objective sublimicist features the same way we do. 
Crowther is right to claim that his search for deeper and wider lix.iproaties carries 
forward the hallmark Kantian method of synthesis.23  
Crowther makes the important point that the postmodan theoreticians hostile to 
the idea of the aesthetic fail to see that the concept of the relatively disinterested sublime 
has practical value for understanding unstable and ungraspable social groups in conflict, 
for shielding analysts from despair, and for maintaining the ideal of consensus 
emerging from rugged conflict.24 Crowther points to a set of flexible constants that 
give some stability—such things as ontological reciprocity and embodiment, the 
uniqueness of embodied subjects and the genuine newness of individually stylized 
perception, the necessity for sense of self, the powers of individuals to resist social 
conformity, the energizing connections to historical fields, disclosures of finitude and 
redemptive possibilities, workings of empathy, and patterns of synthesis—none of these 
being merely linguistic structures. Such constants do not negate the obvious truth that, 
through history, the contextual field keeps growing, emerging, and changing. For 
Crowther, not every mighty something is sublime, but only those "which succeed in 
both engaging and stimulating our cognitive capacities."25  
Some indication has already been given of Crowther's focus in end 
Waling= on the needs of self-consciousness. I am not trying to sketch his full 
aesthetic theory, but to concentrate on his analysis of the sublime. However in this 
work (as we would expect from aesthetic theory) Crowther gives detailed attention to 
the special powers and advantages that art possesses as it, through distancing, brackets 
values off for heightened awareness and richest contemplation, the ways in which 
excellent art, superior to philosophy and far above kitsch, offers an "image of human 
experience itself," such that via symbolically significant sensuous manifold, art 
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how that reciprocity of sensibility and reason, and the individual and collective, 
which are fundamental to embodied subjectivity."26 The root idea is that the ontology 
of art is homologous to the ontology of integrated human life, as philosophy would not 
be. 
While I cannot pursue this in detail, some items bear strongly on the crucial 
concept of transcendence in theory of the sublime. For Crowther, art works achieve an 
overcoming of personal and cultural antagonisms, which gives to art its unique mode of 
redemption. However, this overcoming of finitude cannot, in his view, take us as high 
as a postulated timeless Platonic world. We are not transported, in sublime art, by 
Platonic absolute universals. However, the logical categories used by the intellect in 
grasping sublime experience are natural kinds that endure through aeons, so that we can 
be elevated from the existential to the aeonic; thus sublime art creates a reciprocity 
between finite and trans-finite. One pleasure of the sublime is the victory over 
astonishing size or power, and another is the pleasure and transcendence achieved in 
seeing something as "the perfect specimen of a natural kind." This reference to a 
concept would take the experience out of pure beauty into the Kantian zone of 
dependent beauty and to the sublime. Such reconciliations and quasi-eternal 
transcendencies yield a secular theory for the redemptive powers of art, which 
Crowther calls "our secular immortality."27 In two more specific comments on the 
sublime, Crowther notes that postmodernism tends to shift the setting for sublime 
experience to urban life and the world of techno-science, and that postmodern audiences 
have a special affinity for the sublime, "a sensibility orientated towards the disruptions 
of the sublime rather than the felicities of the beautiful."28 This is why sublimicist 
thought can be productive in the search for consensus features that bridge over and 
synthesize the rugged ideological clashes and pluralisms of the contemporary world, 
assuming of course that the disruptions can come to some kind of larger encompassing 
pates• 
Lyotard's theory of the sublime is certainly designed for an epoch obsessed with 
techno-science. For him, the sublime is our only salvation because it keeps alive 
metaphysical thinking (presenting the unpresentable) in an age when all legitimating 
narratives that might stabilize culture have been shattered. Paradoxically, Lyotard 
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defends, in his way, a kind of Platonic idealism floating above the unreliable real 
world, yet not sharing the crucial principle of Plato and Aristotle that the ideal Forms 
have explanatory consonance with reality and yield true knowledge. Lyotard's floating 
world is made possible by the lift of the sublime. 
Appropriately, Lyotard's most clarifying statement 'Presenting the Unpresentable: 
The Sublime," came in an art journal.29 The basic thesis is that the modern world of 
data-gathering, efficiency-worshipping, wealth-seeking, techno-scientific, ruthless 
capitalism is destroying soul and spirit (using photography as its tool) and the only 
hope of salvation lies in avant-garde artists and philosophers who resist this new 
leviathan by fundamental questioning of the very nature of art and the very nature of 
thought. These radical scepticisms demand the use of ideas, and a powerful idea 
belongs in a spiritual absolute realm which cannot be fully presented (as Kant 
understood) by any clear image or clear understanding. Therefore avant-garde painters 
and philosophers share the common necessity of presenting the unpresaitable, bringing 
art and philosophy fully into the domain of the sublime. Their whole project is sublime. 
This conception of the sublime originates with Nietzsche: an entire project of art and 
philosophy presenting a higher fictional world of value. 
Lyotard locates a great contemporary demon in capitalism merged into technology 
and free-market strategies; and his thought allows that socialism can remain a valid, 
Utopian, absolute dream no matter how much it is defeated in real politics and real 
society. He hopes to help a modern confused world shore fragments against ruin. 
Photography, for Lyotard, functions as the nemesis of sublimity because it 
crushes painting: "Painting's impossibility arises from the industrial and postindustrial--
tedmo-scientific—world's greater need for photography than for painting." Lyotard 
believes that painting attained its true place of honor in the Renaissance when, under 
"Neoplatonic inspiration," it gave citizens and nation their sense of identity in a 
reasoned and orderly world. Sublime and absolute ideas were wedded to the sensory 
forms of paintings. Yet the new technocratic capitalists care nothing about spiritual 
ideology. They do have their sense of infinity, but it is only the consumer-focused 
"infinite ability of science, of technology, of capitalism, to realize." Photography can 
publicize efficiently every new product on the market, can easily prostitute itself to The 
hardness of industrial beauty," and thus photography jettisons the original noble task of 
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painting to bring citizens into the ideal but unpresentable worlds of value and 
philosophy. A photograph presents what j presentable, the hard surface beauty of a 
new object for consumption.30  
Painting, reeling from this triumph of photography, but still keeping alive, in the 
avant-garde, the desire to reach some kind of ideational paradise, finds no solid world 
of belief, and therefore can only question painting itself as its metaphysical project—just 
as philosophy can only question thinking itself. In our time, Lyotard believes, "there 
are no consistent symbols for good, just, true, infinite, etc."31  
In spite of the general state of doubt, for Lyotard, modern painters must keep alive 
the honorable thrusting toward the sublime: "That which is not demonstrable is that 
which stems from Ideas. . . . The universe is not demonstrable; neither is humanity, the 
end of history, the moment, the species, the good, the just, etc.—or, according to Kant, 
absolutes in general." Serious avant-garde painters must continue to strive to use 
abstract means to mesh with Kant's "negative presentation" of the unpresentable, to 
make "ungraspable allusions to the invisible within the visible"; and "The sublime is the 
sense that these works draw upon, not the beautiful" Even when the questing painters 
fail, "and even if that causes suffering, a pure gratification will emerge from the 
tension."32 
Interestingly, Lyotard scorns postmodern architecture for giving up on profound 
experimentation and dialectic, for accepting a feeble "eclecticism of consumerism," for 
selling out to the present state of techno-scientific culture, for catering to "the sensibility 
of the supermarket shopper," for caving in before this "menace" which "implies the 
corruption of painting's honor." For Lyotard, the crisis is too deep for the relaxed 
pursuit of quaint architectural playfulness, and for the relaxed pursuit of the beautifuL 
"The spirit of the times is surely not that of the pleasant its mission remains that of the 
immanent sublime, that of alluding to the nondemonstrable." The radically questioning 
philosopher dares to call the avant-garde painters "his brothers and sisters in 
experimentation."33  
Lyotard's position may be more fully understood by considering three of his 
books, IbLEQ§IMMICOLEalabig The Postmodern Condition, and Lessons on the 
Analytic of the Sublime. Thtiminsslizalsigainzi is crafted, interestingly, as letters 
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to children. Lyotard explains that serious art is always threatened when any single party 
takes control, or capital takes control. Science, capitalism, and techno-science forge an 
unholy trinity encouraging a bleak materialism, the "escape of reality from the 
metaphysical, religious, and political assurances the mind once believed it possessed" 
Kant's theory of the sublime is indispensable, because "the aesthetic of the sublime is 
where modern art (including literature) finds its impetus, and where the logic of the 
avant-garde finds its axioms." Modern painting is in search of techniques for 
"presenting the existence of something unpresentable. Showing that there is something 
we can conceive of which we can neither see nor show—this is the stake of modern 
painting."34  
Lyotard presents avant-garde painters as those who undermine realism and all 
simple gazing at the surface of museum objects. Thus the artists have "humiliated and 
disqualified reality"—a project he locates correctly in the vision of abstract painters such 
as Newman. Lyotard's turn away from nature is important. Two marks of modernity 
are postulated by Lyotard: a passive nostalgic mode of melancholic regret for the 
absence of significant presence, and a zestful =ado mode of bold experiment, the 
former seen in Proust and German expressionism, the latter in Joyce, Braque, and 
Picasso. In Joyce, the writing (the signifier) "makes us discern the unpresentable." This 
carries forward the suggestions of Longinus and Kant that style is a resource for the 
sublime. Lyotard points out that &Igo in art creates these two modes of modernity, 
so that "allusion . . is perhaps an indispensable mode of expression for works that 
belong to the aesthetic of the sublime."35  
Lyotard, like Crowther, has his own rejection of formalism: it signals the weak 
retreat into the merely pleasant (a cowardice in a time of total crisis). Formalism avoids 
the agony of the true sublime. When the nostalgia for absence takes consolation in 
pleasant form, this is not the true sublime, which must include both a pain and a 
pleasure breaking beyond form, "a pleasure in reason exceeding all presentation." 
Crowther and Lyotard both defend the authority of reason, but for Lyotard, it cannot 
take us anywhere, it can only stay alive in a wasteland. For Lyotard, postmodern artists 
and philosophers must be iconoclasts who shatter and destabilize: "The postmodern 
would be that which in the modern invokes the unpresentable in presentation itself, that 
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which refuses the consolation of correct forms, refuses the consensus of taste 
permitting a common experience of nostalgia for the impossible, and inquires into new 
presentations—not to take pleasure in them, but to better produce the feeling that there is 
something unpresentable." Thus "The artist and the writer therefore work without rules 
in order to establish rules for what will hays been made." Ina sense, Lyotard is full of 
the wildness of Nietzsche. Lyotard remains somewhat in Nietzsche's anarchic stage, 
but unlike Nietzsche, he makes anarchy permanent, because when he condemns 
nostalgia for what is "impossible," the impossible is any kind of universalist vision of 
purpose and value which could unify cultures and selves. Lyotard makes this clear 
when he declares: "the answer is this: war on totality. Let us attest to the unpresentable; 
let us activate the differends and save the honor of the name."36 The differends are 
those saving layers which Ideas project out beyond material reality, as well as between 
different language games. Lyotard's rebuttal of Hegel is that no total conceptions will 
ever return, yet the sublime is our sacred weapon to keep spirit itself alive in an age in 
which spirit does not know, cannot know, what values and beliefs to celebrate. 
Lyotard comments that his earlier work, The Postmodern Condition, was flawed 
in that it gave too large a place to narrative as the only way to legitimate a given specific 
idealism for society. Science has no narrative, and the present authority voice, 
capitalistic techno-science, has no narrative. However, Lyotard repeats his basic claim 
that all of the great legitimating narratives have collapsed: the Christian dream, the 
Western enlightenment dream of human emancipation through reason and freedom, the 
Marxist dream of the emancipation of labor. Science is perceived as undermining its 
own optimism, and techno-science has no need of narrative, thriving on efficiency and 
success, paying no attention to what is "good, just, or true." Justice is a major concern 
for Lyotard, and he claims that the religious route "is far from being just."37  
Lyotard, coming strongly into the postmodern concept of culture as language 
games, develops the thesis that language itself can legitimate, without narratives of 
origin, simply by the realization that linguistic phrases are givens. They just show up as 
novel events. Phrases are used to situate individual identities and referents. Phrases 
have been misused in cultures based on heroes and myths, misused to support 
totalitarian dreams. For Lyotard, the legitimate governments are "Republican" and 
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"deltherative." They might seem paralyzed by encouraging diverse views and a "play" 
between phrase families (linguistic communities). But somehow, not in a logical 
fashion, they can ask "What ought we to be" (a search for an unpresentable sublime), 
and somehow produce an answer, identify friends and foes, by just some prescription 
of an ought, with no need for a legitimating narrative. This is Lyotard's own political 
and social dream. It is rather dismaying for him to declare that there are no norms for 
goodness or justice, just some arbitrary assertion of will. Nietzsche has, partially, been 
absorbed. What hurts Lyotard is that his favorite enemy, techno-science, has 
deliberated and has asserted by fiat an ideal, proceeding to give it control through its 
own "phrase regime." Lyotard can say that we ought to protect, somehow, a plurality 
of discourse communities, but this is a vague and hapless position. He hopes that 
somehow, order will fall out of multiplicity. Again, however, Lyotard can be very 
helpful. He states that the grand stake, the first stake, for a culture is asking a question, 
"What ought we to be?" This priority for a question that founds an "ought" gives a 
powerful moral center to Lyotard's thought. Bringing moral thinking to the fore, he 
correctly asserts that the actual does not incapacitate the ought "One cannot deduce 
what a people ought to be from what it is today." Whatever kind of new ideal some 
reflective republic can declare by fiat, the sublime sensibility (not needing empirical 
proof) can communicate it by analma.38 Though Lyotard does not give examples, a 
good one would be, "The Kingdom of Heaven is like unto a mustard seed." 
Lyotard agrees with Kant that this openness to the sublime grows from high 
culture and must be acquired through culture. And he emphasizes his sense of pluralism 
by declaring that all dogma and all hegemony should be resisted "without forming a 
new 'front,'" but by supporting a multiplicity of "micrologie&" There is no politics of 
the sublime, "But there is an aesthetic of the sublime in politics." Political conflict is one 
field for sublime appreciation, suggested, Lyotard claims, by the fact that even 
disinterested people thrilled to the French Revolution.39 This is not nearly as good an 
example as that disinterested people would thrill to the political decisions that have 
created great museums of art. 
The combination of melodrama and pessimistic crisis is distinctive in Lyotard. He 
condemns thinkers like Sartre, Chomsky, Negri, and Foucault for seeking some 
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hopeful philosophy and not accepting the total "vacancy of the place once occupied by 
intellectuals." The Lyotardesque melodrama appears in statements such as Nazism 
"burns" the avant-garde, while capitalism, "without any concern for legitimation, by 
pursuing the disintegration of the modern social bond, the community of citizens," 
delivers the avant-garde "muzzled to the culture industry." He continues his scorn for 
postmodern architecture, calling its multiple quotations from earlier periods a feeble 
"bricolage" based on a dishonorable rejection of modernist idealism, a rejection of the 
"ideal of the progressive realization of social and individual emancipation encompassing 
all humanity."40 Lyotard is at his best when his distinctive accolade for the sublime is 
joined to his own moral imperative. He is important, partly, for understanding that 
sublimity is not separable from morality, though, as with Crowther, that does not entail 
that moral judgments are not separable from aesthetic judgments. In fact, Lyotard's 
"phrase regimes" would set off aesthetic phrases from ethical phrases. 
Lyotard claims that his war against collapsed or misguided hegemonies, his 
championing of avant-garde questioning and restless going beyond, has emphasized 
"the moment of dissent," making a system of "critical rationalism"—somewhat similar in 
spirit to Crowther's critical aesthetics, yet thoroughly pervaded by negativity.41 
It must be emphasized that Lyotard, to the discomfort of Marxists, condemns to 
failure both liberalism and Marxism.42 It does not favor Marxism or other strong 
ideologies when Lyotard insists that at the moment, paralysis is everywhere, and no 
new viable positive theory is in sight Revealing an important closeness to Crowther, 
Lyotard insists that what is required, what we do not have, is a metaphysical system 
that recognizes basic human needs, "needs for security, identity, and happiness."43  
Interestingly, Lyotard sets writing against language, proclaiming that in our current 
state of negativity, writing allows the project of the sublime: "One wants to say what it 
does not know how to say, but what one imagines it should be able to say."44  
We have noted Lyotard's desire for "thrown out" phrases with no origin. The 
avant-garde is always beginning anew, which is the task of writing as opposed to 
language. Lyotard claims that writers (we may include painters) preserve true 
"initiation" events, with an ontological function included: not to "tarnish the wonder that 
(something) is happening," and thus to protect the deep moments "from what is 
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customary or understood"—a role made to order for the sublime.45 To use Crowther's 
term, we might locate two aeonic constants in Lyotard: basic human needs and the 
sublimicist imperative for Utopian metaphysical speculation and innovation. 
Since in Lyotard's view reason, for the time being, cannot decide what to hope 
for, we can hope only for a saving residue felt in "the unconscious body" as a 
"sensibility" that can be "communal." This is the sensibility of the sublime, and through 
it, though we are entrapped in a new capitalist-technocratic barbarism, we can maintain 
"the responsibility of resisting and bearing witness," can resist technology by using its 
forms "in an attempt to bear witness to what really matters: the childhood of an 
encounter, the welcome extended the marvel that (something) is happening, the respect 
for the event:46 
 We must accept "doing no more than making a start.47 That start is, 
for Lyotard, the sublimicist transcendental moment articulated by Kant. Lyotard's 
advice to negate almost everything and do almost nothing explains why Wlad Godzich 
has aptly called him "the wild man, albeit the gentlest kind, of French philosophy for 
nearly twenty years."48 While dramatizing wholesale collapse and despair, he uses the 
sublime to keep alive the revolutionary mentality. 
Lyotard's explanations in The Postmodern Explained contain almost all of the 
important ideas from his earlier The Postmodern Condition. Yet a few points from the 
earlier work are noteworthy. Lyotard cautions that in the hegemony of capitalistic 
techno-science, selves will be defined as "located at a post through which various kinds 
of messages pass"; to help ward off the danger of such a world we should strive to give 
citizens at large full access to computer banks. He warns that when university 
professors (who could keep alive sublimicist thinking) allow themselves to be judged 
by efficiency, outcomes, and performance criteria (added to the fact that they allocate 
but do not control funds), they enslave themselves to the techno-scientific managers, 
turning away from the sublime task of "the realization of the Idea or the emancipation of 
men."49  
Lyotard traces the collapse of science to problematics in Plato's dialogues. As 
science and other narratives of coherence disintegrate (Lyotard here recognizes 
Nietzsche's nihilism), people would fall into great pessimism and barbarity except for 
the saving hope that a new "legitimation can only spring from their own linguistic 
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practice and communication interaction." In short, no one can stop them from throwing 
out some new phrases, some "new statement" profoundly revolutionary.50 
 
As a rule, Lyotard insists that each narrative or phrase regime is sealed off so that 
some non-scientific narrative cannot be judged by the ideas of science, which would 
seem to deny overlap between sublime territories. However, he admits that science does 
condemn folk narratives as "savage, primitive, undeveloped," making for "the entire 
history of cultural imperialism from the dawn of Western civilization? Yet he also 
declares that it is "impossible to judge the existence or validity of narrative knowledge 
on the basis of scientific knowledge and vice versa? In other words, science does 
judge other language communities, but the judgments are not valid. Under Lyotard's 
model there can be no consensus, yet he admits that all organizing narratives are 
designed to create social consensus. As a practical matter, in an age of doubt, he 
believes that somehow, "We must thus arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is not 
linked to that of consensus."51 This does not seem possible. A coherent philosophy 
(some form of Lyotard's envisioned Idea) will have to make sharp and negative cross-
cultural judgments, or lose its legitimation. Lyotard's rejection of judgments across 
phrase families weakens his own negative judgments about capitalism and techno-
science, as it would also weaken his condemnation of religions and Neo-Platonism. 
Scepticisms tend to weaken truth claims, and there will be a loss in judgmental force 
when, as Godzich claims for Lyotard, the costito is replaced by the dubito.52 
Lyotard's Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime explains why he leans so 
heavily on Kant, whose theory of the sublime is connected to "die transport that leads 
all thought (critical thought included) to its limits? The Kantian sublime is "a sudden 
blazing, and without future. Thus it is that it acquired a future and addresses us still, we 
who hardly hope in the Kantian sense." Kant perceived that "the sublime feeling is only 
the irruption in and of thought of this deaf desire for limitlessness? Lyotard conceives 
of sublime subreption as the trick which averts horror, "subverts it and turns it into 
admiration and respect for an unpresentable Idea? Kant's sublime points to the exalting 
principle that before all the operations of reason, "there is thought," and "this is 
absolute? The feeling of the sublime "is neither moral universality nor aesthetic 
universalization, but is, rather, the destruction of one by the other in the violence of 
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their differend"53 
 
Lyotard, as revolutionary, likes the violence of the sublime, using it to connect 
sublimity to morality. A specific virtue is not violent, but morality in general is violent 
through "its resistance to temptation, its triumph over them, reducing them to naught." 
Lyotard often takes up the idea that while a moral judgment lies in a different field from 
the sublime, there are genuine relations without a mixing of categories. There are 
analogies between the sublime and the moral, which allow a kind of jump from one 
category into the other, though analogy is not a true bridge. However "Kant is well 
aware that the cousinship between the good and the sublime is closer than that between 
the beautiful and the sublime." When the perceiver of the sublime resorts to reason, the 
self enters the supersensible domain where practical moral reason holds sway; thus the 
sublime "furnishes practical reason the opportunity to reinforce its hold on thought and 
to extend its power according to its facultary interest," a situation in which "reason can 
in effect render almost 'intuitable' . . . to thought the Idea of its true destination, which 
is to be moral." Lyotard adds the interesting idea that the sacrifice of imagination and 
nature at the altar of reason generates an aura of the sacred: "By sacrificing itself, the 
imagination sacrifices nature, which is aesthetically sacred, to exalt holy law," and 
"when one lights the beautiful on fire, the sign of the good rises from its ashes." 
Because the sublime is violent, it can perform a major service for the good, even though 
the two are only cousins.54  Thus from the broadest point of view (somewhat like 
Nietzsche) Lyotard gives to the sublime the whole human program of thought as a 
transcendental enterprise, the whole program of breaking out of existing world-views to 
establish new foundations of value and belief, but he attaches the sublime more to Idea 
than to art, unless we can find in Lyotard the evidence that he, like Nietzsche, 
construes ideas as artistic fictions. Lyotard gives these great tasks to the sublime, but 
makes it difficult for the work to proceed in the postmodern world because, while we 
know how to start a new philosophy (using sublimicist sensibility to throw out new 
phrases of sublime violence), we do not know which philosophy to start•, yet in our 
confusion we might stumble on some useful idea of pluralistic justice to soothe the 
troubled waters while we wait. Lyotard's thought is noble and in its way hopeful, yet in 
its way it is also greatly paralyzed.55 
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Frances Ferguson's contribution to sublimicist theory is difficult to pin down 
because she launches a contradictory project of trying to maintain an allegiance to Kant, 
and also to deconstruction theory. She wants to blend transcendental idealism with the 
theories that reject ii A second source of difficulty in understanding Ferguson is that 
many sentences are unclear, a trait which further aligns her with deconstructionists like 
Paul de Man. However there is a final judgment about Ferguson that seems reasonable: 
she yields so much ground to rhetorical problematization that she comes close to 
viewing the sublime and human nature as rhetorical constructs. While she repeatedly 
claims that she wants to maintain the on-going value of the sublimicist theory of Burke 
and Kant, she does this by following the deconstructive mode of finding in the sublime 
not a source of any victorious and transcendent resolution of difficulty, but rather a site 
for the enactment of rhetorical problematics. Weiskel at least hopes for psychological 
constants, and Lyotard at least has a master concept of a cultural ought, but when 
Ferguson is in danger of reaching some clear affirmative ground, she habitually seems 
to undermine it, which may of course be part of her purpose. 
Ferguson is aware of her contradictory impulses. Indeed, in the introduction to her 
main study, Solitude and the Sublime, she admits that the clarifications she forces on 
Burke and Kant are taken away as she brings in recent linguistic and deconstructive 
theory.56 However, in spite of confessions of contradictions, Ferguson also writes as 
if she has one constant intellectual commitment to defend Kantian idealism (which she 
calls formalism) against both Burkean empiricism and the anti-idealist tendencies of 
Derrida, de Man, and other deconstructionists. Ferguson might have moved against two 
arguments that materialism launches against formalist Kantian idealism: that empiricism 
overcomes idealism or that idealism harbors a kind of self-deluding empiricism. 
However, in preparation for her own undermining of Kant, Ferguson finds that the real 
interest in Kantian idealism resides not in problems resolved, but in "the question of 
individuation," or "how can there be one of anything." Apparently Ferguson makes this 
strange reduction of Kant because what she really wants to talk about is the nature of 
self in relation to society, especially the theoretic ambiguity surrounding this 
problem.57  
Operating like a deconstructionist, Ferguson seeks some troublesome site of 
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aporia in the sublimicist theory of Burke and Kant. Sublime experience requires the 
activation of mental constructs. Ferguson notes that Burke treats mental images "first as 
if they were the affective traces of objects and then as if they were objects themselves"; 
thus Burke has difficulties because the increasingly non-material mental images make 
empirical experience "virtually illegible," rendering "the testimony of the senses its own 
skeptical double"—a conflation shared by "recent deconstructive and historicist 
criticism." Thus Burke's materialism is weakened as the role of linguistically mediated 
mental images is strengthened. This is a possible criticism of materialism, but it is not 
closely connected to Burke's sublimicism. Ferguson does from time to time defend 
Kant, pointing out here that Kant correctly resolves this problem by giving everything 
to mental images and formal mental categories. Because Kant construes "aesthetic form 
as a regulative structure," he makes epistemology "parasitic on form." Ferguson would 
like to believe this since she wants aesthetics to govern epistemology: "I argue that 
aesthetic formalism (rightly) insists that the material can only count as matter at all 
through the operation of prior systematic articulations of human agency." Kant might 
well agree that matter has no status except in terms of categories of mind, but Kant 
would base this conclusion on his own epistemology, not on his aesthetic theory. This 
is one of numerous places at which Ferguson seems axentric.58  
Ferguson obviously has been influenced by the reader-response theory that 
became wide-spread somewhat before deconstruction thought. Reader-response is 
another way to cancel the intent of the artist and to problematize the separate objective 
identity of the art object—strategies that Ferguson thinks she should support. Therefore 
she finds aporia in Kant, claiming (wrongly) that Kant completely identifies the sublime 
with nature, thus minimizing affective response, failing to see that "the viewer's or 
auditor's response may be necessary to constitute the experience as 	 c."59 This is 
a strange comment in that Kant gives the sublime not to nature but to the viewer's 
subjective response via inner concepts of reason. We must assume that Ferguson wants 
to assert reader-response theory at all cost. Since audience-response is linguistically 
mediated, this theory shifts the ground away from art objects and artistic creators. 
Ferguson ties Burkean empiricism to deconstruction in a rather odd way: 
deconstructionists take away selves and external objects so that (thanks to rhetoric) 
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nothing material is left except the marks of letters on the page. We have "writing-as-
mark," not "writing-as-reference"; thus "Ironically, deconstruction. . . converts the 
analysis of the beautiful and the sublime into a modern variant of the empirical model 
that Burke established for it."60 Again, this is peculiar forcing, in that the 
deconstructionists would strongly reject the psychological constants that are the essence 
of Burke's aesthetics. Ferguson makes no objection when she points out that the "self-
reflexive" rhetorical world of the deconstructionists allows them to interpret "Kant's 
discussion of aesthetics as so many backhanded and implicit arguments against the 
viability of ideas of unity and autonomy for art objects as well as individuals? 
Ferguson thinks we can keep the virtues of Kant's formalistic idealism and wed it to the 
deconstruction logic that "keeps the formal constructive process from being able to 
close."61 Closure (based on the Derrida-deconstructionist rationale) is impossible 
because our discussions occur in texts that fade out infinitely at the margins into other 
texts, so that self-reflexive rhetoricity (allowing no firm knowledge or contact with 
reality) is inescapable. 
In the Kantian formalist account of the sublime, from Ferguson's perspective, the 
solitude of the perceiver "represents the difficulties of arriving at any account of any ong 
whatever outside a process of systematic formalization," while for Burke, beauty 
becomes a positive social form resisted by sublimity, which is the "dysfunctional social 
form that enables society to continue by providing illusions of individuality."62 It is 
Ferguson, not Burke, who calls them illusions. Again, we get the impression that 
Ferguson wants to use the sublimicist theory of Kant and Burke as a site for raising 
problems about the individual, society, the aesthetic, and the epistemological, so that 
the rhetorical discourse of Kant and Burke can seem relevant to and compatible with the 
deconstructive discourse. Other than appreciating the value and importance of 
deconstruction, Ferguson tries, not very clearly, to explain the second half of her 
project "Ultimately, the subject of this book is the way in which the aesthetic 
discussion that emerged in the eighteenth century located an anxiety about the 
relationship between the individual and the type, the particular and the general, not 
merely as one epistemological problem among others but as thc characteristically 
aesthetic epistemological problem? Ferguson's use of "anxiety" reveals her concern to 
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find problem areas.63 
In an article on the Burkean sublime, Ferguson at the start points to Wordsworth's 
appreciation of "disputed" meanings, and Coleridge's awareness that conceptions of 
pleasure are "equivocal." Ferguson finds a problem for Burke when he uses "linguistic 
practice" as his evidence (not empiricism). Ferguson, not objecting to de Man's 
position that there is nothing except a "rhetorical sublime," notes that Burke makes use 
of both ordinary language and literary language for evidence, adding the peculiar point 
that Burke does not lean on language as being true and mating contact with real objects, 
but rather leans on the "obscurity" of language. Burke of course does find sublimity in 
obscurity, but certainly does not embrace the rhetoricity that Ferguson implies. 
Ferguson apparently turns fully deconstructionist when she writes that it would be 
"churlish" to chide Burke for implying "rhetoricity" and "subversiveness" because the 
Enquiry has itself preceded us in this gesture." Burke relies on "conventions of 
reading" and "offers narratives about" sublime or beautiful objects, as well as lacing the 
Enquiry "with quotations which are explicitly rhetorical." Ferguson justifies Burke's 
inaccuracy in quotations because the integrity of other texts has "no force" when set 
beside Burke's own "affective" rhetorical strategy. This is one of the many unfortunate 
features of deconstructive rhetoricity: misreadings are celebrated as normative. 
Ferguson ends by emphasizing properly Burke's sense of the beautiful as weakening 
and the sublime as strengthening. It is no accident that Ferguson concentrates on these 
"power relationships," bringing her article closer to current deconstruction thought and 
to political correctness.64  
In Ferguson's chief work on practical criticism, she gives away her deconstructive 
and rhetorical bent in her title: Wordsworth: Language As Counter-Spirit--a peculiar title 
in that Ferguson gives Wordsworth's remark that language must never be allowed to 
function as counter-spirit, Wordsworth's point being that words must truly represent 
thoughts, otherwise language becomes, Wordsworth declares, a "counter-spirit, 
unremittingly and noiselessly at work to derange, to subvert, to lay waste, to vitiate, 
and to dissolve." Having given her own blessing to deconstructive rhetoricity, 
Ferguson cannot allow Wordsworth to mean what he says; therefore she argues that 
Wordsworth's own ambiguous language sabotages his idealism, creating what is 
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simultaneously both "spirit and counter-spirit" In their actual language use the 
romantics "commit themselves to the antinomy as a constant mode of perception. The 
erosion of the notion of unity becomes an inevitable corollary of the Romantic 
allegorizing of language." Since the experience of cosmic unity is the core of the 
sublime for Wordsworth and Coleridge, Ferguson, in her typical manner, tries to make 
them relevant by undermining their basic beliefs, using rhetoricity as the tool for this 
inversion, reinterpreting them as subverting the unity of external objects, self, and 
cosmos. Faced with the sublimicist affirmation at the end of Wordsworth's immortality 
ode, Ferguson comments: "The almost universal invocation of the last three stanzas 
speaks of continuities and connections, but it affirms these connections in a rhetoric 
which suspends itself over a gap in demonstrable truth." Ferguson embraces Derrida in 
her claim that the Lucy poems, in effect, renounce the stability of selves and objects 
because "In such a poetic universe, language must increasingly do without the 
imaginary anchors of justification and grounding."65  
A final look at Ferguson's criss-cross methodology may center, appropriately, on 
Wordsworth's own fragmentary essay about the sublime. After giving Wordsworth's 
claim that in the authentic sublime experience, the mind should soar above multiplicity 
to an"intense unity," Ferguson declares: "Yet the multiplicity and nature of the qualities 
which he requires of sublime objects--individual form, duration, and power, all 
coexisting—tend to erode the internal unity of the objects with which the mind is to 
establish 'intense unity.' Thus, while we might see the mind's 'union' with sublime 
natural objects as an effort to impute to itself (temporarily) a stability and continuity 
which it lacks, Wordsworth is repeatedly drawn to examples which are those of 
opposition and resistance."66  Since Ferguson does recognize some kind of subjective 
entity as audience, and since she keeps talking about self and society, it would not be 
correct that she fully endorses a "merely rhetorical" sublime, yet she constantly leans in 
that direction, and may fairly be seen as a representative of the postmodernist and 
deconstructive mentality which would reduce the sublime to nothing more than 
rhetorical construct. She treats the sublime, the aesthetic, and the self as sites of 
contradiction and ambiguity, due chiefly to the power of rhetoric to construct all 
putative truths, beliefs, realities, and agents. If the sublime becomes no more than a 
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dramatic but fictive way of using language, then obviously no authentic sublime is left, 
since there can be no real transcendence and no genuine selves to experience it.67  
Ferguson, Weiskel, Crowther, and Lyotard are obviously helpful in the 
establishment of an adequate context for approaching the sublimicism of the abstract 
expressionists. Crowther's thought is more affirmative and philosophically positive 
(with cognizance taken of the current attraction for a negative sublime), while the other 
three are strongly marked by the general recent climate of scepticism and anti-idealism, 
offering support for those who might want to slant the works of Rothko, Newman, and 
Still toward postmodern assumptions. 
In the case of Weiskel, such a postmodern orientation could utilize his key 
concepts of the retreat of God, the decline of transcendental idealism, the emergence of 
a problematical secondary sublime featuring diminishment and parody, the attraction to 
semiotics and Freudian psychological naturalism, the assumption that ideology is 
fictive, and the assumption of the collapse of the vision of a unified self. Yet such a 
negative and pessimistic sublimicism could not do justice to Rothko, Newman, and 
Still, who (while they clearly understand the truth of declining spirituality and 
traditional idealism) do not yield to the sceptical voids, but rather try (in tune with 
modernism) to fill the voids with new kinds of belief and value. However, to the credit 
of Weiskel, he understands clearly that the sublime always requires transcendence, as 
we have seen in his comment "The essential claim of the sublime is that man can . . . 
transcend the human." It is better to say that the sublime requires major and astonishing 
transcendence from one zone to another, in some cases involving the human and 
natural, in some cases the supernatural. In all cases there is a kind of mysticism, if we 
mean by that a deep sense of spiritual reaching out in relation to some kind of Other—
which could be some rich and surprising painting whose contents seem touched with at 
least quasi-eternal values. There is always the prospect of sublime ideas energized by 
devices of form and style. 
In the case of Ferguson, the serious limitation is also excessive negativity, the 
moving too far toward a fundamental problematization of all discourse, too far toward a 
conception of language as sabotage, too far toward a rejection of closure, and too far 
toward the unwarranted rejection of stable, autonomous, and morally responsible 
selfhood. On the credit side for Ferguson (and supportive of abstract expressionist 
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perspectives) is Ferguson's desire to keep the older sublimicist discourse in play (such 
as that of Kant and Wordsworth) and to maintain focus on the theory of selfhood, 
refusing to completely abandon some genuine sense of the subjective agent. These are 
important theoretic assets. 
In the case of Lyotard, what we might call the seal of negativity lies upon several 
of his key assumptions: the collapse of coherence-yielding narratives, including 
Marxism; the peculiar state of having the sublime power to utter novel phrases for a 
new order but not knowing what to say; the acceptance of radical scepticism for the 
languages of art and philosophy; the hopeless dream of some social justice not 
connected to or justified by any coherent ethical or political theory; and the failure to see 
that cultures need homogeneity as well as diversity. On the positive side (and thus 
applicable to the positive visions of Rothko, Newman, and Still) are six major doctrines 
in the thought of Lyotard: that culturally integrating phrases must exhibit a moral com 
that sublime vision and experience must be activated by the avant-garde as thinkers and 
artists strive to present the Kantian unpresentable, which—for Lyotard—is lodged in 
metaphysical speculation about the good, the true, the real, and the beautiful; that art can 
change culture by creating oak& for new values (a kind of ideographic art symbol), 
thus making likeness as fundamental as difference; that the damaging features of 
techno-scientific capitalism can be resisted by the avant-garde; that even in a time of 
declining faith, the artists play a crucial role in keeping the power of sublimicism alive 
as they at least bear witness to the raw ontological wonderment of being, which is the 
ur-ground encouraging the more complex new metaphysics and morality waiting in the 
future; and that (in accord with Nietzsche) the entire project of a painter or philosopher 
can be a project of the sublime. When Rothko, Newman, and Still insisted upon some 
absolute dimension in their metaphysical subject matter, they were themselves asserting 
that very power of idealized thinking in which Lyotard locates the absolute essence of 
the sublime. Lyotard greatly elevates the mode of the ideational sublime in his peculiar 
longing for an unpresentable paradisical vision. 
As Lyotard is more positive than Weiskel and Ferguson, Crowther is more 
positive than Lyotard, and it is indeed helpful to discover contemporary theoreticians 
who reject a radical break with the past; who appreciate on-going integrations in 
personality, thought, art, and society; who utilize some features of flux and negativity 
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without giving them final dominion; and who find mutually supportive reciprocity 
between elements which (in other perspectives) make for splintering and alienation. It is 
certainly clear that Crowther's utilization of Kant, existentialism, phenomenology, and 
other elements to create a positive critical aesthetics bonded to society and philosophy, 
and aiming for polarities that harmonize, offers a kind of positive perspective adequate 
to treat most of the core ambitions of Rothko, Newman, and Still, who, like Crowther, 
were in search of a new synthesis for ideas and art, a new kind of redemptive social 
coherence in which negative features are recognized, but given subsidiary status. 
Crowther's extensive speculations on the art object and the self as complex 
embodiments which join the sensory and the cerebral supply the kind of context needed 
to explain the hopes and works of the first-generation abstract expressionists. 
However, from my point of view, there are some problems with Crowther's analysis. 
The values which he associates with the sublime are not ranked in a clear hierarchy 
which might give a firmer pattern. For instance he does not assign to the religious and 
the moral sublime the extremely high place which they deserve in light of the manner in 
which religions and moralities establish so great a degree of cultural unity. Since 
Crowther makes much of our feeling at home in the world, one might press him in this 
manner speaking existentially and phenomenologically, how crucial is a religious 
orientation in supplying an admato sense of at-homeness in our galaxy and in society? 
Also, if the embodied self seeks a harmony of faculties, does and should the moral 
sense take a certain dominion over other faculties when it emerges into full conscious 
power? Since moral vision is intrinsic to art forms and is powerful in their making, 
criticism should always apply moral criteria to the evaluation of art Quil art; thus 
Crowther might well give more prominence to the moral and to the moral sublime, in a 
move toward a sharper hierarchy of values.68 He might give aeonic duration to some 
universal moral principles. 
Together, Weiskel, Ferguson, Lyotard, and Crowther give high status to the 
sublime as a source of awe and wonder, as a generally rugged and complex experience 
(either calm or turbulent), and as an encounter which (aesthetically) is uniquely wedded 
to metaphysical and moral ideas. They offer proof of the value of absorbing historical 
perspective and of using essentialist terminology. They show that all sublimicist 
analysis is accompanied by problematical features, yet there are so far—in recent 
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thought—no persuasive arguments to replace positivistic models of value and 
philosophy with sceptical models, no persuasive arguments to abandon trans-cultural 
and permanent truth claims (including moral ones), no persuasive arguments that major 
hegemonic Western narratives should be rejected wholesale, no persuasive arguments 
that the modernist avant-garde search for new centers of order should (or has) come to a 
halt, no persuasive arguments that spirituality and religiosity must yield to materialism, 
and no persuasive arguments that sublimicism, as a concept, has been discredited by the 
full submergence of selfhood or the full emergence of rhetoricity. Obviously, for 
painters of positive belief such as Rothko, Newman, and Still, much is at stake in the 
general fight over whether or not truth, knowledge, spirituality, morality, 
transcendence, and cultural coherence and continuity retain or lose their traditional 
prestige. All eight of the theorists treated so far in this study are highly relevant to the 
larger overall debate, and in my view, all of them are effective in warding off total 
scepticism. An important factor in the formation of largely positive beliefs by the 
abstract expressionists was the powerful contemporary influence of Sartre and Jung, 
and it is therefore necessary, in the next chapter, to round out the background picture by 
trying to pin down just what it was in Sartre and Jung that stimulated Rothko, 
Newman, and Still, and brought distinctive new coloration into their particular visions 
of the sublime—and thereby brings new elements into my own working theory of the 
sublime, formulated at the end of the next chapter. 
Three - Indirect Sublimicism in Sartre and Jung 
The general impact of Nietzsche's ideas on the abstract expressionists was very great. It 
is usually, and correctly, assumed that, after Nietzsche, the two contemporary thinkers 
exerting the greatest influence on Rothko, Newman, and Still were Sartre and Jung. 
Sartre far outweighed other twentieth century existential philosophers because he 
popularized his ideas, giving them compression and clarity. Also, Sartre's ethical 
imperatives were stronger, a factor which made him more congenial to the American 
spirit. Kierkegaard should be placed after Sartre in strength of influence, but his impact 
was greatly diminished by his intensely Christianized vision and his uncompromising 
irrationalism. Heidegger's impact was felt much later than that of Sartre, and had little 
influence on the thinking of the founders of abstract expressionism. Jung eclipsed 
Freud as an influence in art and literature because his essential categories embraced 
spiritual and aesthetic values in opposition to Freud's more bleak and narrow emphasis 
on sex, neurosis, and materialistic determinism. This is not to say that Freud did not 
loom large, but rather that his erotic obsessions were both appreciated and incorporated 
into the more broadly hopeful and humanistic perspective of Jung. Myth theory was in 
general a powerful stream affecting all artists, and it may be treated as an adjunct to 
Jung, who so fully absorbed the various thinkers advancing the claims for myth. 
Sartre's most popular essay, "Existentialism is a Humanism," certainly presents a 
logical starting point for a brief consideration of his ideas. This essay may be 
conveniently found in Walter Kaufmann's Existentialism from Dostoevslor to Sartre. 
Sartre begins by restating his basic claim from Being andNothingness that unlike the 
other objects and creatures of nature, man is a unique form of being whose essence 
cannot be known ahead of time. Man enjoys so much freedom of choice, so much 
creative freedom to shape his own nature, that his essential features cannot be 
established until his choices are exercised in the on-going processes of the life 
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experience. In Sartre's words, "man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in 
the world—and defines himself aftenvards."1 Man is nothing at the start, "he is what he 
wills" and "is nothing else but that which he makes of himself."2 Sartre moves 
promptly to his ethical imperative by deducing that as a creatfire of free choice, "man is 
responsible for himself," having "the entire responsibility for his existence squarely 
upon his own shoulders. And we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own 
individuality, but that he is responsible for all men.* It is inescapable that "in choosing 
for himself he chooses for all men" because in each choice he creates "an image of man 
such as he believes he ought to be."3 It is not surprising that the abstract expressionist 
painters responded to these stirring declarations of Sartre. Painters welcome the idea 
that their lived choices as artists stand not on the edge of philosophy but at the core, a 
point of view reinforced by Nietzsche. Sartre strengthens his ethical stance by 
proclaiming that "nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all," that "In 
fashioning myself I fashion man," and that we must always ask (in a totally Kantian 
manner) "what would happen if everyone did as one is doing?"4 Even if most 
interpreters of Sartre have not made the point, it is nevertheless true that Sartre's 
thought gains one of its best features in this striking ethical proximity to Kant. While 
criticizing Kant for not recognizing how often abstract principles break down in the 
press of difficult choices, Sartre specifically declares his agreement with Kant that "a 
certain form of . . . morality is universal."5 To properly understand the excitements and 
dedications of the abstract expressionists we must reconstruct the heady intoxication, 
the artistic enthusiasm, with which the American artists in the forties and fifties greeted 
the principles of Sartre, steeped as they were in individualism, moral seriousness, value 
theory, and creative freedom. 
Sartre offered also a tragic vision to supplement that of Nietzsche, with his 
tragic sense that man has no divine sponsor and is forlorn, that the duty to choose for 
all mankind carries with it an enormous burden of anxiety which cannot be lifted 
because we cannot shift any of the burden to God or to preestablished human nature, 
cannot escape our own total responsibility for our virtues, vices, and passions. In 
Sartre's famous words "We are left alone without excuse," and are "condemned to be 
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free."6 Sartrean despair has a further basis in that each existent controls only a small 
portion of the world and cannot be confident that social forces and social groups will act 
responsibly--thus the individual must "act without hope," and Sartre drives home his 
point by declaring that no one should place great hope in the Communist party because 
we "do not know where the Russian revolution will lead."7 The American artists were 
thoroughly Sartrean as they became fiercely engaged in life choices, in the activism of 
art, demanded by Sartre: "Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only in 
so far as he realizes himself, he is therefore nothing but the sum of his actions" and "no 
other than a series of undertakings."8 If there is any doubt that Sartre followed 
Nietzsche in taking art as the model for life, Sartre dispels it in his assertion that "moral 
choice is comparable to the construction of a work of art" and "There is this in common 
between art and morality, that in both we have to do with creation and invention."9  
Not enough attention has been given to Sartre's insistence that the bed-rock 
foundation of existentialism is the mit° of Descartes, because "This theory alone is 
compatible with the dignity of man, it is the only one which does not make man into an 
object."10 Sartre notes that the absolute and free commitment of Descartes to his cogito 
has the true character of all existential commitment, and in this sense "free being" is also 
"absolute being." 11 Newman was vehement about a reasoned metaphysical content for 
art, and so was Still. Irrationality did not appeal to them, but Sartrean rationalism did, 
with its new version of the cogito. Husserl and Sartre both agree that their philosophies 
are a working out of the deeper implications of the Cartesian revolution.12 
Offering another principle which would encourage painters to turn inward,Sartre 
declares: "we do not believe in progress" because "man is always the same, facing a 
situation which is always changing, and choice remains always a choice in the 
situation."13 Sartrean ethics validates the selves of others in that the cogito assumes 
others and "the intimate discovery of myself is at the same time the revelation of the 
other as a freedom which confronts man"; thus we find ourselves in a world of "inter-
subjectivity," and "It is in this world that man has to decide what he is and what others 
aTe.9.14 
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While much has been made of the atheism of Sartre, it is important to 
understand that the existence or non-existence of God is not a crucial issue. Sartre's 
position is that even if God exists, He can play no role in human thinking or choosing. 
As evidence, Sartre effectively observes that even if one hears some mysterious voice, 
the individual must decide if the voice is or is not angelic, and even if religious signs are 
given, "still, it is I myself, in every case, who have to interpret the signs."15 Agreeing 
with Nietzsche, Sartre observes that human values are made by persons, not by God, 
and that "even if God existed that would make no difference" because man is 
abandoned and "there is no legislator but himself."16 Sartre lays a basis for an 
existential subjective sublime (leaning on Kant and Nietzsche): "Man is all the time 
outside of himself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond himself that he makes 
man to exist; and, on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he himself 
is able to exist. Since man is thus self-surpassing, and can grasp objects only in relation 
to his self-surpassing, he is himself the heart and center of his transcendence."17 By 
such logic, Sartre (as well as Nietzsche) encouraged the abstract expressionists to have 
prophetic hopes about reaching transcendence via subjective assertions of value. 
Significantly, Sartre (agreeing with Nietzsche) rejects any merely human humanism: 
"an existentialist will never take man as the end, since man is still to be determined:48  
While the rather vague intuitional ethics of existentialism has generally been 
seen as a weakness, Sartre does specify three transpersonal and more or less universal 
moral judgments that an existent may make: that others deceive themselves and choose 
in error; that it is morally wrong not to see "freedom as the foundation of all values" and 
not to "will freedom for freedom's sake"; and that it is wrong not to see that "the 
freedom of others depends upon our own."19  
One of the better books on existentialism is the collection of essays Existential 
Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau Ponty, with an introduction by the editor George 
Schrader, who finds a permanent truth and value in existential ideas, noting that 
"Existential philosophy is evidently supported by a deeply-seated concern on the part of 
twentieth century man" and that (keeping in mind the theme of the alienated soul from 
Plato to Heidegger) "The quest for knowledge and certainty is the manifestation of an 
urgent and deeply seated human need. It is supported by an existential concern and 
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subject to the paralyzing effects of anxiety2,20 
Schrader helps to lay a foundation for an existential sublime: "Dread as the 
experience of the contingency of being is an ever-present possibility for awakening in 
man a sense of transcendence. . . . Thus to be aware of one's own being is to have 
some intimation of death as the possibility of not being." Furthermore, to be aware of 
anything as being "is to be aware of its sheer presence as such and to marvel at the fact 
that it is something rather than nothing at all. It is with the sense of awe, wonder, and 
mystery that all inquiry begins."21 It is not surprising that "being" could have a sublime 
component in that it is, in the Kantian sense, a unifying concept of reason representing 
something vast and baffling to the understanding and the imagination, and also 
something destructive in that human mortality is entailed. Schrader's suggestions point 
to a sublime aspect for everyday life and particular things, but only if there is ground 
for awe and mystery. 
These Sartrean existential concepts are relevant to the programs of Rothko, 
Newman, and Still, who all felt a strong but secularized moral imperative; viewed their 
works as ethically instrumental; rejected religious, philosophic, and ethical systems; 
insisted on radical individualized freedom; insisted on the artistic postulation of values; 
and sought a sublime subject rooted in the immediacy of lived experience. Existential 
ideas were in the air, and these painters found them compatible with their own instincts 
and inclinations.22  
The same can be said for new concepts of myth, especially the myth elements 
incorporated into Jungian psychology. Jung himself was the beneficiary of a rich 
collection of seminal studies in the theory of myth. Sir James Frazer's The Golden
Bough was widely read, focusing on various European myths of the sacred mistletoe 
associated with priest-kings upon whose succession depended the health of a society. 
Jung and others also benefited from the myth theory of Ernst Cassirer plus a large body 
of important works in anthropology which focused on myth as a key to the essential 
structure of primitive societies. It is reasonable to single out Jung because his theories 
were especially welcomed by artists and by theoreticians in the humanities due in part to 
his broad cultural perspective, and due also to his colorful and dramatic theory of 
archetypes, which allowed him (like Sartre) to popularize his concepts and give them 
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the impact of a general cultural saturation. Almost all interpreters of abstract 
expressionism list Jung (and Nietzsche) among the most powerful influences on this 
school. Thus far the studies of abstract expressionism have called attention to the 
importance of Jung, but have given only a few sentences or paragraphs to the essential 
features of his thought. However, a more thorough but condensed description is 
required if we are to locate the deepest correlations between Jungianism and the works 
of Rothko, Newman, and Still. Since Jung did not produce any comprehensive essay 
summarizing his concepts, the summary must be pieced together from several key 
works: The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, SymkoknMandomiatign, 
Psychology and Alchemy, and Aion.23  
Coming closest to general outlines of his system in The Archetypes and the 
Collective Unconscioua, Jung declares: "In addition to our immediate consciousness, 
which is of a thoroughly personal nature and which we believe to be the only empirical 
psyche . . . there exists a second psychic system of a collective, universal, and 
impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. This collective unconscious does 
not develop individually but is inherited. It consists of preexistent forms, the 
archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form 
to certain psychic contents."24 Jung adds that "there are as many archetypes as there are 
typical situations in life," and that probably the archetypes "are the unconscious images 
of the instincts themselves, in other words . . . patterns of instinctual behavior."25  
Jung explains that one of the chief archetypes is the Anima, which is both man's 
dream of the ideal woman and also man's intuition that he contains female qualities that 
must be integrated in a mature self. The Anima stirs with power when any woman (first 
the mother) makes an unusual impression on a man; the Anima is symbolized chiefly by 
malelfemale pairs and deities; and men are compelled to project this image over and 
over.26 The Anima tends to defy conventional sexual morality because of the strength 
of the psychic energy gathered around it.27  
The God archetype is raised very high in the Jungian paradigm, along with the 
figure of Christ (a strong difference between Jung and Freud). In Jung's view the God 
intuition "identifies the deity with the numinosity of the unconscious," and all God 
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images express "the unified wholeness of man."28 The sense of numinosity in the self 
is its sense of divinity, and the God concept implies the wholeness of self in part 
because it is the psychologically necessary construct for assuming the unity of the 
cosmos, that intuition which the Greeks first began to clothe in logos rationality. In 
Jungian thought, the integration of the self always depends on the elevation of the 
archetypes to the level of rational comprehension. Reason, however, becomes harmful 
if it denies or represses the archetypal passions. A genuine reciprocal dialectic must 
develop between reason and instinct—precisely as Nietzsche taught that the Dionysian 
and Apollonian powers must bow to each other, while the Apollonian spirit establishes 
the essential order and coherence. Jung believes, however, that Christianity succeeded 
only for a time in a wholesome spiritualization of the dark instincts. It was able to do 
this, Jung declares, because it had sexual male/female symbols and other powerful 
archetypal images at its center.29 Christ, Jung assumes, was a splendid hero archetype 
who "exemplifies the archetype of self."30 As an archetype, the self is our instinctive 
passion for what Yeats called "Unity of Being," our necessary obsession with 
wholeness and integration. The very fact that the Christ symbol called out the primitive 
images of fish, serpent, and buried Logos proves that Christology successfully attached 
to the underlying archetypes.31 Had Christianity not misconstrued these symbols, it 
could have pointed properly to the unknowable essence of an incarnate God. 
Unfortunately, however, the rational side of the Christian mind, in Jung's rather 
Nietzschean analysis, made some fatal errors, chief of which was the locating of 
divinity outside the self in an external God, external Christ, and external rituals and 
sacraments. If an unconscious value is removed from the self and located outside, that 
sacred content "forfeits its own life."32 To Jung it is extremely dangerous for a culture 
to take this wrong turn. If the rationalized, spiritualized theology of Christendom (all to 
the good) is paralyzed by this outward projection of value into Church forms or the 
Bible itself, then Christianity becomes a hollow shell and the psyche is turned over to 
the buried powers of primitive barbarism, and if Christian forms cannot really dwell in 
the inner man, the inner man cannot be touched and changed.33 Christianity, then, has 
failed in its deepest purpose, making it almost impossible for the modern Western 
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psyche to achieve integration, since "It is the prime task of all education to convey the 
archetype of the God-image . . . to the conscious mind."34  
In Jung's thought polarity plays a central role: "the self is a complex oppositorum 
precisely because there can be no reality without polarity."35 The most obvious 
example is paired male and female sex symbols whose meaning often is the healing 
beneficence of a proper union between the masculine consciousness and the feminine 
unconscious—an interpretation showing that Jung, unlike Freud, avoids narrowly 
sexual categories.36 The Anima also functions as an archetype for the life force, 
carrying the sense that life has meaning, and pointing to Jung's principle that any 
powerful intuition of deep meaning will always call up, always attach itself to very 
ancient primordial forms.37 Jung urges not a return to the past but a penetration into the 
deep places of a living psyche which cannot help but resurrect ancient patterns of 
unchanging psychic necessities—"Christian civilization has proved hollow to a terrifying 
degree: it is all veneer, but the inner man has remained untouched and therefore 
unchanged."38 The polarities postulated by Jung entail a permanent awareness of 
mystery, of uncertainty, of concealedness, which the Enlightenment foolishly and 
dangerously attempted to remove, Jung declares, adding that wholesome religious 
dogma must always embrace paradox, the loss of which, in a religion, brings spiritual 
impoverishment.39 Polarity retains the proper and wholesome sense of awe and 
mystery, and Jung comments that in religious matters "I . . . prefer the precious gift of 
doubt, for the reason that it does not violate the virginity of things beyond our ken."40  
Jung, much like Nietzsche, combines symbol with myth: "Myth is the primordial 
language natural to these psychic processes, and no intellectual formulation comes 
anywhere near the richness and expressiveness of mythical imagery"; thus mythology is 
a "treasure-house of archetypal forms."41 Nietzsche called the crucified Christ the most 
sublime symbol, and Jung observes that "The Christ symbol is of the greatest 
psychological importance in so far as it is perhaps the most highly developed and 
differentiated symbol of the self, apart from the figure of Buddha"—although 
Christology, Jung adds, does not yet include the full desiciaated richness of symbolic 
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efficacy.42 Perhaps Jung believes that the Christ symbol has not yet been adequately 
correlated to sex or nature, to subjectivity, and to aesthetics. Jung's interpretation of 
Christ in terms of existential integration of the self might have encouraged Newman to 
undertake his Stages of the Cross series, and encouraged Rothko to undertake the 
chapel project at Rice University, though Jews in general concede that Jesus is the 
greatest of the prophets. Jung again comes close to Nietzsche in a comment relevant to 
the Christ figure and other hero models: "What we seek in visible human form is not 
man, but the superman, the hero or god, that quasi-human being who symbolizes the 
ideas, forms, and forces which grip and mold the soul."43 Rothko, Newman, and Still 
certainly could have been encouraged by Jung to locate a fresh sense of myth and 
heroism in the existential deep structures of the artist's own psyche. 
Of importance to the theory of myth and symbol are Jung's claims about sun, fire, 
and number symbols—sun is the most inevitable symbol for God; fire-making is a 
symbol of sexuality; the number three has strong psychic suggestivity including the 
masculine principle; and the number four suggests the feminine and wholeness.44  
From a Jungian perspective one might consider sun, light, fire, trinities, and 
quaternities in the formal designs of Rothko, Newman, and Still. For Jung the soul can 
be elevated and perfected in subjectivity only if there are operative symbols and myths 
which activate a limited set of universal archetypal images bound to basic instincts. 
Nietzsche would probably agree to some extent, but would want more space and 
freedom for future novel psychic obsessions. Jung follows Nietzsche in declaring that 
"supreme values reside in the soul."45  
To round out Jung's paradigm, a few of the important archetypes should be 
named other than God, self, warrior-hem, Anima, and Wise Old Man: Animus is 
woman's vision of ideal man plus her own rationality and masculinity; Shadow is the 
inner power of evil, which we must not deny; Mask or Persona is the impulse toward 
social conformity; and Earth Mother is the attraction to Nature. 
Jung offers, then, a limited set of archetypes which are activated by a limited set 
of universal psychic obsessions, archetypes which enjoy permanence and autonomy, 
and also bring danger in that each is like a spaceless inner tornado of energy and desire, 
difficult to integrate into an harmonious self, and capable of destruction if not restrained 
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in an ordered whole. The pattern is quite similar to Nietzsche's Dionysus and Apollo, 
but elaborated through modern depth psychology.` 6 The important thing to keep in 
mind (and the thing not stressed by those who connect Jung to the abstract 
expressionists) is that the redeeming theory of psychic unity through archetypes must 
be set beside Jung's analysis of the hollowness of the modern soul, Jung's version of 
that sense of prevailing spiritual bankruptcy and wasteland which was shared by 
Rothko, Newman, and Still. The retreat of the sublime activates an agonized desire for 
its renewal. In a time of spiritual poverty, the psyche, Jung declares, instinctively 
searches for depth, a journey most often symbolized by a descent into dark water.47  
This may be relevant to the profoundly dark panels in the Rothko chapel in Houston. 
In terms of theory of the sublime, Jungian psychology offers several areas for 
potential transcendent break-through: into the numinous aura of psychic depth, into a 
highest integration of self, and into a set of timeless psychological universals. 
Obviously the turbulence and destructive danger of the archetypes link Jung to the 
dynamical sublime. Obviously his archetypal symbols yield the cultural order 
constituting the Nietzschean sublime, and probably Jung displays sufficient majesty of 
thought to qualify for sublimity of idea. His archetypes are somewhat like Kant's 
sublime ideas: unifying concepts of reason allowing us to handle cognitively some 
rugged powers baffling to understanding. Since Jung's field of relevance is wholly 
psychological, not theological, he occupies the zone of the existential sublime, to which 
he adds timeless forms that link the modern self to the primitive self. To the extent that 
Jung offers a natural supernaturalism he has links with the romantic sublime, but for 
him nature is only one of a set of archetypal objects of desire. While rationalism is at 
times too much depreciated by Jung, the philosophic man is caught by the Wise Old 
Man archetype, and Jungian salvation is impossible until the rational mind properly 
understands the forces in the unconscious. Jung's rationalism aligns him with Kant, 
Nietzsche, and Sartre, but he would vigorously reject any version of atheism. He 
speaks strongly not for God but for the idea of God. Jung resembles Kant, Longinus, 
and Nietzsche in that intense passions underlie the sublime experience, yet a subjective 
triumph of Apollonian reason gives the strongest sense of elevation, exaltation, and 
sacredness. Since the regulative ideas of God, symbol, myth, instincts, and integrated 
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self—like space, time, cause, attribute, mode, and relation—are brilliant human 
creations, studies of the sublime should give more emphasis to what we might call the 
brute sublimity of a strong idea, clearly recognized by Longinus, Kant, and 
Nietzsche.48  
Even though Rothko, Newman, and Still may not have pursued systematically the 
thought of Sartre and Jung, they clearly did absorb from their surrounding milieu the 
existential attitude and the new conceptions of myth in relation to culture. These two 
background streams come together as these painters seek a new foundation for myth 
grounded in the immediate existential condition. 
Taking a wide perspective based on these investigations of Sartre and Jung and on 
the preceding explanations of theory of the sublime in Longinus, Burke, Nietzsche, 
Kant, Weiskel, Crowther, Lyotard, and Ferguson (and prior to detailed approaches to 
Rothko, Newman, and Still) it is necessary to sketch briefly an adequate working 
theory of the sublime. All these theorists allow us to postulate that an authentic positive 
sublime experience requires a sense of astonishment at something extraordinary and 
grand which poses a difficulty in comprehension, resulting in some transcendental 
ascent, some threshold crossing, that carries feelings of awe, elevation, and exaltation. 
The astonishment can be either hot or cool, either emotive, or cerebral and calmly 
meditated. Obviously something grand in this sense could exist in nature, in art, in the 
sum:naval, in human character and conduct, in historical events, in grand ideas and 
projects. Following Crowther, this definition modifies Kant to allow intrinsic sublimity 
for external items such as vistas of nature or art objects, does not rule out Kantian 
sublimity through ideas of reason, and assumes that the sublimity will have to register 
in the self as a subjective comprehension. Kant covered a huge amount of the relevant 
ground by recognizing a mathematical sublime of size and distance plus a dynamical 
sublime of force and energy. 
In terms of a required transcendental ascent, obviously there are many possible 
levels and types of transcendence falling between raw perception and mystical union 
with deity. Also, penetration to depth must be recognized along with elevation to 
height, if the requisite conditions are met; in both cases, a major threshold is crossed. 
The postulation of some shock, check, and difficulty, joined to something complex and 
ungraspable, differentiates the sublime from the smoother and harmonious mode of the 
89 
beautiful. However it might be possible for a beautiful thing to have concealed depths 
which could activate a sense of the sublime, and if this happens, perhaps the best 
explanation is to assume two different modes of perception in close proximity, both 
relatively disinterested. Myths as well as personal, social, and historical narratives may 
have sufficient power to attain the sublime, including narratives of sections of the story 
of art or philosophy, along with other cultural narratives, such as the story of science. 
Also, we should agree with Longinus, Kant, and Nietzsche that a raw idea can be noble 
and sublime. 
A zone of transcendence occurs in the threshold crossing from particular to 
Platonic universal, or from the sensate to the aeonic, as preferred by Crowther. For 
Nietzsche, moments of crossing come when the will to power ascends to the domain of 
symbol and myth, when man projects superman, when chaos is elevated to order and 
coherence. For Lyotard crossing opens into possible future Utopian visions of a moral 
ought. We should recognize a moral sublime, not only in heroic and astonishing moral 
choices of individuals, but in the difficult threshold crossing from selfishness to moral 
law, and in the elevation to general public good intended by art, philosophy, and 
criticism. Since the decision of how to spend each hour is a moral choice, there is no 
way to isolate fully any sphere of experience, conduct, or thought from a moral 
component. In a general sense, most art objects are symbols of the good, even though 
we approach them in a relatively disinterested manner. 
Just as there are many possible zones of transcendence, there are multiple 
possibilities for shock and difficulty. Burke pointed to intellectual difficulty and the jolt 
of terror; Kant to a strain on inner faculties; Nietzsche to the shock and check to the will 
offered by the meaningless cruelty and destruction of the Dionysiac state of nature; 
Weiskel to overloads of signifier or signified and to psychic trauma; and Lyotard to the 
shock of collapsed social narratives and collapsed epistemological confidence. 
However, a sufficient shock could come more modestly from seeing some normally 
mundane thing in a surprising new way—the shock of a recognition scene, assuming 
that there are accompanying feelings of awe and wonder. Essentially, a sublime 
experience is possible when there is a threshold zone between the self and a significant 
Other. 
An adequate theory of the sublime must recognize a variety of modes, an anatomy 
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of modes. It must be recognized that there will be modal overlap just as we would find 
in any other discourse area. For instance, an existential sublime might or might not 
overlap with a religious sublime or a negative sublime. Positive modes of the sublime 
should include the ideational, the religious, the moral, the Burkean-Gothic, the Kantian 
(a version of the ideational), the Nietzschean, the romantic, the existential, the Jungian-
mythic, the ontological, the noble, and the sublime of light/color. Among negative 
modes of the sublime would be the comic, the ironic, the counter, the mock, and the 
rhetorical (in the sense of merely rhetorical). This is not to imply that these modes 
would have no positive values, because often they do. Negativity is used in the sense 
that these modes often work to undermine, and are negative when this is the dominant 
concern. This list is tentative and not fully comprehensive. One could name a 
psychological sublime, except that almost all the modes have a strong psychological 
element. However in Weiskel's sense one could posit a "merely" psychological 
sublime.49 A political sublime could well be named (either positive or negative) but I 
would see this as a sub-type of the ideational. Perhaps in the future scholars will 
produce a reasonably comprehensive anatomy of modes of the sublime. 
As we have seen, the ideational sublime of raw idea can be enhanced by artistic 
style. A good example (other than Kant's Isis Temple passage) would be this quatrain 
of Emily Dickinson: 
The Brain is deeper than the sea— 
For—hold them—Blue to Blue— 
The one the other will absorb— 
As Sponges—Buckets—do-- 
The ability of the human brain to hold an infinite number of concepts and thereby to 
absorb all ocean life may be seen as a sublime idea, reinforced by the stylistic 
compression and bold comparisons of blue, bucket, and sponge. The most valuable 
direction for treating the sublime in Rothko, Newman, and Still is through the ideational 
sublime intensified by style. However, other modes are also crucial. From a global 
perspective, the religious sublime would loom very large. 50 The moral sublime can be 
grounded partly on sacrificial human conduct, partly on the raw sublimity of moral 
concepts, partly on the threshold crossing from selfish sensate life to the higher realm 
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of moral law and idealism, partly on the ubiquity of ethicality, and partly on the general 
intention of artists to constitute a public good. Lyotard's sceptical mode involves a 
strong moral sublime in that the thrown-out founding phrases of a culture establish a 
moral ought. As ethical and ideational factors complicate the art work, the resultant 
difficulty (as Crowther emphasizes) increases sublimicist effects and values. Nietzsche 
gives high place to sublime moral fictions in the integration of a culture. Also, it would 
be foolish to dismiss Plato's belief that all parts of creation and human life come under 
the hierarchical dominance of the concept of the Good. The moral sublime obviously 
overlaps with the ideational in that moral choice is usually based on ideas. 
The Nietzschean sublime is distinctive in connecting will-to-power to the artistic 
fictions of art proper and also to science and philosophy viewed as art constructs, and 
distinctive too in the supreme role of myth in presenting the sublime art symbols to 
culture. Nietzsche deserves credit for realizing that entire cultural projects, at their 
highest, will be sublime projects. Implicit in Nietzsche's view (and also noted by 
Longinus and Kant) is the idea that political and historical conflicts can be a ground for 
sublime experience. 
The romantic sublime may be differentiated by its emphasis on the role of 
imagination (not reason) in bridging over the threshold between self and the cosmic 
unity of nature, with stress on the wild grandeurs of nature.51 The Burkean-Gothic 
mode comes into play when there is a dominance of terror and pain, both bodily and 
psychological S2 An existential sublime should also be recognized. We have noted 
Crowther's suggestion that Burke's emphasis on bodily emotional states and threats to 
life warrants the treating of Burke's model as an existential sublime, and we have noted 
Crowther's thesis that contemporary shocks and terrors in films and television can 
provoke a rejuvenation of vital faculties, counteract boredom, and engender existential 
coinage. Sartre allows for an existential sublime in the threshold crossing into 
transcendent future perfected selfhood, and also into the moral sublime of responsibility 
for the choices of all other people. There is a sense in which a Jungian sublime would 
be existential, in that the divine Other must be located within the individual psyche and 
its immediate life. 
The specific idea of the mythic sublime was inaugurated by Nietzsche and attached 
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by Jung to archetype theory. The Christian story of sacred history still has formidable 
mythic power in Protestant and Catholic circles. Cassirer has widened the concept of 
operative myth to include various secular and social narratives. For any mythic sublime, 
a threshold is crossed between the temporal and the enduring, the myth being construed 
as a timeless symbolic form that rules over the temporal and finite. Lyotard believes that 
the grand narratives we could call mythic have all collapsed. Therefore the sublimicist 
sensibility must be kept alive while we await some new founding phrases that would 
legitimate a new acceptable myth. So far, Lyotard is not being connected to the mythical 
sublime, but the connection should be made. There is a basis for one kind of 
ontological sublime in Heidegger's analysis of Being, and in other thinkers who 
emphasize wonderment in the face of the beingness of the world.53 Also the 
ontological reciprocities in the thought of Crowther make a place for some difficulties 
and tensions which, as Crowther sees, can be resolved in a sublimicist manner. That is, 
the ontological realm is implicated in the synthesizing sublimicist theory of Crowther. 
The modes of the noble sublime and the color/light sublime are also important, 
especially so for approaching Rothko, Newman, and Still. Recognized by Kant, the 
noble sublime occurs in a calm and measured manner, involving not hot passions but a 
cool and rational wonder about something overwhelming. Kant (as did Longinus) ranks 
the contemplative noble sublime higher than the intense passional varieties. The 
measured coolness of Rothko and Newman aligns them with the noble sublime. Burke 
clearly perceives the sublime of light/color, giving favored status to dark and light 
contrast and to rich dark colors. The sublime of light/color attaches to complex 
movements of luminism in Western art, and attaches to Turner as well as to the color- 
field abstract expressionists.54  
While Crowther's conception of the sublime is highly positive, he has not been as 
much concerned with the many modes of the sublime as he has with broad patterns 
shared by most of the positive modes. Crowther has focused on what the sublime 
experience is good for, which is reflected in his emphasis on human needs, on the 
highly self-conscious state of vivid appreciation in aesthetic and sublime experience, on 
the rich enhancements generated by the sublime experience, and on the necessary 
bondings to culture, morality, philosophy, and existential embodiment. More than any 
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other theorist, Crowther reveals the fullest perception of the nature, scope, and special 
value of the sublime—an essentially philosophic project, and while he recognizes the 
attractions of negative modes, he finds ways to attach them to positive values so as to 
weaken the presumed scepticism. 
Negative modes of the sublime must be recognized, though they belong more to 
posmodern thought than to the modernist mind-set of Rothko, Newman, and Still. 
However, their sublime subjects have a negative thrust in that as paintings declare 
certain values, they war against others. Furthermore, the sublime, involving as it does 
an internal stress, an overcoming of difficulty, contains a movement of negation which 
can be utilized in broadly negative ways. Among negative modes may be included the 
ironic, the mock, the counter, the comic, and the rhetorical. We have seen Weiskel's 
claim that the contemporary materialistic and sceptical mind will require that the sublime 
perspective be joined to irony, that even when some transcendental Other is tentatively 
envisioned, the element of dubiety will be maintained—as if we would say that we hope 
there are universal moral laws but might be wrong, or as if a modern lover would say to 
his beloved that he thinks he loves her, though there is an element of doubt, or as if we 
would say that even though there is no God, we will defend the honor of the idea of 
God. An ironic sublime would operate somewhat along these lines. The imprisonment 
followed by release, the saving kind of positive sublime when the difficulty yields to a 
resolution generating awe and exaltation, the overwhelming entity yielding an 
intensified awareness and enhancement of cognitions, faculty powers, and at-homeness 
in the world, all these positive joyous vectors would be curtailed in the ironic sublime, 
not eliminated but diminished. It is not surprising that an ironic model would be offered 
in a time that talks so much of the retreat of the gods and the rejection of all higher 
idealistic worlds, and in an age so devoted to the critical intellect. Even with the first 
generation abstract expressionists, we should keep irony in mind, since Rothko lists it 
as one element in his works, and there is irony in Clyfford Still's program. The neo-
geo painter Philip Taaffe has stated that people today desperately need the sublime, that 
we are living in "a sublimity-deprived society," and that contemporary painters might 
choose to "construct a mock-sublime to summon the sublime by indirection, because 
teasing or entertaining the sublime is just another way of aspiring toward sublimity. I'm 
interested in a sublimity which encourages laughter and delight in the face of profound 
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uncertainty.”55 
 Taaffe has in view the ironic, mock, and comic sublime. While 
Nietzsche separated the comic from the sublime, Longinus allowed for a comic sublime 
in his remark that laughter counts as a strong emotion. Raimondo Modiano observes 
that Don Quixote was recognized in the eighteenth century as a comic sublime epic, 
which, in theory, would graft the sublime to low and ordinary subjects: 'This negation 
of the sensible by the supersensible which constitutes the sublime is in turn rejected by 
the comic which reaffirms the objective over the subjective 56 Partly explaining the 
political and Marxist interest in the sublime, Gary Shapiro points to Marx's theory that 
the final phase of some political-social world form will be a collapse into farce, so that a 
comic sublime perspective can elucidate the farce and encourage a counter-movement to 
a radical new social structure.57  
The rhetorical sublime becomes an inevitable mode when so many thinkers are 
attracted to the belief that language exerts total control over everything human, including 
all of our sense of self-identity and our formulations of epistemology, ontology, and 
science. We can never say anything except what language allows us to say. In this 
model, language is the god that mates all aspects of the human world, everything is an 
arbitrary linguistic construct, a creation out of nothing. In such a paradigm, all sublime 
effects would become merely linguistic, merely rhetorical. There could be a language of 
sublimity, but it would have to be seen as a word game, not as any kind of ascent to 
higher realities above the linguistic-social order. In my opinion, such a thesis can yield 
no more than a mock sublime. The possibility of any real transcendence now or in the 
future is rejected. If we think that sublimicist language can achieve no more than a small 
fireworks display of words, then we would see little reason even to enjoy the 
fireworks. Of course truth, metaphysics, and sublimity would be back in business if the 
claim is made that word games can tell the truth about non-linguistic structures—a 
position which (considering the ten major theorists treated) would be held by Longinus, 
Burke, Kant, Sartre, Jung, Crowther, and possibly Weiskel, but not by Nietzsche , and 
apparently not by Ferguson or Lyotard. There is no sense at all in Rothko, Newman, 
and Still that their sublime subjects have no external reality and are no more than 
linguistic fancies. 
This over-view of the definition and modes of the sublime should be 
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supplemented (for a treatment of painters) by a reminder of some of the specific forms 
and patterns singled out by Longinus and Burke for expressive value when joined to a 
proper sublime subject. Longinus offers organic unity, silence, question and answer 
patterns, alternations between one and many, seriality, infusions of past into present, 
metaphor, hyperbole, strong passions, and cool thoughts. Burke offers terribilia, 
obscurity, darkness, difficulty, light, strong dark colors, emptiness, privation, silence, 
solitude, modifications in power, vast size (we may add scale), strong verticals, 
jaggedness, ruggedness, and one item not previously mentioned, penetration into 
depd1.58  
This working theory of the sublime is, to some extent, a kind of summation of the 
thinkers covered in part one of my study. To this summation should be added a few 
general comments on Sartre and Jung. They reinforce some of the general arguments 
that undagird my study in the following ways: they supplement the wave of positive 
philosophic affirmation that characterizes the idealism of Longinus, Burke, Kant, 
Nietzsche, Crowther, and some emphases of Lyotard. The materialism connected to 
Freud is resisted by the more spiritual and humanistic framework of Jung, who helped 
to encourage hope and belief in Rothko, Newman, and Still. Jung's sense of 
transcendence and religiosity probably gave confidence and universal depth-psychology 
content to the sublimicist aims of the three painters. Sartre also postulated universal 
human conditions and offered his own humanistic paradigm with several threshold 
crossings to higher ground. Sartre proclaimed his philosophy as an optimism which 
gave each person maximum freedom, yet also charged each life with maximum moral 
seriousness and force, so that the long tradition of the moral sublime traced through 
Longinus, Kant, and Nietzsche receives new life and strength through Jung and Sartre, 
as does the ideational sublime receive energy from the rationalism of Sartre and the 
archetypal ideas of Jung. In this grouping, Nietzsche stands alone as construing 
metaphysics and morals as fictions, yet he too makes optimistic and universalist claims, 
and even approaches the traditional Western center in his concept of necessary fictions. 
The point is that the pervasive affirmation and spirituality that have dominated the 
accumulating theory of the sublime gained some new psychological and philosophic 
stimulus in Sartre and Jung, a blending that deeply marked the thought climate of the 
age of abstract expressionism, a blending that promotes art historical efforts to 
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understand and appreciate Rothko, Newman, and Still by taking their own ideas 
seriously in terms of transcendence, spirit, and affirmative philosophy, allowing us to 
meet these painters on their own chosen ground and not wrongly to relegate them to 
some wrongly conceived "obsolescent" stretch of time now rendered irrelevant by 
postmodern doubt And thus we may now turn, in part two, to the elucidation of 
exactly what their chosen ground consisted of, in relation to various thresholds of 
transcendence and various modalities of the sublime. 
PART TWO 
THE SUBLIME IN ROTHKO, NEWMAN, AND STILL 
Four - The Sublime in Rothko 
The general procedure for the specific treatment of Rothko, Newman, and Still 
will be first to consider their own statements, then turn to secondary sources, and then 
examine some particular works. In the case of Rothko, the Tate Gallery published a 
group of his writings as part of the exhibition catalogue Mark Rothko:1903-1970. 1 
In 1938 Rothko, co-authoring a brief catalogue preface with Bernard Braddon, 
states that what the abstract expressionists shared was "their capacity to see objects and 
events as though for the first time, free from the accretions of habit and divorced from 
the conventions of a thousand years of painting:a While showing in this attack on 
tradition a thrust of the counter-sublime, the deeper tone is that of a raw existential 
present, suggesting the influence of Sartre, whose concept of total freedom includes 
freedom from past traditional restraints. In 1943 Rothko writes an important letter to the 
art editor Edward Jewell, first declaring that his The Rape of Persephone tried to 
express the enduring "abstract concept"of the timeless "essence of the myth," and his 
The Syriaq Bull also offers "a new interpretation of an archaic image" on the 
assumption that "Since art is timeless, the significant rendition of a symbol, no matter 
how archaic, has as full validity today as the archaic symbol had then." Obviously we 
see here the Jungian point of view of archetypal symbolic concepts that are ever new, 
plus the important idea that the myth is reconstructed on the basis of immediate 
existential conditions, as Rothko makes clear when he asserts that his new versions of 
the myth (conveyed abstractly) involve "unprecedented distortions."3 This conception 
of the mythical sublime requires an existential base. Also noteworthy is the emphasis on 
"abstract concept" because the abstract expressionists set themselves off from other 
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movements by emphasizing their ideational subject matter. For this reason their work 
falls primarily under the ideational sublime, with considerable overlays into other 
modes. Their "expressionism" does involve strong passions, but the passions are 
aroused chiefly by, called out by, ideas of an impersonal and eternal sublime subject—
an emphasis setting them off from German expressionism. 
Rothko adds that these painters see art as "an adventure into an unknown world" 
full of "risks," using the free "imagination" to cause the audience to "see the world our 
way—not his way."4 This adventure language suggests the striking and extraordinary 
domain of the sublime, and the sublimity of the imagination (as opposed to the 
sublimity of nature) was proposed by Longinus: "Wherefore not even the entire 
universe suffices for the thought and contemplation within the reach of the human 
mind, but our imaginations often pass beyond the bounds of space," and these 
subjective extensions of "what is striking, and great" allow us to "discern the purpose 
of our birth."5 Rothko's sense of great "risk" has behind it the daring of Nietzsche's 
vision, plus the Sartrean risk of choosing .6 And Nietzsche's model of a total sublime 
art project imposed on society by the artist's will is a possible influence on Rothko's 
plan to make the viewers "see the world our way." We should invoke the Nietzschean 
sublime to explain this prophetic strain (of using will to change world) in Rothko, 
Newman, and Still—but of course there are other background elements, such as cubism 
and Mondrian, and the general modernist search for newness of style. 
Rothko's letter goes on to state that "We favor the simple expression of the 
complex thought. We are for the large shape because it has the impact of the 
unequivocal. . . . We are for flat forms because they destroy illusion and reveal truth."7  
Rothko is moving toward a sublimity of scale in the absolutist flavor of *unequivocal," 
and his ideational paradigm is manifest in the terms "complex thought" and "truth." The 
abstract expressionists do not turn postmodern by celebrating illusion and rejecting 
truth. At the end of his letter Rothko drives home his sense of a sublime project: "There 
is no such thing as good painting about nothing. We assert that the subject is crucial and 
only that subject matter is valid which is tragic and timeless. That is why we profess 
spiritual kinship with primitive and archaic art."8 "Tragic" brings in Nietzsche's myth 
theory to blend with this Jungian flavor. It is important to note that Rothko, while 
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accepting Nietzsche's model of will and tragic vision, does not accept Nietzsche's 
rejection of truth and universal value. The abstract expressionists saw their work as 
penetrations to the axis of reality and to enduring truth, not as comforting necessary 
fictions. Therefore they take much from Nietzsche, but not everything. 
Rothko makes valuable comments in a 1948 radio broadcast, pointing out that 
"The modern artist has . . . detached himself from appearance in nature," understanding 
that even in portraiture the great painters of the past rejected realistic appearance, 
pushing aside the actual model to seek "an ideal which embraces all human drama rather 
than the appearance of a particular individual." Rothko adds that the modern painters 
carry farther the move away from the natural world but retain the classical interest in 
character and emotion, which are "the human drama."9 The existential commitments of 
the abstract expressionists force them to retain "human drama" for their center, even 
though they move from figuration to abstraction. Rothko's remarks suggest that there 
was no sweeping animosity for past masters—as would be required by Bloom's 
counter-sublime. This same sense of roots in the past will be seen in Newman, and to a 
lesser extent in Still. Also, Rothko's rejection of the forms of nature takes him away 
from Wordsworth and the romantic sublime of Friedrich and Turner. 
Rothko elaborates further on his perception of his mythical subjects and his 
alignment with Jung: the myths are symbols that "modern psychology finds . . . 
persisting still in our dreams . . . and our art," and we seek "the roots of the idea" in 
"our own terms" and "through our own experience" as "something real and existing in 
ourselves."10  This existential grounding encourages the general idea that myths can 
take a contemporary shape—old wine in new skins. Rothko's locating of myth in the 
existential self is carried further by Newman and Still. Rothko adds that the ancient 
myths come from a period similar to modern life: "the constant awareness of powerful 
forces, the immediate presence of terror and fear, a recognition and acceptance of the 
brutality of the natural world as well as the eternal insecurity of life."1 I Since Rothko 
was familiar with Burke, he invests tragic myth with the Burkean sublime of terror, 
while giving it an existential direction—exemplifying the typical overlap between various 
modes of the sublime. 
In a 1945 statement Rothko (again rejecting the strong counter-sublime) declares 
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that "I quarrel with surrealist and abstract art only as one quarrels with his father and 
mother"--rejecting abstraction if it is seen as mere formalism, and rejecting surrealism if 
it trivializes the human spirit by confining it to "phantasmagoria of the unconscious," to 
"hallucination," and to "memory." Also in opposition to claims for the dream world, 
Rothko declares: "I adhere to the material reality of the world and the substance of 
things," 2 
Clyfford Still receives an early analysis from Rothko, who links Still to the 
abstract expressionist "band of Myth Makers," yet "his is a completely new facet of this 
idea, using unprecedented forms and completely personal methods" to by-pass 
formalism and create "new counterparts" for ancient myths in his unique expression of 
"the tragic-religious drama which is generic to all myths at all times"—an expression 
whose forms Rothko calls vital "organic" entities which shape "a theogeny of the most 
elementary consciousness, hardly aware of itself beyond the will to live—a profound 
and moving experience."13 Rothko is right to stress the strong Nietzschean individual 
volition in Still and the highly "personal methods." While the religiosity of Rothko, 
Newman, and Still is rather vague and muted, it is genuine, and they help to make the 
religious sublime a major component in the American sublime. 
In 1947 Rothko published an essay which has been given the title of the opening 
words, "The romantics were prompted." The opening sentence declares that the 
romantics often did not reach true transcendent ground in their search for exotica, while 
the isolated modern artist, often scorned by society, has some good fortune in rejecting 
the security of community ties and the familiar world, because free of such mundane 
relations, "transcendental experiences become possible."14 Rothko adheres to the 
general theory of the sublime, that the experience is extraordinary, and adheres also to 
the Kierkegaardian assumption that important work is always done alone, not in a 
group. Rothko delivers a remark widely quoted by his interpreters: "1 think of my 
pictures as dramas: the shapes in the pictures are performers," and "Neither the action 
nor the actors can be anticipated, or described in advance. They begin as an unknown 
adventure into an unknown space. It is at the moment of completion that in a flash of 
recognition, they are seen to have the quantity and function which was intended." This 
is a miraculous event, and when the painting is finished and severed from the painter, 
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then for him and the viewers the picture should be "a revelation, an unexpected and 
unprecedented resolution of an eternally familiar need."15 Several things are important 
here: his works contain human drama and are not merely formalist; they have the risk 
and venture of the unplanned movement into the unknown; there is a sudden moment 
when idea and form come together; and the completed work operates as an astonishing 
resolution to an eternal human need. We should see here the existential sense of a fresh 
raw point of origin, the insistence on idea as subject, and the search for the pattern of a 
sublime, astonishing revelation and resolution. There is to a limited degree a sense of an 
"action painting," the painterly acts being those by which the idea itself begins to take 
shape. Probably there is an influence from Sartre's thesis that values are manifest only 
in action. Action in this existential sense is different from the label "Action Painting," 
which Rothko repudiated as "antithetical to the very look and spirit of my work"—
probably meaning that his work is serene and long pondered, not dashed off in 
spontaneous movements.I6  
Rothko adds that his shapes break with the visible world, have their own volition 
and freedom, "without need to conform with or to violate what is probable in the 
familiar world," and that his drama could not be presented through the familiar world 
"unless everyday acts belonged to a ritual accepted as referring to a transcendent 
mini." 17 Since his paintings are designed to function as cultic space in the absence of 
public cultic rituals, Rothko operates on the important assumption that an abstract 
painting can have an essence as icon, which would constitute the painting as a threshold 
site for transcendence to sublime ground. Such a symbolic painting functions like a 
sacred myth. 
Elaborating his point, Rothko observes that archaic people gave clear public 
expression, gave "official status," to transcendental (cultic) experience, but modern 
painters cannot use the everyday public world: "With us the disguise must be complete. 
The familiar must be pulverized in order to destroy the finite associations."18 Rothko 
benefited from the realization that abstraction could by-pass surface reality, lending 
itself to the realm of idea and transcendence. The abstract nature of music can offer a 
similar advantage. Rothko observes that the drama of transcendence cannot be enacted 
"Without monsters and gods," and in those epochs since the retreat of authentic myth, 
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artists who imitated the familiar world could not cross the threshold of transcendence, 
could only produce their most poignant image: "the single human figure—alone in a 
moment of utter immobility. . . . the solitary figure could not raise its limbs in a single 
gesture that might indicate its concern for the fact of mortality. . . . Nor could the 
solitude be overcome. . . . I do not believe that there was ever a question of being 
abstract or representational. It is really a matter of ending this silence and solitude, of 
breathing and stretching one's arms again "19 This passage is often quoted but seldom 
analyzed. It says that in the absence of cultic myth, mankind is returned to the realm of 
mere objects, can stand in the loss and isolation, but cannot raise his arms in a symbolic 
sign that his mortal existence should be connected to the higher zone of the sacred and 
eternaL Rothko declares that he will find a way to make such symbolic signs without 
using commonplace visible forms or public religious rituals (now inoperative). He will 
create cultic space from his existential situation. It is important to observe that this 
insightful essay was written in 1947, the year in which Rothko achieved his mature 
style of ghostly blocks of floating color rectangles. The Tate Gallery exhibit offered one 
of these alnijiligLI247), and two more from 1948 (Multiform 1948 and Num& 
151948). The point to be emphasized is that Rothko's theory about new abstract 
symbols for a sublime subject was declared in the same year as the emergence of his 
mature style, and we have no choice but to connect the theory to the hallmark paintings. 
In spite of what some theorists say, the painter's intent is a crucial item when it is 
known. Any adequate aesthetic theory will have to construe a painting as an intentional 
object. The fact that interpretations must be validated by the actual painting has never 
entailed that the intent should be ignored. 
The Tate collection of Rothko's writings also gives a short passage from Tiger's 
En in 1949: "The progression of a painter's work, as it travels in time . . . will be 
toward clarity, toward the elimination of all obstacles between the painter and the idea," 
and that "memory, history, or geometry" might be such obstacles.20 Obviously, 
starting with Menet and C&anne, many modern painters have been reducing and 
simplifying, the process carried to limits in Mondrian, and in Rothko, Newman, and 
Still, though not as far as White on White. What we might call the special virtues of 
abstraction have been emphasized by Robert Motherwell in his conception of abstract 
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expressionism. Having taken graduate work at Harvard in philosophy, Motherwell has 
commented that the Harvard philosophy department was heavily influenced by 
Whitehead, whose principle "the higher the degree of abstraction, the lower the degree 
of complexity" made it easy for Motherwell to adapt to abstraction.21 In chapter ten of 
Science and the Modern World, Whitehead treats abstraction in relation to mathematics 
and abstract universals, claiming that the abstract ideal forms are logically necessary to 
explain reality, so that "the understanding of actuality requires a reference to ideality." 
Though abstraction necessitates a transcendence into the ideal, the transcendent and 
eternal form is not divorced from the concrete particulars, but enters them as a mode of 
"ingression" (for instance, sphericity enters by ingression into a red apple). Whitehead 
also had his version of an ontological sublime in that a given abstract universal "cannot 
be divorced from its reference to other eternal objects and from its reference to actuality 
generally." Furthermore, Whitehead declares a religious sublime similar to the proof of 
God from necessary being: the individuation met in reality requires a fixed transcendent 
principle to fikaatc individuation, and only the concept of God would provide a 
sufficient center of leverage.22 The important thing to note is that Motherwell records 
the awareness of the abstract expressionists that their abstract style was validated by the 
powers of abstraction in science, mathematics, and philosophy, plus the awareness that 
the acceptance of modern science does not rule out intuitions of a divine absolute. 
Rothko, Newman, and Still emphasized the aesthetic value of scale, which is 
relevant to horizons of the sublime. In 1951 Rothko explains that he creates large 
paintings in search of the "intimate and human" because the larger work tends to absorb 
both the painter and the viewer: "you are in it," actualizing "a spiritual basis for 
communion."23  Scale for these painters brings in monumentality plus hints of the 
mathematical sublime, and also the ideational sublime when grandeur of scale correlates 
to grandeur of idea. 
Rothko's last public statement about art (an especially valuable item) came in a 
1958 lecture at the Pratt Institute. Transcript notes were taken by Dore Ashton, and 
some are included in the Tate retrospective. Rothko observes that past figural painters 
(like himself) were seeking not to describe real persons but to suggest "an ideal which 
embraces all human drama." The abstract artist carries this concept further in that "The 
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whole of man's experience becomes his model, and in that sense it can be said that all 
of art is a portrait of an idea."24 
 As usual, Rothko makes clear his search for the 
ideational sublime, here a search for ideas that embrace the general human situation seen 
in terms of drama. Rothko's frequent use of the idea of drama derives partly from 
Nietzsche's stress on Greek drama plus the inherent drama of the will-to-power as actor 
on the human stage, and partly from the existential sense of the anguish and drama of 
daily choices. 
Irving Sandler also made use of notes from Rothko's lecture, but fortunately for 
scholars, Rothko's latest biographer, James Breslin, gives almost the entire lecture in 
pieces interspersed with comments. Using Breslin's text, important details become 
available. Rothko begins by emphasizing that he has sought impersonal themes: "I have 
never thought that a painting has anything to do with self-expression" and "Knowing 
yourself is valuable so that the self can be removed from the process."25  
Rothko continues by giving his "recipe" for art as seven ingredients: a tragic 
preoccupation with death; sensuality; tension as conflict or curbed desire; the use of 
"wit and play"; the irony of self-effacement; "the ephemeral and chance"; and "Hope. 
10% to make the tragic concept more endurable."26 We should take the last item at face 
value, assuming that even in the darker last works there is some positive optimism in a 
largely tragic aura. The preoccupation with death and destruction would derive in part 
from Nietzsche's Dionysus, Greek drama, and existential anguish, as well as from 
personal experience. Rothko's emphasis on sensuality and conflict are both important, 
both related to Nietzsche and to the general modernist appreciation of polarities carried 
by art forms. Rothko's phrase "curbed desire" points to his long broodings over 
measure and proportion, suggesting that his ratios are meant to convey, in a 
Nietzschean sense, the ordering and restraining Apollonian impulse. Very few 
interpreters have found much "wit and play" in Rothko, but perhaps he had a general 
ironic sense of his own limited and repetitious manner, along with the irony of his own 
self-effacement. As to "chance," that could connect to Nietzsche, to Duchamp's use of 
chance, to Greek tragedy, and to whatever Rothko takes from automatic art, even if it is 
no more than the exploratory first laying down of a color. And obviously an 
appreciation for chance often comes from one's own experience. We should go straight 
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to Nietzsche's theory of Apollo and the sublime to explain Rothko's "make the tragic 
concept more endurable," since this is, for Nietzsche, the whole sublime purpose of art 
symbols and myths. 
Rothko's lecture includes an appreciation of Kierkegaard's emphasis (in Fear and 
Iambling) on the symbolic value of the Abraham and Isaac story, Rothko interpreting 
it as an allegory of the artist type: "as soon as an act is made by an individual, it 
becomes universal. This is like the role of the artist." Also Rothko saw himself in 
Abraham's social isolation, secrecy, and silence.27 As previously noted, the abstract 
expressionists were impressed not by Kierkegaard's Christian piety and Christian leap 
of faith, but rather by the more general existential import of Kierkegaard's subjective 
intensity, his inwardness, his existential agony.28  
Rothko delivers the important remark that his works are facades which "open one 
door and one window or two doors and two windows."29 We can hardly over-estimate 
the importance of this revelation. As his works approach minimal colors and 
monochrome, there would be one window and door. The works with more than two 
color slabs would offer two windows and two doors. Furthermore, the confinement to 
a one-two-three-four imagery may well carry considerable ideational freight, possibly a 
consonance to Pythagorean numerology, to the numbers in golden section logic, to the 
earth-air-fire-water set, to numerology in the Kabbalah, and to the three and four cultic 
symbolism sketched by Jung. However, even if we cannot with confidence invoke 
these wider aspects as part of Rothko's ideational sublime, we can with confidence 
assert the major interpretive key for relating Rothko to the sublime: his works 
symbolize portals as doors and windows that represent the crossing of thresholds onto 
transcendent and sacred ground, and this hopeful and positive note is never destroyed 
by the accompanying tragic vision. 
Rothko goes on to declare that he is not Zen, dislikes the over-stress on 
"primitiveness, the subconscious, the primordial," and is "not interested in any 
civilization except this one. The whole problem is how to establish human values in this 
specific civilization." His temporary use of ancient myth in his early works was 
"unsatisfactory," and now his paintings "are involved with the salg of human feelings, 
the human drama, as much as I can express."30 In keeping with the sense of myth 
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offered by Jung, Rothko recommends no return to tribal mentality, but rather a search 
for universal values still alive and relevant in the modem situation. He always thought 
of his pictorial forms as actors conducting a contemporary human drama. 
The lecture was followed by questions and answers. Rothko declares that he is 
not a colorist, but uses color and light to express "a new view of the world," and "If 
you have a philosophic mind you will find that nearly all paintings can be spoken of in 
philosophic terms."31 These are further pointings to the ideational sublime. He adds 
that a painter can have a personal message that is not self-expression (which would be 
"boring"), and in this sense the term abstract expressionism is not adequate, since he is 
"anti-expressionist."32 He means that he shuns limited private confession, adding that 
self-expression involves too much non-reflective violence, a "stripping yourself of will, 
intelligence, civilization. My emphasis is on deliberateness. Truth must strip itself of 
self which can be very deceptive."33  
Obviously Rothko's stress on calm reflection fuses his ideational sublime with the 
noble sublime, a fusion signaled by the following important comment "Large pictures 
take you into them. Scale is of tremendous importance to me—human scale. Feelings 
have different weights; I prefer the weight of Mozart to Beethoven because of Mozart's 
wit and irony and I like his scale."34 The musical sense of the weight and ratio of 
human feelings presented by human scale is a crucial key for interpreting Rothko's 
meditative sublime. His interest in approaching the state of music is probably related to 
Nietzsche's emphasis on the relation of music to pure will and music's closeness to the 
Dionysian impulse, but in a Nietzschean sense Rothko may properly talk of ratio and 
measure because the orderly form of the music introduces the voice of Apollo to tame 
the irrationality of Dionysus. 
Breslin does additional service by providing some passages from an unpublished 
and never completed draft of an essay Rothko wrote about Nietzsche. The painter 
claims "that the poignancy of art in my life lay in its Dionysian content, and that the 
nobility, the largeness and exaltation are hollow pillars, not to be trusted . . . unless 
they are filled to the point of bulging by the wild." It seems clear that for Rothko the 
measure and pondered ratio of his "pillars" should not negate the counter-assertion of 
Dionysian wildness. Rothko adds that Dionysus "has the secret of direct access to the 
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wild terror and suffering and blind drives and aspirations which lay at the bottom of 
human existence," while Apollo shows this wild rawness "filtered and made endurable 
by presenting itself thru a series of reflections, reflection being meant in both ways." In 
balancing these polarities the question of form becomes "the question of measure," and 
"I have imprisoned the most utter violence in every square inch." This would certainly 
be the case if, as is clear, Rothko symbolizes the general Dionysiac frenzy of life and 
the direct access to it by music. Rothko declares that his works are his best effort to 
"achieve the greatest intensity of the tragic irreconcilability of the basic violence which 
lies at the bottom of human existence and the daily life which must deal with it"—an art 
project which Rothko calls comparable to "the ritual celebrating of the power of a God 
whose potential is destruction, who must be propitiated by the very image of this 
potential if one is not himself to be destroyed" Of the clash of Dionysus and Apollo, 
Rothko reveals that he hopes to create "the moment of their greatest antagonism when 
they are constrained by some outward force (the artist) to inhabit together this limited 
space."35 From Rothko's known familiarity with Nietzsche we might have postulated 
these principles in Rothko's art, but this essay makes it impossible for interpreters not 
to connect Rothko to the Nietzschean sublime. The sublime in Rothko should be seen 
as a blending of the ideational, noble, existential, mythical, Nietzschean, moral, and 
religious sublime—the very kind of admixture we would suspect in a well-educated, 
philosophically-minded painter. 
Breslin's study occasionally supplies other statements by Rothko, and these 
should be carefully assessed, such as Rothko's comment that the Seagram Building 
Murals (which Rothko withdrew and later sent nine to the Tate Gallery) have an 
"exalted, even sacred character."36 Throughout his life Rothko expressed doubts about 
his achievement, worrying that his 1961 Museum of Modern Art and traveling show 
might amount to "nothing."37 Relevant to Kierkegaard and Sartre (and Nietzsche also), 
a friend of Rothko recalled that in the WPA and Hitler years, the painter often expressed 
his concern about "whether or not joining a group was going to make him change his 
art or lose his identity." Breslin cites an entry in a notebook of Rothko showing that in 
the thirties he was reading Plato, Kant, and Nietzsche's Digth of Tragedy. Breslin adds 
that around 1940 Rothko read Frazer's ThLgskkaihnigh. Sally Avery recalled 
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hearing Rothko discuss Plato well into the thirties. Leaning on conversations, Breslin 
observes that "If anyone praised the sensual beauty of his paintings, Rothko pointed to 
their spirituality; but if someone else hinted at spiritual properties, he defined himself as 
a materialist."38  
To one of Rothko's classes at the California School of Fine Arts, the student Clay 
Spohn brought some questions and recorded Rothko's answers: that art should be a 
"philosophic expression"; that modern art should move toward "esoteric reasoning"; 
that art can reveal the absolute; that young painters should study "psychology, 
philosophy, physics, literature, the other arts, and writings of the mystics"; and that the 
most interesting painting expresses "Philosophic or esoteric thought"39  
In conversations with Alfred Jensen, Rothko declared that "When a person is a 
mystic he must always strive to make everything concrete"; that he admired the 
sensualism in Mondrian's colors; that his paintings either "push outward" or "rush 
inward"; and that "When I recognize myself in a work, then I realize it's completed." 
The last item probably implies a sense of human scale and the artistic achievement of an 
idea, not an expression of private ego. 
Breslin offers a remark from Rothko that he does not think in terms of space, and 
offers the observation of Louise Bourgeois that Rothko "always sounded like a 
religious official. His demeanor was that of a prophet" Elaine de Kooning reported that 
his conversations had a "messiah" tonality, a sense "that he had discovered something 
great." On hearing that Meyer Schapiro in front of a class wept over the Holocaust, 
Rothko declared, "He's so sentimental. I can't stand it."41  
Breslin repeats some of Rothko's conversations with William Seitz: that "Intuition 
is the height of rationality. Not opposed"; that "I want pure response in terms of human 
need"; and that "My new areas of color are things. I put them on the surface. They do 
not run to the edge, they stop before the edge."42 Since Rothko declared that he was 
not interested in space, this partly explains why he does not suggest infinite space by 
taking his forms to the limit of the canvas (unlike Newman). In a letter to Motherwell 
cited by Breslin, Rothko mentions "a respect for human foreboding and tragic intuition 
which are so precious to the artist."'" There is no reason not to accept this idea as an 
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adequate explanation for the dark tonalities of Rothko's work. The idea of a tragic sense 
of life is part of Rothko's ideational sublime, and with a glance toward Burke, 
Nietzsche, Kant, and Lyotard, obviously a general "tragic sense" is formless and 
unpresentable, involving both a shock and the resolution through philosophic 
acceptance, thus involving both a pain and a pleasure, and involving a tribute to reason 
for conquering a potential field of terror by bringing it under a holistic rational concept. 
Breslin records that Rothko labeled as "acute" an early scholarly essay by Hubert 
Crehan, "Rothko's Wall of Light"—to be treated later. In a conversation with Alfred 
Jensen Rothko said that his forms do represent man, woman, and child, a remark 
relevant to the triptych panels in the Houston chapel, whose trinities probably carry 
some Joseph, Mary, and child implication; obviously a lurking family set would point 
strongly to human scale and human needs. Critics in general have ignored this 
possibility, though they have emphasized how zealously Rothko perceived his works as 
his "children? A conversation with Stanley Kunitz is cited in which Rothko declares he 
hates nature." 
Rothko's friend John Fischer records that in his first trip to Europe (1950) Rothko 
was much impressed by the sealed door and window motifs in the small-mom vestibule 
of Michelangelo's Medici Library, and his friend Dan Rice records that on his second 
European trip (1958), Rothko "responded more to architecture and music than to 
painting"--suggesting again that portals and musical measure are important concepts 
behind his ghostly chunks of luminous color. When the German curator Werner 
Hartman visited Rothko to discuss the Seagram murals, he remembered Rothko's 
comparing his aims to the Sistine Chapel, speaking vaguely of "transcendental 
experience," calling his works "mythical actions," and praising the surrealists "for 
having rediscovered mythical possibilities in everyday life."45 These are important 
revelations that Rothko, after moving away from ancient myth, still construed his 
works in terms of a different kind of myth, something rising from an immediate 
existential base. 
Harvard's president Nathan Pusey, visiting Rothko to work out a deal for a set of 
murals, recalled that Rothko linked some plum-colored austere paintings to Good 
Friday and the Easter resurrection, an important revelation that prior to the Houston 
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Chapel commission, Rothko was willing to handle Christian symbolism, probably 
willing because of its relation to universal human needs.46 Rothko hung five large 
panels (all with the rich crimson ground that Burke had named for sublime potential) in 
an elegant Harvard dining room, but he was concerned about utilitarian contamination 
and catering to the rich. 
Dore Ashton had close personal relations with Rothko, and presents some of his 
remarks in her study About Rothko. She notes that in Rothko's early visits with Milton 
Avery and his wife, "the long evenings were spent in discussions, often of literature—
poets such as T. S. Eliot and Wallace Stevens—and, according to Sally Avery, some 
philosophy. Rothko, she says, was reading Plato." Ashton gives Rothko's comment in 
a letter to Katherine Kuh that for audience he prefers an unsophisticated but sensitive 
observer possessing spiritual needs, "For if there is both need and spirit there is bound 
to be a real transaction." Ashton reveals that Rothko often, in private, called his works 
"portraits" of "states of the soul," an important idea that other interpreters have not 
utilized. She gives the painter's remarks that in the Rice chapel he wanted to "make East 
and West merge," and that he was influenced by Origen and other early church fathers, 
for whom everything "went toward ladders." Ashton shrewdly notes that the first 
Church fathers were attractive to Rothko because orthodoxy did not then exist, and 
these thinkers tended to be in rebellion against fixed traditions. The "laddering" concept 
relates Rothko's color slabs also to Plato, Plotinus, and neoplatonism. Ashton reveals 
that Rothko often said he would not work for a synagogue, and she connects this 
attitude to his Nietzschean heritage. She records Rothko's preference, when he was in 
Rome and Europe the second time, for the more conceptual mysteries of the early 
Renaissance, and she gives the important admission of Rothko, in a letter from his 
friend Gabriella Drudi, that his works develop from long ponderings (at the Museum of 
Modern Art) of the Matisse masterpiece Red Studio, Rothko stating that "from those 
months and that looking every day all of my painting was born." Finally, she records 
Rothko's remark in a letter to her that his late dark paintings in black, purple, and 
brown suggest "all the crosses we load on our own shoulders when the world settles 
for things without crosses."47  Here again Rothko shows his typical blend of spiritual 
idealism plus tragic awareness. 
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An unpublished recollection of Rothko by Robert Motherwell has just been 
published, in which he mentions frequent statements by Rothko that a group of his 
paintings shown together would function "as if each individual picture was a solo voice 
in an opera"—a remark related to Rothko's life-long passion for Mozart. Motherwell 
thought that he and Rothko, the Celt and the Jew, were perhaps held together by 
"unrestrained metaphysical anger"; that the late Rothko moved toward "poignancy 
before the unknown voice"; that he several times said "mine is a bitter old age"; and that 
his conversations revealed that "a work was fully realized if he could endure it, if it 
were not a lie."48 We may assume there were two kinds of "endure" for Rothko: the 
Nietzschean quest for sublime art forms that allow mankind to endure the horrors of 
existence, and Rothko's art-morality question of his own ability to endure his own 
productions. The sense of a moral sublime in Rothko needs to be built up from several 
vectors, some social and some personal. 
To turn now from Rothko's own words to analyses of critics, a reasonable 
starting point is to present two kinds of interpretations that should be rejected: the view 
that Rothko's work in his whole mature phase is ambivalent, contradictory, self-
negating; and the view that all talk of the spiritual sublime is meaningless empty jargon. 
Negation and equivocation are emphasized by three interpreters. Ashton (while 
conceding some orphic and Platonic elements in Rothko) believes that his final faith 
was ambivalent, probably Godless, and obsessed with death.49 Brian O'Doherty sees 
Rothko as self-negating, cut into contradictory halves, baffled by the search for 
transcendence and the failure to reach it, the Houston panels failing to reach any 
sublime transcendence.50 Breslin's biography takes a similar direction, declaring that 
Rothko's ambivalence is related to childhood trauma, that the portal motif is an 
invitation to a mysterious sublime yet also a wall of inaccessibility, and that Rothko's 
despair dominated his last phase and negates positive meanings.51 These three 
interpreters are failing to use paradox as the key to allow tragic and hopeful vectors to 
coexist in Rothko's work, and failing to understand Rothko's rejection of personal 
confession. 
The second dubious interpretation of Rothko is to brand all sublimicist and 
transcendental talk as empty jargon, a stance Robert Hughes approaches when he 
113 
doubts that Rothko could sustain a sublime vision, warns against all of the "clickety-
clack" about the sublime, thinks all the transcendental rhetoric might be a hollow 
she11.52 Ian Dunlop agrees, calling the sublimicist notions of Rothko and Newman 
"metaphysical pretensions" and "bogus religious overlay."53 Also, Donald Kuspit's 
scepticism about the sublime is well known, centered in his belief that abstract modern 
painters take refuge in the illusory sublime because they cannot comprehend or deal 
with the real social world and its pressing issues.54 Kuspit may have been influenced 
by Andre MaIrawes The Twilight of the Absolute, which treats modern art as a retreat 
from transcendence.55. 
In any case, these nay-sayers who are sceptical of the sublime in abstract art are a 
minority, and the main stream of criticism has accepted Rothko's aims more at face 
value. Rosenbium's study in 1975 emphasized the serious secularized religiosity in the 
romantic tradition from Friedrich to Rothko, declaring that Rothko chose spirit above 
matter, created a mystical luminosity akin to Turner, and achieved in the Rice chapel a 
perfect example of spirituality outside the channels of orthodox creeds.56 A few years 
later, in 1978, Diane Waldman produced her long catalogue essay on Rothko, 
proclaiming that he developed his own version of Mondrian's abstract expression 
(through "balanced asymmetry") of Platonic transcendental idealism attached to strong 
sensuosity; that he sought "the incorporeal reality of the sublime"; and that his best 
works elicit awe and mystery in creating "reminders of an order beyond man and 
nature," though the dark works in the last period are "brooding, forbidding, tragic:67  
In 1982 Anna Chave produced her doctoral dissertation on Rothko's subject 
matter, not as penetrating as we would prefer, but very helpful, asserting that his 
timeless dark/light polar symbolism accords with the long tradition in Zoroaster, 
Judaism, Christianity, Apollo, and Dionysus; that he tends to give darkness the upper 
hand, but not always; that his layered paintings utilize a strong "high and low, above 
and below" symbolism; that the uppermost color shape "might, for example, be at once 
a metaphor for the highest zone in the macrocosm," which would be heaven, and also 
symbolize head and intellect, and also the highest "resurrected state" of a "ritual male"; 
and that his most essential subject matter "was the human drama, human experience, 
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emotions and values."58  
In his much-praised study of abstract expressionism, William Seitz (not himself 
favoring negativity, alienation, and impasse) observes that Rothko launched a quest for 
the final stasis of an absolute, yet followed the ideas of Nietzsche in that the "Antitheses 
. . . are neither synthesized nor neutralized in his work, but held in a confronted unity 
which is a momentary stasis." Seitz intelligently notes that polarities, in principle, may 
be resolved either as permanent hostilities, or as a harmonious marriage of opposites, or 
by a dissolution of the contraries. There is a general sense in which Rothko paintings 
suggest all three patterns, which would not be surprising in that we often see all three in 
marriage and other relations. Seitz observes that in the era of Rothko, Newman, and 
Still, ambiguity had become a strong value, and the abstract expressionist painters 
sought a structural clarity that derived from "a tension of oppositional forces"—a 
condition which avoided overt religious meanings, yet recognized that the on-going 
"personal quest for a transcendental reality, and for an absolute, has in no sense 
abated." In such a metaphysical program, "Beauty becomes secondary" and "Reality 
and truth are the terms that best designate the absolute of abstract art."59 Seitz does not 
say so, but obviously he has sketched the classic ground of the ideational sublime set 
apart from beauty. In addition to encompassing dualities and focusing on truth and 
reality (including mystical reality), Seitz later adds deep thematic concerns with 
organicism, naturalism, and humanism, emphasizing (correctly) that the abstract 
expressionists created an almost wholly European movement, heavily indebted to 
romanticism, realism, Cizamie, Cubism, Mondrian, and expressionism, all of these 
reflected in France at the turn of the century.60 Seitz, however, downplays too much 
the great influence of American life and the rich world of New York art, and he might 
well have traced the genealogy of abstract expressionism back through the Renaissance, 
the Middle Ages, Greece, and Jewish and Christian beginnings. 
Another major work, Stephen Polcari's study of abstract expressionism, treats the 
movement as "an art of historical and mytho-religious character addressing the spiritual 
life of the West," and accepting Nietzsche's ideal of overcoming nihilism in a 
redemptive pattern "to affirm and at times regenerate Western life." The painters, 
Polcari asserts, were seeking a new basis for affirmative vision even though they were 
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affected by the pessimism of thinkers such as Spengler and Malraux, and were full of a 
sense of profound crisis, intensified by World War II. They took fmm surrealism, 
Polcari adds, not its key beliefs but its search for a radical new liberated model for self 
and society, launching from surrealist automatism but adding their own subjects, not in 
an effort to subvert reality, but rather to universalize their themes through metaphor, to 
"found the personal in the universal."61 Polcari finds a "secularly spiritual art" with 
two main themes: "to be caught in a web of difficulties and to seek to overcome them 
through an inward transformation and rebirth."62 In my view this suggests one key 
impulse in modernism, which is a search for new, satisfying, universal foundations of 
order, value, and meaning. 
Polcari states that these painters derived from the flood of myth theory the concept 
of a mythic hero who "symbolizes the group's problems, struggles, and triumphs in his 
own actions." They took from Nietzsche, Polcari declares, not his cyclic pessimism, 
but the concept of the creative Apollonian artist rejecting imitation and utilizing myth 
and tragic suffering. Rothko is presented as a classicist, "a serious student of ancient 
culture, particularly Greek painting and architecture," who often visited the Near 
Eastern and Greco-Roman rooms of the Brooklyn Museum—yet "Rothko's classicism 
is a Nietzschean Dionysian archaism new to twentieth century art and thought." Polcari 
rightly connects the shapes in Rothko's mature style to Newman's concept of the 
ideograph, a visual "vehicle for an abstract thought-complex," and he rightly finds in 
the mature works a "dialectic" which, musically, utilizes "contrapuntal rhythm." While 
emphasizing the pessimistic tonality of Rothko, Polcari properly sees that it does not 
cancel the positive vision carried by the sacred doorway motif, and that the bleakness 
was mitigated because at all stages Rothko "offered images of the enduring history, 
continuity, and sacredness of human life."63 More than other interpreters, Polcari 
connects Rothko to the entire Western tradition from Greece through Nietzsche to 
Joyce, Eliot, Jung, and the whole fabric of modernism. 
Having now used several major mainstream studies to establish an affirmative 
spiritual ideational core for Rothko (and thereby having set aside interpretations that 
either reject the transcendental sublime zone or find in Rothko a program of 
cancellation, equivocation, and failure), let us return to the statements of the painter to 
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work out the features of his engagement with the sublime. 
The most basic feature is Rothko's insistence on metaphysical subject matter 
wedded to mystery, awe, and transcendence, the defining essence of the ideational 
sublime. While numerous critics agree that this mode constitutes the center for the 
program of Rothko (as well as Newman and Still), most critics have been reluctant to 
be specific about the ideas which are adumbrated by Rothko's ghostly blocks of color. 
The following list is offered as a promising set there is a sacred absolute behind the 
world; human life is greatly bitter, tragic, and painful, but there are universal and 
constant vectors of joy, hope, and belief; the wild and passional Dionysian forces of life 
must be celebrated, yet through art and thought they must be given balance and order; 
polarity in a Nietzschean sense (not negative paradox) is a basic law for understanding 
reality and psychology; modern abstract art is a powerful new aesthetic style, yet it 
retains deep bondings to the whole of Western culture; abstract paintings can function 
religiously as cultic space; paintings should be intelligent about scale and the scale 
should embody the typical human emotions of contemporary lifr, art works and the 
cosmos and the vision of artists rest on measure, ratio, and proportion construed in a 
musical manner such that art approaches the condition of music; art works should not 
be confessional but should rest on an irony of self-effacement; the sacred ground of 
reality, the zone of godhead, remains shrouded by mystery, concealedness, and 
enigma; the creative artist should impose his values on society in a Nietzschean project; 
existential selfhood and lived experience is the basis of art projects; even in extreme 
abstraction, sensuality must be celebrated along with abstract thought, the sublime must 
be concretely embodied; myth theory is productive if it can be clothed in new 
contemporary garments; color and light are symbols for human drama and 
transcendental realities; the creative artist is a mythic cultural hero; and the abstract 
symbolization of new values in a new creative style born from artistic freedom strikes a 
major blow against materialism, unrestrained capitalism, social conformity, Marxist 
totalitarianism, orthodox religions, and collectivism. Certainly Rothko clearly revealed 
quite a sufficiency of specific metaphysical beliefs to actualize an ideational sublime, 
and each one of these ideas carries the nobility of thought and the unpresentable subject 
appropriate to a search for modes of the sublime. And in the Longinian sense, Rothko's 
intellect is good enough to demonstrate the sublime capacity for grasping noble 
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conceptions. 
Rothko's unpublished essay on Nietzsche, joined to his many references to 
Nietzsche over the whole of his life, makes it indisputably clear that the painter fully 
absorbed the Nietzschean sublime and clearly understood the Apollonian and Dionysian 
polarities, the centrality of tragedy and myth, the cultural heroism of the bold artist as 
will-to-power, and the Nietzschean definition of the sublime in The Birth of Tragedy, 
the work Rothko most carefully studied. 
Rothko blended the existential sublime into his program, as did Newman and 
Still, being well aware of Sartre's main ideas and those of Kierkegaard, and absorbing 
them in the sense of individual freedom, in the sense of a personal vision that was 
morally attuned to be constructive for other existents and for society, and in the hostility 
to social groups and collective movements. The non-Christian rationalism of Sartre 
becomes a decisive factor which tips Rothko more toward Sartre than Kierkegaard, 
though the Dane's isolation, anguish, and inwardness were clearly influential." The 
evidence of the existential center would be Rothko's use of Kierkegaard's version of 
the Abraham and Isaac legend; the life-long anguish over the "authentic" and morally 
honest, uncorrupted quality of his painting; the sense of personal fulfillment, the 
crossing of a threshold into psychic wholeness through secret inwardness and 
creativity; and also the stripping away of past conventions to reach a raw, living, 
existential base. The committed acts of abstract expressionist painting must be seen in 
the light of Sartrean acts which legitimate character and conduct, under the full burden 
of choosing for self and for others. The willingness of Rothko and his circle to work in 
isolation was fostered by Sartre's concept of each self as alone, without a divine 
sponsor or a preformulated life plan, a situation which, for Sartre, makes free being 
absolute being. The Sartrean threshold crossing onto transcendent ground which 
Rothko accepted is demarcated in the previously quoted passage of Sartre: "Man is all 
the time outside of himself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond himself that he 
makes man to exist; and, on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he 
himself is able to exist. Since man is thus self-surpassing, and can grasp objects only in 
relation to his self-surpassing, he is himself the heart and center of his 
transcendence."65 Also we should keep in mind that Sartre, like Nietzsche, offered a 
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strong pessimism and sense of death lighted by a redeeming hope and joy. 
The strong humanism of Sartre would reinforce Rothko's often stated subject of 
the "human drama" Also Sartrean is Rothko's statement that the modern artist benefits 
from being stripped from the past, being alone, being able to explore ahead into an 
unknown as, in Rothko's words, "transcendental experiences become possible." This 
is the ever-new sense of open risk and venture with which the existentialist greets each 
day. Also existential is Rothko's remark, "When I recognize myself in a work, then I 
realize it's completed." 
Rothko's deep interest in myth brings into his paintings the Jungian-mythic 
sublime. We have noted Rothko's comment that even in his specifically mythic 
paintings he sought the universal, generic "essence" of myth, and that the myth must be 
reconstructed in "our own terms," as "something real and existing in ourselves? This is 
precisely the theory of Jung--that the universal archetypes carrying the myth are all alive 
in each living person. Rothko called Still one of the band of "Myth Makers." The 
question then becomes: what myth structures might operate in Rothko's late works 
which are devoid of specific allusion to mythology? It is helpful to remember Cassirer's 
point that secular modern narratives are working as unrecognized myths. These strands 
of myth and symbol theory lead to two principles which invest Rothko's work with the 
mythical sublime: that when any narrative becomes cultic it becomes myth, and when 
any art space becomes cultic it becomes a religious or quasi-religious icon. Following 
these principles, Rothko's luminous paintings are numinous paintings with spiritual 
iconography; also several new narratives take on genuine myth status, such as the story 
of an artist's life if the artist is seen as a questing culture hero; and such as any narrative 
segment or whole of the history of art. That is, the story of Rothko's life may carry 
mythical value, and so may the story of abstract expressionism. This latter principle is 
clearly declared by the contemporary painter Philip Taaffe, when he adopts as a 
painterly project the using of the story of first generation abstract expressionists as a 
"theodicy," as "a series of inspired moments," a segment of the story of modernism, 
which is itself a "field of inquiry" that can be construed and experienced as a 
"theological history to be examined and made lucid."66 Taaffe has worked out some of 
the implications of Jungian myth theory and applied it to abstract expressionism. Even 
in an individual's memories, the remembrance of things past in the life of a family; the 
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remembrance of special private spiritual pilgrimages and readings and viewings; and the 
growing story of a given marriage all obviously take on a narrative cultic value. Indeed. 
the space of a person's house, if made sufficiently rich and pleasing, becomes often a 
cultic space more resonant with aura than the local churches. Myth-making goes on at 
many levels. This, then, is the claim made for interpreting Rothko: a mythic and 
religious sublime is deliberately sought and achieved by a cultic sense of the artist as 
questing hero, the cultic sense of an artist's life story being embodied in the works, the 
cultic use of art space, and the possible cultic use of favored segments of art history as 
sacred narratives, especially as these constructs are set beside Rothko's often repeated 
concern for an absolute transcendental subject seen in a new existential way and 
expressed in immediate phenomenological terms. 
The coming together of the mythic and religious sublime is revealed clearly in 
Rothko's 1947 essay "The romantics were prompted," especially the often-quoted but 
usually misunderstood passage about the isolated human figure in art of the past. 
Rothko is not analogizing his color blocks to the isolated human figures of Friedrich 
and others. Rothko's point is that these isolated human figures cannot raise their arms 
toward the supernatural because from the Renaissance on there has been no authentic 
myth to connect the temporal to the eternal. Also, if art remains figural, this frustrated 
human figure will remain the typical structure. But, Rothko adds, abstract art pulverizes 
this bankrupt everyday world and allows, by the special powers of abstraction, a 
soaring power which realizes the crossing of the threshold into cultic transcendence.67  
Because of Rothko's setting nature aside and espousing an impersonal personal 
vision, we should not connect him strongly to the romantic sublime, though there are 
some important bondings, as suggested by Rosenblum. In Bloom's theory of the 
counter-sublime, the young new artist should try to destroy his major predecessor, but 
Rothko does not show such vehemence, though there are some hostilities which might 
allow a less violent model of Bloom's theory. Rothko's art, like Newman's and Still's, 
keeps in view certain forces in culture and commerce which are always under attack, 
suggesting also some needed alterations in Bloom's model. If the counter-sublime is 
broadened to include a sense of enemies and declarations of culture wars, it becomes a 
useful part of theory of the sublime, an essential part when we try to understand the 
lone soldier mentality of Still, with powerful enemies close at hand. The beautiful 
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cannot handle warfare and destruction well, but the sublime is suited for such a task. 
Also, we must connect Rothko to the sublime of color/light and to the moral 
sublime. All interpreters focus on the crucial role of color in Rothko's program, and all 
accept Rothko's view that his color functions as metaphysical symbolism. Rothko 
approved of the early article on his use of color by Hubert Crehan (1954), the critic's 
claims being that the paintings contain symbolic "flashes of affirmation and bolts of 
doubt"; that the color forms abolish tine to convey "the essential oneness of things"; that 
Rothko achieves a new version of the mystical handling of light throughout biblical and 
Western culture, reviving this ancient visionary concept of light as "the commonest 
figure of speech for spiritual essence"; and that while conveying forebodings which 
may be related to the light of atomic explosions, Rothko also symbolizes that "it is still 
possible for us to discover serenity in the midst of turbulence."68  
Occasionally critics treat Rothko's color in merely visual terms, but this is rare.69  
Waldman states that color is his vehicle "for transcendental meaning"; that he achieves a 
kind of Rembrandt light; that "Red fascinates Rothko above all colors" and may 
symbolize ritual, fire, blood, life, death, and spirit; that in spite of a general sameness 
of style he achieves "seemingly infinite" variations in color forms and nuances; and that 
the blacks and reds of the Houston Chapel connote life, death, and spirit.70 Chave 
observes that Rothko moved away from bright colors as being too "seductive" and thus 
detracting from his subject matter. Kozioff has a second article on Rothko's color, 
noting the astonishing quality of chromatic glow that comes from within, "as auto-
luminous." Kozloff explains why he does not connect color to meaning: he finds the 
color effects often "directionless, unmotivated," and intellectually and spiritually 
frustrating. Ashton thinks that Rothko was focused not on color but light: "to create 
light, generate light by overpainting, masking, thinning, and thickening, and working 
for the musical effect, the vibyato to which he responded in the most poignant of 
Mozart's late work." She adds that he responded in Europe to the "hermetic" handling 
of light in Byzantine chapels. Polcari believes Rothko learned more about color from 
Matisse than from Still, especially the effect of a color wall in The Red Studio. Breslin 
notes that "by the diluting the paint to the verge of disintegration, Rothko created his 
unique luminosity," and that the painter often spoke of "breathing paint on canvas." 
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Ann Gibson asserts that Rothko, Newman, and Still, as they simplified their colors, 
achieved a cultural chronological regression to a mystical sense of cosmic oneness 
typical of primitive life and children. The three painters are presented as being 
influenced in this move by Nietzsche, the painter-theorist John Graham, and the myth 
theory of Joseph Campbell. Gibson cites passages in which Merleau-Pbnty speculates 
that colors have unique sacramental value in bridging between body and cosmos, that, 
in Merleau-Ponty's words, "Color is the place where our brain and the universe meet? 
Gibson concludes that "To Newman, Rothko, and Still, it (color) was the vehicle by 
which the mechanism of regressive time could be activated to enable one to attain 
transcendent union with the cosmos and oneself."71  
Ending his catalogue essay on Rothko, Irving Sandler declares that the painter 
uses color to express the urge for self-transcendence which "not only has not lessened 
but can stir passions as intense as those in any past age," and that Rothko interpreters 
must carefully ponder the color effects, "the unexpectedly joined hues, the slight, and 
continually slighter, modulations within the large area of any single surface, and the 
softness and the sequence of the colored shapes" which are "means, not ends? Robert 
Rosenblum's remark, given earlier, in chapter one, should be recalled—that Rothles 
tiers of color, "these infinite, glowing voids carry us beyond reason to the Sublime." In 
an article Polcari connects Rothkn to a concept of Novalis: that light is the "breath of 
life" for the universe. Although keeping to his main thesis that Rothko's forms both 
invite and frustrate, O'Doherty believes the light represents "spiritual desire" and the 
color slabs function semantically like paragraphs. However, it is better to say that they 
function by ratio and measure, and function as portals. Motherwell's comment, given in 
chapter one, that the abstract expressionists turned the surrealists' automatic doodle to 
something "plastic, mysterious, and sublime" should be set beside his remark that their 
chief instrument was "light that counts above everything. Not colored light, but color 
that gives off light-radiance," and "The supreme gift, after light, is scale."72 
In his article "Rothko and Belief" Peter Schjeldahl declares that sublimity is the 
only term adequate to describe Rothko's spiritual subject, that Rothko proceeded ualif 
sheer color, mediated by a design adjusted to give it maximum impact and versatility," 
could reach the zone of the sublime, and that "a dramaturgy of color, a sense of its 
122 
infinite capacity for poignance and shock, is the fundamental Rothko talent, the ground 
of his absolute originality." Evan Firestone believes "that the selection of color to 
convey meaning in Abstract Expressionism was frequently, and necessarily, 
conventional"—assuming that we would associate red with life, black with death, 
radiance with paradise, etc. Therefore Rothko and his circle "were the heirs to a modern 
tradition of color symbolism that dates to the early nineteenth century." Some 
corroboration for this claim for conventional symbolism is offered by Claude 
Cernuschi, who gives a comment Rothko made to Marjorie Phillips about a painting: 
"The . . . tone of the lower section of the canvas could symbolize the normal, happier 
side of living, and in proportion the dark, blue-green rectangular measure above it could 
stand for the black clouds and worries that always hang over us?' Cernuschi 
understands that this high/low and bright/dark polarity could suggest metaphysical 
oppositions such as freedom/necessity and finite/infinite, and that in the later works the 
darker and bleaker side of the polarities receives a larger weight Georgine Oeri finds in 
each work the "dichotomy between wholeness and separation," with color being 
"the substance by which that is substantiated which has no substance."73  
Donald Goddard suggests that Rothko's colors insinuate earth, air, fire, and 
water, the sense of "fundamental matter." Ashton, in an article, claims that "it was 
Rothko's portion to take what was most moving about the love of light in the painterly 
tradition (Rembrandt more than Fra Angelico) and transport it into our century." 
Lawrence Alloway asserts that Rothko invokes "Neo Platonic memories of light as the 
energy of the creator." An effective statement about this general Western mysticism 
carried by symbolic light is made by James Snyder when commenting on a paradise 
painting of Bosch: "For the mystics, heaven was Light and the Unknown, and the 
ascent was the dissolving of one's ego into the oneness of God. . . . The source of all 
is pure light, pure color," and Bosch's Aunt jalQlbgcsiitsfialfaradix, with its tunnel 
of radiant light, "is one of the most awesome and poetic representations of this mystical 
return to One, the Source, the Light, ever created in paint"74 The interpreters of 
Rothko are giving him a similar role in the twentieth century, though the paradise 
vision, while genuine, is accompanied by a sense of polar tensions and foreboding, by 
an existential sense of death, and by the decline of traditional mythic faith. Burke was 
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the major theorist of the sublime who first emphasized the importance of the sublime of 
color and light. We cannot be more specific about Rothko's metaphysical meanings 
than to declare that his color and light point to a possible oneness behind reality and to a 
sacred ground of being approached with awe and ultimate concern. The portal 
symbolism, his most important motif along with radiance, should be construed as an 
invitation to cross the threshold into the outer mystery, and Rothko's increasingly dark 
colors imply that the crossing is beset with agony and difficulty. Yet it was also Burke 
who noted that increases in difficulty and enigma are themselves sources for the 
sublime. Because of the considerable degree of ominous and fearful symbolism, and 
because Rothko was familiar with Burke's theory, the Burkean sublime is woven into 
Rothko's work, as it is into Still's. 
It remains to connect Rothko to the moral sublime and the noble sublime. When 
moral principles operate, the sublime stands near because there is an ascent, a threshold 
crossing, from the practical and actual into the ought and ideal, a crossing often touched 
by the sense of eternal and sacred things. Also, a moral precept exists in the invisible 
domain of the =presentable, and is a very powerful force which often includes pain 
with pleasure, posing a difficulty. In a broad manner, the first generation abstract 
expressionists all believed that society was in crisis, and their paintings were 
instruments for an ethically motivated process of healing and saving. A spiritual 
vacuum, a spiritual void, was to be alleviated by their concepts, values, and abstract 
forms. Set beside this broad ethical perspective was a second moral vector: their 
passion for honesty, their rejection of false feeling and commercialism, their sense of 
integrity in materials and style, their search for reduced and purified forms—a kind of 
painterly morality in addition to social morality. Furthermore, as we have seen, the 
existentialism that dominated the era of Rothko, Newman, and Still called for deep 
moral awareness, the responsibility to choose for all other existents. 
No one has insisted on the moral base of abstract expressionism as much as the 
philosophically trained Motherwell, who makes constant reference to this element: "the 
art that interests me asserts man's moral courage, intellectual daring, radiant sensuality"; 
"The question of objects in painting is unimportant because the real subject of paintings 
is moral attitudes"; purity of expression "is an effort to be truthful about human realities 
at any cost"; "Modern art is a specific ethical enterprise in relation to specific historical 
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necessities ... on the part of men who deeply love painting to preserve its integrity and 
truth"; the painter's struggle "has inexorable moral values—no nostalgia, no 
sentimentalism, no propaganda, no discourse, no autobiography, no violation of the 
canvas as surface . no cliches, no predetermined endings"; "to modify one's art is to 
modify one's character"; the question for a painter "is whether he has a vision"; even if 
Duchamp did not treat the holy, "he did find an ethic beyond the 'aesthetic' for his 
ultimate choice"; Picasso made a harmful ethical decision with "his romantic personality 
dominating the painting, as with Wagner"; and "The ethical concept as expressed by 
Kierkegaard hit me."75  
During our waking hours the moral sense (like rationality, common sense, sense 
of stability, comic sense, intentionality, and other states of mind) cannot be broken or 
divorced from other elements because the decision as to how we spend each hour is a 
moral choice, like the writer's choice of subject or the scientist's choice of experiment. 
Although we live in an epoch unwilling or unable to produce robust and effective ethical 
systems, our failure does not diminish the noble status of moral value, and does not 
diminish the categorical imperative to produce ethical theory. It is enormously to the 
advantage of Rothko, Newman, and Still that they sought and attained a moral vision 
and brought into their art the moral sublime. 
The noble sublime, the cool and reflective sublime of thoughtful brooding raised 
high by Kant, should be seen as a hallmark for Rothko's ouevre. Most interpreters 
emphasize the long hours of contemplation in front of each work, resulting in what? 
Resulting in some small adjustments in measure, ratio, proportion. Rothko's noble 
sublime resides, above all, in his application of measure construed in a musical sense, 
as if his color slabs and portals were musical phrases fixed by laws of harmony. 
Ashton, who was close to Rothko, records that he was always thinking about 
proportion. Polcari is right to note that Rothko would have felt in The Red Studio of 
Matisse not only the color-wall effect but also the "architectonic" quality, which 
influenced Rothko more than the forms of Still. Waldman declares that "Rothko's 
sensibility is in many respects close to Mondrian's," showing "attraction to order, 
stability, rectilinear structure and balanced asymmetry" in a "developing sense of the 
need to express a Platonic ideal."76  In any discussion of measure and ratio one must 
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emphasize the probable presence of Plato and Pythagoras, the sources for the idea that 
the cosmos receives its order from elemental ratios between primary geometric forms 
such as triangle and pyramid. The Pythagoreans thought that all profound polarities 
were patterns of measure and proportion. Their ideas were confirmed by their discovery 
that an octave could be raised or lowered by halving or doubling the length of the 
vibrating string. Such reasoning gave them warrant to speak of the music of the 
spheres, which Rothko may have in mind, but he certainly has in mind that basic 
human emotions associated with the sublime, in his own words, have different 
"weight." When Rothko named specific emotions he included "ecstasy" and "doom," 
an important pair reinforcing the deepest theme of combining some optimism with 
considerable pessimism, in the manner of Nietzsche. 
Simply to assert the importance of emotions of the sublime conveyed in the mode 
of the noble sublime via long-meditated and impersonal adjustments of ratio and 
measure does not, of course, solve all the problems, because it will be difficult, always, 
to be certain exactly which abstract ideas and which emotions are bonded to which 
specific color ratios and adjustments. Nevertheless, to use this concept as a key to 
Rothko's aims does take us a long way toward understanding the nature of his sublime 
subjects and the stylistic devices which carry and enhance them. As suggested earlier, 
these measured color blocks of Rothko, as he declared, relate to the motif of doors and 
windows, of portals that invite a threshold crossing. Numerous critics hold this idea, an 
example being Breslin's claim that for Rothko "a portal makes a place of transition, a 
crossing (sometimes a ritual crossing) of borders, a site of physical movement and 
emotional crisis, of coming and going, leaving and returning, loss and reunion—some 
of the principal themes of Rothko's life and work."77 There are powerful portal motifs 
all through Western art, and in numerous bible passages.78 From the late 1940s to the 
Rice Chapel, as Rothko moves away from traditional myth to a new sense of existential 
and phenomenological mythicality centered in subjective immediate experience and 
conveyed through iconic symbols of abstract color in a cultic space using flatness and 
frontality, his works have been unified by a sublime subject and the imagery of portals. 
In summary, we have suggested that Rothko's paintings have complex but 
probable relations to a number of the important modes of the sublime. Perhaps any 
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stress on creative genius should be connected to the romantic sublime, though Rothko's 
hostility toward nature has been the justification for not including a strong degree of 
romanticism, a decision also justified in that Rothko does not celebrate wild passion, 
but rather strong feelings that are rationally weighed and constrained. 
Some specific Rothko works may now be considered in relation to the established 
relevance of various modes of the sublime, not in an extremely detailed way but in a 
search for most salient features. The four works selected are Mull= ( 1948), plate 26 
of the Tate catalogue); Orange and Yellow (1956, plate 54); BiarjunAtaiwn (1959,    
plate 65); and the Houston chapel (1965-67). 
Milldam (1948) is chosen because it is one of the earliest works launching 
Rothko into his mature style. Essentially, seven colors are used in fuzzy-edged slabs: 
yellow (laced white); blurred dark orange and light orange; dark plumish blue (with 
some streaks close to black and laced white); yellow-orange; and crimson (laced 
orange). There are also animations of various streaks and dots, and a small greenish-
yellow patch. Even in this early work we sense portals; ascension; passionate 
exaltation; ratios; metaphysical radiances of inner light; tragic tonalities in plum-blue and 
crimson; joyous tonalities in white, orange, and yellow; a dialogue of polarities; and a 
veiled mysterious subject not fully presentable. We sense the special domain of the 
sublime—not simple beauty but a profound aesthetic object given the jolt of ideational 
complication. The intrinsic difficulty of fully abstract art forces us to seek, in the 
Kantian sense, ideas of reason which supply some unity to the aesthetic manifold. The 
difficulty itself provides the chefick, the shock, which the interpreter hopes to 
overcome. Since Rothko was fully cognizant this early about Nietzsche, about his own 
concept of measure, about theories of the sublime, and about the prevailing thought 
climate for existentialism and myth theory, all these intellectual currents are the 
background for these seminal works. As usual for Rothko the darker colors tend to 
come at the top, and there is no reason not to take this as rather conventional 
symbolism, an iconology giving the doomed and tragic awareness more of what 
Rothko called "weight" in his metaphysical use of abstract forms. It seems reasonable 
not to connect the black, plum, and crimson tones with the tragic vision of Nietzsche 
and Sartre (along with Rothko's troubled private life), and also with the Jungian 
concept of penetration into the darkness of psychic depth before integration can be 
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achieved (and certainly implied is the integration of Jungian polarities as well as 
Apollonian and Dionysian forces). 
There is a secondary counter-sublime in that Rothko's aloneness plus his rejection 
of realism plus his use of difficult abstract forms are certainly designed to negate 
Marxism, collectivism, conventional religious dogma, commercialized capitalism, and 
middle class taste. The unclear edges, the conceptual difficulty, and the black, plum, 
and red colors relate to the theory of Burke, while the ideational content relates to the 
emphasis on reason by Longinus, Kant, and Sartre. The seven different colors in this 
work draw attention because Rothko will soon move to sets of two, three, and four as 
he simplifies his strategy. 
What Rothko means by human scale is not fully clear; however, it would include 
an aim for monumentality of scale plus a humanistic weighing of values attuned to 
deepest human needs. In this early painting there certainly is a celebration of strong 
human scale, aiming for a combination of monumentality with the transcendental 
radiance and grandeur suited to the subject of sublime ideas. It may well be, as Chave 
claimed, that the high/low feature of Rothles forms carries a head and body 
implication, which would mean that the painter emphasizes thought and idea. 
The second painting, Orange and Yellow (1956), is chosen to represent the 
domination of a joyous mood, which Rothko often sought, plus the painter's growing 
simplification of means. It is easy to over-emphasize the pessimistic strain in Rothko. 
Even in the late period of his black and gray series, he was at the same time producing 
light and bright works, and he exhibited a great sense of joy over the chapel project of 
his last years. Orange and Yellow shows a pale orange ground as border, with faint 
streaks of pale white that set off the edges of the two main color slabs. Rothko declared 
that his forms are demarcated, given measure by not spilling out over the edges. The 
bottom color block here is rich orange with deep concealed whiteness, and the top 
rectangle is rich yellow with deep concealed whiteness, and the two forms are separated 
by a narrow white zone laced with both yellow and orange bleedings. It is almost never 
pointed out how frequently Rothko approaches the 3x5 ratios of the Golden Section. 
Numerous canvas sizes and panels in Rothko's Rice chapel come close to these 
proportions. One probably should connect this to ancient Greek ratio theory, which was 
itself greatly affected by human scale in that the Golden Section was seen in the 
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proportions of the human body. In Orange and Yellow both color slabs are close to the 
Golden Section, and so is the overall shape of the canvas. Even though Rothko's forms 
are horizontal, their stacking in a vertical ladder ascent is important for his sublime 
subjects. The threshold crossing is upward, in the vertical pattern noted by Burke. 
Rothko's habit of deeply concealed dim flares of inner light also suggests the sublime 
penetration to depth named by Burke and emphasized in the depth psychology of Jung, 
and others. The fact that Rothloo's light is not natural light, but an emanation from 
within, offers an iconology of cerebral light along with a sacred emanation meaning 
related to Plotinus and the general Western, Christian, and Jewish mysticism of light. 
This radiant painting celebrates the empire of light. And it may be the case that Rothles 
distinctive blurring and mysterious bleeding together of margins carries a vision of an 
absolute, a One reached by ladders of emanation. Emanation theory would have a 
special value for Rothko, Newman, and Still because it brings a sacred grounding 
different from those of Christian and Jewish orthodoxy. For these painters, one great 
merit of Plotinian emanation theory is that men and women must strive to attain their 
own ascent to Nous, and the redeeming agency is intellect, which would harmonize 
with the search for the ideational sublime. When Rothko's works are dominated not by 
dark tones but by intense orange and yellow, the painter's vision of hope and joy, his 
ten percent hope, should give the clue to the meaning. 
The third work, Black on Maroon (1959), represents a further simplification of 
means as the color values come closer together, revealing Rothko's general move 
toward darker colors, and revealing also that Rothko did not reject vertical color slabs, 
though he typically chooses horizontal stacking. This work is elected because the sense 
of doors and windows is overwhelming. Indeed, it may well be that Rothko preferred 
the horizontal slabs because the door and window symbolism would not be so obvious, 
and his mysteries would be better protected. slack on Maroon displays the deep colors 
favored by Burke, and reveals the dark tragic vision of Rothko. The black pillars are 
stained over the maroon ground, and enough edging is left to give the forms measured 
weight. The twin door motif in the middle, in radiant lavender, invites a threshold 
crossing toward light, toward some reality clothed in enigma. In terms of polar 
combination of joy and doom, even if we associate black with death or suffering, the 
black is over the plum ground, and the plum ground extends wider than the black slabs. 
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Also, Rothko's pure abstract forms are indeed like segments of music, reaching 
harmonic meanings with no imitation of objective reality. Black on Maroon is strong in 
two and four logic, with a triadic hint from the plum ground. Even if there is no close 
connection, we could still see an analogy to Pythagorean numerology and also to 
Jung's theories of the pm-ordained tendency to connect powerful beliefs to these simple 
number codes. Most critics assume that there is little sexuality in Rothko. This is 
improbable. We should include male/female relations in his symbolism of polar forces 
that complement and do not cancel out. Also, we should allow sexual meaning to the 
portal symbolism. 
The Rothko chapel cannot be photographically presented, but Breslin gives a 
partial shot in his figure 48. Almost all interpreters emphasize the genuineness of the 
attainment of the religious sublime. Ashton claims that Rothko, like Mallanne, always 
sought some "orphic explanation of the universe?' She does admit that the deepest 
meaning of the Rice chapel might be the sense of the absence of God, but that this 
should be seen as a spiritual state. However Waldman quotes Rosenblum's assertion 
that "the very lack of overt religious content here may make Rothko's surrogate icons 
and altarpieces, experienced in a nondenominational chapel, all the more potent in their 
evocation of the transcendental." Waldman states that Rothko was full of joy about the 
project, that his central theme is the passion of Christ, and that he fuses the "finite and 
the infinite," the "sensuous and the spiritual." Polcari suggests that all the panels 
suggest the Stations of the Cross; that when there are three panels grouped with the 
center panel elevated, there are hints of Crucifixion and Deposition scenes; and that 
"The chapel paintings climax Rothko's life-long subject: the absorption of the individual 
by his spiritual environment." Alloway says that in the chapel triptych pattern there are 
"unbreakable associations to Christian art and to number symbolism," plus a new 
secular element, "an assertion of the heroic stance of the artist within the traditional 
themes"—a valuable point in that Rothko certainly would preserve in all of his works his 
discovered existential sublime and his acknowledged Nietzschean project of imposing 
his values on the world, just as Matisse did in his chapel at Vence. In her article Ashton 
reminds us that in his research for the chapel project, Rothko pondered the writings of 
the church fathers and their three-fold scheme of literal, ethical, and allegorical 
meaning, and made "painstaking research for the proportions of the Houston Chapel." 
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Joseph Liss gives Motherwell's assertion about the Houston panels, "No, they didn't 
look funereal to me," and Rothko was so happy that when Motherwell met him on the 
street, "he threw his arms around me." Liss adds that he too found Rothko very happy 
with the chapel project. In his writings Motherwell observes, in relation to Kafka: "the 
void need not be terrifying. It can indeed vivify, when contrasted as an image with the 
fragility of human life."79 
 Previously noted is Breslin's view that the chapel panels are 
self-negating and defeatist, a view that some others, such as O'Doherty, would share. 
However these negative voices are very much in the minority, and the general tendency 
is to call the chapel a success as a celebration of sublime spirituality in modern terms. 
A few details about the Rice chapel are noteworthy. As one enters, the wall ahead 
has three large amorphous dark maroon panels, about 5 feet by 15 feet, close to the 
Golden Section. They set recessed in an apse, with no containing borders. Also, the 
center panel is brighter, with more internal color play, and slightly larger. On the 
opposite west wall of the octagon building is a matching triptych in black, with thin and 
straight maroon borders, the side panels being smaller. On four other walls are single 
dark panels, one having faint horizontal bars. Obviously the forms resemble portals and 
doors. As the viewer turns to leave the central room, the last single panel seen has a 
black rectangle on a maroon ground, but the bottom maroon border occupies about one-
fifth of the canvas, and the colors meet at the height of the human chest This last panel 
has very faint concealed white tones, and Breslin (who, as has been noted, calls it only 
a "momentary resolution" in order to maintain his general thesis that the chapel is 
dominated by the tonality of loss and despair) concedes that the forms of this final panel 
are not repeated elsewhere, and it "asserts singularity." Breslin maintains his negative 
analysis even though he repeats this Rothko remark about the chapel: "You can be 
engaged into the study of proportion or the response of your own meditative moods," 
and "It is all a study in proportion." 80  This is quite a significant statement by Rothko, 
meaning that viewers can seek a highly human-scale response in terms of their own 
states of soul, which should include various combinations of joyous, peaceful, or tragic 
conditions. Or, in a more objective and philosophic manner, they may contemplate the 
metaphysical, the ideational suggestivity of the handling of ratio and measure. This 
combination comes close to being ideal for the purposes of any chapel. 
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Taking for granted the allusions to Christology (the altar-piece tonality) of the 
chapel murals, and taking for granted the certain desire of Rothko to convey a wide 
range of mystical and spiritual value outside of specifically Christian tradition, including 
oriental and contemporary secular spirituality, one may seek other interesting features. 
Rothko uses clean rather than fuzzy edges, offering one more reduction toward 
simplicity, and suggesting, semantically, a kind of clarifying finality for this vision. 
This is a good time to mention seriality as one of the resources for sublimity named by 
the classical theorists. Throughout his life Rothko was eager to have his paintings 
shown as a set in one room. This serial concept allows the paintings to work together 
like various voices in a unified operatic work, and also allows for an incremental 
ladder-like ascent toward eternal things. Two other patterns (named by Longinus) are 
also prominent in Rothko's aims: the grand motif of the one and the many (also implied 
by the single room with eight walls), and the bold pushing of the past into the present. 
We would see more emphasis on some of these principles from classic sublime theory 
if the Rothko interpreters had absorbed the major studies. Longinus also singled out for 
sublime expressivity the fact of organic unity, meditative silence, question and answer 
patterns, metaphor, and strong passions—all of these present in the Rothko chapel and 
preceding works. From Burke's theory the following affective features are also strong 
in the Rice chapel and previous works: terror, obscurity, dark/light combinations, dark 
colors, emptiness, privation, solitude, vastness, verticality, and penetration into 
deepness. Attention should be focused on the last panel in the chapel. The sense of 
human scale is sharper, the optimism of color is greater. It seems reasonable to take this 
panel as a testimony for humanism, for the cry of a man with arms raised toward 
transcendental realities, an assertion of human will-to-power, an assertion of man as 
measure., an assertion of existential freedom and human triumph. 
Certainly Rothko is still working for a mythical sublime, a generic sense of 
mythicality located in modernist experience and the lived immediacy of existential hope 
and anguish, and also for an ontological sublime if we assume that his rectangles, duos, 
trinities, and quaternities testify to the basic stuff of the cosmos, as well as to basic flux 
carried by the sense of radical change in the new abstract aesthetic, and by field 
imagery. 
The moral sublimity of the Rothko chapel is indisputable due to its positive 
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spiritual purpose. yet other ethical aspects also exist. As Motherwell insisted, the entire 
abstract expressionist program had its own intrinsic morality of a quest for 
uncontaminated new forms of expression wedded to a ruthless honesty about feeling 
and form. 
Finally, to reinforce the general thesis that Rothko belongs most essentially to a 
combination of the noble and ideational sublime, it is appropriate to list again some of 
his key ideas that invest these three paintings and the chapel with the ideational sublime: 
behind the world lies a sacred absolute; life is greatly bitter and painful, but there are 
also valid grounds for hope and faith; Dionysian and Apollonian powers must be 
celebrated and balanced; polarity combined with measure and ratio constitutes a great 
cosmic and human law; modern abstract art is a radical break, yet it retains major 
bondings to past art; measure and ratio function musically and allow abstract art to 
approach the condition of abstract music; art should be impersonal not confessional; the 
sacred is shrouded in enigma; the creative artist imposes his values on society; 
existential lived experience is the chief source for values; sensuality must be related to 
concepts; new approaches to myth are needed; color and light are powerful symbols; 
the creative artist is a mythic hero; and materialism, Marxism, and unrestrained 
capitalism must be resisted, along with empty traditional religious conventions. To this 
set (certainly not exhaustive) may be added a theoretic rejection of anecdote, narrative, 
imitation, sentimentality, nostalgia, and local color. Rothko firmly held a set of major 
ideas adequate to become the basis for an ideational sublime, ideas woven into the 
aesthetic patterns of his paintings and of the Houston murals. 
Having ended this chapter with the Rice chapel, it is appropriate to note one 
further range in Rothko's religious program: abstract art offers extremely satisfying 
ways to honor Godhead and yet protect the purity of an eternal absolute. That is, since 
abstraction can avoid anecdote and human figures and local scenic realism, it can 
minimize the anthropomorphic and superstitious elements in a given religious form. The 
nous-centered religion of Plotinus tries to achieve such a purification. The point has 
already been made that Rothko's abstract ladders suggest the emanation theory of 
Plotinus, emanations tied to rationality. Recalling Rothko's advice that young painters 
should study Western mysticism, we might suspect that Rothko had Plotinus in mind, 
and that emanation logic is a semantic feature of Rothko's technique of inner light and 
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color fusions which do not negate formal separations. A general emanation pattern is 
also logical for Rothko since it is a key aspect of Jewish mystical writing (which 
influenced Newman more than Rothko). Rothko might have been influenced by the 
Kabbala to use emanation as a pattern.81 Reason and emanation may be seen as coming 
together in the Houston chapel in a theologically astute manner. 
The perspectives of Weiskel, Crowther, Lyotard, and Ferguson would allow 
varied readings of Rothko. From Weiskel's point of view, one could bring to the fore 
the counter elements and the ironic masking of the private self, yet the Jungianism of 
Rothko works against Weiskel's Freudianism, and the negative features of Rothko's 
works are overshadowed by the strong affirmative currents. However Rothko would 
support Weiskel's claim that the sublime requires a more than human transcendence. 
Perhaps Weiskel would recognize the predominance of optimism and spirituality in 
Rothko and thus assume (like Rosenblum in Modankaintingandihetionliern 
Romantic Tradition) that Rothko did not move out of the romantic sublime into the more 
negative postmodern sublime. 
Crowther's perspective is praiseworthy because—comprehensive enough to 
embrace the crucial ground for understanding Rothko—it would allow for the painter's 
moral seriousness, his ideational and noble sublime, his intent to enrich the capacities of 
viewers, his utilization of suffering and tragedy, his aesthetics of rational 
contemplation, his perception that abstract art mounts a critique of capitalism and social 
structures, his sense of physicality and existential embodiment, his sense of strong 
relations to history and culture, his sense of reciprocity between the sensory and 
ideational, his belief in the redemptive power of art, his sense of psychological 
constants and trans-finite modes of experience, and his efforts to meet deep human 
needs. 
Lyotard's approach would call attention to some of the painter's valuable features: 
Rothko offers what Lyotard describes as the essence of the sublime, the "ungraspable 
allusions to the invisible within the visible"; he would support Lyotard in resisting all 
dogmatic positions; his moral dimension would accord with Lyotard's sublime moral 
ought; he would agree with Lyotard that art should satisfy basic human needs; he would 
agree that experimental art should renew our sense of existential wonder, and he would 
agree that the crucial zone for sublimity is the ideational. Rothko's paintings, however, 
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would not accord with Lyotard's dismissal of all large legitimating narratives, since 
Rothko is situated not only in Western theory of the sublime but also in the grand 
narratives of enlightenment, democracy, and liberal humanistic freedom. And, in that 
the work of Rothko, Newman, and Still was designed as positive affirmation to fill the 
spiritual void of fading orthodox religions, Rothko would not accept Lyotard's 
sceptical claim that nothing positive can now be offered. And the abstract expressionists 
would be in accord with Lyotard's view that modernism and idealism should continue 
as the main stream. 
Assuming that Ferguson's method would be to look for problematic sites of 
contradiction, she might well support those readings of Rothko which claim that the 
voids negate the putative sublimity, adding up to a nothingness. Also a Ferguson 
approach might lean heavily on Rothko's irony of self-effacement, seizing upon that as 
a sign of the destabilizing of the concept of self, which would be a misreading, since 
Rothko's setting aside of the private ego is designed only to reach the impersonal 
ground of universal contents, and does not function to problematize either selfhood or 
external objects. Abstract expressionism is an assertion of ideas and subjectivity, but it 
is not a denial of contact with external objects. Rothko, Newman, and Still never speak 
in these terms. Also, a Ferguson type of reading might pay careful attention to the 
language statements of Rothko, hoping thereby to shift the ground away from the 
paintings toward rhetoricity, and seeking in the painter's words some elements that 
could contradict and problematize the paintings. Thus Ferguson, Lyotard, and Weiskel 
may be used for partial insights into the oeuvre of Rothko; yet, their approach can 
encourage misreadings when positive contents are forced into an extremely negative 
framework. Rothko's works do not allow their own recognitions of doubt and negation 
to overpower the stronger components of affirmation carried in both measured form and 
sublime content. Strongly negative readings are strongly negated by Rothko's ratio and 
proportion, and his portals are the opposite of sealed windows. As I have argued earlier 
(in my general approval of Crowther's perspective) Crowther's model, so far, does not 
give a full enough appreciation of the high place of religions and moralities in 
sublimicism, and to that extent, does not do full justice to strong religious and ethical 
themes in painters such as Rothko. 
Thus in any full and fair appraisal of Rothko, interpreters should pay attention to 
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the structures of positive belief; the spirituality; the reasons for resisting politicized art; 
the sense of cultic space, ratio, and human scale; the idea of self-effacement; the motif 
of the artist as questing culture hero; the special powers of abstraction; the rejection of 
traditional orthodoxies; and the special power of the portal image. 
As we have seen, there can be some fundamental disagreement over the best way 
to interpret this portal, and also the dark colors that Rothko prefers. The predominantly 
affirmative interpretation which I have favored is based on the general sense of value 
affirmations that emerges from Rothko's many statements about his program. And I 
have argued that these positive implications continue to be the dominant ones all the 
way to the ecumenical chapel at Rice University. Yet Rothko has called attention to the 
darker motifs in his work, the suggestions of tragedy, doom, and terror. Interpreters 
could assume that these factors deserve greater emphasis, could assume that the very 
vagueness and murkiness and veiled aspect of Rothko's works could convey the 
unreachablility or unknowability of whatever absolute might exist behind the veil, 
behind the portal which could be seen as much as a barrier as an access. Additionally, a 
middle ground could be taken, the presumption that the veiled effect points both to an 
access and a concealment, and such a middle ground interpretation would, I think, 
accord better with everything we know about Rothko. I have favored tipping the scales 
to the positive side because of accumulated evidence, and I have shown that most of 
Rothko's interpreters favor this approach--which may owe something to the generally 
optimistic flavor of the American mind. However, we should recognize that an 
alternative and more pessimistic reading is possible. 
Such ambiguities are relevant to a later chapter in this study which raises the 
difficult problem of discriminating between the generally hopeful voice of modernism 
and the generally less hopeful voice of postmodernism. The situation of Rothko will be 
found in other major modernist painters: an interweaving of negative and positive 
elements, an interweaving of the power of rupture with the power of tradition. These 
paradoxical features abound throughout the whole pattern of American and European art 
in the twentieth century. If Rothko, Newman, and Still are the heirs of a modern 
European tradition of mystical and spiritual ascent toward the absolute, they also inherit 
the anguish of German expressionism and the bitter flavor of Dada and futurism. This 
chapter on Rothko points to such issues, to be treated later. 
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For now, the chief intent has been to present a generally positive reading of 
Rothko and to make a case for locating in Rothko's paintings the following modes of 
sublimity: ideational, existential, Nietzschean, religious, Burkean, moral, counter, 
noble, and light-color. The assumption is that all of these modes lace together in 
Rothko's search for new ways to approach absolute subjects in a pattern of 
transcendence. 
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Five - The Sublime in Newman 
The chapters on Newman and Still can be briefer than the treatment of Rothko, 
since there is no need to cover the same ground again. Interpreters of Newman are now 
in an ideal situation to treat his general program because of the 1990 Barnett Newman; 
Selected Writings and Interviews. 1 Using this work, one can readily follow the 
development of all of Newman's most important concepts. However, some 
amalgamating must be done in that the chronological data is distributed under six 
chapter headings: The Artist-Citizen, The Artist-Critic, The Artist-Thinker, Statements, 
Correspondence, and Colloquies. A study of these writings and interviews suggests 
that a sound analysis of Newman's concerns can be sought under fourteen pivotal 
concepts that Newman keeps returning to over the years: (1) the crisis situation for 
American painters in the thirties and forties; (2) the way out of the crisis by a 
neoprimitive avant-garde creation of a bold new art with universal metaphysical subject 
matter conveyed through subjective, ideographic, and abstract symbols; (3) a stress on 
strong feelings in art, but feelings aroused by metaphysical ideas, and this 
emotive/cerebral art constituting a direct pointing to the desiderated truth, a direct 
ontological participation in the truth rather than any kind of indirect representation of it; 
(4) a search for the sublime rather than the beautiful, for exaltation of spirit in a secular 
mode of muted religiosity stained by terror and tragic awareness; (5) a strong sense of 
existential humanism, of authentic place of being, and of existential freedom; (6) this 
existential center leading to an important art concept of humanized scale created by 
drawing; (7) this existential center also leading to a metaphysical art motif of total 
selfhood lifted out of social and natural environment and poised under a space dome of 
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all four unbounded horizons; (8) a sense of a new mythology with Jungian tonality yet 
derived not from the past but from contemporary sources; (9) a generally anarchistic 
mind-set which rejects dogma and fights against excessive social control and 
dehumanization characteristic of Fascism, capitalism, and Marxist authoritarianism; (10) 
a distinct theory of art history; (11) a preference for titles of paintings that suggest 
metaphysical meaning; (12) a life-long effort to clarify his divergence from surrealism, 
from Mondrian, and from the formalism of Bell and Fry; (13) a distancing of himself 
from direct political and social reform; and (14) comments on the sense in which there 
was or was not a genuine New York School or a school of abstract expressionism. 
Obviously there is some overlap among the fourteen areas, but Newman himself has 
marked them out as topics for repeated treatment. 
From Newman's perspective, the crisis situation of the thirties was generated 
partly by art history and partly by social history. Painters were moving away from 
realism, as witnessed by surrealism and the full abstraction of Mondrian. Yet Newman 
spoke of impasse. While "the new painters were dissatisfied with realism," they could 
not accept formalist abstract art that seemed to deny subject matter, and they could not 
accept the fantasy dream world of surrealism, though the surrealists were right to stress 
"the importance of subject matter for the painter."2 Newman thought the new painters 
were standing naked without a proper subject or method, had to fall back on 
subjectivity, and could not use any traditional social or religious symbols.3 Newman 
also felt that most preceding artists had sought to produce paintings which were 
beautiful objects. But his generation was also dissatisfied by beauty, which is a product 
of form, not of subject matter. In looking back at this situation, Newman states that 
they could not paint a beautiful world because "we realized that the world wasn't 
beautifuL4 But much earlier, in 1945, Newman had declared that the new painters 
were seeking a "non-voluptuous" art "to get rid of, to slough off, the skin of 'beauty,'" 
and this project "involves a denial of Western European art."5 In addition to this 
impasse in the world of art, Newman also stressed a crucial element in the cultural 
situation: the bleakness about society engendered by World War II with its horrors and 
the atomic bomb and the ideological oppressions by the Nazis, the Marxists, and 
capitalism. Newman declared in 1948 that while Egyptians faced an unknown 
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ontological terror of death, life, and eternity, the modern painters faced a recognized 
social terror of a world gone wrong, and "What we have now is a tragic rather than a 
terrifying situation," a new sense of fate like "the tragic position of the Greeks." 
Newman declares that the modern painters must not make the mistake of the Greek 
artists and seek an ideal beauty but must instead imitate the Greek writers and "tear the 
tragedy to shreds."6 So far the interpreters of Newman have failed to make the 
extremely important connection such concepts have to Nietzsche. 
Given then the predicament of a new sense of tragedy plus profound 
dissatisfaction at the available subjects and methods of the legendary preceding 
modernist painters, Newman, like Rothko and Still, struggled to create a new method 
and new subject matter. For Newman the proper subject was metaphysical ideas and the 
proper method was the subjective, abstract, participatory, ideographic symbol. More 
than any other topic, Newman emphasizes the question of subject matter. As early as 
1926 Newman scribbled on a brown paper bag that "The artist emphatically does not 
create form. The artist expresses in a work of art an aesthetic idea which is innate and 
eternal."7  It is not certain whether or not Newman takes his "aesthetic idea" directly 
from Kant, or from his own situation and milieu. Like Rothko and Pollock (and partly 
influenced by Nietzsche, Jung, Cassirer, Eliot, Joyce, and others who raised high the 
world's primitive myths) Newman perceived a close analogy, in 1944, between his 
twentieth century art of ideas and the work of primitive artists. Primitive artists captured 
spiritual content, and "their art by the same magic illuminates the work of our time" and 
helps clarify the modern abstract artist's aims by the primitive "sense of dignity, the 
high seriousness of purpose," and by "the tangible expression of man's innermost, 
intangible, spiritual aspirations." For Newman the primitive artists were metaphysically 
and aesthetically sophisticated in their pursuit not of the real external world but of "the 
elemental mystery of life," and their works "were the same sublime creation of highly 
sophisticated artists with the same doubts, the same wonderings, and the same search 
for salvation, that same indomitable courage which activates men and spirit today." 
Newman declared that their high sense of moral purpose reached a "sublime plane."8 
Also in 1944 Newman, in an essay on modern art, declared that modern abstract 
painters have made a neo-primitive return "to first principles," creating art which is "an 
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expression of thought, of important truth, not a sentimental and artificial 'bonny.' It 
established the artist as a creator and searcher rather than a copyist." Newman adds, "It 
has been charged that modern art is abstract, intellectual. So are Einstein's theory, the 
quantum theory, and cosmic theory."9 This is an important comment in that Motherwell 
was stressing Alfred North Whitehead's praise of abstraction in science, mathematics, 
and philosophy, and claiming that the extreme simplifying and reducing in scientific and 
philosophic abstraction gave the abstract expressionists a sense of the value of abstract 
art as a vehicle for ideas Newman goes on to assert that "the art of the future will . . . 
be an art that is abstract yet full of feeling, capable of expressing the most abstruse 
philosophic thought."113 A year later, in 1945, Newman observes that such subject 
matter is universal, not personal or regional, and not political, in the sense that "no one 
agitates for American, French, or Mexican 'mathematical tradition.'"11 Thus Newman, 
like modernism in general, sought a universal truth and an international style, two 
elements which demarcate modernism from postmodernism--though just how much 
division there really is remains unsettled. 
Sometime in 1944 or 1945 Newman produced an unpublished essay on painting 
and prose, observing that the Western European primitive artists enjoyed the authentic 
sublime subject, being concerned "with the creation of gods, with the expression of 
forces with numinous beings," yet Christianity negated this authentic ground by an 
excessively "rationalized religion," and Judaism negated the free creative ground by 
"outright taboo," and for these reasons any new kind of religious dogmatism would be 
a "blind alley."12 
Also in 1945, in a letter, Newman emphasizes that the new American painting "is 
concerned with metaphysical implications, with the divine mysteries," and that "to 
create numinous beings these men have created new symbols, new images, a new 
plastic language."13 Around 1950 Newman interestingly rejects deliberate ambiguity in 
art ideas, declaring that "One thing is certain: ambiguity as a deliberate act . . . is an 
anomaly and an evasion. ... Clarity alone can lead to freedom."14 Newman frequently 
notes that the proper new transcendental subject matter is "an expressive art yet not of 
the painter's personal feelings."15 In 1947 Newman claimed that the American artist 
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"transcends his abstract world to make that world real, rendering the epistemological 
implications of abstract concepts with sufficient conviction and understanding to give 
them body and expression."16 This embodiment in art symbols brings metaphysical 
ideas into the felt existential domain as an incarnation into real presence, not as a 
description. Newman adds that the painters give reality to intangibles, achieve a kind of 
"mysticism," and "To put it philosophically, the European is concerned with the 
transcendence of objects while the American is concerned with the reality of the 
transcendental experience."17 Newman is close to Kant's idea-based theory of the 
sublime, and close to Nietzsche's sense of the artist as creator of religious and 
metaphysical values, but he does not share Nietzsche's belief that all truth is fiction. 
Enough has been said to highlight Newman's sense of an abstract art embodying 
metaphysical ideas. Now, what kind of abstract symbol can pull off such a magic trick 
and be a magic of reality, not fantasy? We need a subjective but impersonal abstract 
symbol that achieves an ontological capture of a transcendental reality. Experts on the 
theory of myth and symbol may be able to show how such a concept originated in the 
works of Nietzsche, the French Symbolists, Jung, Levy-Bruhl, Sir James Frazer, 
Cassirer, Tillich, and others. Newman worked out his own way with this complex 
background around him. 
Newman records that in 1948, he produced his first exploratory "Onement" work, 
nothing but one line in the center of a canvas, and he pondered it for a full year, 
realizing that somehow this abstract symbol that came into Onement I "confronted" him 
with "a life of its own."18 Newman at one point calls attention to the idea of pure 
poetry, in which words function "purely and abstractly in the manner of music."19 
Even if words (ordered by grammar and syntax) never actually achieve such purity, it is 
possible for painting. Newman's symbol comes from personal subjectivity, but 
embodies universal and impersonal ideas. And "when a personal symbol is integrated 
with the abstract idea, it has the living element within it that will carry the living 
thought"20 This mysticism of abstract symbols would resemble the way in which, in 
biblical Logos theory, all particulars of creation incarnate the Logos; this Johanine 
doctrine is quite a good example of secular but spiritual symbolism in the sense of direct 
participation required by Newman. He calls this "a vision of the world of truth in terms 
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of visual symbols," and also calls it "a kind of symbolic logic," and "an attempt to 
achieve feeling through intellectual content"21 
 If Mondrian's art was too cool, this is 
an impassioned art; yet the passion flows not from any personal life problems, rather 
from the recognition of sublime metaphysical verities. Newman is stalking bigger game 
than personal romantic confessions. 
In a revealing remark in the 1947 letter to Greenberg, Newman notes that a non-
Euclidean formula in geometry is not like Einstein's formulas because the latter are 
"symbols that evoke in a stenographic fashion the imagined idea-complex that is 
Einstein's vision of a cosmos. . . • We must evoke his world, recreating his reality 
from his non-material stenography."22 Even if this is not a very clear statement, it does 
at least point to Newman's interest in a kind of art symbol which could evoke and 
illuminate higher realities at the cosmic and universal level. 
In 1963, Newman asserts that he wants to see an art work not as a mere object but 
as an "entire sentence."23 Sentences make philosophic predications about truths, and 
Newman hopes for the same power in an abstract painting. This does not imply that the 
essence of the painting could be given in a sentence. It could not be, since such a 
reduction would remove the direct pointing. "Direct pointing" offers a helpful phrase. 
In the art of Zen Buddhism, the painting as direct pointing means that the painting 
literally is the revealed state of enlightenment, to be grasped at once as existential 
ontology. Finally, in that 1970 last statement prior to his death, Newman comments that 
his paintings are not like windows showing the way to something else; rather, "The 
beginning and end are there at once."24 What all of these passages accomplish is to 
reveal Newman's working out of his early 1945 intuition that primitive art, like the 
abstract work of Gottlieb, utilizes abstract "pictographic" forms functioning as symbols 
to elevate "the aesthetic self to the ecstasy man feels whenever face to face with deep 
insight."25 
 Obviously the "deep insight" and "ecstasy" would pertain to metaphysical 
appropriation of an authentic sublime subject. Finally, there are the explicit comments in 
Newman's 1947 piece "The Ideographic Picture," defined by Newman as a direct 
conveying of ideas by symbolic figures in which an "idea-complex . . . makes contact 
with mystery."26 
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Various remarks already given reveal that Newman wants impassioned art rather 
than calmly rational art. In 1969 Newman offers "For Impassioned Criticism," favoring 
Baudelaire's intense and partisan criticism and rejecting criticism more cool and 
"scientific."27 The 1944 article "On Modern Art" for La Revista Belga contains the 
claim that the new art "is abstract yet full of feeling."28 In the 1945 memorial letter for 
Howard Putzel, Newman calls for an art "concerned with numinous ideas and 
feelings."29 Newman proclaims that the first man was an artist who gave "yells of awe 
and anger at his tragic state."30 Strong passions attach to all the previously mentioned 
aspects of ecstasy and exaltation in Newman's subject matter. In an interesting 1966 
conversation with Thomas Hess concerning Newman's series of paintings The Stations 
of the Cross, Newman insists that the intellectual and emotional cannot be separated.31  
A year later, while addressing a conference on art and religion, Newman claims that 
while the young recent painters, like the hippies, may seem to show no strong beliefs, 
their work projects an emotional longing for religious feeling.32 
Other than comments already given, Newman offers many insights into his search 
for the sublime, the grandest possible subject, and a predictable one for painters not 
devoted to beauty. Perhaps the logical place to begin is Newman's 1948 essay "The 
Sublime is Now," his last article for Tiger's Eye. The year 1948 is important, because 
this is the year in which Newman discovers his own mature style. In a note to this 
essay Mollie McNickle states that in preparing it, Newman, who had studied standard 
texts on the sublime in college, "refreshed his memory of the standard texts on the 
subject: Longinus, Kant, Hegel, Burke."33 If this is true, a firm ground is laid for 
connecting Newman's paintings to these theorists. In the essay, Newman judged that in 
their concept of the sublime absolute, Longinus, Kant, and Hegel kept too close to the 
Greek sense of beauty and formal qualities, but Burke did not, and "to me Burke reads 
like a surrealist manuaL"34 Newman is not fair to Kant, who marked off the rugged 
sublime from the formal perfection of the beautiful. Newman reveals a preference for 
Gothic and Baroque sublimity in that these modes show "a desire to destroy form."35  
From the Renaissance up to impressionism, Newman declares, the impulse toward the 
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sublime was wrongly centered in the Greek obsession with ideal beauty, but the 
impressionists could not reach a needed new vision because they lacked "an adequate 
substitute for a sublime message." The ugly strokes of impressionist painters did launch 
modern art in that "The impulse of modern art was the desire to destroy beauty."36  
In Newman's view modern artists are struggling to regain a genuine sublime 
subject Although "living in a time without a legend or mythos that can be called 
sublime," some artists "are finding the answer" and "are reasserting man's natural 
desire for the exalted, for a concern with our relationship to absolute emotions." These 
artists are not, like the Greeks and the Middle Ages, making "cathedrals" out of man or 
Christ, but are making them "out of ourselves, out of our own feelings."37 It would 
have helped Newman had he understood that Kant and Nietzsche both located the 
sublime in human thought and feeling. 
Attention has been drawn to comments in which Newman gives to primitive 
artists an authentic sublime subject. In "the Plasmic Image," written in the mid-forties, 
Newman assumes that surrealism was too man-centered to reach a sublime vision. 
However, "the present painter is concerned not with his own feelings or with the 
mystery of his own personality but with the penetration into the world mystery. His 
imagination is therefore attempting to dig into metaphysical secrets. To that extent his 
art is concerned with the sublime. It is a religious art which through symbols will catch 
the basic truth of life, which is its sense of tragedy."38 In this same essay Newman 
declares that the primitive painter and modern painter both face directly "the mystery of 
life" and present "wonder" and "terror" before this mystery "or the majesty of its 
forces."39 Again, Newman's interest in forces rather than distances suggests that his 
chief interest lies in the dynamical sublime. This sense of force was strong in 
Newman's essay "The Sublime is Now," wherein he assumes that in the absence of a 
public sublime myth, the revolutionary modern art reaches sublimity "in its effort and 
energy" to discover some saving strategy. Mondrian's effort is seen as reaching the 
sublime realm, but "The geometry (perfection) swallowed up his metaphysics (his 
exaltation)."40 It is important that Newman perceives a close bond to Mondrian, but 
wants a stronger sense of emotive exaltation. 
Newman records (in relation to The Stations of the Cross) that he felt close to the 
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sublime level of Michelangelo and Turner in striving "to paint the itnpossible."41 An 
especially interesting comment appears in Newman's address to the congress on 
religion and art when Newman declares that the sublime sacredness of a work of art 
might well depend "on the quality of the work of art, on its uniqueness, on its rigor."42 
This is a new insight, a late one, and it suggests Henry James's famous remark in one 
of the prefaces to his novels that a work cannot "bear witness" to its high subject unless 
if has great formal and stylistic perfection. Such a principle would demand both 
significant form and significant metaphysics—a very productive theory to hold. 
The remaining items in the list of fourteen do not require as thorough a treatment 
as did the topics of subject matter, symbolic method, emotive content, and sublime 
aims. Two elements come together in Newman's sense of existential selfhood and 
existential place. A catalogue statement of 1965 declares that "The self, terrible and 
constant, is for me the subject matter of painting and sculpture."43 A year later in the 
catalogue statement for his own showing of Thg Stations of di Cross, Newman 
explains that his basic theme of the cry of Jesus that God has forsaken him becomes 
transmuted into the tragic cry which is "the story of each man's agony," and that the 
alienated selfhood of Jesus constitutes "the human condition since Adam."44 An 
important remark combining Sartrian existentialism and Newman's space dome concept 
occurs in a 1962 interview: "Anyone standing in front of my paintings must feel the 
vertical domelike vaults encompass him to awaken an awareness of his being alive in 
the sensation of complete space," and yet he rejects the subject of his personal self as 
being an 	 1,45 
In the 1965 B.B.C. interview with David Sylvester, Newman offers the 
somewhat Sartrean comment, his hope that his paintings have "the impact of giving 
someone, as it did me, the feeling of his own totality, of his own separateness, of his 
own individuality, and at the same time of his connection to others, who are also 
separate. . . . the disdain for the self is something I don't quite understand."46  
Accompanying Newman's sense of the sublime existential self is his sense of 
place for the self. Again in the B.B.C. interview, Newman declares:"One thing that I 
am involved in . . . is that the painting should give man a sense of place: that he knows 
150 
he's there, so he's aware of himself." Newman adds, "To me, the sense of place not 
only has a mystery but has that sense of metaphysical fact."47 Newman elsewhere 
states that facts belong to art because artists "create reality," and do not imitate nature.48  
Obviously, one of the metaphysical ideas that Newman captures in his abstract symbols 
is the concept of spatially embodied selfhood. The mystery and sacredness of place 
emerges as the core motif of Newman's design for a Jewish synagogue, the creation of 
an altar place of existential freedom where one is alone with God, and "under the 
tension of that `Tzim-Tzum' that created light and the world, he can experience a total 
sense of his own personality before the Torah and His name."49 Also, in his address to 
a 1967 conference on art and religion, Newman claims that any artist who creates a 
genuine sense of place reaches a spiritual dimension, and "the Jewish medieval notion 
of Makom is where God is."50 The "Tzim-Tzum" concept refers to the theory in 
Jewish 1Cabbalah lore that in order for God to generate a space for the cosmos, He 
contracts his own sweep of being to make that space. Existential embodiment also 
stands behind Newman's important doctrine of scale in paintings, scale produced not 
by color but by drawing, by line. A 1965 catalogue statement contains Newman's 
declaration: "The freedom of space, the emotion of human scale, the sanctity of place 
are what is moving."51 Also, Newman asserts that in his Stations of the Cross, "I 
wanted human scale for the human cry."52 A 1962 interview with Dorothy Gees 
Seckler contains Newman's remark that he is not a colorist, that his "passionate" 
subject is reached "primarily in my drawing."53 A 1966 interview gives Newman's 
comment that scale is realized "in separating the painting from the sense of 
environment."54 Various comments about scale appear in a tour-of-the-Louvre 
conversation between Newman and Pierre Schneider in 1969. Of Uccelo's painting 
Battle, Newman says that the scale is good because "content and form are inseparable"; 
that Ingres could paint but could not draw because he "had no sense of scale"; and that 
in The Raft of the Medusa "the scale is marvelous."55 Newman's doctrine of scale 
obviously concerns not size but ratio and proportion as they actualize a sharply human 
perspective of value and idea which is autonomous in the painting, not fixed by any 
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external perspective of the physical environment—a kind of "man is the measure" 
concept. 
Newman's distinctive space dome and four unbounded horizons idea appears in 
the 1962 Seckler interview: "Since childhood I have always been aware of space as a 
space-dome. . . . For me space is where I can feel all four horizons."56 All of 
Newman's pivotal ideas relate to the sublime (as is the case with Nietzsche), and this 
connection is clear when Newman makes a remark in the interview with Hudson which 
has the sense of the sublimity in Friedrich's paintings. Newman observes that his sense 
of scale is like being on the tundra where there are no mountains to block the infinite 
horizon, and "the feeling of space involves all four horizons," and "when you are 
standing on a beach or on a plateau or on the tundra, you get a tangible, almost 
fearsome sense of space."57  
Newman does not often speak of mythology, but it is an important concern. 
Attention has been given to his belief that the modern painter of the sublime does not 
enjoy a public sublime mythos and must struggle to achieve a personal myth. In the 
memorial letter for Howard Putzel, Newman sees the new American art as essentially "a 
religious art, a modern mythology concerned with numinous ideas and feelings."58 In 
his catalogue foreword in 1946 Newman states that the modern abstract painters "are 
creating a living myth" for their age.59  
Newman's anarchism flows from his rejection of all coercive dogma, whether 
political, social, or religious. In 1968 Newman writes a foreword to an edition of 
Kropotkin's anarchist Memoirs of a Revolutionary, claiming that "What is particular 
about anarchism is not its criticism of society but the creative way of life it offers that 
makes all programmatic doctrine impossible," and noting that "Anarchism . . is the 
only criticism of society which is not a technique for the seizure and transfer of power 
by one group against another." Kropotkin is seen as a lover of "personal freedom," and 
as "the existentialist man observing his own drama," and as one "deeply concerned with 
the dehumanization which was happening as a result of the industrial revolution." It is 
in this sense that Newman several times called his work subversive of capitalism, and 
he pins this down in his 1966 remark that capitalism is challenged because "if my 
paintings were properly understood, society would change."60 Newman clearly rejects 
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any art of direct political aims because authentic works make their own aesthetic 
challenge to misguided societies 
Newman's theory of art history has already been suggested in his tracking of the 
sublime subject from the primitive artists to the Greeks and on to the impressionists, 
surrealists, and Mondrian. Newman designs his art history in terms of an exalted 
sublime subject properly conceived by primitives and Egyptians, turned off track by the 
Greeks, perceived better in the Middle Ages and Gothic, wrongly turned toward the 
Greeks in the Renaissance and until the impressionists, wrongly turned by the 
surrealists to dream and fantasy, made too scientific and cold by Mondrian, and now 
coming into a proper new passionate phase in abstract expressionism. The key element 
for Newman is to reject the physical real world in search of existential exaltation before 
mysteries of being and powers of metaphysical concept. 
Newman's theory of titles appears when he states in the 1984 documentary film 
interview that his titles are an effort to create a "metaphor" for his mesnings.61 This 
concept is valuable for any analysis of Newman's work. Perhaps enough has already 
been said about his quarrel with the surrealists; he disliked their drift into fantasy and 
dream, their use of recognizable objects, and the dogmatism of their allegiance to Marx 
and Freud. Mondrian erred in being too rational and too much concerned for geometric 
beauty. Naturally Newman would reject the formalism of Fry and Bell. Newman 
asserts that the doctrine of significant form has become a harmful new academy.62 Fry 
and Bell were important because in reaction against them, Newman developed his 
aesthetic of subject matter. Newman's hostility to direct political art has been explained 
in his support of anarchy, and the anti-political stance also follows from a concern with 
the sublime and with revolutionary ideas, not revolutionary social action. 
Newman's own perspective on the idea of a New York School is somewhat 
vague. In 1947 he claims that he, Gottlieb, Rothko, and Still constitute a "new 
indigenous school."63 Yet in 1965 Newman claims that he and his cohorts were not "a 
cohesive bloc," that none of the suggested labels are appropriate because each painter is 
so "powerfully personal," and that the only common ground was "the creation of a 
new, free, plastic language."64 However, this much of a common ground seems to 
justify the label of abstract expressionism. 
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Clearly Newman's own statements connect him to a number of the modes of the 
sublime. As in the case of Rothko, Newman's constant insistence on the primacy of 
metaphysical ideas places him essentially in the ideational sublime as this direction 
develops from Longinus, Kant, and other sources. Newman's approach to sublimity 
through idea reveals some features which differentiate him from Rothko: a clearer 
concept of the ideographic symbol; a clearer personal conception of art history as it is 
structured by concern for the sublime; a firmer rejection of the beautiful in favor of the 
sublime; and a stronger desire for alignment with modern science. 
The concept of ideographic symbol emerges in previously noted comments of 
Newman—that the proper fusion between personal symbol and abstract idea will carry 
the thought in a lived, existential manner; that in such a symbol strong feeling merges 
with intellectual content; and that a kind of semantic sentence is created by these 
pictographs through which one "idea-complex . . makes contact with mystery." The 
strong feelings (not arising from irrational passions) are those generated by some idea 
put forward semantically as a sentence-like truth claim. To use an example from 
Newman's work, Vir Heroicus Sublimis is based on an emotionally stirring abstract 
idea: that a person can raise his life to a heroic and sublime level. The painting consists 
of a large 96x216 inches slab of rich bold red given enough variety to be sentence-like 
by four slender zips, one charcoal, one white, and two pale red. As an ideograph 
symbol, we can say that Newman's vast crimson slab is a color/light sublime entity; 
and the crimson b phenomenologically rich in the very qualities of life, energy, and 
grandeur, and the four zips Er affirmative in their verticality and am constituents of 
polarity and variety sufficient to suggest a complex human personality as a general 
force, not as a private subjective ego. Even if we stop here and do not add that the vast 
red field might symbolically participate in a cosmic One as the validation of sublime 
encounters, we still have enough to justify Newman's thesis of a "magical" pictograph 
whose white magic is to fuse emotion and sensory form into the essential substance of 
the abstract idea. Pale pink or pale blue could not have been used by Newman for this 
work, and if the zips were not there, we might have a possible symbol for a hidden 
One, but would not have the realization of polar complexity that can not only represent a 
human being, but can represent a sublimity of human character set in polar relation to a 
transcendent absolute. Reasoning of this sort does reveal an acceptable logical 
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foundation for Newman's important speculation about the ideographic symbol--
acceptable enough to give credence to the painter's project. This is not to say that 
philosophers could not come up with arguments against an art symbol having such 
semantic and epistemological features. However, all such debates should be settled on a 
probability scale, and Newman can lay claim to strong probability. It has long been 
accepted that art symbols successfully embody metaphysical concepts, and icons such 
as the cross or mandela have always been construed as carriers of a white magic. 
Following Crowther, one could argue that this revolutionary use of an abstract symbol 
constitutes precisely that adjustment to social change that keeps symbols culturally alive 
and opens a saving dimension when symbols grow stale from conventional overuse. 
That is, the aliveness and new potency of a good symbol is phenomenologically present 
in Newman's bold new forms. Newman's symbols mean something sublime in terms 
of a lived existential emergence. 
In turning from ideograph to Newman's scheme of art history, the ideational 
sublime again becomes prominent through Newman's belief that the art projects of 
different ages should be evaluated in terms of a transcultural concept whether or not 
the artists aspire to an exalted sacred zone of transcendence, whether they keep to this 
highest ground and turn away from the beauty of external objects or optic impressions 
of nature or geometric formalism or any other subject (such as politics, materialism, or 
egotism) which would not encourage the ascent to the eternal and snared. This 
framework offered by Newman is strongly stained by Nietzsche's sense of a general 
sublime culture project, and by Nietzschean and Jungian thought about the absence of a 
true mythos for the modern artist. The presence of the Nietzschean sublime also appears 
in Newman's belief that the modern tragic awareness of a world gone wrong places the 
modern artist in the same perspective as the tragic Greek dramatists. 
Newman connects his ideational sublime also to modern science, especially in his 
statement that Einstein's vision of the cosmos is not vivified by his stenographic 
mathematical signs and formulas, whereas an art symbol can successfully "evoke his 
world, recreating his reality"—meaning that Newman's art takes cognizance of the 
cultural change engendered by relativity theory and quantum theory. This is a grandiose 
claim for abstract art, but Newman finds it plausible. It is reasonable, then, to suggest 
that the color field abstract expressionists can convey something of the existential, 
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phenomenological quality of the structures of reality postulated by modern science, and 
further, that the color field makes contact with the field theories of modem science, and 
that abstract art forms are especially suited to convey the scientific truth of abstract 
mathematical sentences. Newman's mind was working in this direction. It might also 
be the case that when abstract painters from Mondrian to Still reject narrative and 
anecdote, they are responding to the universalized and timeless patterns of scientific 
thought, which fit well with the timeless zone of sublimity, myth, and archetype. One 
could argue that a new scientific sense of quanta of energy is incorporated not only in 
the activated color fields of Rothko, Newman, and Still, but also in the energy swirls of 
Pollock and de Kooning. In any case, we must underline Newman's interest in art that 
can reach both spiritual and scientific absolutes, an ideational center not so conspicuous 
in Rothko and Still, but certainly not absent. Also, we should keep in mind (following 
Longinus and Kant) that major scientific concepts, as raw ideas, might qualify as 
sublime ideas. 
The fourth element in Newman's ideational sublime is the firm and conscious 
rejection of the beautiful, revealed in his claim that the quest for the specific beauty of 
natural forms has been a wrong turn in art history. This point of view also marks 
Newman's Tiger's Eye essay on the sublime, wherein Burke is praised for his sharp 
contrast between smooth formal beauty and the rugged contours of the sublime. This is 
a good place to connect Newman to the Burkean/Gothic sublime, since, in this essay, 
Newman raised Burke above other classical theorists and declared his own affinity for 
Gothic and Baroque sublimity, in which isolated forms are shattered under the pressure 
of soaring ideas. Also Burkean is Newman's emphasis on strong passions as suitable 
for sublimity, and even if there is less long brooding over ratio and measure in 
Newman than in Rothko, Newman is still in the territory of the noble sublime because 
his forms are geometrized and the strong feelings are triggered by ideas, not by 
instinctual urges. It is an obvious truth that strong ideas call out strong feelings. 
These vectors from the ideational, Nietzschean, and Burkean sublime are joined 
by a conspicuous alignment with the Jungian and existential sublime, seen especially in 
the Tiger's Eye essay when Newman declares that the modern abstract painters do not 
make sacred art based on Greek realism or on the life of Christ, but rather make their 
cathedrals "out of ourselves, out of our own feelings," creating from this ground a new 
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kind of effective mythos. As Newman states, the modern painter is like the primitive 
artist in the need for myth, yet cannot use ancient myth. It is not necessary to elaborate 
this point, which has been developed in relation to Rothko. We may simply note that, in 
a Sartrian fashion, the matrix for the new myth is lived personal existence, and, as in 
Jung, the divine absolute is shifted from external location and placed within the powers 
of the human psyche. Also, in Cassirer's logic, the life of an artist-hero could establish 
a secular narrative that becomes culturally effective as a myth, a story connecting the 
human to the sacred. This new version of secular myth is interestingly adopted by the 
neo-geo painter Philip Taaffe in a 1987 interview, offering his conception of a mythical 
narrative theodicy which "extracts an exegesis or makes a story from a number of 
sacred, inspired, or supernatural events. In doing so, these sacred events become 
amplified, more lucid, more approachable. Perhaps we should see modernism as a field 
of inquiry in that sense." Adding that in his own mythic theodicy of modernism, 
Newman, Rothko, and Still are major figures in his narrative of sacred moments, 
Taaffe follows the principle that new myth is where one finds it.65 The existential and 
phenomenological grounding of Newman's mythic awareness is suggested by painting 
titles such as Right Here (1954) and Not ncillsis (1962). 
Newman's search for a light-color sublime (every bit as strong as Rothko's) 
reveals itself in a series of tides such as Horizon Light (1949), Queen of the Night 
(1951), Day_Qag (1951-52), White Fire 1 (1954), Primordial Light (1954), Black Firs 1 
(1961), Noon Light (1961), Shining 
	
(1961), Profile of Light (1967), Voice of 
Eke (1967), White and Hot (1967), and Shimmer Bright (1968). Furthermore., in 
leafing through Newman's major works in Harold Rosenberg Barnett Newman,66 it is 
obvious that the painter's strongly favored colors are the ones that Burke connected to 
the sublime: crimson, rich blue, black, and radiant white. 
The moral sublime is embedded in Newman's paintings in several obvious ways, 
chiefly the core idea that modern art must serve the social good by creating a new 
mythos of transcendence to replace the fading orthodox religious structures—a sublime 
project indebted to Nietzsche, Jung, and others, a project shared by Rothko and Still. 
Additionally, Newman shares Rothko's moral passion to attain aesthetic forms of 
rightness, forms simplified and cleansed for the honor of candor and truth to modern 
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experience, a kind of morality of brush stroke and plastic surface akin to that of 
Mondrian, and carried forward by Noland, Kelly, Stella, and Will Barnet. 
While a counter sublime of attack dwells in Newman's art (carried by the warfare 
his paintings wage against the past rhetoric of beauty attached to objects of nature, 
along with warfare against anecdote, romantic personal confession, totalitarian forces, 
materialism, and regionalism), these counter-currents are subordinated to the positive 
tonality of his strong religious sublime. In Newman's case (in contrast to Rothko) there 
is a conspicuous Jewish element that should be neither ignored nor exaggerated. We 
have noted Newman's interest in a spiritualized space in touch with God, which the 
painter connects to the medieval Jewish concept of Makom, a place where God is. We 
have noted Newman's interest in "Tzim-Tzum," the Kabbalistic doctrine that God 
contracts his own being to generate a space for the cosmos, a space for the coming of 
light and world. In describing his own design for a synagogue, Newman declares his 
vision of a space to which each person can go, where "he can experience a total sense 
of his own personality before the Torah and His Name." In another text, Newman 
concedes that younger artists were losing a sense of the sacred and the moral, but that, 
still, they struggle "to create a sense of place so that the artist and the beholder will 
know where they are." Newman's own sculpture an Zum II  is an effort to create such 
a space.67 The sculpture consists of a paired row of large zig-zag panels of Cor-ten 
steel, the folds apparently representing the contracting of deity to create space for the 
universe. Obviously, in light of these remarks, Newman's works aim for a cultic 
religious space in which existential selfhood stands before the Creator, and the space 
acts in the manner emphasized by Crowther to produce a sense of hospitable belonging 
in the world—a coming together of body-hold and world-hold. 
Since Newman's remarks do point directly to the Kabbala, some brief 
observations on Jewish mysticism are appropriate. The basic doctrine, The Tree of 
Life, establishes a tree-like sequence of emanations from the Creator. The topmost level 
is called the Crown, closest to Godhead. Under that come three triads, described by 
Edward Hoffman as Wisdom, Understanding, and Knowledge; then Judgment, Mercy, 
and Beauty; then Victory, Glory, and Foundation; and finally one bottom category 
called Kingdom.68 One prominent scholar of the Kabbala, Gershom Scholem, asserts 
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that these levels carry additional meanings of love, power, compassion, lasting 
endurance, and majesty. These ten stages are called the Sephirot. Scholem explains that 
"although the &dim are emanated successively from above to below, each one 
revealing an additional stage in the divine process, they also have a formalized 
structure." Scholem reveals that some scholars think the Tree of life was structured in 
three levels of intellect, soul, and nature in response to the levels of the cosmology of 
Plotinus and neoplatonism. There was some interplay because the Christian 
neoplatonist Pico della Mirandola founded a Christian school of the Kabbalah in order 
to blend some of its mystic concepts with Christian belief.69  
Hoffman notes that under the category of beauty comes the highest divine 
presence that can be glimpsed during earthly life; that commentators connect the third 
triad to form, specific shape, and procreation; and that the bottom entity, kingdom, is 
construed as a female counterpart for the male creator, an emanation closest to normal 
human life, so that "link by link . . . we are inseparably connected to the most hidden 
and exalted dimensions of being."70 Some Kabbalistic books, such as the Zohar, 
abound in sexual imagery. There are scattered noble passages rich in sublime content, 
for instance in The Lesser Holy Assembly book of the Zohar: "And he separateth 
Himself ever more and more; He is separated from all things, neither yet doth He 
altogether separate Himself, seeing that unto Himself all things adhere, and that He 
Himself adhereth to all; He is the Most Holy Ancient of all ancients, the Concealed with 
all the Concealments."71  There are also large segments of the texts which are murky 
and too fanciful. In his introduction to The Kabbalah Unveiled Matters observes that 
evil (as in Plotinus) is associated with matter, and ten classes of devils are evolved to 
match the ten Sephirot.72  All of this kind of primitive thinking is what Plotinus tried to 
avoid In the Kabbala these ten emanation stages (balanced in the perfect man Adam 
Kadmon) are cluttered with fantasy items, whereas in Plotinus we have an almost 
scientifically clean progression from creator to nous to world soul to human intellect—
just as in the gospel of John, we have a potent philosophically purified creation story 
going from creator to logos to human intellect to incarnation, a story which can be seen 
as a rebuff to the superstition in the Genesis creation narrative. 
Modern Jewish intellectuals like Newman and Rothko would have to reject much 
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of the Kabbala, but could be expected to respect the broadest concepts: that orders of 
emanation structure the cosmos and distribute divine powers into nature and man, so 
that mankind, by meditation, can ascend the tree of emanation to seek a complete 
spiritualized integration of the self. These purified core concepts are emphasized by 
Hoffman as he seeks to reconcile the Kabbala with modern psychology, pointing out 
that Jewish intellectuals have attached the sephirot to Jungian archetypes; have 
suggested that the sephirot envisions four basic levels of reality as Force, Pattern, 
Energy, and Substance; and that these four zones can be related to the theories of 
modem science. Certainly this is the right direction to take, and it has met with some 
success, but the burden of superstition is still extremely heavy. The sublime of light 
operates in the Kabbala: the great Kabbalist Isaac Luria taught that the original vessels 
designed to receive the holy light of the Zimzum were shattered by its magnificence, 
resulting in an imperfect world with sparks of the heavenly Light lodged in all things, 
and laying an imperative on men and women to elevate their own divine spark back to 
the primal One. Also, in some books of the Kabbala there is a holy color symbolism of 
blue, yellow, white, red, and red-white. This might be related to Newman, though 
there is no supporting evidence. The important realization is that Newman appreciated 
and used some core principles in Kabbalistic emanation theory, but appropriated only 
broad philosophic concepts far removed from the textual vagueness and elaborate 
fantasy, much in the same way that modern Christians would appreciate the general 
cosmological patterns and blend them with the stronger non-Jewish mysticism of the 
West It is of some interest that, in the sephirot, the first divine quality emanated is 
wisdom, a fact that probably ties to the Old Testament wisdom books, which are 
probably the finest part of the Old Testament, assuming that Isaiah and Jesus inherit the 
wisdom tradition, with its origin in Solomon. A text like Proverbs has much less 
superstitious baggage than the books of the Kabbala. A number of Newman's painting 
tides focus his interest in the religious sublime by clearly suggesting the light of the first 
day of creation, raising the probability that he views artistic creation as an extension of 
cosmic creation, as many artists do. 
It seems likely that Newman's interest in Kabbalistic cosmology and the 
contraction of the deity to create space is connected to his reiterated intent to give his 
viewers a feeling for sacred space and full selfhood stabilized by the sense of a space 
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dome touching all four horizons, a kind of space interest not met in Rothko. Newman 
also emphasizes scale, which needs no elaboration beyond the comments in the 
previous chapter. 
Scholarly interpretations of Newman shed valuable light on the modes of the 
sublime in his works. Michael Zakian has published two articles on Newman and the 
sublime. Generally speaking, Zaldan distorts Newman's theory of the sublime to 
confine it as much as possible to the physical and social world, and to fully human 
values, showing a sympathy for materialism, nominalism, Hegelianism, and Marxism. 
In "Barnett Newman and The Sublime," Zakian sets aside any upper mystical zone by 
claiming that Newman wants to give each viewer a sense of sublime selfhood and 
relativistic individual fixing of meaning face to face with the physical world.73 Zakian 
limits Newman's sublime narrowly to people simply raising metaphysical questions in 
the midst of the physical world, and thus transcending "the objective nature of their 
environment by recognizing their difference from material reality."74 However, such a 
reduction ignores Newman's core sense of exalted spiritual mystery and his rejection of 
the real world. In his second article "Barnett Newman: Painting and a Sense of Place," 
Zakian connects Newman's sublime to a humanistic Hegelian sense of total unity, yet a 
unity conditioned by "a comprehensive system of historically shifting mediations," and 
coming not in a genuine absolute sense but "as a practical intuition attained through a 
participation with real things," this being possible only in "the totality of current social 
conditions."75 Because Newman uses particulars, Zakian concludes that "we see 
Newman's nominalism, his belief that there are no universal essences, only factual 
objects and specific incidents."76  In such an analysis, we learn more about Zakian than 
Newman. There can be perhaps a fully humanistic social and materialistic theory of the 
sublime, but Newman's sense of an exalted mystery out of normal space and time 
cannot be accommodated to Zakian's Marxist materialism (at least it seems Marxist). 
Philip Taaffe, the neo-geo painter, in his previously cited statement on Newman, 
believes that Newman wanted to cancel all the previous rhetoric about the sublime, to 
"set sail across an ocean of sheer terrifying potentiality," and thus create "a sublime of 
disassociation, a Great Refusal of the Sublime."77 Again, this is too narrow, too 
negative, too wild and woolly to mesh properly with Newman's many statements about 
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his aims. There is a kind of fresh sense of "terrifying potentiality" in Newman's art, but 
there is much more than that. 
Crowther offers a shrewdly reasoned article on "Barnett Newman and the 
Sublime." Supporting his claims with key statements by Newman, Crowther shows 
that Newman stands close to the Burkean sublime but also moves toward Kant in that 
Newman recognizes "the element of rational self-comprehension inherent in the artist's 
awesome feelings." Crowther observes that interpreters should pay more attention to 
Newman's concept of an abstract ideographic symbol, that Newman prefers such a 
symbol to representational art or geometric abstraction, and that we may assume "that 
he sees non-geometrical abstraction as simply having greater connotative power. It 
hovers, as it were, in the potently ambiguous semantic space between conventional 
representational art and pure geometric abstraction." Crowther has raised the right issue: 
what are the specific semantic powers of the abstract ideographic symbol? Crowther 
also notes one problem for the early abstract expressionist work in that biomorphic 
forms make a bond to the very naturalistic forces that Newman's sublime wishes to 
negate-78 This probably explains why Rothko, Newman, and Still moved away from 
such forms. 
Crowther points to some inaccuracy in Newman's effort to track the sublime 
through the history of art, but concludes that such flaws do not invalidate Newman's 
core belief "that a mode of abstraction free of overt natural associations is sublime in a 
more profound sense," a stand different from that of Kant. Offering one of the few 
plausible explanations as to why Newman was so struck by his Onement 1(a work in 
which he began his move away from biomorphic forms), Crowther suggests that the 
central zip "serves to semantically activate the colour field" and thereby intimate a 
transcendent zone, and we may infer by analogy that "so humankind can only define 
and express its own finite and rational natures in opposition to the infinite unknown. 
Reciprocally, just as without its opposition to the zip the colour-field remains 
undeclared, so too are the infinite and unknown only established as such by virtue of 
their opposition to humankind's finite rationality."79 Crowther also offers one of the 
few productive theories of the zip and field symbolism, one which has the advantage of 
meshing well with Newman's statements about his spiritual aims. We certainly must 
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produce a theory of semantic content because of Newman's many claims to symbolize 
metaphysical ideas, and we must generate some kind of analogy to explain the semantic 
force of Newman's ideographic symbols. 
Crowther further observes that Newman's titles can be best seen only as symbolic 
analogy, not as any personal confession. Finally, Crowther declares that there are 
serious weaknesses in Newman's program: his minimal style cannot be developed 
because any changes would move toward naturalism, even a change to polychrome; it is 
a fault for an artist not to advance into new directions; Newman defeats the sublime 
subject by confining it to a rigid style; and artists should stress not a destigye sense 
of the sublime but an evaluative sense, since the latter leaves the sublime free to be 
manifested in any style, such as in a Watteau painting or the peasant boots painting of 
Van Gogh (which Heidegger stresses as a vehicle of sublime content). In defense of 
Newman, he did say that whether or not a painter uses abstraction is not the real issue. 
And as to whether or not a painter or writer must keep on changing his style, that is not 
an easy question, though Crowther is certainly coifed to assume that we expect an artist 
to assimilate fresh experience in a fresh way. Crowther is also right to assume that a 
rigid formula for the rugged and variable sublime would not make good sense, though 
Newman would probably reply that a minimalist set of stylistic devices does not 
necessarily prevent fresh intuitions of a sublime subject, as long as each painting differs 
from others through its own unique adjustments. Such a limited set might become a 
handicap for viewers of the works, and any frustration of serious viewers counts as a 
flaw in an artist's program. But of course viewers must bring their best intelligence to 
their viewing. Crowther adds that in Newman's theory of art, "the artistic act in its 
confrontation with the unknowable, is what marks us out as authentically human, and 
that reciprocally, it is as the bearer of `pure ideas' about death and tragedy and other 
aspects of the unknown that the artistic act finds its raisfasEette."8° 
Thomas Hess's full study of Newman should be noted He emphasizes a dynamic 
sense of antinomies in Newman, with bold reconciliations in works that are "grand, 
strong, profoundly moving." Thus Hess locates Newman in the dynamical sublime, 
correctly observing that the arena of action for Newman is not the world of objects but 
the "thought world? Hess understands that, unlike Rothko and Gottlieb, Newman had 
no interest in primitive myth as such, because Newman is wholly modern in point of 
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view. At one point Hess finds in Newman an instance of the belief that the artist as 
creator operates like God in bringing coherence out of chaos.81  
Hess also states that around 1946 Newman showed a renewed interest in the Old 
Testament, the Talmud, Jewish mysticism, and the Genesis creation motif, and that 
Newman's zips might suggest beams of light as utilized in Jewish mysticism. Hess 
locates Kabbalistic rebirth meanings in Onement I as if "God separated light from 
darkness with a line drawn in the void," adding that the vertical zip might also 
symbolize first man, and adding further that the onement concept may point to the holy 
union symbolism used often in books of the Zohar. Making more use of Kabbala lore 
than anyone, Hess comments, "It is possible that I am pushing the Kabbalist 
interpretation too far. Certainly Newman never spoke about such a basis for his art—and 
he loved to talk about his paintings and sculptures."82 Hess claims that Newman's loss 
of orthodox faith is part of his tragic sense. He also postulates that there are secret ratios 
in Newman's works, concealed geometric divisions. Rather often Newman comes 
close to the five to eight ratio of the Golden Section; however, he would have rejected a 
close pre-planned formula. Hess declares that Newman seldom approaches the Golden 
Section, yet the inner segmentation must be considered in order to settle the matter. As 
Hess interprets specific works he stresses the transcendental spirituality of Newman. 
For instance, commenting on Newman's important sculpture Broken Obelisk, Hess 
believes the dramatic meeting of two heavy masses in two sharp points is in part 
Newman's "re-enactment of the drama of Tsimtsum, the instant of creation."83 In a 
comment on Newman's White Fire IL Hess, interestingly, points out that, according to 
Gershom Scholem, the written Torah is called white fire, and the verbal tradition of 
added commentary is called black fire. Moses was the only person who saw into the 
heart of the white fire mystery. Hess observes that Shining Forth comes from the same 
vision as Newman's series Stations of the Cross: a metaphysical grappling with tragedy 
and death plus an exalted joy in attaining an affirmative resolution.84 In separating 
Newman from the second generation abstract expressionists, the latter are characterized 
by Hess as "in the main public, hedonist, objective, and theatrical," while Newman's 
work is "private in subject matter, moral in its choices, subjective and tragic in 
mode."85 
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In his full length study Harold Rosenberg calls Newman "The outstanding 
metaphysical painter of the postwar era," though in the 1970s "To espouse grandeur as 
a value in painting is to arouse suspicion of being either an aesthetic reactionary or a 
crank." Rosenberg believes that Newman sought the subject matter of the sublime, and 
points out that Newman, as a modernist, must be located against "the background of 
world thought" Rosenberg perceives the religious sublime in Newman, calling his 
basic method "activating the predetermined elements of his plastic vocabulary—his 
rectangles and bands—as in a religious rite."86  
Connecting Newman's rejection of images of nature to an emphasis on primitive 
seeing in the poetry of Wallace Stevens, Rosenberg quotes lines from the poet's Notes 
lossaalumcmgiligion: "How clean the sun when seen in its ideaJWashed in the 
remote cleanliness of a halve:I/That has expelled us and our images." Such a purging of 
human imagery relates to the already discussed theological merits of abstraction, which 
fully apply to Newman as well as Rothko. Rosenberg also calls attention to T. E. 
Hulme's claim that the absolute values of true religious feelings do not lend themselves 
to natural images, but to geometric forms. Rosenberg shrewdly concludes that "With 
geometry changed into a language of passion, Newman was in a position to convert 
twentieth-century spiritual deprivation into an advantage," purged of obsolete traditional 
myth and purged of nostalgia, moving directly from existential idea to transcendental 
subject in the ideograph painting: "The fundamental condition was that the sublime ideal 
object should have the materiality of real things." Newman is properly seen as desiring 
"a sense of epiphany without concrete associations." While Rosenberg does not say so, 
this allows for eternal things not to be contaminated with the local and contingent 
Rosenberg defines Newman's epiphany as "the formal sign language of the inner 
kingdom," as "equivalents in paint of a flash . . . of what had been known throughout 
the centuries as spiritual enlightenment" The critic supplies a later comment of 
Newman, looking back on his discussion of northwest Kwakiutl art: "I wasn't talking 
about Indians . . I was talking about man's birthright, his urge to be exalted."87  
Pointing out that when Newman experimented with triangles he needed to negate 
the natural form of the triangle and make it express a metaphysical idea, thus revealing 
his general project "to induce emptiness to exclaim its secrets," just as naturalistic color 
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had to be negated by forcing it to serve ideas, because the sublime itself is "neither 
yellow nor blue," Rosenberg reveals a clear view of Newman's ideational sublime, that 
the underlying idea produces "a whole greater than its parts," and that in the Who's 
Afraid of Red. Yellow and Blue series, Newman declares that he can "compel the 
primary colors to serve his metaphysical ends." Newman's emptiness is a "pervading 
eidolon" functioning as "the translation of the invisible sublime, and it contains the 
possibility that the spectator will be occupied by the paintings as by a spirit or 
daimon."88  
Rosenberg believes that many of Newman's works involve the Kabbalistic zim- 
zum notion of cultic place, a "transcendent Place," a meaning carried in the "Here" 
paintings and sculpture, along with the meaning of being in America right now as a 
declaration of independence from Europe. Yet Rosenberg pushes the Jewishness too far 
when he reprimands Newman for even attempting a Christian subject such as The 
Stations of the Cross series. For one thing, Jesus was a Jew and many Jews perceive 
him as the greatest of the prophets. Also, Rosenberg ignores Newman's comments that 
he takes the cry of the forsaken Jesus as an archetypal pattern for everyman, thus 
bringing Christian material toward world culture and toward existentialism, merging it 
into the broader Western cultural tradition, and removing it from religious orthodoxy 
and dogma. This is exactly what a modern liberal Christian would do; Newman's 
instincts are correct, not Rosenberg's. Newman, like Rothko, sought an international 
style and an elevating, timeless, international sublime subject, in keeping with the ideals 
of modernism. Rosenberg should have taken a hint from his recognition that when 
Newman designed a synagogue he canceled the sense of orthodox group worship and 
emphasized a new sense of existential isolation before deity. However Rosenberg 
agrees that Hess pushes the 'Cabbala!) influence much too far, because the main theme 
of Newman is supplied by the painter's own phrase, "the self, terrible and constant" 
But Rosenberg is wrong to conclude that "Regardless of their sacred associations, 
Newman's concepts are secular in meaning," and that he had only a "poetic" interest in 
theology, just enough to give a "metaphysical hum" to his paintings." Newman's 
ideographic sentences are more ideational than a vague hum. The truth lies halfway 
between Hess and Rosenberg.89 
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His own spiritual scepticism probably causes Rosenberg to hedge too much in 
asserting that "For Newman, painting was a way of =Wag the sublime, not of 
finding symbols for it" Any metaphysical messages the painter can present are 
"inaccessible" because they are private and do not rest on any "social cohesion." 
Rosenberg does not understand that Newman's sublime and absolute emotions kept 
pure by abstraction are meant to be socially effective as a new existential mythos that 
counteracts the loss of the social cohesion of orthodox mythology. Rosenberg's last 
word is that the spectator before a Newman painting may experience an exaltation or 
may react merely to "cold visual fact" in "a flood of sensations.' 90 Yet obviously the 
bare formalism of the second response is what Newman, Rothko, and Still fiercely 
rejected. Rosenberg usually inclines toward formalism. 
An interesting new study of happenings in the year 1950 in the New York abstract 
expressionism has been published by April Kingsley, her choice of 1950 determined by 
the fact that in this year the New York School painters developed a clear sense of their 
mature style. She emphasizes the religious and ideational center of Newman's work, 
but is probably wrong to associate Newman's zips with the flare of the A-bomb and the 
Old Testament pillar of fire that guided the Israelites through the desert. Newman was 
not political enough for the one or orthodox enough for the other. She also claims that 
the zip "ma Newman," which is plausible only if we connect the zip to impersonal 
human acts of intellect and choice-91 Kingsley (connecting to the existential sublime) 
finds the heart of Newman's thought to be "the primacy of the individual and the 
absolute necessity for personal freedom," which explains why he "rejected all political 
solutions right and left." She believes the Newman zip is "an anthropocentric thing with 
which we identify—erect, straight, firm, and sure."92 Kingsley gives some support for 
Crowther's warning about a mechanical formula in Newman's work, declaring that 
while de Kooning succeeded in moving ahead to new ground, Rothko, Newman, and 
Still were less successful in escaping "the trap of their own name-brand imagery."93  
The point has been made that Bonnard's late works may have influenced 
Rothko's sublime of light and color, though not as much as Matisse. However Jean 
Clair comments that for the most part, Newman and Rothko should be seen as polar 
opposites of Bonnard because of their severe abstraction; consequently Bonnard's color 
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theory is best used as a sharp contrast to Newman and Rothko. Clair explains that 
Bonnard's perspective is visual and not ideational, aiming at giving everything in the 
field of vision with no sense of hierarchy or transcendence. Although Bonnard is 
strongly drawn to portals and windows, his subject is confined to the "shimmering 
fabric" of the optical field. In the same text with Clair, Antoine Terrasse presents 
Bonnard's own statement that his "main subject is the surface which has its color, its 
laws, over and above those of objects." Bonnard seeks color turned into light, but his 
color-field impressionism is part of nature, not part of the rejection of nature to reach 
the ideational sublime. Tenasse points out that Bonnard's notes show little interest in 
metaphysics or morality." Consequently, though Newman and Rothko would have 
been moved by the color explosion in a masterpiece such as Bonnard's L'Atelier au 
minima, and moved by the sense of the artist as bold agent, they would have no interest 
in revealing nature through optical surface. 
Irving Sandler's study of American art in the fifties also uses contrast to shed light 
on Newman, Rothko, and Still, emphasizing that the younger abstract painters who 
came after them were more painterly and less philosophic; were not serious about 
"transcendental experience, an incantation to the sublime"; connected ethics more to 
self-development than to eternal things; did not feel the anxiety of existential crisis and 
were thus more hedonistic and aesthetic; were more confessional and spontaneous, 
more open to randomness; were more inclined to be colorists; and developed a more 
formalist rhetoric to oppose the early abstract expressionist passion for transcendental 
subjects." 
David Quick treats Newman's meanings in a doctoral dissertation which (though 
superficial in handling Longinus, Burke, and Kant) reveals a proper understanding of 
Newman's dealings with the sublime: "The transcendental meaning of the sublime 
evoked by a sense of limitlessness was to act as a revelation of the essential self as part 
of a universal whole"; and "for Newman, the sublime allowed the tragic condition to be 
confronted without mythos"; and "at the end of the 40's, he brought together his ideas, 
developed during his study of primitive art, with the aesthetic theories of the sublime to 
form the basis for his mature art."96  
With her central and correct thesis that the abstract expressionists sought an 
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abstract mythic symbol, Alwynne Mackie develops the idea that Newman especially 
utilizes the symbol of space treated through scale: fullness of space is represented by the 
all-over effect, and scale is used by Newman to convey "the immensity of the event" as 
not confined to the picture frame and not related to physical environment, and thus free 
to achieve transcendence. In other words, excellence of scale gives the work such 
internal perfection that it takes on a distinctive autonomous power to break out above 
limitations in space and time. Probably this is what Newman thought when he 
emphasized scale and the sense of being in relation to the four horizons. Though 
Mackie emphasizes the mystical, she has very little mystical awareness, and does not 
try to connect Newman's technique of space and scale with the crossing of thresholds 
to either existential total selfhood, or to a sacred One, or to sublime and timeless ideas. 
She offers the mild claim that such a symbolic use of space "would make one aware of 
one's own being."97 However, her ideas on scale are helpful. 
Encouragement to locate a counter-sublime in Newman comes from various 
scholars, such as David and Cecile Shapiro and Nancy Jachec. The Shapiros point out 
that Clement Greenberg's essay "Avant-Garde and Kitsch" should be considered "the 
manifesto and program for the art movement known today as Abstract 
Expressionism."98 In this essay, Greenberg argues that avant-garde culture was created 
as a counterforce against debased bourgeois taste and also against politicized socialist 
and Marxist art. This much is true, but Greenberg is completely wrong to add that these 
champions of difficult art shunned subject matter. Kitsch is defined as mass-produced 
art suitable for peasants who have moved to town and become middle class, seeking 
diversion from boredom through debased or pop art, watering down serious art for 
popular consumption. Universities and magazines such as The New Yorker. Greenberg 
claims, are part of the turning of art into popular commodity. Kitsch, "Another mass 
product of Western industrialization . . . has gone on a triumphal tour of the world, 
crowding out and defacing native cultures."99  
Jachec reinforces Shapiro's claims by developing in detail the way in which the 
abstract expressionists moved finally to embrace democracy as, morally, the best 
antidote to both Fascist and Marxist-socialist repressions of freedom, with 
encouragement offered by existentialism, Nietzsche, and the idea of the alienated 
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individual, leading the painters, with some reluctance, to champion democracy, 
"choosing to operate within the existing capitalist structure."100 In short, there is a 
counter-sublime of warfare in Newman (as in Rothko and Still) which strikes out 
against not only realism, anecdote, and narrative, but also against kitsch and all forms 
of authoritarian politics, and also strikes against capitalism and consumerism, but does 
not advocate the violent overthrow of the free enterprise system by radical politics.The 
counter-sublime may be seen as strong passions turned against some foe, as opposed to 
strong passions that affirm. We might recall Lyotard's conception of morality as a 
destructive force. Considering the options available, it made good moral sense for the 
avant-garde painters to endorse Western democracy yet not favor all of its features. As 
Polcari puts it, "The political beliefs of Abstract Expressionists were ill-defined, or 
rather the artists tended to hold that combination of anarchist-bohemian-conservatism 
typical of many modern artists," who talked revolution but were actually devoted to 
continuity and moderate change.101  
If one took Ferguson's perspective in treating Newman (looking for ambiguities 
that might problernatize the self as autonomous agent, and contradictions that might 
cancel a transcendent sublime), such a reading would go against some specific remarks 
of Newman which we have noted: "the disdain for the self is something I don't quite 
understand," and "ambiguity . . . is an anomaly. . . . Clarity alone can lead to 
freedom." Of course Newman, Rothko, and Still would all support Ferguson's general 
desire to maintain idealism against modem materialism. Weiskel's thesis of sublime 
overload in signifier or signified has relevance to Newman's works. The signified 
meanings have the surplus of sublime subjects, and the signifying color fields in large 
scale carry their own shock of superabundance. But Weiskel's anti-idealism and his 
preference for a secondary negative sublime, if pushed, would distort Newman's 
positivism and intense spirituality. His especially strong affinities to modern science 
and liberal humanism would work against Lyotard's false assumption that these large 
narratives are obsolete. Newman's belief that a painting should operate semantically like 
a sentence would be illuminated by Lyotard's appreciation of new phrases that artists 
and thinkers can declare, from the standpoint of the sensibility of the sublime. As was 
the case with Rothko, Crowther's synthesizing critical aesthetics would mesh 
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productively with all of Newman's major concerns; Crowther's reciprocity principle 
would apply to Newman's blendings of sensory form with abstract meaning, self with 
society, finite with infinite, present with past, creative genius with created work and 
audience, the ethical with the aesthetic, and the theorized with the existentially lived and 
embodied. Political correctness receives a further sharp rebuff from Newman in his 
previously cited remark that he resents the whole business of "transfer of power by one 
group against another." 
Four works by Newman have been selected for analysis: Onement I (1948), Yff 
Heroicus Sublimns (1950-51), Midnight Blue (1970), and Broken Obelisk (1963-67). 
Quemeal—the eye-opening and mind-opening fist work that Newman brooded over 
for months to determine what wonder he had wrought—is oil on canvas, 27x16 inches, 
a mahogany field with orange-red flickerings and in the exact center a narrow orange-
red zip with rough edges. We have noted Crowther's view that the zip in Onement 1 
creates a semantic reciprocity by which mankind's finite rationality is established in 
cross-relation to an unknown infinite presence, and "Reading Onement j in these terms 
explains why Newman was so excited by it He could express humanity's relation to 
the unknown not simply by destroying form in the standard manner of sublime art, but 
by creating an artifact that embodies this relation through a subtle kind of non- 
representational symbolism."102 Crowther finds a symbol operating as analogy: zip is 
to field as human reason is to an infinite unknown. And without the reciprocity, the 
polar oppositions would not be semantically or ontologically validated. This analysis is 
much better than the several opinions that have been given which endow the zip with 
the meaning of first man—a meaning that contains too little. Newman was too clear 
about first man finding exaltation in front of a mysterious and sacred absolute. 
Crowther is right to find more than "here stands an everyman." It is plausible that for 
Newman, the vast field will represent the absolute, and the smaller but crucial vertical 
zips will suggest the ascending penetrating rays of human intellect charged with 
passions evoked by sublime ideas. Indeed, much of the passion lies in the penetration 
of the grand field by what we may call Newman's existential agent intellect, different 
from the divine agent intellect of pre-Renaissance Western thought. We should also 
recall Crowther's belief that Newman later negates his desired emotional intensity by 
repeating a fixed formula in his abstract vocabulary. 
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We should reject Rosenberg's thesis that Onement I is a fusion by Newman of art 
and self but says nothing at all, it merely "confronts" us as "an act or an event," and 
holds a special place in Newman's art because he shucks off his earlier biomorphic 
forms. However Rosenberg agrees with Crowther that the zip is like a "live wire" 
creating "psychic animation."103  
Certainly we should accept Newman's onement concept as revealing a symbolism 
that probably implicates both a mysterious Nietzschean sacred One and also an 
integrated human psyche as theorized by Sartre, Jung, and others. The sacred One is 
related to the Kabbalah and the whole of Western mysticism, and also to Oriental 
thought. We must assume that Newman has absorbed what he has absorbed. 
Motherwell and Reinhardt include (from the Studio 35 sessions) Newman's statement 
that painters should seek illuminating titles: "I think it would be very well if we could 
title pictures by identifying the subject matter so that the audience would be helped"104 
Onement I carries a strong moral message in keeping with Motherwell's insights: 
the reduction, cleanness, geometry, and purity are iconographic statements about 
integrity and honesty of vision; they work like banners of candor which speak against 
contaminations from past rhetoric and from debased society. Also, like Rothko, 
Newman is imposing his values on mankind, demanding their acceptance and victory, 
in the spirit of Nietzsche. Onentait I is a challenge, a declaration of war, and to 
understand this we need to be able to recapture the early attitude of Newman, Rothko, 
and Still that abstraction itself could cut clean like a sacred blade. I do not think that we 
see too much when we see these messages in Newman's works. The blade of 
abstraction is itself a concept in Newman's ideational sublime. 
We should ask why Newman's zip is exactly in the center. It may suggest some 
original divisions by the creator, night from day and one polar opposite from another, a 
kind of Yin-Yang clue. Yet we should also recall that Mondrian, seeking polar laws of 
the natural world (which Newman did not seek) had favored (as did Chinese and 
Japanese art) an asymmetrical pattern, not a perfect equilibration but a dynamic 
equilibration. It might be that Newman's strong sense of architectonic harmony in all of 
his works makes a sentence about his feeling more liberated than Mondrian, less bound 
to vision and to nature, and thus free to use either perfect symmetry or some asymmetry 
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as a free act of mind, not as an imitation. If this point is valid, we should conclude, as 
we did with Rothko, that an element of opposition to Mondrian is present, yet this 
counter-sublime does not reach the hatred and destruction of the father in Bloom's 
excessively radical model. Additionally, there is no reason not to associate the dark 
maroon colors of theinsnLi with the color sublime of Burke, especially since in 
Onement II (an echo of Onemeal but larger, 60x36 inches), Newman changes the 
color ground to the rich red named by Burke, with the zip now changed to purple. 
Vir Heroicus Sublimis (96x216 inches, and in The Museum of Modern Art) is 
discussed by April Kingsley, who connects the heroism motif to World War II heroes 
popularized in films, and also to Truman's bold firing of General MacArthur in 1950, 
an act which Barnett greeted by shouting "Vir Heroicus Sublimis."105 Even if 
Kingsley's thesis has some small validity, a much better perspective comes from 
Rosenberg, who points out that all through Newman's work are titles pointing to heroic 
figures, such as Abraham, Achilles, Adam, Dionysus, and Christ, plus the concept of 
the heroism of artistic creation as parallel to divine creation, plus Newman's constant 
theme of his own terrible and tragic selfhood: "These metaphysical and heroic 
experiences were conceived by Newman as analogous or even synonymous with the 
struggle of art and with his own struggle to conquer his mediums and transform 
them.”106 Yet Rosenberg's point of view is not broad enough. It would be impossible 
for Newman to paint a tribute to the heroic human life without having in mind the 
questing heroes of myth and the use of this pattern by Joyce and Eliot, and also 
Nietzsche's sublime tragic artist and Nietzsche's superman, as well as the wholly free 
and morally responsible self of existential thought, whose presence posits nobility not 
only on Newman as bold artist, but also on each viewer whose own self is rich in 
heroic potential called out by this huge and stunning work. 
The issue of scale is important. Crowther notes Newman's steady increase in 
canvas size up to 1950: "the increase in the scale of his work does not of itself make 
transcendent sublimity self-evident. Rather, we require in addition a thorough-going 
knowledge of Newman's theoretical assumptions. ... Newman's work (as much if not 
more so than any other twentieth century artist) depends upon a matrix of aesthetic 
theory in order to be read authentically."107  Crowther has properly rearticulated the 
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ancient principle of Longinus that a given artistic gesture is not of itself sublime, but 
must be attached to a suitable context of sublime intent Since an art work is 
indisputably an intentional object (as a natural stone is not), any acceptable ontology for 
art must include the intent (ascertained from any and all relevant data). The rejection of 
authorial intent by various twentieth century intellectuals rests upon a peculiar will to 
sabotage and cynicism, not upon a reasoned search for adequate principles of 
interpretation. Longinus especially connected a proper sublime subject to sublimity in 
idea and intellect, pointing to that very metaphysical matrix in Newman which Crowther 
emphasizes. The same point is made by David Craven as the conclusion to his article 
rejecting the idea that abstract expressionism could rest on any merely spontaneous and 
non-rational gesture in paint: "Just as few if any viewers have experienced the sublime 
before these paintings without knowing what the concept means historically, so 
Newman, Rothko, Motherwell, Still and Gottlieb all drew substantially if also very 
subtly on the formal values associated with nineteenth-century European paintings that 
dealt with the sublime."108 
It is helpful to extend Mackie's thesis that internal scalar excellence isolates the 
work from the external environment, giving it freedom for a transcendental elevation. It 
would do that and more. Excellence in scale would be a tribute to the pondering 
intellect, to the instinct for proportion. Also, scale in an abstract work allows an even 
stronger separation from nature, and thus, in a Kantian sense, a stronger triumph over 
nature by reason. Newman believed that there is an intrinsic affinity between abstract 
art, abstract idea, and abstract scientific and mathematical theory. Any point of view 
(Platonism as well as abstract expressionism) can be strengthened by an attachment to 
mathematics. 
The scale in Vir Heroicus Sublimis is established by the large crimson field 
animated by four zips, two pale red bands at the sides, and then a clean white and a 
light charcoal band located so as to mark off a large red square in the center of the huge 
rectangle. There are no outer edges. The mind of the viewer tends to focus on the 
organizing strength (the scalar segmenting) supplied by the white and charcoal bars, 
and the paleness of the two light red outer zips is achieved by letting a first stripe of 
white show through the pale red, and the light charcoal band allows some underlying 
red to shine through. There is strong polarity between the white and charcoal bars. 
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Thus fusion occurs in the zips, as well as through the embracing field The sense of 
scale declares the sense of a magnificent mysterious something penetrated by rays of 
human intellect, carried chiefly by the whiteness in the rays which (unlike rays of white 
light above the head of Christ in Renaissance paintings) do not come down from above. 
The carefully studied and almost perfect symmetries suggest not only the integration of 
the human self, but also the harmony of the cosmos as declared in the perfect symmetry 
of mathematical equations such as E=MC2. Since crimson and the fire imagery played 
such a great role in Nietzsche's motifs of the life force and German fire music, and 
since crimson has intrinsic symbolism of power and life, it may well be, as previously 
suggested, that Newman's crimson field is a direct-pointing ideograph for the energy of 
Einstein's equation, not an improbable idea because Newman's title denotes the energy 
of the heroic human life. It would be a mistake to minimize Newman's interest in 
modern science. 
Keeping in mind Jungian and other theories that polarities, trinities, and 
quarternities have universal symbolic power to suggest harmonies in the self and in the 
cosmos, it is noteworthy that Vir Heroicus Sublimis has three major sections (like 
Rothko's Houston panels), four zips, and the duo of the white and charcoal bars. The 
scale, therefore, resonates with a sense of the minimum structural foundations of self 
and cosmos, as if Newman, like the God of Pythagoras, can count to four. Such 
speculations are probable in that Newman clearly adopted Kabbalistic patterns of the 
fire and light of the first day of creation, and blended this emanation concept with the 
wider patterns of Western mysticism. The fusing in Newman's zips may well carry the 
logic of emanation and the power of intellect to climb the ladders upward toward the 
source. The warrant for offering such readings comes from Newman's often repeated 
insistence that his subjects are abstract ideas related to the awe and exaltation of sublime 
vision. The cosmic and timeless implications are heightened because the crimson field 
has no edgings, encouraging the viewer, as Newman explained, to perceive the self 
against a four horizon sweep of space, not against any local and natural site. Newman's 
massive scarlet field offers a profound sense of shock, one of the basic features of the 
psychology of the sublime, yet the verticals add the human measure which prevents the 
shock from negating our sense of at-homeness in the world. 
Newman's Midnight Blue (1970), coming late in his career, offers a good 
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example of his working with dark colors and of his general evolution toward more 
simplification. It is close in spirit to his dark blue Oueen of the Night II (1967) and to 
his Voice of Fire (1967), in which the crimson center band is flanked by dark blue 
panels. Also rather than oil on canvas, Midnight Blue is acrylic on canvas, its 
dimensions 76x94 inches, its location the Museum Ludwig in Cologne. It is an 
interesting work to set beside Yjratuthais  Sublimis because, subtracting the white 
vertical bar on the left edge and the blue panel on the right edge marked off by the light 
blue zip, the central dark blue shape is an exact square. Thus Newman maintains his 
basic and severe vocabulary, in this case achieving some variation by the white vertical 
zip's placement on the outer edge rather than on the inside, the typical format The pale 
blue narrow zip on the right has white undertones. 
By his title Newman calls attention to maximum darkness, unlike the day and fire 
implication of Vir Heroicus Sublime. Looking over the shoulder to Oueen of the Night, 
one is inclined to suspect a kind of tribute to a maternal principle (as in the symbolism 
of the Kabbalah) or at least an implication of the primal darkness before it is penetrated 
by the divine intellect in the moment of creation, the intellect given masculinity in both 
the Kabbalah and the Genesis myth. It is worth remembering that Nietzsche's absolute 
One was treated as a mother principle. Newman's midnight blue has a value different 
from the black and blackish purple of Rothko's late works: the blue carries the tragic 
dark awareness insisted upon in Newman's own vision of tragic myth, existential 
anguish, the retreat of religious faith, and a world gone wrong, yet Newman's late 
works do not manifest the bleaker despair of Rothko's: a rich, dark blue is a positive, 
affirmative color, though touched with the sadness of mortality, as in a piano nocturne. 
In Midnight Blue the viewer projects the white band on the left across the dark 
field as it breaks through on the right in the light blue zip undershot with white. As 
Crowther emphasized, the zips animate the field with semantic values. In Newman 
criticism there is surprisingly little specific analysis of specific works, which is also the 
case with Rothko and Still. This tendency is explainable by the inherent difficulty of 
connecting abstract forms to specific ideas. Many of the points made about yir 
Heroicus Sublimis, such as the consideration of scale, obviously apply to Midnight 
Blus, and will not be repeated. However, I have so far held off on the extremely 
important presence of the noble sublime in Newman's abstractions. When we look at 
Midnight Blue, calmness and cerebral ordering strongly dominate, the white forms 
suggesting intellect Keeping in mind all that has been said about Newman, Midnight 
Blug should be interpreted in this fashion: ideationally it declares the morality of a clean 
modernist reductionism in opposition to all aesthetics of imitation and sentimentality; it 
invokes the sense of a hospitable world; it declares moral war on corrupt forces in 
society and economy; it fuses into its colors and forms favored features of the thought 
worlds of Longinus, Burke, Nietzsche, Sartre, Jung, the Kabbalah, Einstein and 
others; and it disciplines these complex strands by the strictures of the noble sublime 
harnessed to the ideational sublime, the dominating noble sublime supplying the 
logicality, lentor, calmness, and dignity specified by Kant as its defining features. 
Broken Obelisk (three casts were made, one for the Museum of Modern Art, one 
at the University of Washington, and one outside the Rothko chapel in Houston) has 
received scattered generalized comment as one of the most important pieces of American 
and modernist sculpture. We have seen Newman's comment (given by Rosenberg) that 
his obelisk "is concerned with life and I hope I have transformed its content into a 
glimpse of the sublime." Rosenberg's faint-hearted explanation is too bleak: "The 
ultimate meaning of the work lies in the affirmation of the collapse of past grandeurs 
and the transcendence of that collapse that survives because the artist wills it"109 In his 
doctoral dissertation David Quick states that where the points meet in Newman's 
sculpture might signify the point of transcendence at which man meets God110 April 
Kingsley gives the important revelation that Newman often observed the obelisk 
Cleopatra's Needle on the hill behind the Metropolitan Museum, and she suggests that 
the meeting of the two points "creates the kind of drama Michelangelo intended for 
God's moment of sparking life into Adam on the Sistine ceiling."111  
Probably the wisest way to interpret Broken Obelisk is to refuse to avoid the 
obvious. The inverted obelisk with its crumbled base closest to heaven rests with its 
point on the point of the normal pyramid, which acts as its base. It is about ten feet 
wide and twenty-six feet high. Newman has said that his theme is both sublimity and 
tragedy. Probably we should assume that the triangle and obelisk capture the spirit of 
primitive sublime art (something like a totem pole) and also invoke the religious and 
philosophic history of the West from the Egyptian pyramids and the geometricity of 
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Pythagoras and Plato (the same assumption we should make abut L M . Pei's glass 
pyramid as entrance to the Louvre). The pyramid and obelisk invoke temple architecture 
in general, giving Newman his hallmark of a sacred place. The powerful stability of the 
supporting pyramid (like the stable octagon of the Rice chapel) prevents any reading of 
dominant pessimism. 
As religious icons the obelisk and pyramid also represent past mythologies, the 
grand stories about divine/human encounters, and the meeting of the two points 
symbolizes those encounters. The soaring quality of the work represents the 
transcendence to sublime eternal presences, the verticality recognized by Longinus and 
Burke as a technique of sublime art. In the conception of the sublime as a crossing of 
thresholds, nothing could constitute a better participatory symbol than the sharp point of 
transition where the lower triangle meets the higher obelisk. This point of change is 
even more dramatic, more charged with passion, than Rothko's doors and portals. 
But we still must ponder the shattered base of the obelisk, closest to heaven. The 
broken base of the obelisk (plus its inversion) cries out the tragic retreat of the gods, the 
isolated unsponsored self of Sartre, the demythologizing of all myth, the temporary 
nihilism demanded by Nietzsche, the fading of the master narratives of the great 
religions, the failures of mankind in the two great wars, the confessions of sins, the 
suffering of the human awareness of death, and quite possibly the threatening entropy 
principle of modern science, promising the death of the cosmos. My point is that the 
crumbled base and the inverted form would logically represent all that we know or may 
assume about the tragic sense of modern man, all of this appropriate for a major public 
sculpture. Possibly the rust symbolizes all these tragic things. Conversely, the pyramid 
and the clean sanctity of the bulk of the obelisk, plus the dramatic meeting of the points, 
will represent all that we know about the hope and exaltation of Newman's orientation 
toward the sublime, an orientation dominated by the subsuming of various historically 
accumulated modes of the sublime under the pattern of the ideational and noble sublime. 
Behind these four works and the whole oeuvre of Newman, and woven into the 
sensory ideographs, the ideational sublime is realized as dynamical sublime through the 
force and power of Newman's favored metaphysical interests, which include the 
following set: the sense of crisis for modern art and thought; the fact of the decline of 
orthodox religion; the need for art to try to fill the spiritual emptiness; the special value 
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of the ideographic art symbol which participates in the sublime reality it reveals.; the 
sense of scale as humanized value; the need for strong passions, but passions aroused 
by abstract sublime ideas; the setting aside of beauty in search of the sublime; the 
inescapability of terrible tragedy and suffering, the need to accept it and transcend it; the 
ability of abstract art to express concepts of science; the necessity for the artist to 
impose his vision on a misguided humanity; the inescapability of existential freedom, 
anguish, and moral obligation; the sense of sacred selfhood embodied in space; the need 
for new kinds of mythology raised from a subjective, existential, phenomenological 
base; the opposition to Fascism, Marxism, and the excesses of capitalism; the story of 
segments of art history as modern myth; the war against kitsch; a pattern of art history 
governed by the fate of sublime vision; the distancing from formalism and Mondrian; 
the distancing from group political action; and the on-going validity of distinctly 
religious idealism. Certainly Newman had an ample body of ideas with which to work. 
The mind-set of a painter is embodied in the works, just as the moral vision of a 
novelist is part of the formal design of the novel. Newman creates spiritual icons in 
cultic space, and we must locate in his works both the existential base and the wider 
culture-hold which have given direction to the brush strokes. 
Such ideas provide for Newman an impressive base for his most emphasized 
mode of sublimicism, the ideational sublime. But the case has been made that various 
other modes are crucial for understanding his program: the religious sublime touched by 
Jewish mysticism, Genesis creativity, and the sublime religiosity of primitive man; the 
existential sublime deriving from Sartre and others; the Burkean sublime centered in 
strong passions and tragic vision; the Nietzschean sublime in Newman's sense of the 
aggressive artist as seeking a new vision of cultural unity in a general art project fully 
sublime as project; the Jungian mythic sublime carried by Newman's sense of a new 
subjective mythos and universal subjects; a moderate counter sublime located in a sense 
of major ideational enemies; a strong moral sublime centered in meeting the modem 
need for spiritual rebirth and new belief; and a conspicuous light-color sublime carried 
by radiant colors and dark shades. All of these modes involve a threshold crossing to 
higher ground. Newman has a firmer religious vision than Rothko, and a stronger 
stylistic devotion to cleanness, clarity, and verticality, as well as a stronger use of line 
and space. Newman obviously believes in the universal validity of transcendental 
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sublime experience, in treating it by confident universalist categories, and in a generally 
positive conception of truth and reality. The elements of crisis, doubt, politics, and 
alienation are not given the victory by Newman, but are rather the challenges to be met 
and mastered by abstract sublimicist art. 
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Newman - giransmi.1 (1948) 
Oil on Canvas 17x16 
The Museum of Modern Art, New York, New York 
Gift of Annalee Newman 
Newman - Vir &Token Subjunigi (1950-51) 
Oil on Canvas 96x216 
The Museum of Modem Art, New York. New York 
Gift of Mr. and Mrs. Ben Helier 
Newman - Midnight Bing (1970) 
Acrylic on Canvas 76x94 
Museum Ludwig, Cologne, Germany 
• 
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Newman - woken Obelisk (1%3-67) 
Cor-ten steel 26x101/11101/2 
Rice University, Houston, Texas 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, New York 
Chapter Six - The Sublime in Still 
Still's approach to the sublime emerges from his own statements, most of which 
are given in two exhibition catalogues, one from the San Francisco Museum of Modern 
Art in 1976, and one from The Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1979.1 Still has been 
extremely reluctant to publish any essays on his point of view, but he has agreed, in 
these catalogues, to present some letters, notes, and prefatory remarks. 
In the San Francisco catalogue Still gives "A Statement By the Artist," declaring 
that his works are an effort to "challenge the arrogant farce enacted by those responsible 
for the intellectual corruption perpetuated during the last four decades in the name of art, 
criticism, and history," and also an effort to strike out against "the presumptions of the 
tastemakers whether called artistic, political, architectural, or critical."2 The director of 
the museum, Henry Hopkins, offers some personal comments stating of Still that "I 
had heard him discourse on the rights and powers of the individual will and upon the 
isolation of integrity and the integrity of isolation."3  
This catalogue also contains a biography of Still, and in it we learn that when he 
taught at Washington State College in 1940-41, his studies had "special emphasis on 
Plato, Longinus, and Croce."4  The connection to Longinus has never been carefully 
explored. Still allows one of his idealistic comments about teaching to be included in the 
catalogue: "One simply tries to remove the load of educational negations which inhibit a 
student's mind, so that he may comprehend or come in contact with the forces he has 
within him. From those to whom this has no meaning one turns away. To those who 
discover it, is born of no competition, but a beautiful wonder and affinity with the 
creation."5  Most of the abstract expressionists envisioned their art as having an affinity 
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with the creation of the cosmos, but Still had no real interest in a return to primitive 
states or primitive creation myth. He focused on a distinctly modern mind working in 
the present moment. 
Still offers a diary note in which he explains his distrust of theory and criticism: 
"Verbiage becomes a substitute for comprehension. And everything leads to words and 
words become a substitute for everything," and words are treacherous, making fools 
seem plausible, "Because they are so common and can be so commonly and easily 
misused."6 The compiler of the biography claims that Rothko developed his final style 
after visiting Still's studio in 1949 and seeing one of his large black paintings. 7 Still 
offers a 1951 letter to Rothko declaring that at times he speaks out against those who 
would try to fit him into some collective movement, "to incorporate me or deny my 
right to exist," and he calls the public domain "not a well to drink from, but a cesspool 
of insidious and poisonous matter." In another comment about teaching, Still says he 
tries to get his students to use their voice as "a lance—a broom—an exposure of aesthetic 
and semantic confusion or corruption."8 A lance and broom, like the shapes in Still's 
paintings, are vertical weapons, and this concept does relate to the verticality in his 
works. 
The catalogue has a section called "Notes by Clyfford Still." Here he gives a 1951 
letter remark to Rothko: ". . . I hold that unless a man's art gives him strength to deny 
the value of social power for the real security of his inner comprehension he is on a 
devil's path to frustration."9 Often sociology departments offer a course called "Social 
Control," and this idea is for Still one of the major enemies, an absolutely Satanic 
concept to be hated and resisted. In a 1951 letter to a friend Still says he is "asocial," 
and wants his paints to ay out this message: "Here I am; this is my presence, my 
feeling, myself. Here I stand implacable, proud, alive, naked, unafraid. If one does not 
like it he should turn away because I am looking at him. I am asking for nothing. I am 
simply asserting that the totality of my being can stand stripped of its cultural 
camouflage and look out on factional people who pass before me and see them without 
rancor, desire, or fear."10 Still offers a related comment from an =tier exhibition 
catalogue, the 15 Americans show at The Museum of Modern Art in 1952, and his 
comment here is also from a 1952 letter: "That pigment on a canvas has a way of 
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initiating conventional reactions for most people needs no reminder. Behind these 
reactions is a body of history matured into dogma, authority, tradition. The totalitarian 
hegemony of this tradition I despise, its presumptions I reject. . . . We are now 
committed to an unqualified act, not illustrating outworn myths or contemporary alibis." 
Also in this letter Still rejects "the will to power."11 He does derive partly from 
Nietzsche the sense of the revolutionary importance of a strong individual will, but he 
rejects the idea that a superman would impose his will on others, as he also rejects 
Nietzsche's thesis that a society needs the social control of religious myth. Still is 
obsessed with each person's discovery of his own inner power, uncorrupted vision, 
and freedom of choice. 
Still also presents a 1954 letter stating, "I would not relinquish my identity to the 
security of the historical myth or the collective tide:' Nothing was more important to 
Still than setting himself and his art in opposition to all the calls for collectivism that 
swept the twentieth century. The crusading, isolated, idealist mode defines Still. In this 
same letter he makes the major revelation that he rejects the horizontal spreading out into 
society and celebrates "The vertical rather than the horizontal; the single projection, 
instead of polarities, the thrust of the flame instead of the oscillation of the wave."12 
This phrase from Still, "the thrust of the flame," is a revealing one, and points to the 
hallmark of his mature works, the ragged tongues of flame aspiring upward. 
In an interesting letter of 1954 to a friend, Still comments on a new study trying to 
explain Nietzsche, a study resembling Northrup Frye's study of Blake: lust read 
Frye's book and you can dispose of Blake by 'understanding' him. So the scholar 
makes his contribution to the mass of murderous knowledge and the creator is 
supplanted by the pedant and all his work negated or hidden from those who might 
have some desire to experience it He who does not send the enquirer to the original 
work is a thief, a liar, a fraud, and a murdering dog."13 Still includes an important 
diary note of February 11, 1956, speaking of his "tense slashes" on the "beautiful white 
fields," and observes: "And as the blues or reds or black leap up and quiver in their 
tenuous ambience or rise in austere thrusts to carry their power infinitely beyond the 
bounds of the limiting field, I move with them and find a resurrection from the morbid 
oppressions that held me only hours ago. Only they are complete too soon, and I must 
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quickly move on to another to keep the spirit alive."14 
In a 1960 letter Still hopes that his work "will give back courage as freedom," and 
he takes another statement from an earlier catalogue for a show at the Institute of 
Contemporary Art at the University of Pennsylvania, 1963, declaring: "To be stopped 
by a frame's edge was intolerable; a Euclidean prison, it had to be annihilated, its 
authoritarian implications repudiated without dissolving one's individual integrity."15 
The second exhibition catalogue (from The Metropolitan Museum of Art) adds 
additional crucial insights. In a prefatory essay Katharine Kuh writes that Still had 
declared that he saw his black colors not as death but as a warm generative colix.16  
This catalogue also has a selection from Still's notes and letters. In a note written at the 
time of his first New York show at Peggy Guggenheim's gallery in 1946, Still deplores 
the "vitiating pressure" of the commercialized museum world and the "subordination of 
the freedom of the creative spirit," adding that the majority of lesser painters "know 
who they are painting for and why, and it is not for the edification of mind or soul."17 
This suggests the Longinian elevation of soul. In a 1949 letter to Rothko, Still 
condemns the simplistic escapist demands of the public, asserting that the critics and 
theorists "make hamburger of us for the public gut" He "rejects the suppression of the 
genius and the tyranny of the masterpiece," and "sees responsibility as a single, 
individual, alone."18 
An important claim comes in a 1950 letter to a friend, in which Still rejects any 
return to primitivism: "one must not drag in past primitives or erudition to corroborate 
our position. This is a different thing,--a different meaning. The scholar will only defeat 
us if we allow him ascendancy. This we must carve clean." A great deal of Still's 
program is implied in the imperative to "carve clean." In this same letter the painter 
observes: "I am myself--not just the sum of my ancestors, and I know myself best by 
my gestures, meanings, and the implications of my thoughts and acts."19 
It is significant that Still chooses to print a review article from Hubert Crehan in 
the San Francisco Chronicle July 1950. Crehan takes Still out of the beautiful and into 
the sublime: "In his paintings there is no trace of figures, and all semblance of 
conventional painterly beauty has been negated with an austere rigor, but the monstrous 
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black and red shapes, with their swift yellow flicks or blue articulations, evoke a 
spiritual charge akin to those profound emotions produced by the occasional scientific 
or philosophic utterances that reconstruct our consciousness of reality in a more perfect 
order." Crehan adds that "When one examines the history of styles in art, he discovers 
that styles pertaining only to happiness are among the least striking; but the more art is 
concerned, as it is in our time, with all that transcends man—with the diabolical and the 
sacred—the less man and the objects of his familiar life enter into its portrayais:20 For 
Still the sacred is inside the work and the diabolical outside. 
In a 1953 letter Still says he is one who struck out against "the conspiracy of a 
social culture," and in a 1959 note to an art critic he calls the intellectual establishment 
"intellectual eunuchs" in the "collectivist castration wart" He follows with a letter to 
this critic declaring that thirteen years earlier, on a white wall, "was shown one of the 
few truly liberating concepts man has ever known. There I made it plain that a single 
stroke of paint, backed by work and a mind that understands its potency and 
implications, could restore to man the freedom lost in twenty centuries of apology and 
devices for subjugation." Still believes he carries real power, and his work "threatened 
the power ethic of this culture, and challenged its validity." In this letter Still mentions a 
sublime "moment of elevation" from "an idea" whose integrity is degraded by museum 
dealers, and degraded by painters who accept commercialism and "are amply worthy of 
the contempt and hatred they secretly exchange with one another even unto their 
deaths." Still adds a key remark "It has always been my hope to create a free place or 
area of life where an idea can transcend politics, ambition, and commerce." Obviously 
Still has his center in the ideational sublime. He closes this powerful letter by bringing 
in a tragic sense, asserting that some individuals can dig out the truth that is "usually 
hard and sometimes bitter." He counsels: "Dig out the truth and one man is a match for 
all of them. Accept their premises and you will walk on your knees the rest of your 
life."21 
Still writes Mark Rothko in 1951 to kick the architects for "their lust to plan a 
controlled culture," urging him to celebrate "what goes on before a totally free field in 
the man who employs it as a means for total realization."22 It seems reasonable to 
assume that "total realization" would be, in the Kantian sense, an idea thrown up by 
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reason to encompass an infinitely complex existential area that cannot be held in a clear 
image or act of understanding, and obviously "total realization" is the transcendence that 
has been located in the indirect Sartrian sublime. 
This Metropolitan Museum catalogue also includes a biographical chronology 
presumably prepared by the editor John O'NeilL We learn that in his youth Still was an 
avid student of old masters, a book collector, a player of classical piano works, and a 
heavy reader of literature, and that in addition to Plato and Longinus, he stressed Croce 
in his college studies. O'Neill gives a statement from Still recording that he wanted to 
break with European tradition but not in the "ontic protest and parody" mode of 
Dadaism nor in the exotic foreign mode of Picasso or Modigliani, nor the technological 
mode of the Bauhaus with its program of mass contro1.23 Also printed is a 1948 letter 
from Still to Motherwell revealing Still's hope for at least a small social group of 
enlightened people "uncorrupted by political ends or social needs," a hope that might 
solve his "relation to society," but probably "the most foolish hope I ever had."24  
Still also reprints a letter to Gordon Smith offered earlier in the exhibition 
catalogue from his 1959 show in Buffalo sponsored by the Albright Art Gallery and the 
Buffalo Fine Arts Academy, a letter emphasizing Still's dislike for museum showings 
due to "my responsibility to the completed work . . . to make clear its conceptual 
germination of idea and vision, without which all art becomes but an exercise in 
conformity with shifting fashions or tribal ethics." Some critics declare that Still's 
subject is vague powers, but Still often insists that clear ideas are present in his works. 
In this letter Still records his desire to cut through all "cultural opiates" so that in "a 
direct, immediate, and truly free vision," some "idea be revealed with clarity." He goes 
on to offer one of his most revealing comments: "It was a journey that one must make, 
walking straight and alone. No respite or shortcuts were permitted. And one's will had 
to hold against every challenge of triumph, or failure, or the praise of Vanity Fair. Until 
one had crossed the darkened and wasted valleys and come at last on a high and 
limitless plain. Imagination, no longer fettered by the laws of fear, became as one with 
vision. And the act, intrinsic and absolute, was its meaning, and the bearer of its 
passion." There is no critical vocabulary adequate to this absolute act and limitless plain 
except the vocabulary of the sublime. Still calls for an immediate existential revelation 
, 	 190 
that is "beyond vanity, ambition, or remembrance," clearly a disinterested state 
connected to our supersensible inner life of freedom and thought. It is extremely 
important that in this letter Still quotes Blake. Two of the couplets given are these: "The 
Vision of Christ that thou dost see/Is my vision's greatest enemy" and 'Thine loves the 
same world that mine hates,/Thy Heaven doors are my Hell Gates."25  
O'Neill gives a letter of 1972 in which Still declares of the painters he secluded 
himself from that he does not hate them, "I like these people—they represent the creator- 
man—for the survival of our life, the only hope left."26 O'Neill notes that in 1975 Still 
received from Washington State University an alumni award stressing his resistance to 
power structures and his liberation of the human spirit.27  
In an article on Still, Patrick McCaughey quotes a remark by Still in the catalogue 
for the 1963 exhibit at the University of Pennsylvania's Institute of Contemporary Art—
the remark that "The Sublime? A paramount consideration of my studies and work from 
earliest student days."28 Another remark by Still is given by Donald Kuspit, from an 
interview with Benjamin Townsend, in which Still declares that he removes all 
associations and all that is "pleasant, luminous, and symbolic," and that he has an "anti-
elegant attitude."Kuspit adds that the only association the painter keeps is that of the 
sublime.29 Still keeps more than that, though the sublime is dominant. 
In a conversation with Still in 1976, Thomas Albright gives Still's comment that 
"Art is a force for life, not death" and "It is a matter of joy." Of the New York School 
Still observes: "We were all quite different. There was no cabal, no gang, no real 
movement, although we shared certain basic attitudes, a basic vocabulary. These were 
strong people. They had their hands on a strong thing." Albright adds the interesting 
(and not correct) point that Still has revealed only one symbolic clue: that a jagged 
slicing line could be read as his "life-line."30  
Supplementing statements by Still, there are general stances taken by various 
critics. Albright claims that Still's main theme is "The lone individual moving with 
towering self-confidence through a neutral environment which becomes whatever one 
chooses to make of it"; however this claim is much too minimal and timid. Albright 
does better when he finds in Still the "grandeur of a raw and elemental Thereness, 
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transcendent in its implications," and finds that the convulsive forms are "awesomely 
still in their totality." Albright declares that Still's paintings function much like 
orchestration in music because like pure sound, the works are "pure vision."31 Again, 
this is too vague and minimal a thesis, though it may be part of the truth. 
Robert Hughes, in The Shock of the New, is one of the few critics who ridicules 
Still, declaring that his vision of the radical power of one stroke of paint is silly 
egotistical bombast. Hughes calls his theatrical works an achievement "beset by 
cliches," though Still did aim for an heroic Grand Canyon kind of "pantheistic 
energy."32 Max ICozloff claims that the abstract expressionists turned away from 
politics and social structures in search of freedom to treat sublime subjects in "a 
roughhewn grand manner."33 Eva Cockcroft takes an opposite view, that the abstract 
expressionist theme of artistic freedom was carefully used for political ends in the fight 
against communism by Rockefeller money working through The Museum of Modern 
Art; therefore the abstract expressionist paintings were not really politically neutra1.34  
David and Cecile Shapiro stress the importance of two early articles by Greenberg and 
Rosenberg. Greenberg's "Avant-Garde and Kitsch" emphasized that abstract 
expressionism was difficult art aimed not toward politics or the general public but 
toward a cultural elite, and Rosenberg's article claimed that these painters escaped both 
political and moral values by seeing the painting as a radically new event. The Shapiros 
also note that this non-political art was used both by the Museum of Modern Art and the 
CIA for political purposes.35 Continuing the political analysis, David Craven argues 
that the abstract expressionists should be criticized for turning away from politics in 
search for the sublime. Craven claims that all Utopian anarchistic seekers of the sublime 
become obstacles to social reform.36  
David Anfam, in a 1993 article, asserts that Still does indeed, in his early work, 
have a strong myth subject related to important books on mythology by Sir James 
Frazer and others, and that the dark and bitter childhood of Still on the Canadian plains 
becomes a permanent residue in all of Still's paintings. Anfam states that the late works 
carry transcendental spiritual and hermetic value as they blend the carnal and 
spiritual.37 In another article, Anfam claims that Still's strong vertical forms are 
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gendered symbols of male virility.38  
Donald Kuspit develops the thesis that Still falls just short of the sublime because 
his great obsession is ethical and existential: Still wants to do us good by dramatizing 
our total freedom in making moral choices." For Kuspit, the symbolic meaning of Still 
lies in the total volatile field and volatile edges which do not convey the sublime but 
rather "a situation of ethical choice rather than esthetic finality."40 Kuspit apparently 
does not see that existential moral freedom could itself be an idea that reaches the 
sublime. His concept of the sublime is too narrow, but his article is valuable as a 
recognition of Still's existentialism. 
Patrick McCaughey develops the thesis that Still belongs in the Gothic mode, 
treating the sublime in an essentially Romantic Gothic manner revealed especially by 
Still's discovery that the raw canvas is a source of light, which connects him to Gothic 
huninism.41 McCaughey claims that the sublime content is carried not by the masses in 
Still's paintings, but by  the light.42  Again, this valuable idea is too restrictive, because 
the vertical masses play a crucial role in Still's search for sublime meaning. 
In her article on color and abstract expressionism, Ann Gibson claims that 
Newman, Rothko, and Still used color to symbolize the regression to primitive 
thinking in primitive myth. This original sense of oneness with the cosmos is seen as 
their sublime subject.43 The problem here is that Still repudiated the idea of any return 
to primitivism. This contradiction may be resolved by assuming that Still, like Rothko 
and Newman, wanted a kind of primitive condition but not a real return to primitive 
thinking. Stephen Polcari takes the same view as Gibson, stressing Jungian myth, 
Levy-Bruhl's mythology, Nietzsche's use of myth, and others.44 However Polcari 
wisely adds that Still has a second major theme of personal unfettered creativity.45 This 
is the painter's major theme. 
David Anfam has produced an important doctoral dissertation on Still, stressing 
that Still, Rothko, and Newman must all be interpreted through the vocabulary of the 
sublime as the best explanation of their concern for exaltation and transcendence. 
Anfam believes that Still's early works were centered in recurrent motifs of primitive 
myth, especially myths of fertility, this concern being related to Nietzsche and to works 
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on myth such as those of Harrison, Weston, Jung, and Frazer 46 
 Anfam does not offer 
a theory connecting myth to the sublime, but he is assuming there is one. Then, Anfam 
declares, around 1947 Still, Rothko, and Newman all began to seek a new start, some 
"aboriginal matrix" to treat "a primal or ultimate condition" beyond history and myth, 
and they found it in the idea of the color field as a nexus fora transcendent subject 
matter of "first and last things."47 Anfam declares that Still's small flickers of bright 
color symbolize hidden meanings and that his sense of the sublime becomes more 
Burkean, Gothic, and romantic than the directions of Rothko and Newman, due to 
features like rugged and broken surfaces, suddenness and ugliness, darkness and 
terror.48 The connection to romantic theory lies in Still's strong sense of selfhood as 
the basis for a romantic version of the sublime, including a Wordsworthian fear that the 
self might be swallowed in some abyss.49 The romantic bond also lies in Still's 
dedication to symbols as they relate to the thought of Coleridge and Blake (use of the 
imagination to transform matter into spirit by symbols) S0 Anfam also connects Still's 
late vehement and obscure statements to the influence of Nietzsche, "where ethical 
imperatives are fused with an agitated diction," and also to the whole content of 
Nietzsche's thought.51 However Anfam does not treat the Nietzschean sublime. In 
general, Anfam's position is that Still reaches for a sublime elevation to idea, and thus 
remains close to Longinus in his pervasive inclination to identify "art's transcendent 
content with the concept of the Idea."52 This is the correct view, but a heavy stress on 
abstract idea (which is Still's center) drifts away from the typical romantic sublime, just 
as Still, Rothko, and Newman all turned away in their rejection of nature. Anfam does 
not touch on all the ideas that are at the center of Still's method, nor does he stress 
sufficiently the influence of existentialism on Still, though he does mention it Also, 
Anfam does not connect Still sufficiently to a moral sublime, and his favoring of "earth 
mother" myth in Still is not as appropriate as a Promethean pattern. 
The moral center for abstract expressionism is stressed by Robert Motherwell, 
whose opinions are important because he was so close to Rothko, Newman, and Still, 
and had good training in philosophy as well as art history. Several remarks in 
Motherwell's Collected Writing (some previously cited) are relevant to the sublime in 
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Still: that "Modern art is a specific ethical enterprise.. . . on the part of men who deeply 
love painting, to preserve its integrity and truth"; that there is a moral imperative for "no 
nostalgia, no propaganda, no discourse, no autobiography, no violation of the canvas 
as a surface . . ., no cliches, no predetermined endings"; that the sublime is a strongly 
felt experience of "the exalted, the noble, the lofty" and contemporary painting perhaps 
becomes sublime "when the artist transcends his personal anguish, when he projects in 
the midst of a shrieking world an expression of living and its end that is silent and 
ordered"; and that modern abstraction is a mystical enterprise arising, like other 
mysticisms, "from a primary sense of gulf, an abyss, a void between one's lonely self 
and the world. Abstract art is an effort to close the void that modern men feel Its 
abstraction is its emphasis." Motherwell has a good sense of threshold crossing. He 
states that the dynamism in Still and his group derived from "an existential context of 
greatly liberating forces"; that "To modify one's art is to modify one's character"; that 
Still's first New York show, in comparison to the other abstract expressionists, "was 
the most original. A bolt out of the blue"; that he was the first to reject any trace of 
figuration; and that he deeply influenced Rothko in the late forties when Rothko was 
close to Newman.53 
 
While William Seitz's important study of abstract expressionism does not include 
a concentration on Still, his general comments would illuminate Still: that in spite of 
spiritual crisis and doubt "Modern art is still a quest for an absolute"; that Nietzsche's 
sense of polarity and tragic awareness is a major influence; that even if overt religious 
meaning is absent, "Yet the personal quest for a transcendental reality, and for an 
absolute, has in no sense abated"; that beauty became a secondary concern; and that 
modern art (Seitz's closing lines) "In its concern for creation over mechanism, freedom 
over regimentation, inclusiveness over chauvinism, live structures over chaos or dead 
order, and commitment over pragmatism . . . portrays the searcher and idealist among 
contemporary men." Obviously Seitz emphasizes a moral imperative and a 
transcendental aim, and he illuminates Still's method by rightly observing that "In an 
existential aesthetic no part of the process is merely technical; it is a symbolic act, 
inseparable from the biography of the artist."54  
Nancy Mariner makes a number of interesting points about Still: that he reveals 
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considerable experimental variety in his later works, reaching at times "a near-Oriental 
calligraphic delicacy and refinement unprecedented in his earlier work"; that his 
ascending flame-like towers reach "towards infinity" and convey upward spiritual 
longing; that his paint is "an emissary of the artist's will, the symbol of his Promethean 
power" (she does not connect this, as one must, to Nietzsche); that his polarities seem 
almost Manichean; that his romantic melodramatic imagination creates an "agon of 
polarities"; and that his essentially romantic egotism does not postulate an outer-world 
mystical zone, but rather seeks an "equivalent to the transcendent flash of spiritual 
meaning available to earlier art."55 She is right to construe Still in terms of polarity plus 
a Promethean, Gothic-romantic melodrama, but wrong to think that Still stops short of 
a genuine absolutist and transcendental sublime; and she is ignoring his moral sublime. 
Rosenblum, as we have seen, is more correct to locate genuine religiosity in the 
romantic sublime as it comes over into abstract expressionism. 
Just before Still died he was interviewed by Thomas Albright, who observes that 
our final picture of Still "was a kind of composite of Savonarola, Zarathustra, and 
Captain Ahab." Albright reports Still's remarks that in his works he sought "the 
vastness and depth of a Beethoven sonata or a Sophocles drama," and that rather than 
show (as in Rembrandt or Velazquez) what an eye, hand, or foot could do, he would 
show "what just the klea of an eye or an arm or a head might be," and that art is "an 
instrument of thought"--revelations that Still also belongs essentially in the ideational 
sublime. In an insight meshing with Crowther's sense of the needs of consciousness 
and its enlargements and the growth in power through rational grasp, Albright shrewdly 
observes that a Still painting "seems a reflection of consciousness becoming ever more 
conscious of itself, of its freedom and power."56 Though Albright does not say so, he 
points to a transcendence akin both to the Kantian and existential sublime. 
An important publication came in 1992, the catalogue for a Still retrospective in 
Munich, with analytical essays by Thomas Kellein and Michael Auping. Kellein prints a 
remark Still made to Hess in 1952, that his painterly object "is almost all idea." The 
general approach of Kellein is too formalist, as witnessed by his comment that the 
works do not show "a calculated reliance on mystical theories," and "The pictorial 
elements are always interrelated as if involved in a struggle for the painting. Seen 
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individually, they articulate neither space nor color, but a world of interfering, mutually 
attractive and repelling entities that never subordinate themselves to a higher or unifying 
order. . . . and compositional balance is not a prime objective" All that Kellein will 
concede toward transcendence is that "Through their massiveness, the areas of color 
took on a measure of sublimity." The formalists miss too much that really matters. 
Kellein's essay resembles Greenberg's article on Still, a very dull treatment based 
entirely on form, size, and color, and revealing how blind Greenberg was to crucial 
content "On more than one of the few times Clyff and I talked . . . he brought up 
Longinus's 'On the Sublime.' I can't remember at all what he said, but it did seem that 
Longinus was on his mind."57 Greenberg should have remembered. 
Auping's catalogue essay (more satisfying than Kellien's) declares that Still saw 
his work "as one immense visual biography" and "the self—in all its darkness and 
peculiarities—constituted the heart of his image" Correctly recognizing background 
theorists, Auping observes that "In many ways, Still and his colleagues were paralleling 
in visual and symbolic terms a heady theoretical climate that included the writing on 
myth, primitivism, and the unconscious of Freud, Jung, and Nietzsche" Still's 
comment that the threads in his work are life-lines is passed along by Auping, who 
connects it to "an existentially aware self," who accepts the "vaguely gothic" element in 
Still, and who notes that "Still also avoids pure spectrum colors, replacing yellow with 
ocher and orange with sienna." Still's works suggest "a vertical emanation from ground 
to cosmos," and his colors have "a transcendental interior light," though Still 
recognized that he used color, in his words, "in a new and, for many, displeasing 
way."58 What is lacking in Auping's analysis is the needed connection between Still's 
harsh colors and the presence of a sublimicist project 
Like Manner, Auping finds hints of "a primordial or mythic duel," but does not 
connect this to the sublime He does rightly observe that Still's color (as is the case for 
Rothko and Newman) "transforms Mondrian's metaphysics into something more grand 
and awesome"; but we need to know what that something is. Auping discovers in 
works of the fifties a stronger "gothic ascension" and more of a "solemn processional 
quality," along with more Burkean "terror and chaos" than in Newman's "divinely 
calculated" paintings that seem to derive from a personal "Golden Section." Auping 
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properly relates Still to the Burkean sublime, "a phenomenon steeped in gothic 
atmosphere and characterized by properties of terror, darkness, and grand unfathomable 
dimension. Other characteristics of the sublime described by Burke—roughness of 
surface, melancholy color—are particularly applicable to Still's work" In the latest 
paintings of the sixties Auping finds not only more white, light, optimism, and 
economy, but also a deeper theological sense, a sense of rebirth, a "transformation from 
the natural to the metaphysical, to something profoundly moving but not quite 
nameable."59 Obviously Auping gives strong warrant for a sublimicist analysis of Still. 
Finally, mention should be made of a new exhibition catalogue for a 1994 show 
in New York, the exhibition and catalogue title being Newman. Rothko. Still: Search 
for the Sublime, with a discerning text by Irving Sandier, who writes that through their 
color field format they hoped "to evoke what Newman termed 'the Sublime,' Rothko, 
`transcendental experience,' and Still, 'exaltation.'"60 Sandler plays down any specific 
borrowings from primitive art by the three painters, and notes that "Still's images were 
often composed of vertical light forms set off against horizontal dark forms, evoking an 
upright figure in a landscape, male and female, sky and earth, Heaven and Hell." All 
three artists converted myth-making into an American abstract sublime, Irving states, in 
the light of suggestions from Rosenblum and Alloway. Burke's influence is stressed in 
the painters' elimination of line and the blurring of edges to invoke infinity; in the 
increase in size of the canvases to increase sublime impact; in dark colors divorced from 
conventional effects; and in bright colors that were more dissonant than pleasing. Still's 
forms are related to the earlier American sublime of vast geographic spaces, and also to 
Emerson's radical individualism. Still's vertical and flame-like areas "unlock the picture 
space, and cover it to expand up and outward, conveying an immediate sensation of 
limitless upward aspiration." Still is construed as an "ultimate Emersonian" with a 
sublime sense of the mythical American West.61 These kinds of relatedness to a general 
American tradition of the sublime in painting and literature will be treated in a later 
chapter. Sandler's interpretation is perceptive but requires what he does not supply: a 
clear and detailed way to connect rugged individualism to a transcendent sublime. 
If Ferguson's approach were applied to Still, an argument could be made that the 
dissolving of the figure into the ground raises doubts about the individual as 
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autonomous agent; however that would be a misreading because it is hard to think of 
any painter who equals Still in the celebration of the free and unfettered self. 
Deconstructionists and post moderns could of course respond that no matter what Still 
thinks, his writings and ideas are so thoroughly located in the fluid fields of language 
and culture, so thoroughly "constructed" by the malleable contingencies of non-
universal word games, so thoroughly faded out in their interlockings with other texts, 
and so inherently destabilized by the self-reflexive and unreliable ontological and 
epistemological status of his referring terms, that there is no possible way to read him 
except in line with a Ferguson movement toward rhetoricity and deconstruction. 
However, if anyone told Still that his Captain Ahab kind of arrogant, Nietzschean 
assertion of isolated will and intellect was no more than a fiction exploded by his 
enslavement to some culture field, we may imagine Still's blistering response. In short, 
Ferguson-like readings are always possible, but they would not fit with the positive 
aspects of Still's painterly crusade. Ferguson would, however, be helpful in that her 
focus on selfhood is also Still's main focus. 
Weiskel would be very interested in Still as a projector of strong psychological 
compulsions, a perceiver of psychic trauma, an anxiety-ridden modernist whose jagged 
tensions separate him from the harmonious romantic sublime and locate him in the 
secondary, troubled modern or postmodern sublime. Weiskel would claim that Still's 
sense of destruction is fed by the Oedipal antagonism, and that Still's works are best 
explained by physiological and psychological elementary pleasure/pain mechanisms. 
Weiskel would be able to concede that Still genuinely felt the need to reach a more than 
human transcendent zone, but that we should explain this on naturalistic grounds, not 
idealistic. Again, such readings are possible, and Still makes a better case study for 
Weiskel than Rothko or Newman—just as (due to his better sense of enemies) he would 
make a better case study for Bloom's counter sublime. What is wrong here is that Still 
(whose studies focused heavily on Plato, Longinus, and Croce) really ought not to be 
approached in terms of materialism, naturalism, and nominalism. It is counter-intuitive 
to suppose that such a direction could explain his sublimicist art. 
The Lyotard paradigm would be more adequate than that of Ferguson or Weiskel. 
Still, Rothko, and Newman were indeed critical of the culture of the machine age, 
technology, and mass production; they did indeed harbor a vague dream of a more 
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humane and equitable society; they were indeed devoted to metaphysical ideas; they did 
indeed try to present the unpresentable; they did indeed favor a more tolerant society 
open to new voices; and they did indeed relish their power to produce paintings that 
spoke like phrases and sentences to honor a moral ought. These important 
correspondences indicate some of the considerable special merits of Lyotard's theory of 
the sublime. However, there is simply no sense in which Still and his group believed 
that constructive and operative myth was impossible, that the self was unstable, that the 
differing culture areas could not communicate with each other, or, especially, that no 
positive new vision could now be declared. 
There are many interesting ways in which Crowther's terminology allows a 
rewarding treatment of Still. While I will not pursue such a reading in detail, I will refer 
to some of Crowther's specific notions in the analysis of specific paintings. Suffice it to 
say, here, that Still's sense of a vast chaos of inimical culture forces that can be 
logically comprehended, brought into coherence, and transcended through the 
sensibility of the sublime lends itself to illumination by Crowther's expanded Kantian 
model. Crowther gains distinctive advantages for handling positive sublimicist art 
through his positive concepts of personal enrichment, cultural regeneration, universal 
needs of consciousness, flexible but long-enduring constants, and understanding of 
how widely relevant and constructive the concept of the sublime should be. Crowther 
strongly maintains the ideational sublime of Kant, offering the best approach to Still as 
well as Rothko and Newman. Also, Crowther's theorizing of an existential modern 
sublime of shock and terror grafted to Burkean concepts seems highly appropriate for 
the Gothicized sublime of Still. But again, the blazing moral passion of Still, plus the 
absolutism and implicit theism (which I think is there) would not be adequately captured 
in Crowther's model. 
Keeping all the major theorists in mind, plus the insights in Still criticism, plus 
Still's own invaluable statements, what are the most promising ways to pursue sublime 
content in the works of Clyfford Still? Longinus offers one major direction, indicated in 
a listing of some of his insights which relate strongly to Still: that the sublime is seen in 
"a lightning flash"; that through the sublime the soul "gains a proud step upward"; that 
grand conceptions are the chief source of the sublime; that strong passion is a source; 
that an artistic unity of parts to whole is a source; that seriality is a source along with 
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bridging from one to many; that the sublime resides more in mind and imagination than 
in nature; that dark areas in a painting can work as a concealed sublime metaphor; that 
contemporary materialistic, corrupt society is hostile to sublime artists, who must 
denounce both to reach eternal things. Each of these item is connectable to Still's work, 
for instance, his flame motif as an icon both for lightning flashes of intuition and a 
proud elevation of soul, his jaggedness as a suggestion of strong passion, his 
interlocking forms as a unity of parts and whole, his sustained sameness of style as a 
wave of seriality (along with his passion to show works in groups in solo exhibitions), 
his dark sections as symbols, and his turning from nature to mind and imagination. 
Also Longinus, like Still, assumes that moral passions are inextricable from sublime 
aims. 
Burke establishes a major path of interpretation for sublime content in Still, 
especially Burke's stress on passions as psychological universals; on the elements of 
fear and danger, which for Still would certainly involve society as daemonic and the 
self as endangered by social control, as well as private histories of pain and suffering 
and the danger of death; on darkness and obscurity as signs of the sublime, including 
obscurity in sublime ideas; on Burke's sense of power as a necessary aspect of the 
sublime; on solitude, silence, and privation as conditions of the sublime; on verticals 
and jagged surfaces as suited to the sublime; on darkness, light and colors revealed by 
light as symbols of sublimity; on paradox and polarity as sources of the sublime; on 
black, brown, purple, and red colors as appropriate in suggestivity; on the ragged and 
rugged contours of the sublime as opposed to the smooth harmony of the beautiful; on 
things (like paintings) from which we have no real fear but which have an effect similar 
to objects of terror; and on the essential role of the emotion of astonishment. Gothic 
features mesh smoothly with Burke's ideas. 
Nietzsche's theory is also highly relevant to Still, whom we should see as a 
ruthless Nietzschean sublime man struggling to impose his value system on a decadent 
society through sublime art symbols. Nietzsche would not find sufficient myth in Still, 
although clearly we have Apollonian and Dionysian polarities plus a distinctly 
Promethean motif of aggression. Also Nietzsche failed to see how the biography of 
geniuses can become effective as myth. There is no doubt that Rothko, Newman, and 
Still believed they could create new myth from their own lives as long as they could 
achieve a cultic space. 
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Probably the most productive direction for grounding Still's vision of the sublime 
lies in Sartre and Kierkegaard, especially Sartre. The dominant theme for Still is the 
wholly free and morally responsible individual, struggling to make choices that elevate 
the choices of others. The Sartrean existential sublime (though Sartre did not declare it), 
would be located both in Sartrean dread and freedom, and in the transcendence of the 
self toward future idealized states which are projected outward and upward as an 
expanding horizon beyond the zone of the merely human. Kierkegaard relates to Still in 
terms of the rejection of the crowd and the raising high of the anguished individual in 
search of a transcendent ground of being. In a general sense, Still's Sartrean existential 
sublime should be seen as an extension of the egoistic romantic sublime, with strong 
Gothic aura, but the existentialism must be supplemented by transcendent ideas in the 
tradition of Longinus and Kant, and in kinship with Rothko and Newman. 
Still should also be interpreted through the moral sublime, an avenue strongly 
theorized by Kant and in some ways expanded by Crowther and others. For Still there 
was a painterly moral imperative related to the general aims of abstract expressionism to 
purify and simplify the means of expression, along with a social moral imperative to 
convert a sick society to a healthy one. Kant discovers highest sublimity in the power of 
the individual to legislate universal morality, and also in the subjective power of reason 
to supply a concept adequate to bridge over the shock of a rugged encounter with 
powerful forces, certainly the key to Still's achievement. This unifying concept comes 
from the realm of subjective rational freedom where, for Kant and Still, moral 
judgments must originate; thus for Kant the sublime encounters activate our respect for 
the whole inner world of idea, including the area of moral choice. The Kantian model of 
the sublime allows a plausible way to invoke the moral sublime for any artist, like Still, 
who clearly sees his artistic program as ethically instrumental. 
Still's Prometheanism, his Apollonian and Dionysian polarities, his sense of 
ancient foes clashing on a modern plain, his strong sense of the universal validity of his 
vision, all of this is partly founded on the confidence given to the abstract 
expressionists by the archetype theory of Jung, confidence that by probing their own 
existential condition they could reach universal ground, confidence that if they probed 
the dark regions of their own psyches, they could hope for regeneration and integration 
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of self. Also, there is an impressive quality of the noble sublime in Still because his 
works are sharply etched and invite deliberate and rational meditation. Yet he manifests 
less of the noble sublime than Rothko and Newman, less of a sense of balanced ratio 
and measure. Still moves further toward a passional sublime, in keeping with his 
Burkean cast.62 It should be possible to locate in Still a light/color sublime, 
establishing a kinship with Rothko and Newman as a color field painter. Yet there are 
peculiar features to Still's use of color—his refusal of pure spectrum colors, his clear 
understanding that he kept away from "beauty" in his harsh colors. We may properly 
assume that he does this, in part, as a sign that his sublimicist vision is too moral and 
serious, too Puritanical, to keep company with the traditionally beautiful. However if 
harsh colors are chosen deliberately at the urging of a combative idea, this is not quite 
what we mean by an inherent sublime of color—as we find in Rothko and Newman, and 
Turner, as well as in Matisse and Mondrian. It may well be that Still hurt himself by his 
harsh colors, yet his decision came from moral courage, and his colors do contribute to 
his sublimicist project, serving his ideational sublime. 
As we move into the analysis of specific works, it is helpful to keep in mind 
certain particular kinds of awareness activated by Still's own comments: the sense of a 
white canvas as a field fora demonstration of freedom; the sense of a single stroke of 
paint delivered by a thinking mind intending to demonstrate total existential freedom of 
choice; the sense of the edge of the painting as a symbol for oppressive restraint by 
society; the sense of a complete painting as a revelation of a total person showing heroic 
bravery; the sense of sublime reality carried by the sublime ideas of total fieedom and 
total selfhood, by the sublime warfare against a corrupt society, by the sublime pressure 
of strong emotion, by the sublime disinterested state beyond utility or greed, and by the 
parallel between human and divine creation; the sense of vertical forms and flame-like 
ascensions as symbols of the thrust toward the transcendent sublime; the sense that 
harmonious beauty has been set aside for the more harsh, ragged, and rugged tonality 
of the sublime; the sense that strong shocks need to be administered to a public that has 
been made passive by the many opiates of social control; the sense that a bold, 
prophetic, Nietzschean male is flinging down a bold challenge; the Nietzschean sense 
that creative artists, using intellect and imagination, are the only hope for a sick society; 
the sense that primitive thought and the past must not dominate, and that the true state is 
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a fully modern existential mind taking an action in the present moment; the sense that all 
past styles and taste must be set aside and a new style developed for unique purposes; 
the sense that one aggressive stroke of paint might prevail over an entire misdirected 
society; the sense that human freedom is a right of the individual that carries with it a 
powerful moral obligation; the sense that art should shun commerce and achieve an 
elevation of mind which is redeeming for self and society; and the sense that Still is 
standing not only in the midst of modernism, but also in the shadow of Europeans such 
as Plato, Longinus, Burke, Nietzsche, Blake, the symbolists, and the surrealists, and 
equally (as a rather Puritanical Protestant) in the shadow of American individualism and 
transcendentalism. 
Four paintings by Still have been selected for analysis: July 1948, 1951-1 No.2, 
September 1955, and Oil on Canvas. 1959 (using the plate titles in the Kellein Clyffoal 
SfilD. July 194 is chosen because that is the year in which Rothko, Newman, and Still 
were all approaching their mature style, though Still reached his the soonest. July 1948 
has a cream-colored field dominated by jagged and upward-moving black masses, with 
a jagged red flame-like form in the middle of the largest black mass, along with a few 
isolated streaks and jagged spots of red, and also a few spots and streaks of cream in 
the black masses. On three sides the black shapes come to the edge of the painting as if 
extending beyond. 
The most conspicuous features of July 1948 are the ominous sense of some kind 
of endangerment; the restless Gothic and Baroque sense of energy, power, and 
destructive potential; the sense of upward thrust; the renunciation of natural forms and 
figure; and the harshness of the colors in that the cream is rather muddied and the 
crimson is prevented from being a pure spectrum color by some internal streaking of 
cream and black, plus an infusion of orange. We may certainly accept Still's remark that 
he did not like the tyranny of the edge of a painting as a confinement, and thus construe 
the "beyond the edge" motif as a sign of extensions outward toward a more or less 
cosmic and infinite context. In this work the cream ground is close to the bare canvas, 
probably a sign of the bare canvas as a field of freedom upon which a Nietzschean will 
to power (not over people but against oppressors) can inscribe aggressive ideas. There 
is no reason not to agree with Anfam and others that there is a clearly masculinized 
presence in Still's works. 
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It would simplify things if we could assume that in Still's paintings the black and 
other dark colors symbolize forces of oppression and destruction, while the reds, 
yellows, bright blues, and whites suggest the indomitable existential self. But we have 
no warrant to assume that—for this reason: it is possible that the jagged polarities of 
shape and color all represent Still's individual powers, his various faculties and 
resources for waging war, his own fierce internal polarities and strivings for integration 
and synthesis. This latter type of analysis strikes me as the most probable. The entire 
painting is a revelation of a human self flinging down a gauntlet, a human self not easy 
to defeat imam it embodies a complex assortment of weapons, skills, resources. We 
should rely on Still's assertions that a polar duel does not dominate his paintings 
internally, but rather a "single projection," and that his works declare "Here I am; this is 
my presence." Such a reading allows us to see the blacks not as signs of the enemy, but 
rather (in consonance with Burke) as signs of the depth and mystery of a sublime 
subject. However Still's constant enemy (the socio-politico-economic ensconced 
powers, institutions, and traditions) is indeed invoked by implication as the kind of 
thing requiring such strength and violence to be resisted. And here, precisely, lies proof 
of the conspicuous value of the theory of the sublime. Still's foe is so vast, so infinite, 
so complex, so obscure, so unpresentable, so dangerous and terrifying that only a 
concept of reason can encompass and cope with the gigantic entity being contemplated 
or with the force being set against it. Crowther strongly encourages this kind of 
analysis of modern and postmodern art—and so does the art itself. 
Anfam, as we have seen, has called attention to Still's phrase "of the earth, the 
damned, and the recreated," which may be related to a comment of Still already given, 
but worth quoting again: "And as the blues or reds or black lisp up and quiver in their 
tenuous ambience or rise in austere thrusts to carry their power infinitely beyond the 
bounds of the limiting field, I move with them and find a resurrection from the morbid 
oppressions that held me only hours ago. Only they are complete too soon, and I must 
quickly move on to keep the spirit alive." It is important to note that Still includes the 
blues, reds, and blacks as part of the upward affirmations toward infinite concerns. 
These colors represent powers within the self that are touched by the divine in a saving 
kind of recreation for the self. Thus we meet the Sartrean existential sublime in both of 
its impulses: transcendence toward higher and future realizations of perfected selfhood, 
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plus the threshold crossing to moral responsibility for other persons, who are 
encouraged to elevate their lives by similar kinds of fiercely committed idealism and 
agonized choice. Still's extremely negative assessment of the general conditions of 
social life and his sense of the huge dangers to personal honor and Sartrian authenticity 
sufficiently explain his references to oppression of spirit and the state of damnation. 
Also, we should keep in mind that Still approved before publication Crehan's comment 
in the San Francisco Chronicle that "the monstrous black and red shapes, with their 
swift yellow flicks or blue articulations, evoke a spiritual charge akin to those profound 
emotions produced by the occasional scientific or philosophic utterances that reconstruct 
our consciousness of reality in a more perfect order." We cannot properly assess Still 
without keeping in mind a kind of paradise vision, and Crehan's remark also suggests 
that Still (like Newman) connects his ideational sublime to key concepts of modern 
science. Still has made it clear that his paintings operate like pure ideas close to Sartre's 
rationalism. For Still, existentialism was precisely one of the articulations in philosophy 
that had the impact of a major scientific theory. 
The strong reds and blacks of July 1948 make an interesting contrast to the 
luminous domination by yellow of .1951-L No.2 Throughout his career Still produced 
bright works as well as dark ones. The whole middle of 1951-L No. 2 is a large 
upward-thrusting pillar of jagged yellow reaching to the upper edge and thus projecting 
higher. Also at the top are some small slashes of white. The left and right edges are 
irregular narrow zips of burnt orange, and at the bottom center is a small flare of red 
complementing a black streak in the lower right corner. These forms stand out against a 
general ground of pale tan. Except for black and white, none of the colors are pure, a 
feature which should be connected to avoidance of the spectrum hues of nature and to 
the shifting of subject from the beautiful to the sublime. 
The vertical shafts in this work reflect an aggressive Nietzschean male ego. The 
concentration of the white streaks at the top, plus the dominance of yellow, suggest that 
this painting asserts more of the rational and spiritual self, less of the impassioned and 
embodied self depicted by the blacks and reds, which are here not eliminated, but 
pointed to by the smaller lower black and red streaks. All of the streaks and flares in 
Still's paintings function semantically (in their spontaneity and energy) to suggest the 
whole of an aggressive intellect and will—something full of life and energy, something 
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not predictable, something not governed by mechanism, something operating with the 
consciousness of its own freedom, something not to be silenced, something complex in 
weaponry. If there is more warmth and kindness in such a yellow, tan, orange, and 
white painting, more of a sense of possible serenity and heavenly implications, these 
should be taken as part of the existential weaponry. Still's own moments of exaltation, 
joy, and regeneration are certainly a proper sublime subject. It was Sartre himself who 
said that the pessimism of existentialism should not obscure the truth that it is also a 
joyous doctrine. It is the strong domination of yellow in this work, plus the more stable 
colunm as opposed to jagged flames, which suggests a more spiritualized and heaven-
tilted reading of this type of work in Still's oeuvre. 
September 1955 has been selected in part because as a red color field work, it can 
be compared and contrasted to Vir Heroicus Sublimis. Still's bold red field, unlike 
Newman's, offers an impure crimson shot through with orange. The darker red-orange 
tongues of ascending flame stand out against a paler red-orange, and the general red-
orange field reaches to the edges on three sides. On the left side is a ragged burnt 
yellow zip with creamy white streaks, and at the right bottom is a small jagged black 
flare. To the left of center a prominent feature is a thin white line reaching to the upper 
edge. Still and others have mentioned his motif of a "life-line"; however in my reading 
this should not be taken to mean that the thin line is the human self. The life line is, 
rather, an assertion of spontaneous living vitality, and the fact that Still combines lines 
with splashes and streaks has the semantic value of declaring the complexity and 
spontaneity of the self, of the will. It may well be the case that the lines can represent 
rays of the intellect as they cut clean in a turbulent world, but in any case the lines 
represent part of the self, not the entire self. 
If Newman's red masterpiece belongs to the measured noble sublime as a tribute 
to the sublime heroic life, Still's red canvas carries a similar tribute, but in Burkean-
Gothic-Baroque shock mode, strongly colored by Nietzsche and Sartre. We have noted 
that Still admired Blake and that the myth of the fire-stealing Prometheus (strongly 
emphasized by Nietzsche) has been connected to Still and his program. Certainly Still's 
September 1955 lends itself to a Promethean analysis in terms of the aggressive 
boldness, the heroic assertiveness, and the tongues of flame. However we have seen 
that Still rejected any kind of revival of older myths, insisting (like Newman) that a 
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fresh beginning was required, a raw existential base. Jungian archetype theory 
encouraged Rothko, Newman, and Still to believe that universal mythical grounds 
could be reached by the descent into the depth of selfhood, into the turbulence of the 
inner human powers and passions that clashed in polar opposition and required a 
difficult integration. All of this points to the genuine mythical sublime in Rothko, 
Newman, and Still. The living embodied artist jg the culture hero who engages in battle 
with the diabolical forces. We should recall Polcari's general thesis that the abstract 
expressionists picked up the great Western monomyth of the questing hero, suited to 
their uses because they treated two grand themes: "to be caught in a web of difficulties 
and to seek to overcome them through an inward transformation and rebirth."63 Still's 
crimson field, like Newman's, should be seen in the light of a comment by Ronald 
Paulson: "The complementary aim of the abstract expressionists . . . was to secure ths 
archetypal image, an mythic Jungian archetype, whether this was a luminous, 
numinous square or a single vertical line. The powerful, haunting, mysterious image, 
itself sublime in the way that an image of God in glory would have been to a medieval 
Christian, or the omnipotent sun was to Turner." Due to the stronger existential 
appropriation, Still is more humanist than Rothko and Newman, though we have no 
warrant to assume that Still does not adumbrate also a religious divine. He probably 
does. Yet his humanism is powerful, as it was with Blake, who associated fire with his 
Gothic and destructive tiger as symbol of passion and freedom. Paulson realizes that a 
merely rhetorical and metaphorical sublime would not count: "either the human has to 
be truly raised into a natural/supernatural force, as by a kind of possession, or we are 
dealing with at best a metaphorical and at worst a pseudo sublime."64 This is exactly 
what we should perceive in Still—a natural/supernatural force as possession. Still does 
not revive the old fire legend of Prometheus, but rather recreates this same kind of 
heroic and mythic action in his own life, encouraged to do so by Blake, Nietzsche, 
Longinus, Burke, and Jung. Still's effort to behave like a superman and produce art 
symbols intended to impose order on a whole culture stands in close proximity to the 
Nietzschean sublime, and the jaggedness, shock, and tumult of his forms, the intense 
implication of terrors and dangers on all sides, brings his sublimicism close also to 
Burke's in a combination of modes of the sublime somewhat different from those in 
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Rothko and Newman.65  
As a final painting for consideration, Oil on canvas. 1959 seems appropriate 
because it so perfectly conveys the hallmark features of Still's works. There is a general 
ground of tan at the bottom and impure creamy white at the top. On this ground in the 
upper right is a jagged wedge of strong but impure blue, at the bottom left a jagged 
wedge of impure orange-red, and at the bottom center and right a jagged wedge of 
rather harsh maroon. We have the dark colors and rough contours of Burke's sublime, 
plus the strong dark/light contrast Burke singled out for sublimity in the design of 
Gothic cathedrals, plus the Burkean verticals and descent into darkness. Still also gives 
a small black streak at the bottom and a yellow streak at the top, plus a yellow life line. 
This painting is a kind of summary of Still's vocabulary. The white, yellow, and blue at 
the top should be construed as analogues for intellect, hope, and projections toward a 
transcendent and more perfect order. The lower masses of crimson and maroon are 
semantic analogues for powers in the self other than reason and faith—the powers of 
strong passions, including rage, hate, and destructive potential. These existential and 
also universal and trans-finite (if not eternal) entities are, in this work, well balanced 
against the blue and white areas. We seem to reach from the lower depth of the 
unconscious to the upper zones of lucid ideas and something at least close to the 
mandate of heaven, yielding Still's declared ideal of an "edification of mind or soul." 
As a later work Oil on canvas. 1959 seems (importantly) to be somewhat more 
noble, measured, integrated, balanced, reaching the painter's goal of a sonata form. 
Most of the analytical observations made about the other three paintings apply also to 
this one. The white, blue, red, and maroon chunks are like stalwart, courageous 
soldiers set upon the field of battle with great freedom for spontaneous action. Who is 
the enemy? It is an Other whose corruption, power, and threat need this kind of 
counteraction, that huge "collectivist castration word" hated by Still, against which 
some high idealism and male virility should be set. Still's hostile Other is the entire 
social establishment, including the politicized militants as well as the governments, 
churches, capitalists, and art institutions. To use Still's terms, he is creating lances and 
brooms in paint. 
Difficulty and seriality should be mentioned as part of Still's sublimicism. The 
difficulty factor is obvious, and it is noteworthy that Still compounded it by refusing to 
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give any statements that provided specific clues about specific paintings. The Burkean 
sublimity of things made difficult attaches to all abstract art, and especially to Still's. 
Also, he seems more passionate about seriality than Rothko or Newman. He used the 
same forms throughout his entire artistic life. Often later paintings are close echoes of 
earlier ones, and his will decrees that his huge fund of unshown paintings must remain 
in hiding until some city creates a quiet museum (no snack or sales shops) in which his 
works go on permanent display in series. We should conclude that a cumulative wave-
like effect of grandeur and impact was in Still's mind, another facet of Still's search for 
the sublime in our age that needs elevation, awe, and mystery, but finds those needs not 
being met. 
Clearly Still exhibits a moral sublime in this powerful concept of his own aesthetic 
holy war. For Still, every rugged color block, every ascending pillar of flame, gal a 
moral declaration, as his own comments assert, such as his Lyotardian "phrases" that 
for his audience he "will give back courage as freedom," that he will *carve clean," that 
he will use ideas to reach emoment of elevation." In Crowther's theory of the sublime 
there are precognitive constants established by the universal conditions of human 
embodiment, and these are important elemental forces in Still's hold on the world, his 
correlations of hand, eye, and intellect, and his existential sensibility. Crowther also 
stresses the universal needs of self-consciousness, which he defined as attention, 
comprehension, projection, reversibility, species-identity, and individual freedom, and 
which he connects to the unique value of art in overcoming both personal and cultural 
antagonisms in a redemptive, integrative fashion. If we could ask Still whether or not 
he utilized psycho-physiological constants; called for and offered attention, 
comprehension, and projection; focused on the human species and human freedom; and 
tried to achieve a redemptive vision for self and society, Still would reply that someone 
had a good grasp of his program (if the seclusive Still would agree to answer questions 
at all). To understand Still, as well as Rothko and Newman, criticism must employ an 
aesthetic theory much like Crowther's, one which construes aesthetic experience as a 
complex harmonizing of rational and sensory components; construes art as uniquely 
qualified to present a redemptive vision via the sensory manifold; embraces both 
phenomenology and historicity; understands the axiology of the conscious pleasurable 
recognition of aesthetic and sublime content; protects art from dissolution into language; 
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and takes cognizance of often neglected broad features such as the general moral good, 
general existential courage, and the general feeling at home in the world. This kind of 
combination is precisely what Rothko, Newman, and Still adopted in their art 
programs. 
Albright connected Still in his final years to Captain Ahab—a shrewd analogy. 
Ahab, as if in some preordained battle, sets his fire energies against whatever it is in the 
universe that causes frustration, suffering, and despair to mankind, and if the dark god 
who is responsible will not come out and fight, Ahab will attack him through his agent, 
the white whale. Ahab's weapon is the lance, which Still named as his weapon. Most 
critics do not like to discover any kind of paradise vision offering ultimate hope for 
Ahab. They should read again the lines early in the novel from Father Mapple's 
sermon, in which he declares that the brave spiritual fighters of the world may, at the 
end, expect some grand coming of delight "Delight is to him—a far upward, and inward 
delight—who against the proud gods and commodores of this earth, ever stands forth 
his own inexorable self."66 Art historians may not think that Still was a fully 
successful painter, but this is what he did. His Ahab nature and his self-reliance connect 
him to Melville and Emerson and the romantic American Protestant sublime, a 
metaphysical sublime—for Still so totally a project of strong ideas as to place him, 
essentially, in the ideational sublime, with other modes (as has been demonstrated) 
mixed in, including probably a genuine religious sublime as an implication of those 
upward vectors in Still's work that reach toward a zone of radiance and eternity, with 
his creative fire counting as an analogue for divine creation. 
Thus, by way of ending part two of this study, we have seen that our four 
seminal and four recent theorists of the sublime—combined with Sartre and Jung—
supply a full and complex background of sublimicist theory which can profitably be 
brought to bear on Rothko, Newman, and Still—a procedure demanded by the 
speculations on sublimity and transcendental subjects so dominant in the assembled 
personal comments of the three painters. For all three, the sobering negativities of tragic 
awareness and alienation in the modern age are faced and absorbed, yet not allowed to 
destroy a central vision of positive philosophic and spiritual belief. Their programs 
cannot be fairly construed in negative terms, and this fact justifies the art historical 
decision to locate them chiefly in the positive ideational sublime, with strong cross- 
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weavings from a group of other modes: moral, religious, existential, mythic, Burkean-
Gothic, counter, noble, and color-light. The ideational mode includes Kant and his far-
reaching concept of the mathematical and dynamical sublime. We have noted also some 
coloration from the romantic sublime in that Rothko, Newman, and Still do emphasize 
passion and do envision an individualistic hero; yet they tilt away from the romantic by 
the turn away from nature and the advocacy of impersonal universal emotions. There is 
more of the romantic and existential flavor in Still, with his urgent sense of freedom and 
his key concept of one man against the world, and also more of the Burkean-Gothic, 
with his stronger sense of fear, rugged aggression, and breaking of forms. For Rothko, 
the portal motif has been stressed (carrying the symbolism of threshold crossings) and 
stressed also has been his sense of ratio and measure, both of these related to the 
ideational and noble sublime. And for Newman, we have seen a strong ideational and 
noble sublime, with an emphasis on universal passions amused by ideas (including 
ideas of science), along with the strategy of using verticals to semanticize color fields, 
and along with a more conspicuous religious sublime. For all three painters, there has 
been a search for sublime transcendence, a conscious awareness of the traditions of the 
sublime, and an effort to formulate ideas and abstract styles to handle the various kinds 
of awesome and surprising exaltations of spirit that supplied their most favored 
subjects. They were well aware of a general social and spiritual crisis which they could 
help resolve by a bold art grounded not in the sense of beauty, but rather the sense of 
sublimity. 
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PART THREE 
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN CONTEXTS 
FOR 
ROTHKO, NEWMAN, AND STILL 
Chapter Seven - The Tradition of the American Literary and Painterly Sublime 
Rothko, Newman, and Still obviously worked in the general stream of history 
and culture, from which their ideas develop and to which their art contributes. It would 
therefore be constructive to suggest briefly some of the major sources for a general 
American tradition of the sublime, the literary and art context in which abstract 
expressionism emerges. Such a brief sketch would also be helpful in that the 
interpreters and biographers of Rothko, Newman, and Still often point to some of their 
literary interests. Inevitably, any effort to suggest highlights for such a vast field will 
have the fault of oversimplification. One possible way to proceed is to stand back from 
major American writers and ask if there are some points at which we see the kind of 
rugged force, grandeur, and transcendence around which this study has located the 
experience of the sublime. 
In the Colonial period, there was a strong Burkean sense of a religious sublime 
associated with terror. The vision of Jonathan Edwards and other Puritans was 
dominated by their fear of the destructive wrath of a God of absolute sovereign power, 
as indicated by Edwards's famous sermon "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God? 
The Salem witchcraft trials grew out of this perception of terror and the supernatural. 
Much of this Burkean aspect carries into the works of Poe, in his tales of terror. 
Elements of the Gothic sublime abound in Poe's turbulent stories of extreme dangers 
and diabolisms that threaten body and soul. We have noted earlier some of Poe's 
speculation about theory of the sublime.' Juxtaposed against this sublime of terror 
stands Poe's radiant and Platonic sublime vision centered in his famous theory of lyric 
poetry as a brief opening of windows into paradise—a sudden flash of the eternal, very 
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much a kind of portal event which cannot be long sustained. Poe's prose work Eurcka 
is a serious cosmological study in which Poe offers the sublime narrative of an 
expanding and contracting universe that originates in the explosion of a primary 
particle, this One being god himself. Poe can thus envision life and history as a struggle 
to regain the state of the primal One. Poe's short stories, poems, and cosmology treat 
what the abstract expressionists called sublime subjects. 
The Puritanical tradition, coming before America responded to the impulses of 
Romanticism, perceived the rugged wilderness not as a magnificent inspiration but as a 
dark and dangerous pagan zone—some of this attitude appearing in Hawthorne's work. 
In The Scarlet Letter, for instance, the illicit sexuality of the minister and Hester is 
located in the dark woods. 
Puritan dogmas came under strong attack from the early American deists, such 
as Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, and Paine. These voices of the age of reason can 
be seen as a case of the counter-sublime in their strong warfare against Puritan beliefs. 
Their positive sublime vision appears in their core concept of the universe as a complex 
machine ordered by natural law construed as an aspect of divine law. This grand 
rational order of nature, this sense of a cosmic blueprint, would favor a sublimicism in 
the cool, rational, Kantian noble mode. The heritage of deism would be a factor in the 
counter-sublime rejection of religious orthodoxy by Rothko, Newman, and Still, and 
perhaps in their efforts to connect their sublime subject to scientific law. Deism 
connects to the on-going scientific search for rational cosmic design. 
Thoreau and Emerson manifest the coming of the romantic sublime to the new 
world. Thoreau, in consonance with several early landscape painters, declares that 
Walter celebrates the spirit of the American West and wilderness. Perhaps the chief 
core idea of Emerson (treated in his essays "The Oversoul" and "Self Reliance") is that 
the self and nature are pantheistically elevated by the in-dwelling real presence of deity, 
the concept spread by Wordsworth and Coleridge. In "The Over-Soul," Emerson 
claims that each human soul contains the "eternal One," though it is "undefinable, 
unmeasurable," and in the crucial transcendent experience, "The alone gives itself, 
alone, original, and pure, to the Lonely, Original, and Pure."2 Like Coleridge, Thoreau 
and Emerson were more interested in reason and philosophy than Wordsworth. The 
two Americans conceived nature not just as a structure of sublime grandeur, but also as 
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a forest of symbols. Walden continuously finds symbolic values in natural forms. 
Coleridge's thesis that a form of nature gains sublimity when it is a symbol fora grand 
idea would be endorsed by Thoreau and Emerson. Thoreau states that in his year in the 
woods he will confront life, and "if it were sublime, to know it by experience," and he 
names the rational intellect as his device for searching.3  
Melville (joining Thoreau and Emerson to generate the burgeoning American 
romantic vision) offers a number of stagings for grandeur, shock, and awe: the 
encounter with ocean; the titanic battle against ocean's most destructive creaturg the 
Nietzschean will to power in Ahab as he imposes his obsession on his crew; and 
Melville's frequent rhetorical fireworks. And probably as important as these features is 
the distinctive theological-cosmological framework Melville creates. In one important 
passage Ahab posits a god of love to whom he would offer love; a counter-god of hate 
and destruction who delights in tormenting mankind and to whom Ahab offers hate and 
warfare by striking at this dark god's agent, the great white whale; and beyond both of 
these gods, a third supreme deity to whom he appeals for a final refuge and 
justification.4 While critics might wish to dismiss these speculations as part of Ahab's 
madness, there are three reasons to take them seriously: (1) Ahab's theological 
paradigm is precisely that of Manichaeism, (2) Father Mapple's sermon early in the 
novel offers a possible justification for Ahab's war with the gods, and (3) Ahab's 
personal small-boat crew are all Parsees, whose theology would be Manichaen. In his 
sermon, Mapple declares (in the last lines of "The Sermon" chapter) that "Delight is to 
him—a far, far upward, and inward delight—who against the proud gods and 
commodores of this earth, ever stands forth his own inexorable self."5 This may well 
be the kind of final justification Ahab hopes for. In any case, this sense of a cosmic 
Manichaen conflict activates a rugged religious sublime as part of the texture of MQby 
Did, and the tenor level all through the novel, the diabolism and darkness and pain, 
add a Burkean Gothic flavor. Ahab also takes on some flavor of the Prometheus myth 
and the myth of the endangered questing hero, and Melville's masterpiece has itself 
loomed large in the accumulating American narratives that seem to enjoy high mythic 
status. I have observed earlier that Still has been connected both to Emerson and to 
Ahab.6 
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This aura of the mythic sublime may also be seen in a few tales of Washington 
Irving, such as "Rip Van Winkle" and "The Legend of Sleepy Hollow," and afterward, 
items such as The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and Faulkner's "The Bear." Some 
might argue that in the pattern of Robin Hood, important mythic elements are activated 
in Star Trek and Star-Wars movies, Tarzan narratives, John Wayne westerns, and other 
developments in popular culture. The question is, can some of these, like the tales of 
Irving, move toward the status of the Arthurian legends, even if not that high? 
The next literary giant deserving mention is Emily Dickinson, the divine Emily. 
Her powerful compressed verses convey sublime themes of the grandeur of nature, the 
depth of human suffering, and the vast horizons for the absolute sovereignty of the 
human soul (indicating a debt to Emerson). We see this last item when (in her poem 
"The Brain is wider than the sky") she asserts that the human mind will differ from the 
mind of God only as a syllable differs from its sound. In addition to these resources for 
positive modes of the sublime, Dickinson's poems project a blazing counter-sublime as 
she wages war against orthodox Christian concepts.7 She reaches the Longinian 
sublime of intense passions in her revelations of supreme loss and suffering, reflected 
in her name for herself: Empress of Calvary. 
From Hawthorne into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there has been a 
realistic bitter-flavored American tradition in which sublime subjects are scant—from 
Hawthorne to Henry James to Dreiser and Frost. In the nineteenth century it is 
Whitman who nourishes the strong spiritual exaltation, the romantic hope, deriving 
from Emerson. In his strong ideological sublime, Whitman developed a powerful sense 
of spiritual democracy, a vision of the vast enlargements possible for the idea of 
democracy. To this he joined intense appreciations for the wilderness and the land, for 
the westward frontier spirit, and for tolerance and equality. He wanted body raised as 
high as soul, somewhat like Blake. In "Song of Myself" he treats all these major 
themes, and creates a stirring depiction of the depth, range, and mystery of the 
individual self, and of its various mystical bondings to God, nature, and other selves.8  
Moving into the twentieth century, we find major resources for an American sublime in 
Hemingway, Faulkner, Eliot, Hart Crane, and Wallace Stevens, all of these having 
influenced the abstract expressionists. 
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While Hemingway's works offer a strong measure of the tradition of bitter-
flavored realism, there are also some upward vectors toward exaltation and redemption, 
two of these being his existential motif of brave and authentic selfhood for his wounded 
heroes, and the purity and sacredness of nature in wild places such as the upper 
Michigan peninsula, the high mountains of Spain, various cold remote trout streams, 
the green hills of Africa, and finally in the sanctuary of the Gulf Stream. In a strong 
sense, Hemingway belongs to that secularized religiosity that Rosenblum located in the 
northern romantic tradition and connected to Rothko, Newman, and Still. 
In Faulkner several elements are noteworthy: the sublime of extremely strong 
passions centered on sexuality and guilt; rhetorical fireworks; the mythical power of 
Civil War legends in the mind of the South; the sacredness of the American wilderness; 
and a powerful counter-sublime directed against Puritanism in the South and the 
Industrial Revolution. In his short story "The Bear" (already part of major American 
myth) Faulkner celebrates the mystical and saving spiritual power of the American 
wilderness (understood by the Chickasaw Indian Sam Fathers who tutors the white 
boy). This is the last of the annual ritual bear hunts for these plantation aristocrats 
because, full of guilt, they have sold the timber rights to the virgin woods, and the 
railroad spur is being laid. The iron of the machine age puts an end to the American 
Eden. In Faulkner's analysis, Puritanical protestantism in the South has failed to 
safeguard the land and failed to maintain the sacredness of sexuality.9  
In Faulkner's novels one finds a good case study for Longinus's theory that 
sublimity can come through powerful thrustings of past into present. In Faulkner's 
South, the plantation and Civil War dreams and legends never fade. The past is never 
past The hunger for Nietzschean myth is so great that the southerners turn mere 
soldiers into immortals. This hunger (which Faulkner, like Nietzsche, connects to noble 
families) is part of the Utopian Southern dream of a stately, ritualized, plantation 
aristocracy of beautiful white homes, noble gardens, privacy, elegance, dances, 
European culture, and manners—a dream Faulkner both exalts for its excellence and 
condemns for its flaws. The Dionysiac passions that destroy Faulkner's people, set 
beside this Apollonian dream of order and ritual, probably reflect the influence of 
Nietzsche. 
In the case of T. S. Eliot, we meet the unexpected advocacy of a return to the 
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religious sublime of orthodox Christendom, the mythical sublime of the grand narrative 
of creation, expulsion from paradise, the incarnation of the Logos in the Christ child, 
the death and resurrection, and the grand story of European history as Christianity 
triumphs and orders the life of nations around the Christian calendar. Eliot believes the 
classical Christian vehicles of sublime meanings can be revitalized and supplemented 
with new contents and new artistic styles. As examples of new contents, we may note 
his concept of the ever-living and ever-changing magic circle of great books (developed 
in his "Tradition and the Individual Talent"); his appreciation of heresy (in the Blake 
essay); and his praise of James Joyce for using pagan myth to organize contemporary 
secular chaos. 
Eliot's The Waste 
	
like Joyce's Ulysses. is difficult, grand, and complex 
in design, thus enhancing its sublime subject of lost souls that see occasional hints and 
flashes of deity and redemption. Eliot's demand that the living operate with the whole 
European past in their blood and bones is a call for a historical sublime. He has been 
remarkably successful in defending the passion and exaltation that accompany (as 
Heidegger develops along different lines) a religious vision of a sacred space creating a 
community of mankind, earth, sky, and deity. As Rothko, Newman, and Still illustrate, 
the American sensibility has been strongly inclined to some deep sense of a religious 
sublime, and Eliot is part of that tradition. In his own counter-sublime, Eliot often 
strikes against modern secular humanism, asserting that it tends toward splintering and 
chaos, cannot locate an eternal sanction for values, cannot create (even in theory) a 
unified society, and cannot satisfy eternal spiritual hungers.10 The Waste Land is the 
artistic concretization of Eliot's counter-sublime. Suggestions of Eliot's positive vision 
of spiritual exaltation and transcendence appear in The Waste Land when the 
protagonist, shaken by the beauty and aura of the girl in the hyacinth garden, sees "into 
the heart of light"—a sublime portal experience that Eliot also treats in the chief motif of 
Four Quartets: the divine presence as the still point which gives meaning to the turning 
world. Eliot treats the powerful jolt of the phenomenological encounter with the 
absolute." Much like Hopkins, Eliot offers a Christianized version of Heraclitus, who 
had emphasized flux, yet postulated a divine logos to give order to the world of change. 
These logos patterns seem to have on-going attraction in part because they connect to 
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the scientific interest in a blueprint model for the universe, this concept itself is a good 
example of a sublime idea. 
Hart Crane was influenced by T. S. Eliot.12 These poets, like Rothko, 
Newman, and Still, are reacting to the modernist sense of spiritual crisis as both 
Christian and Jewish religious orthodoxy were weakened by science and secularism, 
and the general Western sensibility came into a time of doubt and spiritual emptiness. 
They all thought that art should give new positive content to the growing spiritual void. 
While Eliot hoped for a renewal of Christian orthodoxy, Crane (like Wallace Stevens) 
did not think that would be possible. Very much in the northern Renaissance tradition, 
Crane sought a new secularized religiosity based on new sources of myth and value. 
Following Whitman, Crane thought the American experience itself, the saga of the 
movement from the Atlantic to the Pacific, had activated new mythical contents of 
grandeur and power. However, like Eliot and Stevens, Crane realized that the Christian 
traditions should be kept and absorbed into a wider, more secular context.13 
Crane's modernist epic poem The Bridge is a search for new usable myth and 
value. In his invocation, Crane celebrates Brooklyn Bridge, the beautiful art and 
technology form, asking that his controlling symbol might "lend a myth to God." In his 
outline of authentic mythical emergings, Crane includes folkloristic figures such as 
Pocahontas, Rip Van Winkle, Daniel Boone, and the railroad hoboes who have intimate 
contact with the land. Also Crane brings in as haunting presences the legacy of writers 
such as Melville, Poe, Whitman, and Dickinson, assuming (in agreement with figures 
such as Yeats and Stevens) that major poets have been all along creating a new sacred 
book to rival orthodox religious texts. It is noteworthy that Crane's lines, so rich in 
passionate turns of phraseology, are excellent examples of the rhetorical sublime 
theorized by Longinus. While working on the Bridle, Crane was reading Aeschylus 
and Shakespeare. 
There is no doubt that Crane's spiritual and mythic sublime leans heavily on 
Nietzsche. The Bridge offers several Dionysiac sections, such as the primitive frenzy of 
"The Dance," wherein Crane's white protagonist, under the Nietzschean stimulation of 
dance and music, reaches a sublime merger with the psyche of the Native Americans, 
and reaches also a Nietzschean sense of merger into the maternal One. It would be hard 
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to find in literature a more perfect depiction of the power of Dionysus. And Crane's 
impressive efforts at the interlocking of his segments into a coherent design testify to 
the power of Apollo. In Crane's symbolism, Pocahontas represents the whole 
American continent (an earth-mother model), one breast being the Appalachians and the 
other the Rockies, with the genital zone located where the dark and fertile Mississippi 
delta merges into the Gulf. Crane's protagonist seeks for moments of mystical and 
quasi-sexual bonding to the American land and to the grand narrative of American 
history and the flow of American culture. 
Crane's sense of the terrors that confront the self brings in the Burkean tonality 
of Melville, Poe, and Dickinson, to correct the too easy optimism of Whitman. Crane's 
isolated, anguished protagonist certainly reflects the influence of Sartrean 
existentialism, which (along with Jungian and Freudian thought) was such a strong 
factor in the programs of artists from the twenties to the fifties. At the end of lbc 
Bridge, the protagonist remains in danger and isolation, hoping that the iconic bridge 
can protect him as if it were deific.14 Thus in his masterpiece, Crane presents various 
sublimicist modes: romantic, religious, Nietzschean, Burkean, Jungian, and existential, 
and the difficulty and complexity of his design relates to the ideational sublime of Burke 
and Kant—Crane being influenced by the complexities of Eliot and Joyce. 
In the case of Wallace Stevens, the difficulty factor is even greater. He demands 
very subtle uses of the intellect by his raiders. Probably his most famous poem is 
"Sunday Morning," which offers on one hand a strong counter-sublime as he 
undermines the orthodox Christian world view, and on the other hand a strong positive 
sublime vision as he shifts paradisical language from outmoded heaven to radiant earth. 
The poem appeals to a Christian woman on Sunday morning (a surrogate for the 
Christian community) to understand the Jungian truth that "Divinity must live within 
herself," and that obsolete conceptions of some remote paradise "cannot endure as 
April's green endures." Stevens moves toward a kind of new phenomenological sun 
worship and existential selfhood. In 1940, in two letters he declares that "The idea of 
pure poetry, essential imagination . . . appears to be, at least potentially, as grad as the 
idea of God," and that "The major poetic idea in the world is and always has been the 
idea of God. One of the visible movements of the modern imagination is the movement 
away from the idea of God. The poetry that created the idea of God will either adapt it 
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to our different intelligence or create a substitute for it, or make it unnecessary."15 
Much like Nietzsche, Stevens gives everything to the artistic intelligence and 
imagination. 
Stevens also offers an American version of Nietzsche's superman—a fiction that 
Stevens calls major man, the fiction of a vast giant on the horizon who is a composite of 
the finest human traits, a giant of reason and imagination who has lived and grown 
through all stages of Western civilization and who holds in memory the major cultural 
accruements. This giant differs from Nietzsche's superman in being more god-like, and 
at the same time more normative in that he develops out of normal human needs and 
interests. Stevens's major man thinks and imagines in a zone beyond human error; 
consequently he is the voice to which mankind should listen. He can speak the words 
which would satisfy in our time of spiritual crisis. He is described in Stevens's long 
poem "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction': ". . . He comes,/Compact in invincible foils, 
from reason/Lighted at midnight by the studious eye," and "He is and may be but oh! 
he is, he is." Major man understands that the major poets are creating the true sacred 
book, a work of pure poetry. 
Stevens also speaks of major man in his letters, claiming that this demigod "is 
without any of our weaknesses and cannot fail," and that to conceive of such a fiction 
properly, a fiction to compete with the idea of God, "the first necessity seems to be 
breadth "16 Stevens's construct moves toward the vastness of the unpresentable 
mathematical sublime, and in the energy and power of major man, toward the 
dynamical sublime. In his poem "Chocorua to Its Neighbor," Stevens has one New 
England mountain peak describe major man to a companion peak: "The feeling of him 
was the feel of day," he comes from the blue "of the brooding mind," "He was as tall as 
a tree in the middle of/The night. .. ." One of Stevens's essays, "The Noble Rider and 
the Sound of Words," develops the thesis that modern artists must create bold new 
imagery that offers a nobility equal to that of Plato, and this is noteworthy in that 
Longinus, Kant, and the general tradition of the sublime have made a strong connection 
between the sublime and the noble. It should be added that Stevens also displays a 
strong emphasis on ambiguity, paradox, and change. 
Some of the contours, then, of sublimicism in Stevens are suggested by these 
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details from his works: a new concept of paradise and divinity, a powerful assault upon 
orthodox Christendom, a sense of the body of major poetry as a a redeeming sacred 
book, and the fictional concept of major man. These are a few of the conspicuous 
items, though there are more. Stevens displayed a conscious awareness of the tradition 
of the sublime originating with Longinus. In Stevens's long poem "Esthetique Du Mal" 
(developing a new modern sense of evil attached to human nature and not to Satan), the 
poem opens with philosopher-poet in Naples reading the text of Longinus. Stevens 
assumes that his new ideas about evil (and art) belong to the humanistic ideational 
sublime as it replaces the obsolete religious sublime. Instead of a Satanic force, Stevens 
offers a universal human law which decrees that "fault/Falls out on everything," a law 
for "that evil in the self." Stevens also shows his strong interest in Nietzsche, 
describing Nietzsche—in his letters—as one whose "strong mind distorts the world," 
while the more important task is true understanding, not distortion. The poet comments, 
"The incessant job is to get into focus, not out of focus. Nietzsche is as perfect a means 
of getting out of focus as a little bit too much to drink."17 If Nietzsche encourages too 
much postmodern disturbance, Stevens seeks a modernist correction. 
These efforts to sketch some of the high points in the American literary sublime 
suggest issues that need fuller investigation in other studies. The influence of American 
writers on Rothko, Newman, and Still is very clear. Their interpreters and biographers, 
as we have seen, reveal that the first generation abstract expressionists were reading 
Eliot, Stevens, and Joyce, along with Nietzsche, Jung, and Sartre. They were 
discussing these writers at their meetings, and they were certainly aware of the works 
of Hemingway and Faulkner, as well as earlier American writers. The New York 
climate in which they developed was a rich and complex blending of passions and 
excitements fed by strong currents in literature and philosophy. The general optimism 
and hope in Rothko, Newman, and Still may be reasonably connected to the general 
optimism of American literary traditions, and to the grand, bold, and often astonishing 
projects of writers such as Melville, Whitman, Faulkner, Crane, Eliot, and Stevens. 
This body of literature encouraged sublime programs in American painting. 
Turning now from the American literary sublime to the painterly traditions, one 
may indicate the high points much more easily. This issue has been well treated in the 
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recent study of American art by Robert Hughes, American Visions. Hughes first uses 
the concept of the sublime in discussing the passions, pains, and Rubenesque swirling 
energies in Benjamin West's religious painting Death on the Pale Horse (1796). 
Hughes declares, "With liberal quotations from Rubens, West turned this into a 
phantasmagoria that joins the wildest scenes of English Romanticism, from Henry 
Fuseli to 'Mad' John Martin; it is kitsch, but sublime kitsch." Just as West may be seen 
as the father of American painting, he may also be seen as introducing romantic 
sublimicism into American art, including a Gothic aura, in that Hughes notes the 
Irrational and demonic" traits in West.18 
Linking John Singleton Copley's art to the American realist tradition (in which 
we would not expect sublime subjects), Hughes is nonetheless willing to say that 
Copley took his distinctive linear realism "and made it grand--not through rhetoric, as in 
the 'Grand Manner,' but in the candor of its empirical curiosity."19 There are 
conditions under which an apparently mundane item can provoke a quiet wonder and 
achieve a genuine grandeur, as in Vermeer and Wyeth. 
During the age of Jefferson, there is no sublimicist program in American 
painting. Hughes notes that the dominant concept in the arts was that all art should 
serve and promulgate personal and civic virtue, as a religious duty. This heritage from 
the early years of the new republic created a foundation for the interest in morality 
typical of Americans and displayed by the abstract expressionists. Hughes treats this 
period under the chapter heading "The Republic of Virtue." His next chapter, "The 
Wilderness and the West," examines some strong instances of sublimicist intent. 
Hughes writes: "Without history painting or new great men, where was a national 
image to be found? Only the landscape itself, unique, vast, marvelous, the container of 
all possibility." The westward surging pioneers and settlers encountered landscapes of 
unimagined grandeur."20 The feel of this is what Hart Crane tried to invoke in j 
Arida treating the highways, canals, the Mississippi, and the vast female body of the 
continent. Hughes rightly connects this strong American sense of wilderness landscape 
and national identity to the European romanticism of Wordsworth, Schelling, Turner 
and others, observing that when Americans celebrated wild nature as a product of the 
Creator, "this compensated them for the lack of other signs of the romantic sublime: old 
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castles, crumbling Gothic chapels, the ruins of Roman aqueduct and Greek tempie:21 
Hughes observes that when the American painters began to treat sublime nature as a gift 
from God, they also, for the first time, began to acquire a priest-like sense of the artist 
as seer and visionary.22 This aspect of the romantic sublime—the artist as high priest of 
the imagination—comes strongly into modernism through figures such as Mondrian, Le 
Corbusier, Yeats, Joyce, Hart Crane, and Wallace Stevens, and it stands behind the 
belief of Rothko, Newman, and Still that the artist might change the world. The concept 
of artist as priest and divine creator has played a major role in shifting toward modern 
secularized models for spirituality and sublimicism. 
It is easy for Hughes to develop the thesis of the wilderness as sublime subject 
for the next group of American painters: Thomas Cole's visit to the famous Catskill 
Mountains Mountain House with its waterfall vista that "promoted feelings of sublimity 
and awe," followed by such Cole paintings as Falls of the KaatersItill (1826), with its 
dark storm and radiant sky, rugged stone cliffs, dark lake, powerful white waterfall, 
and storm-ravaged trees, and the vast sky, storm, river, and mountain work View film 
Mount Holyoke (1836).23 Hughes also points to Frederick Church's mathematical and 
dynamical sublime long horizontal view of Niagara Falls (1857) and its "power, the 
relentless kinetic energy"; his wild mountain, lake, and flaming sky panorama Twilight 
intheEildemess (1860); his orange Turneresque mountain, sun, mist, lake, and sky 
view of Cotopaxi (1862); and his glorious rainbow arching over rugged peaks in Rainy  
Belson in the Tropics (1866).24  
In his treatment of the remarkably serene luminist ocean and ship paintings of 
Fitz Hugh Lane (such as Boston Harbor. 1855-58), Hughes observes that the glorious 
design of the tall boats activated a sublime feeling, and as evidence Hughes gives a 
remark from Horatio Greenough that the marvelously crafted tall ships might inspire 
American architects to compete with the Parthenon. Also, describing Martin Johnson 
Heade's Approaching Thunder Storm (1109), Hughes (being well aware of 
Rosenbium's study of the Northern romantic sublime) notes that the calm isolated man 
gazing out over the vast ocean and sky creates "images in American art closest to those 
of European Romantics like Caspar David Friedrich," in whose works "Horizontality 
equals sublimity." Commenting on the serene and rather minimalist marine landscapes 
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of John Frederick Kensett—such as his masterpiece Eaton's Neck. Long Island (1872)--
Hughes points both to Kensett's stress on ideational aura and his "discovery of 
abstraction" as a virtue. However there is no evidence that Kensett was an influence on 
the abstract expressionists.25  
Some sublime effects may be located in the general tendency of Americans to 
tap into the grand biblical narratives, for instance treating Americans as new Adams and 
Eves in a new paradise. To this well-known pattern, Hughes adds that paintings of 
figures like Daniel Boone leading settlers through the mountains were obvious allusions 
to Moses.26 The grand Christian narrative has been a major force in the American 
sublime. 
A strong sublimicism is apparent in the western landscapes of Albert Bierstadt, 
whose paintings of sweeping vistas with rugged peaks and radiant skies are 
characterized by Hughes as "sublime histrionics."27 Joined with Bierstadt was Thomas 
Moran, who spent a year in England carefully studying Turner, then visited the 
Yellowstone Canyon, and produced the huge eight feet by fourteen feet The Grand 
Canyon of the Yellowstone (bought immediately by the American government) which, 
writes Hughes, "rivaled Church and outdid Bierstadt in offering the panoramic thrill 
that no watercolor can give."28  
While Hughes does not connect Whistler to American sublimicism, it is worth 
considering that Whistler's discovery of color as abstract value was a preparation for 
the sublime of color in Rothko, Newman, and Still. Hughes does note that Childe 
Hassam, America's chief impressionist, reached a powerful visionary sense of almost 
religious elevation in the grand flag motifs of his Celebration Day. 1918, a work which 
"has moved into the world of Post-Impressionism."29  
Of considerable importance to the tradition of the American sublime was the 
complex stunning design of the world's longest suspension bridge, Brooklyn Bridge. 
Its designers, John Roebling and his son, claimed to be divinely inspired. It was from 
the start a sublime project, to create the most beautiful bridge in the world. We have 
seen how Hart Crane utilized it as his controlling symbol for a gathering of national 
mythology. Hughes observes that one can hardly exaggerate the "awe and pride" this 
masterpiece evoked as "a powerful metaphor for unity and linkage" and for 
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"transcendental purpose."30  
Since the next wave of American painters (Thomas Eakins, Winslow Homer, 
George Bellows) were devoted to realism, we would not expect to see conspicuous 
sublime subjects, though there are Burkean touches in some of Homer's depictions of 
the danger and terror of the ocean. However when Hughes treats early modernism in 
America, he points to John Marin as trying to convey "the raw anarchic energy of 
Manhattan," Marin's Brooklyn Bridge (1910) being called "a Gothic nave gone wild in 
the sky." Hughes finds a vortex violence of light and color plus an American futurism 
in Joseph Stella's Battle of lights. Coney Island. Mardi Gras (1913-14), and gives 
Stella's own statement that his strongly machine-like portrait of Brooklyn Bridge aimed 
for a "sense of awe, of terror" for this American "shrine" painted as an 
"APOTHEOSIS."31  
Rothko, Newman, and Still were affected by and drew inspiration from these 
American painters and American writers, who, deeply stained by the optimism of the 
American experience, adopted ideational and aesthetic projects of conspicuous 
grandeur, spirituality, and transcendence. Even when they were not consciously aware 
of the philosophic theories of sublime experience, they were working in sublimicist 
modes. And perhaps a suitable place to end this chapter would be a look at New York 
City itself. Around Brooklyn Bridge were the skyscrapers, new icons of bold vision. 
The city throbbed with the powerful energies of steam and electricity, along with new 
sexual energies of jazz and blues. At night the city lights were inspirational. The 
Armory Show had made its explosion. Gifted immigrants from Europe, such as 
Mondrian and Duchamp, had come to New York and were major factors in generating 
that remarkable climate of intellectual and emotional intensity. New York City, being 
vast, complex, and grand, was itself a good candidate for a mathematical sublime, and 
so were its swirling industrial, ideational, and aesthetic forces and energies a candidate 
for the dynamical sublime. This urban dynamo, added to the literary and painterly 
American sublimicism, encouraged the abstract expressionists consciously and 
unconsciously to choose sublime subjects and seek a grand style and a grand scale. 
In summary, we may say that Rothko, Newman, and Still were the heirs of a 
robust tradition of American sublimicism in literature and in generally realistic painting, 
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and their great discovery (influenced by Mondrian and other early abstractionists) was 
that the modern, alienated, and existential self still had a profound need for the sublime, 
and that sublime subjects and sublime ideas could be successfully treated in a fully 
abstract style, a style strong in power precisely because it was bold and new. They 
would have been encouraged toward radically new styles by Dickinson's extreme 
compression, Whitman's distinctive long lines, Crane's verbal richness, Eliot's 
astonishing new voice, Stevens's sophisticated difficulty, Hemingway's markedly 
simplified prose, and Faulkner's unique layered sentences. Of course stylistic 
innovation is a key element in modernism, but the abstract expressionists met it on 
another front in American literature. Also, from these literary sources they would have 
sensed the emergence of a national mythology growing from secularized artistic 
programs. Rothko, Newman, and Still met also an impressive set of what might be 
called grand, sublime art projects in Moby Dick, in Thoreau's year of isolation at 
Walden pond, in Whitman's panoramic coverage of the whole nation, in Crane's 
gathering of national mythology, in the epic cultural scope of IheWaggiand and in 
Faullcner's total fictional county. Furthermore, from Moby Dick forward these painters 
would see strong individualism, Burkean narratives of pain and terror, a strong 
romantic sublime, strong rejections of religious orthodoxies, and the distinctive 
intensity of the American moral impulse, plus something else so crucial for Rothko, 
Newman, and Still: the sense that a divine absolute colored all the individualism with 
the touch of a sublime mysterious One. This same aura marks the Western landscape 
sublimicist paintings we have treated, and from these painters Rothko, Newman, and 
Still would inherit this romantic sublime, including Turneresque effects that point 
toward their color-field experiments. Their projects were nourished by these American 
traditions, and, as the next chapter will address, their projects also grew out of the 
general European context of the modern and the postmodern. 
Chapter 8 - A Comment on Modernism and Postmodernism as Contexts 
While Rothko, Newman, and Still developed their programs in the matrix of 
modernism, a sustained effort to define modernism and, as part of the definition, to 
juxtapose it to postmodernism, is beyond the scope of this limited study. However, the 
attempt in the preceding chapter to describe a general context in American literature and 
painting for these first generation abstract expressionists may be profitably 
supplemented by a tentative brief consideration of European modernism as a further 
significant context. Modernism, however, is an extremely complex thing, and when 
one tries to fix it in clear categories, one is faced with various ambiguities and internal 
contradictions. The general position I will develop is that modernism cannot be neatly 
defined, and even when it is tentatively outlined, it is by no means certain that a clearly 
postmodern paradigm can be marked off. Still, a number of helpful generalizations can 
be made about modernism as the European context for abstract expressionism. 
Since Rothko, Newman, and Still created their mature styles before 1950, the 
European art movements which might have influenced them were impressionism, 
postimpressionism, symbolism, Fauvism, futurism, constructivism, neoplasticism, 
Dada, expressionism, cubism, and surrealism. A few brief comments on specific 
painters may indicate the range of influences that can be reasonably connected to the 
abstract expressionists. In all of these movements there appeared the demand for 
experimental newness of style. With Monet and Renoir came not just a great excitement 
about color, but also, especially in the late works of Monet, the new sense of color 
field, something that lurked also in Turner and in Bonnard. Mark Rosenthal notes how, 
in Monet's late works, "the motif appears to be lost in a coloristic harmony and an 
abstract atmosphere."1 There was a similar portentous excitement about color in the 
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Fauves and Matisse, and also in Gauguin and Van Gogh. The Fauves deserve the credit 
for the liberation of color, which is an important element in the color sublime of 
Rothko, Newman, and Still. Cezanne's decision to present the visual world through 
cone, cylinder, and sphere became a watershed event, since just ahead of Cezanne's 
geometrizing was cubism, Mondrian, and abstract expressionism. In the works of 
Gauguin, the abstract expressionists were probably influenced by the neoprimitive 
motifs, and also by the symbolist aura of a mystical sacredness lurking behind the 
primitive scenes. Gauguin did not want a close imitation of nature, he wanted a 
dreaming, brooding treatment of it that moved toward abstraction, and he made various 
remarks about the advantage offered by increased abstraction. John Russell points to 
the remark of Maurice Dennis: "The idea of having to copy nature had been a ball and 
chain for our pictorial instincts. Gauguin set us free," and Russell also offers 
Gauguin' s comment that he wanted to give artists "the right to dare anything."2 Van 
Gogh also offered a sense of primitivist new beginnings. His basic vision centered on 
the capture of strong feelings, a program of expressionism. Yet he also, like Gauguin, 
tried to capture a sense of the sacred, and he distorted reality in a much more abstract 
style, giving a sense of color as a value in itself, plus a somewhat pantheistic sense of 
awe before the outer mystery of the cosmos. These values are especially strong in 
works such as The Starry Night. Russell offers Van Gogh's remark that "the painter of 
the future will be a colorist such as there has never been seen," and Russell interprets 
The Starry Night as giving cosmic "ideograms of convulsion."3 Probably a better 
judgment would be ideograms of creative energy, since the sleeping village beneath the 
violent swirls of color does not seem to be endangered. The abstract expressionists 
would have been encouraged by Van Gogh to treat strong passions through strong 
colors and increased abstraction. The German expressionists also pushed strong 
feelings to the fore, and unlike other movements, they chose to emphasize the darker 
feelings of terror, suffering, pain--the kind of Burkean dark cast that Rothko, Newman, 
and Still wanted to stress, the kind of deeper sense of terrors that Hart Crane, Wallace 
Stevens, and T. S. Eliot wanted to accentuate as a corrective to the too easy optimism of 
Emerson and Whitman. The importance of terror and pain in both German 
expressionism and abstract expressionism derived in part from a general cultural 
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awareness of corruption and depravity in social and nationalistic structures, a sense of 
European crisis and decay. The darker and disturbing sexual motifs in German 
expressionism, however, were not attractive to Rothko, Newman, and Still. From 
cubism came the obvious importance of planar geometry and bold experiment, but the 
cubists remained tied to the world of physical appearances. 
In the geometrizing and neoprimitive flavor in Picasso's famous Les 
Demoiselles d'Avignon, were impulses that the three Americans would have found 
congenial, but Picasso did not stay in one place long enough to exert the kind of 
influence coming from Mondrian. Matisse, however, was another matter. We have 
noted previously Rothko's comment that his whole program evolved from many 
ponderings of Matisse's Red Studio. Probably Rothko was responding to what many 
have felt: behind Matisse's recognizable forms, the flatness and the arbitrary use of 
color invoke a strong intuition of form as abstract value, plus a distinctive sense of 
color as an autonomous aesthetic field, plus a mysterious sense of the pleasure principle 
elevated to spiritual value. Also, Rothko was surely responding to the daringness of 
Matisse. It is not surprising that both Matisse and Rothko created sublimicist religious 
masterpieces, in the chapels at Vence and Houston. Newman's strong interest in clean 
aesthetic harmony may well have been influenced by Matisse, just as his distinctive 
interest in primary colors may be related to Mondrian. 
Full abstraction changed art forever in the works of Mondrian, Kandinsky, and 
Malevich. The geometrized and reduced forms of Mondrian were an especially strong 
influence on the American painters, and we have noted their comments which 
acknowledge the debt but also voice the criticism that Mondrian's severe, fixed grid had 
too much of an emotionally and spiritually cooling effect. They wanted forms more 
impassioned, as apparently Mondrian came to desire in his late boogie-woogie series, 
influenced by his love of jazz in New York. It seemed at times that Kandinsky and 
Malevich were seeking a pure art that took abstraction beyond subject matter. Rosenthal 
discusses their peculiar wavering back and forth, their contradictory statements.4 It 
seems to come down to this: they wanted to free art from all traditional, realistic, 
personal, and anecdotal subjects as they sought a kind of free, suprematist purity of 
form, yet they also thought that their art was not ornamental because this higher purity 
conveyed elevations toward higher spirituality for the coming ages. Kandinsky and 
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Malevich maintained a kind of religous mysticism, as did Mondrian, something they 
absorbed from the new Theosophy movement in Europe (which also influenced Hart 
Crane in his mysticism). This general drift to keep abstraction allied to some deeper 
spiritual subject obviously carried over into the experiments of Rothko, Newman, and 
Still. 
Mondrian was a stronger influence in part because he never wavered from a 
sense of subject in terms of truth and transcendence. He claimed that scientific laws of 
polarity as well as major human polarities (such as male/female) were suggested in his 
own ideograph symbol of the right angle, one leg vertical, one horizontal, and he 
always insisted that the abstracted and purified forms of his grid were prophesies of 
higher spiritual purity and also actions to purify religion of anecdotal and local 
superstitions. This is clear when (in London just before coming to America) Mondrian 
drafted a note entitled "A New Religion."5 Commenting on Mondrian, Kandinsky, and 
Malevich, Rosenthal states: "the abstract work of art occupies a real presence in the 
space of the viewer even as it conveys a realm beyond the world of experience," and 
"abstraction is ultimately intended as a form of emancipation from the world, and thus 
as a means of transcendence. The early abstractionists referred to myth in order to 
explain how such transcendence might occur."6 For them, as Rosenthal notes and as 
Mondrian emphasized, it was the myth of the artist as quasi-divine Creator. We have 
seen that this myth was important to Rothko, Newman, and Still, along with the 
Prometheus myth, the various questing hero myths, all of this colored by Nietzsche, 
Jung, and modernist myth theory in general. 
Dada was too irrational and too anti-art to be attractive to the American 
abstractionists, and the same is true of futurism, yet Rothko did testify to a sense of 
irony and play probably related to Dada and Duchamp, and the futurists were seeking 
an anarchistic something, even if it was a nothing, which would lift them above the 
general European social corruptions. Their sense of speed and technology was 
absorbed by Hart Crane, and the machine age-technology forms in purism and 
constructivism indicate a line of progression from abstract machine forms to fully 
abstract art forms. 
Duchamp might have exerted a larger influence on Rothko, Newman, and Still, 
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in the light of his emphasis on ideational and even mystical content (as in The Large 
(Hass) and in the light of his strong abstraction. Duchamp's impressive panel Tu M'  
(1918) was almost fully abstract and geometrized (there are some recognizable objects 
like bicycle wheel, hand, and bottle opener). But Duchamp did not pursue this line. The 
complicatedness of his late works did not accord with the reducing and simplifying of 
Rothko, Newman, and Still, and probably they found his comic and ironic flavor not in 
tune with their serious sublimicism. Duchamp did declare that Dada was an interesting 
temporary phase that he quickly moved beyond. We have seen in earlier chapters that 
the three Americans (as especially theorized by Motherwell) felt the force of surrealism, 
but could not accept the emphasis on the irrational or the dream/fantasy world. They 
were, however, influenced by the surrealist search for psychologically profound 
subjects. 
Like Duchamp, Jean Arp developed out of Dada toward richer spiritual 
concerns, creating impressive fully abstract works with clean geometrical shapes, and 
Rosenthal observes that "Purity, the sublime, and an 'incommunicable absolute' were 
Arp's obsessions."7 These anticipations of the sublime subjects of the American 
abstract expressionists would have been reinforced from other directions, for instance 
the search for a new modernist spiritualism in the Jewish mysticism of Franz Marc, the 
search for spiritually elevating purified machine forms in Leger, and the search for 
transcendent spiritual zones in the color-rich abstractions of Kupka. Though Leger 
stays close to fact, he claimed that he helped to liberate color, and considered 
abstraction a "dangerous game" that "must be played."8 While Miro' s biomorphism and 
surrealist fantasy offer a contrast to the programs of Rothko, Newman, and Still, Miro 
did have two fully abstract phases, and Rosenthal believes he "tried to sieze 
abstraction's territory."9 Delauney's richly colored abstractions had a wide impact, but 
he focused (like Bonnard) on light itself rather than symbolized higher meanings. Klee 
also offers a contrast to abstract expressionism due to his biomorphism and his search 
for laws of nature and laws of composition, yet at times Klee draws startlingly close to 
Rothko and Newman, for instance in his powerful fully abstract Fire in the Evening 
(1929), which features rich colors. Dubuffet's unique program suggests a different 
kind of contrast, since his eccentric, famous "weird logic" for each work establishes an 
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eccentricity not compatible with the sublimicist universalism of the abstract 
expressionists. He is of course compatible as a modernist launching bold innovations in 
an avant-garde manner. Bacon is also an interesting contrast with his disturbing realism 
of terror and anguish; however he too felt the tremendous force of modernist 
abstraction, as revealed in his often-repeated comment that he will utilize "very much as 
in abstract painting involuntary marks on the canvas," making of these a "trap with 
which one would be able to catch the fact at its most living point" 10 
An effort was made by Clive Bell, Roger Fry, and Clement Greenberg to define 
modernism in terms of formalism and flatness, both of which are crucial in abstract 
expressionism, yet the formalist model is clearly inadequate because so many modern 
movements emphasized ideational content along with formalist values." Formalism 
had a strong influence in the first half of the twentieth century, but so did Marxism, and 
while the abstract expressionists did not espouse Marxist revolution, their programs 
were affected by the Marxist emphasis on dialectical forces, Utopian vision, and a 
sophisticated theory of human alienations from nature, work, self, and society. 
Marxism colored modernism. And modernist architecture was extremely important also, 
the Le Corbusier cleanness of line and plane, the goal of civic spiritual elevation, the 
reductionist rejection of ornament, the governance of form by function, and the 
tendency of Le Corbusier and Mies van der Rohe to project a Mondrian grid onto 
buildings--these tendencies also reflected in the simplified forms of Rothko and 
Newman. 
This brief and limited comment on many of the major European predecessors 
and contemporaries of Rothko, Newman, and Still demonstrates the importance of the 
idea of the net of culture. The three Americans are understood better when we see the 
complex interweavings that give them ideational and stylistic roofings through 
analogies, and that also clarify by contrast. The very complexity of these many 
connections suggests that modernism itself will not be easy to capture in clear 
definitions. 
Other general conspicuous features that one could attach to modernism (as 
opposed to postmodern assumptions) would be these: a traditional Western search for 
universal truths, new foundations, preferred theories, and hegemonic triumphs; a 
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general optimism about the truth-telling powers of language and art; a general interest in 
hierarchies and higher transcendental entities; a general search for resolutions and 
authentic but radically new closures. These tendencies are reflected not just in the artists 
but in thinkers and literati such as Freud, Marx, Sartre, Husserl, Whitehead, Russell, 
Yeats, Joyce, Faulkner, Eliot, Crane, and Stevens. Most often but not always, the 
radical components in both ideas and styles were slanted optimistically toward a new 
universalist international foundationalism—though these grand tendencies were opposed 
by counter impulses such as Dada and futurism. As is usually the case, well-educated 
and well-read artists like Rothko, Newman, and Still were absorbing many things from 
many directions, and the whole European stream of modernist experiments deeply 
permeated their aesthetic consciousness, even as they sought a raw, new, powerful 
style and new subject matter. Their crucial decisions for the abstract ideograph symbol 
and for transcendent spiritual subjects were made with an American sense of bold 
freedom and American history, yet there were also major absorptions from European 
modernism. 
One might think that a reasonably clear grasp of postmodernism could emerge 
by listing a key set of postmodern emphases which negate the modernist paradigm. And 
indeed, this probably is the most fruitful modus operandi. But the task will be 
complicated because modernist figures reveal some postmodernist turns, and 
postmodern figures have some modernist impulses. Thomas Docherty isolates what he 
considers to be seven key elements in postmodernism: a rejection of rootedness, an 
aesthetic of disappearance in the loss of a distinction between appearance and reality, an 
openly acknowledged historicity and temporality, a new sense of heterogeneity and 
alterity, eclecticism, pluralism, and "the tendency to sublimity or ek-stasis in the work's 
attack on conventional representability.”12 
 Apparently Docherty comes close to 
construing the postmodern sublime as the impassioned counter-sublime. He makes 
sublimicism crucial to postmodernism: "It is the major contention of the present book 
that this sublime [of Lyotard] is only attained by the releasing of the historicity of 
thinking, by what might be called an unpunctual working which will eventuate not in a 
thought but in thinking."13  
By working through a number of works on postmodernism, one may add (with 
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some overlapping) the following longer supplementary listing to Docherty's seven 
items: the deconstruction movement that sees human reality as linguistically constructed 
by seriously imprecise and unstable language forms; political voices of various attacks 
upon Western hegemonic traditions to produce a new non-hierarchical pluralism and 
multivocalism; neo-Marxist strategies to move beyond the discredited Russian 
socialism; eclecticism in artistic styles; a rejection of spiritual and transcendental 
categories and a rejection of preferred theories; a new scepticism about what art and 
philosophy are and whey they should do; an end-of-the-century decadence; a 
connecting of art not to aesthetics or philosophy but to society; a hostility to museum 
and gallery commercialization and a search for art forms that cannot be marketed; a new 
elevation of the art of the masses; a breaking down of the distinction between life and 
art; a rejection of centeredness, closure, and narrative coherence; an assertion of a new 
identity politics; the replacement of the goal of public knowledge by interpretation and 
critique (questions not answers); the shunning of all homogeneity; a new sense of 
history focused not on logical evolutions but on unprepared-for eventual becomings 
which may or may not be concretized; any strategy that opposes modernism; creating a 
warrant for transgression and unpoliced thought; a critique of social codes that produce 
control and oppression; the condition of the death of the stable autonomous self; the 
search for an ethic of alterity; a sense not of isolated identity but of being constituted 
socially through the Other; the shift from an attraction by reality to a seduction by 
unreality; the rejection of the concept of a morally responsible self; a new mode of 
philosophy not as truth-seeking but as playing at the interfaces of ideology; a stress on 
process not product; the thrusting of the verbal into the visual; the construal of meaning 
as provisional, local, temporary; history dominated by asking whose history; the 
Jameson theory of postmodernism as a period phase of late multinational, consumer 
capitalism in which a feeble pastiche replaces the strength of parody to reflect 
disorientation, loss of a sense of history, and entry into a kind of perpetual presentness; 
a rejection of depth and an embrace of a non-relational additive surface; a vast new area 
for publishing academic papers about lack of knowledge, plus a way for elitist 
academicians to maintain their authority over extremely difficult subjects; a political 
guerrilla action; a decentered form centered in some environment; a shift from an all-
knowing author to an ironic playful author; a displacement of the referential by the 
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rhetorical; a new dominance by irrealism and fabulism; a rejection of the authority of 
science and an assertion of the value of magic; and the struggle of art against  itself.  l4 
Lyotard stands in a somewhat unique position, with his doctrine that modernism 
is ongoing, and the postmodern is the moment of innovative rupture which initiates 
each of the radical modernist visions. Lyotard writes: "Postmodernism thus understood 
is not modernism at its end but the nascent state, and this state is constant."15 
Thus obviously, so far, there are contradictory views of what postmodernism 
is: a historical period serving capitalism, a series of attacks on modernism, a new 
movement toward dislocation in a mutated sensorium, the originating radical moment in 
a modernist enterprise, a new style of pastiche, a philosophic rejection of knowing in 
favor of questioning. This last item seems dubious in that most of the voices of 
postmodernism seem to "know everything" about current life, thought, and art, and to 
"know" it in universalist categories. 
Some conceptual difficulties were obvious in what is perhaps the first major 
theoretic description of postmodernism, Jencks's Pounodousm, in which the author 
notes that genuine modernism is still a strong force and should continue; that "a 
commitment to both Classicism and Modernism is required to effect a credible 
synthesis"; and that while Ihab Hassan has produced a very radical model of 
postmodernism marked by anarchy, exhaustion, silence, and schizophrenia, John Barth 
has called this view a desperate decadence, and suggested a much less radical model in 
which the postmodern continues modernism but gives it more democratic contents.16 
The architecture photographs in Jencks's book cause one to ask if postmodern 
architecture is not after all about eighty percent clean modernist geometricity with lesser 
touches of humor, incongruity, classicism, and Egyptian temple. Is Frank Gehry's new 
Guggenheim in Bilboa, Spain dominated by disturbing imbalance or by sleek, elegant, 
elevating idealistic modernist geometrism? Is the new postmodern wing on the Tate an 
effort to achieve some postmodernist playfulness and yet capture a harmonious 
modernist elegance and beauty? Can Lyotard be postmodern when he condemns 
postmodern architects? 
And there are difficulties from other directions. Dana Polan points to Mike 
Davis's claim in the New Left Review that even if there is a postmodernist sensibility, it 
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is confined to various pockets of culture, and is not a dominating force.17 Also, there 
are several questions that should be faced. Is postmodernism actually being advocated 
as a new totalizing narrative? Is an ethic of alterity offered as a new favored theory? 
Will attacks on history be framed by history? Will scientists and philosophers actually 
give up the ideal of truth and universality? Is it even remotely possible for youth not to 
be oriented toward the real world but toward electronic fantasy? When Jencks ends his 
book by listing seven rules for postmodern builders, why is this not an effort at a new 
international style?18 And is it socially and psychologically desirable to give viewers a 
dominant sense of dislocation, nausea, contradiction, and parody, a feeling of not being 
at home in the world? In short, we have not yet seen enough recognition of conflicting 
concepts of postmodernism, and enough recognition of where it is vulnerable to 
critique. 
A reasonable way to end this brief comment on modernism and postmodernism 
in a manner relevant to a study of the sublime is to consider the postulated strong 
postmodernism of Slavoj Zizek in his book The Sublime Object of Ideology. There will 
be some oversimplification in this effort to simplify Zin.k. His crucial concept derives 
from Lacan's psychology: that in life, art, society, and thought the individual posits 
himself in some social symbolic field as being in a doubled relationship of desire with 
some Big Symbolic Sublime Other. He needs to bind himself to the Outer Mystery and 
the Outer mystery needs his contribution. Both are incomplete until completed by the 
other. This double ontology leads to Zizek's key operational principle of doubling, of a 
"double reflection," in which each of the polar opposites (self and Other) floats in a 
peculiar criss-cross relationship. This foundational criss-cross, Zizek argues, must be 
seen as one negativity touching another negativity, because the dominant fact is the Lick 
in the two parties, and a foundational lack is a void, a nothingness. As an example, man 
and woman essentially are a nothingness because each desires and needs the other, thus 
incompletion, the lack, is the dominant item. Sublimicism of a Kantian/Hegelian sort is 
a golden key for Zizek (as it is for Lyotard and Crowther) because of the Kantian theory 
that a negativity, a failure, impels the ascent to the sublime. For Zizek (in agreement 
with Nietzsche and Lyotard) the whole Big Real of the culture complex is the terrain of 
the outer mystery of the sublime. For Lacan and Zizek, there is an unmasking 
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"redoubling" moment when a psychotic patient or a wise philosopher sees the light: that 
both the knowing subject and the Big Other are fantasy constructions, a nothing not a 
something. The enlightened party (even if reduced to a negative) at least senses a new 
open space when he "accepts the Real in its utter meaningless idiocy,"19 and while 
Zizek does not say so, presumably it is a space for some more wholesome kind of new 
ideology or fantasy bondings of self to other. In Zizek's view, Christianity illustrates 
this pattern better than Greek and Jewish religion because "in Christianity, human 
freedom is finally conceived as a 'reflexive determination' of this strange substance 
(God) itser20 Christianity supports the root idea of an ontological criss-cross 
between man and God. 
Zizek finds in Marx and Freud the source of the idea of unmasking fantasy 
constructs. But Freud's commodity theory was flawed because he was unaware of the 
major presence of sublime objects, unaware for instance that the mysterious, spiritual, 
eternal value placed in gold (an immaterial postulated as-if with strong cultural causative 
force) offers "a precise definition of the sublime object," and "this postulated existence 
of the sublime body depends on the symbolic order" and "is always sustained by the 
guarantee of some symbolic authority."21 Thus for Zizek (as for Nietzsche and 
Lyotard) the vast culture field, including political ideologies, philosophy, and 
religionsis the postulated mysterious Big Other, the sublime object to which some 
subject is related through need and desire. Zizek comments that philosophy tries to be 
blind to its unstable foundation (negative meets negative) because "it cannot take it into 
consideration without dissolving itself, without losing its consistency;,22 
A basic term for Lacan and Zizek is "symptom" (partly derived from Marx), 
which is a formulation of relatedness whose consistency depends upon subjects not 
being aware of the hidden contradiction. The fundamental element in any ideology is a 
symbolic "social reality whose very existence implies the non-knowledge of its 
participants as to its essence."23 Zizek argues that even when citizens see through some 
ideological posture and still choose to pretend that the system works, there is something 
deeper than their cynicism that prevents us from being in a post-ideological world. The 
deeper thing is the persistence of the deep unconscious fantasy-form that is the root of 
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all ideologies.24 This is somewhat like Lyotard: the possibility of sublimicism is 
permanent even in a time of scepticism. For Lyotard all serious thinking is an ascent to 
the genuine sublime, while for Zizek all serious symbolic structures create a fantasy 
sublime. 
When a Lacanian patient is led to see through the fantasy criss-cross that has 
caused a neurosis, one might think the result would be total despair, but instead, in the 
Lacan-Zizek model, there will always be fragmented pieces of jouissance, possibilities 
of desire and pleasure, because the enjoyment mechanism is so deep in the unconscious 
that it cannot be dissolved. This enduring pleasure kernel, a sort of buried jouissance, is 
given, by Lacan, the name of "sinthome," so that symptom and sinthome go 
together.25 Such a primitive mechanism, we may recall, was envisaged by Weiskel as 
some deepest pleasure mechanism that would originate movements upward toward the 
sublime. Since fantasy will always resume itself, the fantasy space (a void) is seen as 
an a priori framing potential. Lacan calls it "the frame through which we experience the 
world as consistent and meaningful—the a priori space within which the particular 
effects of signification take place."26 Zizek declares that "Fantasy is basically a scenario 
filling out the empty space of fundamental impossibility, a screen masking a void."27  
Zizek endorses Lacan's later sense of the Real—seeing it as an immaterial (sublime) 
unreal that has a real symbolic presence, a real social force, something that rests on a 
void yet still "exercises a certain structural causality..28 
Lacan theorizes that sublimity is conferred on any ordinary object when that 
object is elevated and baptized to a major place in the symbolic net, conferred by "the 
fact that it occupies the sacred-forbidden place of jouissance."29 Zizek likes Hegel's 
sublimicism not only because of the negativity in the dialectic but also because Hegel 
corrects Kant by bringing the sublime down into the phenomenal world, rather than 
postulating a transcendent world.30 However, Kant's world of a priori mental 
categories is like and unlike Zizek's world of a priori non-material fantasies. Zizek's 
sublime of fantasy is close in form and content to Nietzsche's sublime of art fictions. 
Certainly Nietzsche would recognize a desire and iouissance basis for the willing of 
sublime symbolic fictions of order. Zizek does not use Nietzsche's sense of the will to 
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power, though it could be accommodated. Also Zizek does not speak of a class of 
necessary fantasies, such as Nietzsche offers, and such as Jung attempts in his theory 
of archetypes, but this direction could also be accommodated. 
In rounding out his paradigm, Zizek tries to use his negativity principle to 
mount a critique of essentialism and the notion of "truth." He favors Saul Kripke's 
antidescriptivism which denies that essences rest on objective traits, and claims that, on 
the contrary, the name for an essence functions as an arbitrary socio-symbolic sign. It is 
as if, out of a negative void, the act of naming confers the essence, which is then 
subject to cultural change when different meanings become attached to a given name. 
For instance "chair" might mean a device for seating people, but in a different context 
might mean a symbol for a hated industrialism. In the Kripke model, as Zizek explains 
it, a name that indicates an essence is a sort of cultural, arbitrary "primal baptism," not a 
term for some objective reality.31 For Zizek the elevation of some mundane item to a 
sublime aura is an arbitrary act of baptism. 
In his theory of truth, it is predictable that Zizek would offer a scheme in which 
truth and error support each other in an ontological criss-cross, that "true" and "false" 
meet in a dialectic of give and take, that truth depends upon error, and that we should 
see error "as an internal condition of truth."32 
The final issue (in relation to my comments on the modern and postmodern) is 
this: should we locate Zizek as modernist or postmodemist? It is not an easy matter. 
Obviously the stress on fantasy worlds as opposed to truth worlds seems postmodern, 
along with the critique of essentialism, and along with the post-Marxist tonality of 
deconstructing all political ideologies, and along with the new use of the void as a 
foundational category. However, it is also clear that--deriving from Kant, Hegel, 
Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, and Lacan—Zizek offers a confident new modernist preferred 
theory that is historically grounded. Presumably he would admit to using a 
metalanguage, in that he agrees with Lacan in seeing that poststructuralists are actually 
using their own metalanguage: "a clearly defined theoretic position which can be 
articulated without difficulty in a pure and simple metalanguage."33 Certainly Zizek is 
postmodern in generating a new sense of instability in self and Other, and yet he does 
say that there is a true foundation in the constant unchanging impulse toward jouissance 
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and fantasy. This may not be much of a foundation, but it is something. In my opinion, 
there is another modernist element. If we say that a person can be led to see that his 
symptoms are fantasies which he presupposes to be real, why is not the act of 
presupposing a validation of a genuine subject? And if jouissance itself can never be 
deconstructed because it is so deep, why is not jouissance a site for the validation of a 
genuine subject? And is it not strongly modernist for Zizek to reject the idea of any 
post-ideological condition and to operate with philosophic confidence? 
These points are intended to support my general contention about the difficulty 
of efforts to mark off the abstract expressionists and other artists and thinkers as being 
modern or postmodern. The categories are not yet clear enough to yield confident 
decisions. I have made an argument that the positive modernist sublimicism in Rothko, 
Newman, and Still should be taken as the dominant element in their art programs; yet I 
would not deny that Rothko's sense of uncertainty, doom, and terror is a postmodern 
motif, or that Newman's sense of a radical break with the past is postmodern, as is 
Still's central theme of the threat to the subject by the forces of social control, which 
moves Still towards a postmodern anarchism (and we might recall Newman's 
appreciation of Kropotkin's anarchism). Some recent support for my premise that 
modern and postmodern seem to bleed together comes in one of the very latest 
treatments of modernism, in which Kirk Varnedoe defines the modern as if it has been 
all along the postmodern. He calls modernism our current system, "a system that is in 
crucial senses unfixed, inefficient, and unpredictable--a cultural system whose work is 
done by the play within, in all senses of the word, in a game where the rules themselves 
are what is constantly up for grabs." For Varnedoe the core of modernism is the free, 
uncaused, spontaneous acts of artists, "those first ruptures of convention."34 In my 
view this is too Dada and too postmodern to be a good definition of modernism, but 
Varnedoe, like Lyotard, is not willing to separate the movements, and argues for an on-
going modernism as the main stream. My own inclination at the moment is to favor 
Lyotard's view that postmodern vectors are the radical initiating vectors of the 
modernist search for new foundations. Lyotard's firm theory of the sublime can be seen 
as a kind of foundational structure, and he presents it as if it is true. If Lyotard is right, 
we would assume that European modernism and postmodernist impulses both 
constitute the European context inherited by Rothko, Newman, and Still, and both are 
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reflected in their art; and Lyotard would find, as I have found, and as Crowther has 
argued, that what we might call the negative postmodern features can and should be 
assimilated into some generally positive conception of aesthetics, society, and preferred 
theory, although we do not yet see clearly how to do this. The effort to do this would 
be modernist, even if it involves some thinking at the edge of thought, a task well-
suited for the sublime. Derrida has been viewed as postmodern, yet in one of his most 
recent remarks, he supports the modernist impulse toward hegemony. He conceives 
each new movement as a "jetty" pushing outward its key claims, and "each jetty has a 
hegemonic aim" as it seeks to incorporate other jetties "in order to be incorporated into 
them." Derrida adds the modernist thesis that it is foolish to try to abrogate the historical 
net of Western culture because any new jetty must be "aziori historkist.35 It remains 
to be seen whether the new century will move toward greater stability or greater 
instability. In any case, it seems to me that we should locate Rothko, Newman, and 
Still about ninety percent in the camp of what is generally considered modernist, and 
about ten percent in territory often considered postmodern, and the very fact that such a 
paradoxical ranking is called for suggests that we cannot, at the moment, sharply 
differentiate these two movements. 
Conclusion 
This study has developed from a particular situation: numerous scholars were 
connecting Rothko, Newman, and Still to the sublime but not giving detailed reading 
Rothko, Newman, and Still had studied classical texts on the sublime, but their 
paintings were not being connected carefully to these texts; and recent years have 
witnessed a resurgence of sublimicist theory in relation to current modernist and 
postmodern points of view. Four of these recent theorists—Weiskel, Crowther, 
Lyotard, and Ferguson--were brought to the fore to complement classical perspectives 
in Longinus, Burke, Kant, and Nietzsche. Attention was also given to Sartre and Jung 
as major influences on the general ethos behind abstract expressionism, and as thinkers 
whose doctrines of transcendence carried indirect sublimicist values. The published 
statements of the three painters were scrutinized as revelations of sublimicist aims, and 
specific paintings were analyzed in terms of an iconography of the sublime. Also, an 
attempt was made to locate Rothko, Newman, and Still in the context of an American 
literary and painterly tradition of the sublime, followed by an attempt to suggest the 
larger European context created by the conflict and the interlacing between modernism 
and postmodernism. 
The interpretations offered have postulated the reality of various kinds of 
transcendence from a lower ground to a higher ground, each capable of constituting a 
threshold crossing, an exalted rite of passage into a region sufficiently complex and 
difficult, sufficiently spiritual and universal, to warrant its location in the sublime. Just 
as there are varieties of moral systems and political systems, there are various modes in 
which sublime experience has been manifested, and the ones singled out for emphasis 
in this study have been the ideational (launched by Longinus and Kant), the moral, the 
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Burkean-Gothic, the religious, the Nietzschean, the romantic, the existential, the 
Jungian-mythic, the noble, and the light/color sublime, these being positive modes. 
Negative modes (though not always negative) would be the comic, ironic, counter, 
mock, and the merely rhetorical. Rothko, Newman, and Still (placed most firmly in the 
ideational sublime) operate predominantly in positive modes, though we have seen 
elements of the ironic and the counter. There is considerable over-lapping in the modes, 
and as the layers accumulate, adding metaphysical and ethical dimensions, the resulting 
complexity and difficulty (as Burke and Crowther have suggested) increase the sublime 
potential, making the sublime much richer than the more fully sensate harmony of the 
beautiful. 
The sublime has been defined as a leap of transcendence, a kind of overwhelming 
and awesome jolt—either passional or calmly meditated--in which a threshold is 
approached and crossed, relating the self more or less mystically to a significant Other, 
sometimes in purely human and secular terms, sometimes in religious. In the sublime, 
as a rule, the aesthetic structures will be reciprocally blended with ideational content 
through some kind of ideographic symbol or analogy. Wherever there is some 
astonishing ascent from a lower to a higher region, some elevation joined to 
wonderment, there is a potentially sublime encounter. The case has been made that just 
such a spiritual and ideational ascent has been mediated for Rothko through the portal 
image offered in dark and rich color slabs with careful ratio and with mysterious inner 
light and blurred edges; for Newman through his clean edges, rich and dark colors, 
semanticizing vertical zips, horizon reachings, and human scale; for Still through his 
harsh colors, flickering spots, thin lines, rugged polarities, and ragged ascending 
flames. All through the study an effort has been made to clarify their essential positive 
beliefs as the key to their ideational sublime, including an awareness of things they 
were opposing and rejecting, and including recognition of darker and negative 
elements, and recognition that although there is a general tendency to connect 
modernism with positive items and postmodern with negative, this division cannot be 
sharply made because given artists and thinkers display both tendencies, and because 
there is, so far, no agreement on definitions of modern and postmodern. 
It seems appropriate in some last words to speculate on some of the special virtues 
of the concept of the sublime, and on its probable future as an instrument for creating 
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and understanding serious art, and enriching human life. Why has sublimicist thinking 
enjoyed a renaissance in modernist and postmodern theory? Because as a concept, the 
sublime has conspicuous power and usefulness. In a critical age, sublimicism is 
attractive because it allows access to far-ranging ideas, because it contains its own inner 
dialectic of impasse plus resolution, because it can embrace concepts that are themselves 
ambiguous, because it can mediate between surface and complex depth. Here precisely 
lies the special value of the sublime for art analysis. Art critics and art historians must 
be able to navigate a difficult and disputed zone between sign and meaning, a navigation 
not easy through the surface harmony of the beautiful, yet very possible through 
sublimicist categories, as these carry aesthetics toward philosophy. 
Because sublimicism can operate in terms of impasse, check, and contradiction, 
because it can embrace absence as well as presence, because the dynamical sublime has, 
from Longinus on, been applied to forces and movements in the social and political 
arena, and because the sublime is uniquely defined to accommodate regions of terror 
and destruction, the sublime has been attractive to those revolutionary currents in 
postmodern and deconstructionist thought which thrive on either political activism or 
metaphysical negation and scepticism, or both. The concept of the beautiful does not 
yield such complex resources. The sublime allows aesthetic theory, quite rightly, to 
exert force outward on the structures of society, philosophy, religion, and morality. 
The category of the beautiful can also do these things, but not with the range and power 
of the sublime. Also, because sublimicism, by definition, can reach toward absence, 
can subvert, can strive to express unpresentable new visions, artists of the future, when 
new movements and revolutions are in the air, will find new ways to articulate the 
sensibility of the sublime as a resource for avant-garde programs. 
The twentieth-century mind has often displayed an inclination to reduce thinking 
and value analysis to linguistic forms, to word games, giving language complete control 
of all possible human intuitions of meaning and purpose. People and societies--in this 
perspective--are malleable, unstable, governed by no universal constants in either 
psychology or philosophy. Self, truth, morals, and political forms are mere constructed 
fictions that can be made and unmade according to rules of differing and temporary 
language strategies. If we actually lived in such a floating world, the only possible 
sublime would be a merely rhetorical one. There might be some language of fire, 
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exaltation, and ascent, but there would be no genuine higher zone to reach. The position 
taken in this study has been a constant opposition to the concept of a merely rhetorical 
sublime. If there are no genuine higher zones, but only a linguistic field, then there are 
severe diminishments in the territory of the sublime. Probably the course of science, as 
well as opposition within the humanities, will work against this new kind of language 
scepticism. The sublime will probably have an important future as long as the main 
streams of Western culture are honored and preserved, as they will certainly be by any 
universities charged with the mission of transmitting the best of the art and thought of 
the past. And on psychological grounds, it seems clear that sublimicist art satisfies 
universal needs of consciousness. Sublimicism will also continue to serve another kind 
of need: living people can, by force of mind, draw closer to past ages than to a 
diminished present, and can also reach out to the future; the sublime is an avenue for 
such decisions, with its Utopian potential and its potential for thrusting past into 
present. 
There are some other noteworthy factors lying close to folk psychology. We are 
not likely to see a time when individuals do not feel the need for renewal and 
redemption of spirit, and this impulse will encourage the search for higher zones of 
reality. As Rothko said, there is on-going value to the image of the human figure with 
arms upraised toward something considered absolute. These impulses will continue to 
animate the religious sublime. From a global perspective, religion today is a very 
powerful force in world affairs, and according to polls, most scientists are theists. It is 
unfortunate that most of the major theologies now active are damaged by a substantial 
amount of superstition, as if, in religious terms, mankind is still close to a primitive 
mentality. Sublimicism can in the future exert pressure toward theological reforms, and 
if it does, another of its areas of potential strength will be manifest, just as, now, the 
sublime, as we have seen in Lyotard and others, exerts pressure for political reform 
through both impassioned attack and impassioned Utopian speculation. In view of the 
on-going global force of religion, theorists of the sublime might well give more 
attention to theorizing the religious sublime, and recognizing its high status among the 
sublimicist modes. 
The same holds true for the moral sublime, which is often a major element in the 
religious sublime. While many theorists (such as Longinus, Kant, Lyotard, and 
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Crowther) have treated the possibilities for close contact between the moral and the 
aesthetic, our age has not done well in producing persuasive systems of ethics, and this 
failure is part of the widespread condition of confusion, doubt, and uprootedness. As 
Kant understood, the nobility of the sublime can be reached in the ascent to universal 
moral law, and in the power of individuals to legislate morality. There seems to be now 
a growing sense of a universal obligation to protect the environment. Possibly these 
dimensions in Kant's sublimicism help to explain Lyotard's emphasis on spontaneous 
moral phrases which individuals can throw out. Indeed, since Lyotard assumes that 
some golden new phrases would capture the aura of general public validity, he 
apparently sees a Kantian role for sublimicism in legislating public morality. Of course 
Lyotard also emphasizes that multivocalism makes it difficult for a new consensus to 
develop. Yet, as we have seen, Derrida now finds the hegemonic imperative to be 
natural and good If even one moral law can be seen as universal (such as the keeping 
of contracts, the preserving of the family, or the protection of the environment and gene 
pool), then there is at least a chance that we will see, in the future, a return to some kind 
of natural-law thinking in human ethics, which might, in turn, bring about a stronger 
appreciation for the moral sublime. Most strong voices (from the left, center, and right) 
are relying heavily on moral judgments, but are not producing persuasive moral theory. 
It is interesting that sublimicism has been utilized by both conservative and liberal 
groups. Conservatives respond to its long tradition of idealism, nobility, and historical 
accumulations, while more radical groups respond to its rugged conflicts, its application 
to social forces, its negative modes of attack, and its Utopian potential Sublimicism, as 
Longinus emphasized, can emerge from strong passions, and in order to advance their 
programs, conservatives and radicals and centrists will all perceive the need for the 
passional sublime, even when it might be better to invoke more of the studied, calm, 
rational, and noble sublime. 
It might happen, of course, that sublimicism, like idealism in general, will, into the 
future, meet periods of decline, especially if current movements toward scepticism and 
atheism weaken the hope for transcendental encounters. Conversely, Nietzsche may be 
proved right in his assumptions that affirmations and joys will prevail over doubts and 
lamentations. Even if the positive modes of the sublime retain their favored status into 
the future, it is clear now that the more or less negative modes, such as the comic and 
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the mock, deserve a fuller investigation, especially since they can be put to positive 
uses. One new direction which may gain ground is the position of Nietzsche, Lyotard, 
and Zizek that the Sublime Other is the whole net of culture as it rests on symbols. 
Interestingly, this direction seems to oppose materialism, and might therefore be seen as 
a reinforcement of modernism, in that materialism has been related to the more sceptical 
postmodern frame of mind. However, the anti-materialism of Zizek and Lyotard would 
not bring much comfort to the main line of modernist idealism, since Lyotard's idealism 
does not seem to encourage any cultural consensus, and since Zizek's idealism does not 
reach upward toward universal transcendent zones, but rather reaches downward to 
subjective fantasy. Crowther and Ferguson also offer paradigms which ward off strong 
materialism, and Weiskel, though more aligned to materialistic vocabularies, did insist 
that sublimicism requires an upward thrust to a transcendent Other. Nevertheless when 
Zizek chides Marx for not understanding the omnipresence of the non-material cultural 
sublime, this does involve a sense of the inadequacy of a fully materialistic frame of 
reference. In any case, this study is in part the posing of three important questions: can 
we theorize persuasively the idea that major raw ideas are sublime, that major cultural 
narratives are sublime, and that the general net of culture is sublime? Probably the 
future uses of the concept of the sublime, and also the concept of transcendence, will 
involve a battle of the survival of the fittest. Sublimicism will probably remain an 
influential concept if we continue to see how many important things that can not be 
called beautiful can be called sublime, and if we continue to search for acceptable 
versions of higher transcendental zones. And obviously an additional factor is whether 
or not world-wide religion maintains or loses ground. 
Finally, it seems reasonable to believe that sublimicism will be permanently 
attractive to those artists who—like Rothko, Newman, and Still--desire a subject matter 
that rises above ornamentation and personal confession, a subject matter that touches on 
the concerns of philosophy and religion. The abstract expressionists launched a 
program designed to honor sublime subjects in the new fully abstract art style of 
modernism. They sought an ideograph symbol with semantic properties that would 
allow them to go beyond the beautiful into the realm of the true and the good. They 
inherited from Longinus and Kant a tradition that found sublimity both in reasoning and 
in ideas of reason, and it seems certain that other painters and artists, in the coming 
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centuries, will feel the same need, and will create their own kinds of sublimicist art. 
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for The Birth of Tragedy, ,LW for The Joyful Wisdom, Ii  for Twilight of the Idols, 
and WE for The Will to Power. 
66.1.1, S. 5. 
67. ST, S. 1. 
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68. S. 3. 
69. I, S. 10. 
70. Ibid. 
71. Ibid. 
72. ET, S. 16. 
73. Ibid. 
74. El, S. 1. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Ibid. 
76. Ibid. 
77. HI, S. 3. 
78. El, S. 8. 
79. Ibid. The power of Greek music from primitive Greek culture to the age of Pericles 
was probably very great, but we can only guess, since no Greek music has 
survived. 
80. $j, S. 21. 
81. Ibid. 
82. HI, S. 21. 
83.$I, S. 15. 
84. S. 23. 
85. la, S. 15. 
86. Thomas Kuhn has moved somewhat in this direction by his theory that science 
attains coherence but not final truth. His key work is The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. After Nietzsche, the most sweeping assertion that science, law, the 
arts, and all disciplines offer useful fictions created by the will, comes in H. 
Vaihinger's The Philosophy of 'As If'  , trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1924). Vaihinger states: "It must be remembered that the object of 
the world of ideas as a whole is not the portrayal of reality-this would be an utterly 
impossible task--but rather to provide us with an instrument for finding our way  
about more easily in this world" (15). 
87. El, S. 15. Nietzsche calls Kant and Schopenhauer very helpful in showing the 
limitations of science and reason (S. 18). 
88. $I, S. 23. 
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89. Ibid. 
90. Ibid. Note how close to the opening of Eliot's The Waste Land is Nietzsche's 
comment "And now the myth-less man remains eternally hungering among all the 
bygones, and digs and grubs for roots, though he have to dig for them even among 
the remotest antiquities" (S. 23). Indeed, Nietzsche is so close to Eliot as to 
suggest a specific source. 
91. $1, S. 23. 
92. It seems clear that Nietzsche was as wrong about German legends as was Yeats 
about Irish legends. Neither group seems to have much potency. 
93. $1, S. 19. 
94. la, S. 20. 
95. IT, S. 21. 
96. $1, S. 20. 
97. in, S. 24. 
98. DI, S. 25. 
99. DI, S. 20. 
100. IT, S. 1 
101.$1, S. 2. 
102. Ibid. 
103.$1, S. 9. 
104.1)I, S. 10. 
105.11, S. 17. 
106.$1, S. 23. 
107. Ibid. 
108.111, S. 24. 
109. Edgar Allan Poe also showed some anticipation of abstract art. In "The Fall of the 
House of Usher" the painting by Usher is geometric abstract expressionism, and 
in Marginalia  Poe makes several interesting remarks: that if an artist paints 
decayed cheeses, "his merit will lie in their looking as little like decayed cheeses 
as possible"; that when the imagination chooses new compounds for beauty or 
sublimity, the compound may show "nothing" of the elements being mixed; and 
that "The mere imitation . . . of what j  in Nature, entitles no man to the sacred 
name of 'Artist." See Uuginalia, ed. John Carl Miller (Charlottesville: 
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University Press of Virginia, 1981): 29, 189, 198. Poe's turning away from 
surface realism follows from his theory of lyric poetry as the opening of brief 
windows into supernal reality--one element in his sublimicism. These ideas of 
Poe will be mentioned later in a section on American literature. 
110. My translation of The Joyful Wisdom is that of Thomas Common (New York: 
Russell and Russell, 1964). Quotations are checked against the Kaufmann 
translation for accuracy. 
111. 131/, S. 299. 
112. zly, S. 304. 
113.1A, S. 308. 
114. 1W, S. 337. 
114. DE S. 337. 
115. Ibid. 
116. 1W, S. 347. 
117. 135/, S. 358. 
118. 1M/, S. 370. 
119.1W, S. 379. 
120. I am using Kaufman's translation in his The Portable Nietzsche (New York: 
Viking Press, 1954). Twilight of the Idols has titled parts. I will refer only to the 
long part "Skirmishes in a War with the Age," which is itself broken down into 
numbered sections. In addition to the abbreviation n for the whole text, I will use 
"SWA" for this part, and also give the section number within this part. 
121. II, "SWA," S. 7. 
122. IL "SWA," S. 8. 
123. n, "SWA," S. 9. 
124. II, "SWA," S. 11. 
125. II, "SWA," S. 21. 
126. n, "SWA," S. 22. 
127. II, "SWA," S. 24. In a comment (S. 30) which anticipates Dada, Nietzsche 
declares that in our current age of good-natured and dull mediocrity fixed on 
newspapers and vacations, some irrational absurd responses would be 
apPropriate- 
128. II, "SWA," S. 24. 
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129.11, "SWA," S. 34. Nietzsche slyly notes that people happily endure their unhappy 
lot because complaining adds so much charm to their lives. Emerson's bold, 
heroic egotism appealed to Nietzsche, who asserts (S. 13) that Emerson was 
"Much more enlightened, more roving, more manifold, subtler than Carlyle; 
above all, happier." 
130. II, "SWA," S. 37. 
131.1j, S. 48. 
132. WE, Book One, S. 4. I am using the translation by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967). 
133. Ibid., S. 5. 
134. Ibid., S. 15. 
135. Ibid., S. 30. 
136. WE, Book Two, S. 158. 
137. Ibid., S. 218, 219. 
138. Ibid., S. 144, and WP. Book Four, S. 1035, S. 1036, S. 1037. 
139. WP, Book Three, S. 685. 
140. 152, Book One, S. 29. 
141. Ibid., S. 120. 
142. WE, Book Two, S. 387. 
143. WE, Book Three, S. 487. 
144. Ibid., S. 493. 
145. Ibid., S. 497. 
146. Ibid., S. 522. 
147. Ibid., S. 584. 
148. Ibid., S. 585, S. 689. 
149. Ibid., S. 804. Nietzsche declares (Book Four, S. 1040) that the grand style 
"excludes the pleasing," thus moving it from beauty toward the sublime. 
150. Ibid., S. 805. 
151. Ibid., S. 808. 
152. Ibid., S. 809. 
153. Ibid., S. 811. 
154. Ibid., S. 821. 
155. Ibid., S. 829. 
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156. Ibid., S. 849. 
157. WE, book Four, S. 870. 
158. Ibid., S. 975. 
159. WE, Book Three, S. 800. 
160. WE, Book Four, S. 943. 
161. Ibid., S. 941. 
162. Ibid., S. 1064. 
163. WE, Book Three, S. 828. 
164. Ibid., S. 842. 
165. Ibid., S. 848, S. 849. 
166. MLE, Book Four, S. 1052. 
167. WE, Book Three, S. 851, S. 852. 
168. Ibid., S. 488, S. 489, S. 492, S. 674. 
169. Ibid., S. 767. Nietzsche pushes existentialism down to the level of atoms in that 
each atom has its own creative will acting in its own neighborhood (S. 637). 
170. Ibid., S. 684. 
171. Ibid., S. 853. 
172. WP, Book Four, S. 996. Nietzsche's reality-centered sublimicist thought 
contrasts with Schopenhauer's escapist model. In his study, W. D. Hamlyn 
describes Schopenhauer's view that aesthetic contemplation sets will aside to be 
free from the pain and suffering of the real world. For Schopenhauer, what is 
contemplated as the essence of the beautiful or the sublime is the Platonic idea 
behind the art work, not its sensory feature& Hamlyn describes Schopenhauer's 
sense of the exaltation of the sublime: "For, whereas in the case of the merely 
beautiful the state of contemplation, the pure knowledge of the idea is achieved 
without opposition, in the case of the sublime it is won only after a struggle, by a 
violent tearing away from the relations of the object to will. . . . Hence for the 
state of exaltation that the contemplation of the sublime involves there has to be a 
constant awareness of the object as a threat to the will . . . without its actually 
producing the fear or other emotion it might well produce in a concrete situation." 
See Hamlyn's Schopenhauer (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 111, 
113. After his early enthusiasm for Schopenhauer, Nietzsche fiercely came to 
oppose his predecessor's view that life is monstrous and evil, that the will is 
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poisoned, and that art should deny life and offer an aesthetic escapism. 
173. See Ackerman's Nietzsche: A Frenzied Look (Amherst: The University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1990), 6. 
174. Benjamin Bennet, "Nietzsche's Idea of Myth: The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit 
of Eighteenth Century Aesthetics," PMLA 94 (may 1979): 420-430. Other 
interpreters have also, rightly or wrongly, emphasized the positive value-creating 
side of Nietzsche. Kaufmann assumes that Nietzsche's real center is value theory 
and the creation of a new sanction for value (a position many would challenge). 
See Kaufmann's Nietzsche: Philosopher. Poet. Antichrist (Princeton University 
Press, 1968), 122-23. Richard Schacht develops the thesis that while in later 
works Nietzsche does not see art as the only saving force, Nietzsche does not 
retreat from his early stand in lir that art is the supreme order-making power. See 
Schacht's Nietzsche (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), 8. Julian 
Young argues that when Nietzsche's late perspectivism undermined his own high 
placement of science, Nietzsche then came back toward his art theory in $I. See 
Young's Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 61-62, 95-99. Gilles Deleuze focuses on Nietzsche's will to power, 
presenting it as the bestowing force that propels positive sense and value through 
art symbols. See Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1983), 85. And although Arthur Danto emphasizes 
the extreme nihilism in Nietzsche, he notes that this horrible blank is not 
acceptable, "and the Will-to-Power imposes upon that unshaped substance the 
form and meaning which we cannot live without" See Danto's Nietzsche as 
Philosopher (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), 228. Yet is is also true 
that Danto shows how the nihilism can weaken any positive vision in Nietzsche. 
175. These steps are clarified especially in sections 23-28 of the Critique of Judgment. I 
am using J. H. Bernard's translation (New York: Hafner, 1951). 
176. Ibid., 89-95, 99-101. 
177. Ibid., 103, 114. In case religious people might want to object to these concepts, 
Kant reminds them that were it not for the human ability to grasp the sublime, 
there would be no recognition of the sublimity of God (104). 
178. Ibid., 109, 112-14, 117. 
179. Ibid., 160. We would find similar exemplar combinations of idea and style in 
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poetry, such as Blake's couplet "A Robin Red Breast in a Cage/Puts all Heaven in 
a Rage," or Hart Crane's description of the American land as a Pocahontas earth 
mother with her two breasts the Appalachian and Rocky Mountains: "Time like a 
serpent down her shoulder, dark/And space, an eaglet's wing, laid on her hair." 
Blake's lines are in "Auguries of Innocence" and Crane's are in "The River" 
section of The Bridle. 
180. Ibid., 170, 141, 160, 135, 121, 108, 105. 
181. Roger Scruton connects aesthetics to morality in that they both rest on the same 
cultural net of rules about appropriate judgments, evidenced in the fact that we use 
the same terms to judge character and art (such as the wrongness of 
sentimentality). Donald Crawford connects aesthetics and morality in that both 
must rest on an aajati schema. Ted Cohen argues that nothing but an aesthetic 
object would yield the richness to symbolize a moral value. See Scruton's Art and 
Imagination (London: Methuen, 1974), 247, 249; Crawford's "Kant's Theory of 
Creative Imagination," Essays in Kant's Aesthetics, ed. Ted Cohen and Paul 
Guyer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 162-76; and Cohen's 
"Why Beauty is a Symbol of Morality," Essays in Kant's Aesthetics, 232-35. 
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Transcendence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976), 2-6, 11-12. 
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sixties and seventies by Richard Rorty and other sceptical philosophers to validate 
an "identity" thesis reducing all mentalistic brain events to mechanistic brain buzzes, 
seeing mind as physio-chemical machine. The movement failed due to internal 
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simple machine analogy plus the feebleness of the appeal to the future verification. 
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subject anyone to a law that is alien to him or her" (134). This would be a very 
feeble, non-productive theory of justice. Trans-cultural moral judgments, 
apparently, would not be possible, or even judgments across different language 
communities in the same society. 
38. Ibid., 41-42, 46-51. Lyotard's emphasis on linguistic phrase regimes clearly brings 
him into the recent "language games" ideology, focusing on the phrase as the unit 
of meaning. In his afterword, Godzich concludes that these families of ideolects 
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51. Ibid., 26, 27, 66. In his The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van 
Den Abbeele (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), xi, Lyotard 
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16. Norris points to elements one might well reject, though there are other insights 
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sublime experience. 
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University Press, 1977), xv-xvi, xvii, 3, 125, 194. 
66. Ibid., 116. 
67. The essay collection The American Sublime is designed to articulate the "merely 
rhetorical" concept of the sublime. The editor, Mary Arensberg, declares that for 
poststructuralists and deconstructionists all major meanings have collapsed "into 
the vast sea of textuality," turning the sublime into "a fiction of transcendence, 
itself a fiction of absolute discourse." She comments that within this word-game 
contex, "the sublime is alive and doing well," seen in an empty white "vortex of 
atheism" (2,10). In her own essay on Wallace Stevens, she, like Ferguson, cannot 
allow poets to say anything positive. When at the end of "Auroras of Autumn," 
Stevens calls for a new age of positive belief and genuine innocence, Arensberg 
judges that such a vision must surely come from a "false messiah," even though 
she quotes the declaration of Stevens that such a dawning new innocence "exists, it 
is visible, it is, it is"; also she falsifies Stevens (170) by using brackets to change 
his ending: "a [deluded] happy people in a happy world."She proves how wrong it 
is to ignore intent. In this book Joanne Fat Diehl, in "Women Poets and the 
American Sublime," declares that women should resist the traditional American 
sublime (centered around unbounded horizons for a new American Adam) by 
creating a new "asexual" model, a "Counter-Sublime" (211). Hilary Putnam resists 
the "fully rhetorical" language theorists by noting that "if all notions of rightness, 
both epistemic and (metaphysically) realist, are eliminated, then what are our 
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statements but noise-making? What are our thoughts but mere subvocalization? The 
elimination of the normative is attempted mental suicide." See Putnam's "Why 
Reason Can't Be Naturalized," After Philosophy: End or Transformation?, ed. 
Kenneth Baynes and others (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 242. Putnam 
represents the general view that Western thinkers should not radically shift the 
whole terrain of art and thought. In this same essay collection, Derrida argues that 
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terrain might be kept. See his "The Ends of Man" in After Philosophy, 151. 
68. Crowther's concept of aeonic constants is a move toward univrsal categories, and 
some natural kinds might seem to be close to Platonic universals. If the categories 
of substance, causation, gravity, and numbers are construed as natural kinds, what 
is their age and range, and is it from creation to eternity, and if so, how do they 
differ from Platonic universals? As Crowther moves toward enduring categories he 
gains a better sanction for his own favored values and theories, which are perhaps 
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121SaMe, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 
1956), 290. 
2. Ibid., 291. Since Sartre does not try to prove these claims, presumably he starts 
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